1. "A conspiracy upon which a civil action for damages may be founded is a combination between two or more persons either to do some act which is a tort, or else to do some lawful act by methods which constitute a tort. Where
2. While the conspiracy is not the gravamen of the charge, it may be pleaded and proved as aggravating the wrong of which the plaintiff complains, enabling him to recover in one action against all defendants as joint tortfeasors. National Bank of Savannah v. Evans, 149 Ga. 67, supra; Bentley v. Barlow, 178 Ga. 618 (173 S. E. 707).
3. The conspiracy may be pleaded in general terms, and this is true although the jurisdiction of the court to render judgment against one or more of the defendants depends upon allegations and proof of the conspiracy. Peoples Loan Co. v. Allen, 199 Ga. 537, 558 (34 S.E.2d 811); Walker v. Grand International Brotherhood &c. Engineers, 186 Ga. 811, 820 (199 S. E. 146).
4. If no cause of action is otherwise alleged, the addition of allegations concerning conspiracy will not make one; but, where a cause of action is alleged, the fact of conspiracy, if proved, makes any actionable deed by one of the conspirators chargeable to all. Young v. Wilson, 183 Ga. 59 (187 S. E. 44); Horton v. Johnson, 187 Ga. 9 (5) (199 S. E. 226); Wall v. Wall, 176 Ga. 757 (4) (168 S. E. 893); Grant v. Hart, 192 Ga. 153, 156 (5) (14 S.E.2d 860); Peoples Loan Co. v. Allen, 199 Ga. 537, supra. The liability is joint and several. Smith v. Manning, 155 Ga. 209 (2) (116 S. E. 813).
5. "The law recognizes the intrinsic difficulty of proving a conspiracy. The allegations with reference to conspiracy are treated as matters of inducement leading up to a more particular
6. "Whether or not a combination formed for injuring another in his business be lawful, so far as the purpose is concerned [such as setting up a lawfully competitive business,] if unlawful means are used effectuating that purpose, resulting in damages, the conspiracy is actionable." 15 C. J. S. 1006. § 10; Burrus Motor Co. v. Patterson-Pope Motor Co., 50 Ga.App. 801, 810 (179 S. E. 171); Employing Printers Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509 (50 S. E. 353, 69 L. R. A. 90, 106 Am. St. Rep. 137, 2 Ann. Cas. 694).
7. Where, under an application of the announced principles of law in the foregoing divisions of the syllabus, in an action for damages against three named defendants, it is alleged that the defendants have damaged the petitioner in a named amount by their wilful, deliberate, wrongful, and unlawful deeds, omissions, silences, breaches of trust, loyalty, and
8. Where, in such a case as indicated in the foregoing division, the petitioner amends by alleging that the acts and doings of the second defendant, its president, were authorized and ratified by the corporate third defendant, such amendment is not objectionable as adding a new cause of action or a new party defendant. "A corporation can act only by its agents, yet for
9. Where, in such a case as indicated, it is alleged that the first of the three defendant conspirators, the general agent of the petitioner, is insolvent, has converted the petitioner's funds, goods, and equipment, and so commingled the property with his own that it may be lost, wasted, or disposed of, and an injunction, an accounting, and the appointment of a receiver is prayed, such as to give equity jurisdiction of the cause, and where equity has taken jurisdiction, it will retain it for all purposes against all proper parties. McCord v. Walton, 192 Ga. 279 (3) (14 S.E.2d 723).
10. Since the allegations of the petition must be taken as true in reviewing the case on demurrer, on a consideration of the petition as a whole, the allegations are sufficient as a matter of pleading to authorize a claim for punitive damages, and are not subject to any grounds of the special demurrer. Code § 105-2002; Walker v. Grand International Brotherhood &c. Engineers, 186 Ga. 811, supra, and citations.
11. Where bad faith is sufficiently inferable from the tortious acts allegedly committed wilfully and wantonly pursuant to a conspiracy to destroy the petitioner's business, a recovery of attorney's fees is authorized, and the claim for such fees is not subject to special demurrer. Mendel v. Leader, 136 Ga. 442 (3) (71 S. E. 753); Christopher v. Almond, 177 Ga. 211 (169 S. E. 899).
12. Where, in such a case as indicated, it is alleged that the petitioner has been damaged in a stated sum by the defendant conspirators' destruction of his business, such allegation is not subject to special demurrer for failure to itemize the damage. The measure of his damage is such as proximately flows
13. Where, in such case, it is alleged that, pursuant to the conspiracy, the defendants tortiously induced the petitioner's employees to break their contracts of employment with the petitioner, the allegation is not subject to special demurrer for failure to set out the contract with particularly, as would be the case were the contract the basis of the action. Lambert v. Georgia Power Co., 181 Ga. 624, supra; Luke v. DuPree, 158 Ga. 590, supra; Employing Printers Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, supra, and the numerous cases there cited.
14. "Though a bill be not framed with accurate precision, yet the allegations will be sufficient if they clearly and distinctly apprise the defendant of what he is called on to defend" (Black v. Black, 15 Ga. 445 (2)); and, "the plaintiff is not required to set forth the evidence, either direct or circumstantial, by which he expects to establish the traversable facts alleged in the petition." Cedartown Cotton &c. Co. v. Miles, 2 Ga.App. 79 (1a) (58 S. E. 289). Under an application of these principles of pleading to the petition in the instant case, none of the special demurrers of either of the defendants, not otherwise here treated in detail, is meritorious.
The trial court did not err in any of the rulings of which complaint is here made in either of the cases.
Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.