OPINION OF THE COURT
KALODNER, Circuit Judge.
The Medical Care Recovery Act
In the instant case, the Government, asserting the right conferred upon it by the Act, filed a Complaint on November 29, 1967 alleging that the defendant Andrew Gera's negligent operation, in Pennsylvania, on December 15, 1963, of an automobile in which his brother, Corporal Joseph Gera, United States Marine Corps, was a passenger, resulted in the latter's injuries and that they required his hospital and medical care by the United States in the value of $2,087.65.
The District Court dismissed the Government's action on the ground that it was barred by the Pennsylvania Act of February 22, 1821,
In applying the stated Pennsylvania statute, the District Court rejected the Government's contention that its action was timely brought within the three-year period fixed by federal statute for actions by the United States founded on tort — 28 U.S.C.A. § 2415(b) and (g), since, in its view, the instant action "* * * is founded upon a statute [The Medical Care Recovery Act]", and not upon a tort. 279 F.Supp. 733.
It may be noted parenthetically that the defendant had premised his motion to dismiss the Government's action on the ground that it was barred by the Pennsylvania Act of June 24, 1895,
On this appeal the Government urges that the Medical Care Recovery Act gives it an independent right to recover medical expenses and that the federally-created right is not subject to any state statute of limitations. It further contends that the 1966 federal limitations statute is applicable and that its requirements were met in the instant case since, while it provides in Section 2415(b) that actions for money damages brought by the United States founded upon a tort shall be brought "within three years after the right of action first accrues: * * *,"
The sum of the defendant's contentions is that "basically the Government's claim is a subrogated claim" and as such is subject to the limitations of the 1895 Pennsylvania two-year statute of limitations; further, that "the Medical Care Recovery Act itself contains no Statute of Limitations", and accordingly Pennsylvania's limitations acts, including the 1821 Act, are applicable.
We are of the opinion that the District Court erred in dismissing the Government's instant action on the ground that by analogy, it was barred by the 1821 Pennsylvania statute of limitations
The Medical Care Recovery Act confers an independent right of recovery
The Government's right to reimbursement under the Medical Care Recovery Act is subject only to the time limitations established by Section 2415 (b) and (g), and the instant action was instituted well within the three-year period prescribed by that statute.
Our conclusion that the Government's exercise of its independent right under the Medical Care Recovery Act is free of the restraints imposed by a state statute of limitations is in accord with United States v. Fort Benning Rifle and Pistol Club, 387 F.2d 884 (5 Cir. 1967). There, in reversing the District Court's dismissal of the Government's action under the Medical Care Recovery Act on the ground that it was barred by Georgia's statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals said (p. 887):
It has long been settled that the United States is not bound by state statutes of limitation or subject to the defense of laches in enforcing its rights. United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 25 L.Ed. 194 (1879).
The rationale of the stated doctrine was spelled out as follows in United States v. Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway Company, (1886), 118 U.S. 120 at page 125, 6 S.Ct. 1006, at page 1008, 30 L.Ed. 81:
In Board of County Commissioners v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 60 S.Ct. 285, 84 L.Ed. 313 (1939), the late Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, said (p. 351, p. 288 of 60 S.Ct.):
In United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 60 S.Ct. 1019, 84 L.Ed. 1283 (1940) where the foregoing cases were cited, it was said (p. 417, p. 1020 of 60 S.Ct.):
This Court in United States v. Rose, 3 Cir., 346 F.2d 985 (1965), cert. den. 382 U.S. 979, 86 S.Ct. 551, 15 L.Ed.2d
It is clear that the Medical Care Recovery Act does not expressly waive the historic immunity of the United States from the defense of state statutes of limitations, and that circumstance renders the Government immune from the operation of any Pennsylvania statute of limitations.
In accordance with what has been said, the Order of the District Court dismissing the instant action will be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to proceed in accordance with this opinion.
FootNotes
In any case in which the United States is authorized or required by law to furnish hospital, medical, surgical, or dental care and treatment * * * to a person who is injured or suffers a disease * * * under circumstances creating a tort liability upon some third person (other than or in addition to the United States * * *) to pay damages therefor, the United States shall have a right to recover from said third person the reasonable value of the care and treatment so furnished or to be furnished and shall, as to this right be subrogated to any right or claim that the injured or diseased person * * * has against such third person to the extent of the reasonable value of the care and treatment so furnished or to be furnished. * * * 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b):
The United States may, to enforce such right, (1) intervene or join in any action or proceeding brought by the injured or diseased person * * * against the third person who is liable for the injury or disease; or (2) if such action or proceeding is not commenced within six months after the first day in which care and treatment is furnished by the United States in connection with the injury or disease involved, institute and prosecute legal proceedings against the third person who is liable for the injury or disease, in a State or Federal court, either alone (in its own name or in the name of the injured person * * *) or in conjunction with the injured or diseased person * * *.
"* * * the United States' right to recover for medical expenses is not barred by a state statute of limitations that would bar an action by the injured person."
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