This case is here upon the petition of the National Labor Relations Board under § 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., for enforcement of its order directed at Local 825, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO (referred to as the Union). The unfair labor practices are alleged to have occurred in Elizabeth, New Jersey. The question for decision is whether substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that the Union engaged in unlawful secondary activity under § 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act by refusing to refer employees to Ernst and Ochs (more particularly identified infra)
By its fact-finding the Board concluded the Union had violated the Act by refusing to refer its members to a neutral employer — Ernst — when obligated by contract to do so and with the design to force the employer to cease doing business with Maupai and thus force Maupai to recognize and bargain with the Union. This is the master fact found by the Board.
It is difficult to give a succinct exposition to the Board's subsidiary findings of fact. As Trial Examiner Funke, for example, concluded: "Much of the testimony in this case is obscure, confused, contradictory and, on some vital issues, meagre to a point approaching absence. From such an olio, decision must nevertheless be reached." The narrative of what happened may be, of necessity, somewhat lengthy.
Maupai manufactures and installs heating, air conditioning, and plumbing products. Maupai was a member of the Mechanical Contractors Association which had a collective labor agreement with the Pipefitters' Union
Maupai had a subcontract with Ernst for the excavating work covering the digging of a hole for the installation of a 15,000 gallon fuel tank in the heating plant. Ernst rented a crane, in connection with the excavating work, from Ochs. Ernst, shortly before this, signed a contract and forwarded it to the Union under with it was provided "whenever desiring to employ workmen * * * employer shall call upon the Union * * for any such workmen as the employer may, from time to time, need and the Union * * * shall refer such workmen from the open employment list." On July 6, 1960, Ochs' crane was delivered to the job site with Zahn the operator and an oiler; but the crane was not operated that day because the oiler had not paid his dues with Local 825. The next day the crane was operated by Zahn and another oiler, Williams, both of whom had been referred to the job by the Union. But on the next day a work stoppage occurred — Zahn did not show up for work, and Williams and Esposito, both Union members, refused to work. Ernst was there at the time. He asked Corrigan, a Union member and a master mechanic for another contractor on the project, for an explanation. Corrigan said the men did not want to work because
The Board was in agreement with the Trial Examiner that the Union did not start the work stoppage of Ernst's employees on July 8; since Maupai had no contract with the Union, they had ceased to work themselves because they were concerned about their pension and welfare funds. The Board dismissed the complaint and found no violation of § 8 (b) (4) (i) (B) of the Act; it did find, however, the Union, under its agreement, was bound to refer its members for employment to Ernst; it refused to do so; and that the object of the refusal was to force Ernst to cease doing business with Maupai so as to force Maupai to recognize and bargain with the Union. Such conduct, the Board found [contrary to the Trial Examiner] constituted a violation of the Act, § 8(b) (4) (ii) (B). The Board then ordered respondent to cease and desist and to post appropriate notices.
1. The relevant part of § 8 (b) (4), as amended by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (B), clearly states it to be an unfair labor practice for a union or its agents:
The statute in its present form deals with secondary boycotts and its provisions are not restricted to the use of force or violence as a means of bringing pressure against the secondary employer, but includes economic sanctions also.
2. The Board found — we think correctly — that Maupai, the primary employer, was engaged in commerce under the Act, as was Ochs, from whom Ernst rented the crane needed for the excavation work to be done by Ernst, since both employers made substantial purchases of machinery and materials out of state. N. L. R. B. v. Plumbers Union of Nassau County, etc., 2 Cir., 299 F.2d 497, in a factually similar situation, held it not necessary for the Board to show that each contractor on a project be engaged in commerce, but sufficient to show "[T]hat a work stoppage by the building crafts on the job would substantially affect the flow of materials into the state for incorporation into the building under construction, and that consequently * * the general contractor was so engaged." (p. 500). And even though some of the subcontractors "may not have been shown to have been in commerce, a dispute stopping their work on the job is properly held to affect commerce," citing N. L. R. B. v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 71 S.Ct. 943, 95 L.Ed. 1284; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, etc. v. N. L. R. B., 341 U.S. 694, 71 S.Ct. 954, 95 L.Ed. 1299; and Local 74, etc. v. N. L. R. B., 341 U.S. 707, 71 S.Ct. 966, 95 L.Ed. 1309.
There is substantial evidence to support the Board's finding that the refusal of the Union to furnish workers to Ernst brought about a stoppage of the excavation work. The July 25 meeting was held between Pierson, the Union's business agent, and Maupai's president, for the specific purpose of attempting to bring the men back to work, but with no such result. After the issuance of the District Court's temporary injunction,
3. The Union had a contractual duty to refer employees to Ernst which it violated. The Union through its business manager asked Ernst to sign the contract, which he did, and transmitted his signed copies through Corrigan to the Union. There never was any dispute between the Union and
4. The Union's object, as the Board correctly found, was to cause a stoppage of work of the subcontractor with Maupai in order to force Maupai to enter into a contract with the Union. The record supports the Board's finding the Union wanted one of its members to operate Maupai's welding machine and to have a contract with Maupai covering the operation. In fact, the Union made such a demand; Pierson, the business agent, reiterated it several times; it was also admitted before the District Court. The record shows the Union's pressure on Ernst, a neutral employer, by shutting off his labor supply. In conclusion, we think the coercive action of the Union against Ernst for the purpose of obtaining recognition and bargaining rights from Maupai was in violation of § 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act; and there is substantial evidence to support the Board's findings and conclusions.
A form of decree should be submitted enforcing the order of the Board.
This Court made a complete examination of the pertinent legislative history in N. L. R. B. v. Highway Truckdrivers & Helpers, Local No. 107, 3 Cir., 300 F.2d 317, 320-321, and concluded § 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) prohibits economic sanctions against a secondary employer.
See, too, Smith v. Onyx Oil & Chemical Co., 3 Cir., 218 F.2d 104, 108, 50 A.L.R. 2d 216.