CLINTON v. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF MASTERS, ETC.

PER CURIAM.

"Libellant" appeals from a dismissal by the District Court for the Southern District of California, Central Division, for lack of jurisdiction, of the first, second, third, and eighth causes of action alleged in his complaint. The original pleading named as defendants the International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, Inc., a New York corporation; the Joshua Hendy Corp., a California corporation; the Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., a California corporation; and, the California Employment Stabilization Commission.1 The appellant's pleadings below were marked "In Admiralty" but here jurisdiction is asserted alternatively under 28 U.S.C. §§ 13312 (Federal Question), 1332 (Diversity of Citizenship),3 or 1333 (Admiralty).4

We shall consider each in turn.

I — Admiralty

The first, second, and third causes of action allege various breaches of the by-laws and constitution of Local 90 of the International Organization by the failure of Local 90 to provide proper allocation of available jobs to appellant, a member thereof.

This dispute, if it is anything judicially cognizable, involves various breaches of a contract between appellant and Local 90. Is this a contract civil and maritime of which an admiralty court may assume jurisdiction? We think not. Admiralty jurisdiction is historically a limited jurisdiction. The reports abound with decisions analyzing particular factual situations to determine whether a given contractual arrangement is a civil or a maritime contract. (See 1 Benedict, Admiralty §§ 66, 67.)

Applying this guide to the instant case, the contract herein falls far short of the requisites for admiralty cognition. Its relation to a ship is non-existent; its relation to the sea is indirect. It falls far below even those cases in which there was some direct relation between the plaintiff and a ship — contracts whose ultimate purposes related to a vessel or to navigable waters but which were held to be contracts merely preliminary to maritime matters. (See cases cited 1 Benedict § 67.) It is, in short, a labor contract, entered into upon the land, to be performed upon the land, and breached, if at all, upon the land. Its relationship to vessels and the sea is at best remote and indirect.

As was said by Judge Murphy in a prior action by this appellant:

The eighth cause of action, against Joshua Hendy and Pacific Far East Lines, alleges the initiation of a potential tort — that of interference with appellant's contractual relation with Local 90. There is no allegation that the tort was committed upon navigable waters, therefore, no maritime tort sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the admiralty court is alleged.

The court below did not have jurisdiction of the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1333.

II — Federal Question

Appellant also asserts jurisdiction in the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This section pertinently provides:

Our conclusion above that appellant failed to state a maritime claim cognizable in admiralty is dispositive of his claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (See and compare Doucette v. Vincent, 1 Cir., 1952, 194 F.2d 834, with Jordine v. Walling, 3 Cir., (en banc) 1950, 185 F.2d 662.)

III — Diversity

Finally appellant seeks the aid of the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. To this end his action is directed at the International Organization, a New York corporation, independently of Local 90, an unincorporated California association. Accepting as true the allegations of the original pleading, the only breach of contract alleged was that of the local organization. In any action for breach of the alleged contract the local union is an indispensable party. Diversity jurisdiction may not be artificially created by failing to join parties indispensable to the action and claiming instead against a citizen of a different state who is merely a possible party to the action. Dempsey v. D. B. & M. Oil Co., 6 Cir., 1955, 219 F.2d 808; Warfield v. Marks, 5 Cir., 1951, 190 F.2d 178; 1 Nichols, Cyc.Fed.Proc. § 2.302.

The trial court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is affirmed.