SPEAR, Justice.
Since the respondents have conceded the other issues on this appeal, we are left with the identical facts, issues and law ruled on by the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation, 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). We reach the same conclusion as the Illinois Supreme Court.
The case at hand arises out of the purchase of an industrial steam boiler by Burley Processing Company of Burley, Idaho. The boiler was sold by defendant manufacturers Boiler Engineering & Supply Co. and Bradley Boiler Co., hereinafter referred to collectively as "Manufacturers."
The boiler exploded during installation and the plaintiff Cloyd Doggett, an employee of Bradley, was severely injured.
Alleging causes of action sounding in tort and breach of warranty, plaintiff sued "Manufacturer," Electronics, Optimum and two of "Manufacturer's" representatives who were installing the boiler at the time of the explosion.
The trial court, after reviewing affidavits and interrogatories submitted by both sides, found that neither Optimum nor Electronics had established the necessary minimal contacts to constitute either doing business [I.C. § 5-514(a)] or the commission of a tort [I.C. § 5-514(b)] within the State of Idaho. The court therefore concluded that Idaho did not have jurisdiction over Optimum and Electronics and granted the motions made by them to quash service of summons.
Appellant has assigned error in the trial court's failure to find jurisdiction based on I.C. § 5-514(b). As in the Gray case, the issues presented are: (1) Was a "tortious act" committed in Idaho within the meaning of I.C. § 5-514(b); and (2) If so, will the assertion of jurisdiction against respondents amount to a denial of due process?
As to the issue of whether a tort was committed in Idaho, respondents contend, and the trial court ruled, that the negligent act, as well as the injury, must occur in Idaho. The argument is made that to require only the injury to occur in Idaho would do violence to the language of the statute and in effect make the words "tortious act" read "commission of a tort in whole or in part." With this argument we cannot agree. For the purpose of determining the state with jurisdiction as well as the substantive law which will govern, the state where the injury occurred and the cause of action thus accrued is generally the most logical state for adjustment of rights. This is particularly true where, as here, there are residents of at least four different states involved. The Illinois court's reasoning on this issue is most persuasive:
The result we reach is virtually compelled by the fact that our statute
We are not persuaded to adopt the distinction made by some courts, such as the New York Court of Appeals in Feathers v. McLucas, discussed at page 76 of the case of Longines-Wittnauer W. Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 209 N.E.2d 68 (1965). Feathers construed the New York statute as it then existed
Respondents contend that due process is violated if Idaho courts assert jurisdiction over them. Here again, however, the issue is well disposed of by Gray. As in Gray, respondents' only contact with our state consisted of a product manufactured in one state, incorporated into the finished product in another state which in the regular course of business was sold to a consumer in the forum state. The supreme court of Illinois found no violation of American Radiator's right to due process and we, likewise, are not disposed to find a violation of the rights of "Optimum" and "Electronics."
Respondents, however, contend that the isolated contact they have with Idaho is not sufficient to meet the standards of due process. On that basis they argue Gray is distinguishable because the court there assumed a substantial transaction of business in Illinois. Gray, 176 N.E.2d at p. 766. Respondents cite several cases to sustain their position, such as Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F.Supp. 416 (D.Minn. 1959); Mann v. Equitable Gas Company, 209 F.Supp. 571 (N.D.W. Va. 1962); and DiMeo v. Minster Machine Co., 225 F.Supp. 569 (D.Conn. 1963).
Although we do not consider the point which respondents attempt to distinguish as the ratio decidendi of the Gray case, we do consider helpful an independent review of those precedents which bind this court.
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), the court held, at page 318 of 326 U.S., at page 159 of 66 S.Ct.:
In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), the court quoted from International Shoe, supra, as follows:
Mr. Justice Black, author of the McGee decision, then discussed why California had jurisdiction:
However, in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), some cautionary notes were added:
In Hanson v. Denckla the court concluded that jurisdiction did not exist, and observed:
Finally, the court stated:
In summarizing these statements, then, we make the following observations:
On the basis of the United States Supreme Court cases, we conclude that under these circumstances the one contact with Idaho, resulting as it did in injury to an Idaho resident, was sufficient to give Idaho jurisdiction over the respondents in a tort action. In placing their goods in the flow of interstate commerce, the respondents must have had the reasonable expectation that such items would be shipped indiscriminately throughout the United States. If dangerously defective goods are placed in the interstate flow of commerce,
A final cautionary note must be added. In oral argument, appellant argued that if Idaho had jurisdiction over a defendant on the basis of a tortious act committed in Idaho, this state would have jurisdiction over all claims a plaintiff had against the defendant. This argument overlooks the impact of I.C. § 5-516.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs to appellant.
McQUADE, DONALDSON and SHEPARD, JJ., and DURTSCHI, D.J., concur.
FootNotes
(a) The transaction of any business within this state which is hereby defined as the doing of any act for the purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit or accomplishing or attempting to accomplish, transact or enhance the business purpose or objective or any part thereof such person, firm, company, association or corporation;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this state;
(c) The ownership, use or possession of any real property situate within this state;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this state at the time of contracting."
(a) The transaction of any business within this State;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this State;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this State at the time of contracting; * * *."
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state."
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the State, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act, if he
4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state."
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