BURGER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant (Fiat) is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in New York City. It imports Fiat automobiles and sells them to wholesale distributors, among which is the Roosevelt Automobile Company (Roosevelt), a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in the District of Columbia. The appellee, Alabama Imported Cars, Inc. (Alabama) is an Alabama corporation and a dealer under a sales agreement. Appellee instituted this suit under the Automobile Dealers' Franchise Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1221-1225, against Fiat and Roosevelt as co-defendants and purported to accomplish service on Fiat by service upon the president of Roosevelt in the District. Fiat's motion to quash service was denied and this appeal from the interlocutory order was certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958).
The lengthy "Distributor Sales Agreement" to which Fiat and Roosevelt are parties provides that Roosevelt is an authorized distributor of Fiat motor vehicles, parts and equipment for the District of Columbia and nine southeastern states.
These and other provisions of the agreement manifest a continuing business relationship involving the supervision and control by Fiat of numerous details of the Roosevelt business. The theory of appellee's complaint is that Roosevelt and Fiat, through their control over dealerships, did not afford appellee's franchise the good faith treatment required by the Dealers' Act under which suit is brought. Thus, the cause of action upon which the suit is based arises from the relationship between Fiat and Roosevelt and provisions of their agreement. In our view this relationship subjects Fiat to service in the District whether that issue is considered to be governed by federal or local standards.
Assuming that in the absence of controlling federal statute
Appellant contends that even if it is subject to service in the District, service was not effected in a proper manner under the Rules. We agree with appellant that the president of Roosevelt was not "an officer, a managing or general agent" as described in Rule 4(d) (3), Fed.R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C.A., upon whom service could be made. But Rule 4 (d) (7) allows service in the manner prescribed by local law.
Since the District Court had power to subject Fiat to service in the District and the service was made in an authorized manner, the court correctly denied the motion to quash service.