This is an appeal from a negative award of the Full Industrial Board. Kenneth Wayne Lincoln was employed as a punch press operator on the 4:00 P.M. to the 12:30 A.M. shift at Whirlpool Corporation in Evansville, Indiana. He was shot and killed on June 19, 1969 at approximately 7:58 P.M. while waiting for the factory whistle to blow so that he could go to lunch.
Kenneth Wayne Lincoln had arrived at a back gate to the plant at approximately 7:55 P.M. on June 9, 1969. Employees were usually given 5 minutes to wash up before going to lunch. Kenneth Lincoln's lunch period was from 8:00 P.M. to 8:30 P.M. There were approximately 50 to 60 employees gathered around the fence and gate waiting to go on their lunch period when Ricky Lee Whitehouse, age 14, commenced pinching and goosing Kenneth Lincoln through the fence and calling him obscene names. They were both engaged in a verbal exchange with one another. Robert Valention Alvey testified "He was laughing with the boy. They were both cutting up." Ricky Lee Whitehouse in a joking manner addressed the guard at the gate and said, "Can I whip his ass?" Ricky Lee Whitehouse was only 5'1" tall and weighed approximately 125 pounds while Kenneth Wayne Lincoln was 27 years old, approximately 5'8" tall and weighed 175 pounds. When the guard unlocked the gate, Ricky Whitehouse pushed it open. Kenneth Lincoln had taken off his belt and as he stepped out of the gate Ricky Whitehouse kicked him on the leg. Lincoln in a playful and light manner struck Whitehouse on the leg with his belt. One witness testified that Lincoln barely touched him on the leg. When Kenneth Lincoln struck Whitehouse on the leg with his belt, somebody hollered from the back, `Don't hit him on the leg, hit him on the ass.' Ricky Whitehouse, no longer laughing or smiling, pointed his finger at him [Lincoln] and said, `Just wait, I'll be right back, I'll fix you.'" Ricky Whitehouse turned and ran across the street and went into a house three or four doors up the street.
Linda Lou Lincoln, Kenneth Lincoln's widow, filed a Form 10 Application on June 28, 1969. A hearing was held before a single member of the Industrial Board on September 29, 1969. Thereafter, a hearing was held before the Full Board on July 1, 1970 and a negative award was entered on June 16, 1971, which is as follows:
The Industrial Board filed with this court the following "Additional Findings of Fact" which, after omitting the formal parts thereof, reads as follows:
The "Assignment of Errors" is:
The Appellants'-Plaintiffs' brief reduces the error for review by this court as follows: "The issues presented for review in this Appeal to this Court is whether the award of the Full Industrial Board of Indiana is contrary to law."
If the award of the Full Industrial Board is based upon competent evidence, it will not be reversed on appeal: Burger Chef Systems, Inc. v. Wilson (1970), Ind. App., 262 N.E.2d 660 [23 Ind. Dec. 174]; Kiddie Knead Baking Co. v. Bolen (1939), 106 Ind.App. 131, 17 N.E.2d 477.
We may reverse a negative award only if it appears that the Full Board's decision
It is the duty of the Board to weigh the evidence and draw reasonable inferences from the facts. In order to reach a contrary conclusion, we may not disregard any reasonable inference drawn by the Board from the facts which the evidence tends to establish. George v. Interstate Metal Products, Inc. (1955), 125 Ind.App. 406, 126 N.E.2d 258.
When reviewing the record, we are required to disregard all evidence which is unfavorable to the findings of the Board and consider only those facts and those reasonable inferences which support such findings. Pittsburgh Testing Laboratories v. Kiel (1960), 130 Ind.App. 598, 167 N.E.2d 604.
The Appellants'-Plaintiffs' burden of proof was to establish:
IC 1971, 22-3-2-2; Ind. Ann. Stat. § 40-1202 (Burns 1971 Cum.Supp.)
The Full Industrial Board's conclusion of law No. 1 is:
The statutory term "arising out of" and "in the course of" are not synonymous. They are conjunctive terms. The term "arising out of" refers to the origin and cause of the "accident." The term "in the course of" refers to the time, place and circumstances under which the "accident" occurred. Kariger Motors, Inc. v. Kariger (1961), 132 Ind.App. 85, 173 N.E.2d 916; Tom Joyce 7 Up Co. v. Layman (1942), 112 Ind.App. 369, 44 N.E.2d 998.
We need only concern ourselves with the term "arising out of" to determine whether the award of the Full Industrial Board is contrary to law. This is the only question presented by this appeal.
The only finding of fact which supports the Full Board's conclusion of law is the finding that "* * * at the time of the plaintiff's-decedent's death he was * * * engaged in horse play with a person who was not an employee [of the Whirlpool Corporation]." It is not particularly significant that Ricky Whitehouse was not an employee of Whirlpool Corporation. Chicago, Indianapolis and Louisville R.R. Co. v. Clendennin (1924), 81 Ind.App. 323, 143 N.E. 303.
The test of "increased risk" has evolved as a determinant of those "accidents" which occur on the outer fringes of logical employment patterns. Explaining this test in United States Steel Corp. v. Brown (1968), 142 Ind.App. 18, 22, 231 N.E.2d 839, 842, we stated:
Several standards have been developed in later cases which will assist us to determine what is an "increased * * * risk beyond that to which the general public is exposed." One such standard may be found in Woodlawn Cemetery Association v. Graham (1971), Ind. App. [27 Ind.Dec. 91, 94], 273 N.E.2d 546, 548. We stated:
Our court has also held that the question of whether or not the injury arises out of the employment does not depend on what the employee is doing at the time the "accident" occurs, but rather it depends upon whether the "accident" was due to a hazard which the employee would not have been exposed to had he not been performing the duties or incidental tasks of his employment. Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Dehn (1942), 110 Ind.App. 483, 39 N.E.2d 499; Hunt v. Gutzwiller Baking Co. (1937), 104 Ind.App. 209, 9 N.E.2d 129.
The resulting critical question is the causal factor. The Full Industrial Board made a finding of fact that Kenneth Lincoln was "engaging in horseplay" at the time of the accident. We need not consider the sufficiency of the evidence to support this finding of fact since the appellant has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Full Industrial Board's finding of fact. State v. Heslar (1971), Ind. [27 Ind.Dec. 281], 274 N.E.2d 239. Therefore, the sole question confronting us is whether a person actively engaged in horseplay is barred from compensation because such an injury does not "arise out of" his employment.
Our court first recognized the horseplay doctrine in the case of In re Loper (1917), 64 Ind.App. 571, 573, 116 N.E. 324, 325. Commenting on the doctrine, this court stated:
This court further recognized in this same case an exception to the horseplay doctrine:
Other exceptions to the horseplay doctrine may exist where the instrumentalities used in the horseplay are also incidental to the work environment
The Full Industrial Board in its "Additional Findings of Fact" found that Kenneth Lincoln was "* * * engaged in horseplay * * *," thereby placing the facts in this case squarely within: Block v. Fruehauf Trailer Division (1969), Ind. App. [19 Ind.Dec. 489], 252 N.E.2d 612.
In the Block case, supra, this court stated that:
We recognize that there has been some criticism of the horseplay doctrine.
The award of the Full Industrial Board should be and the same hereby is affirmed.
HOFFMAN, C.J. and SHARP, J., concur.