STEWART & CO. v. SADRAKULA

MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Supreme Court of New York awarding damages for accidental death. As a statute of the state necessarily was sustained against a contention that its application to these circumstances violated the provisions of the Constitution as to the exclusive authority of the United States over a post-office site purchased with the consent of New York,1 this Court has jurisdiction under § 237 (a) of the Judicial Code and the Act of January 31, 1928.

The issue of law involved is whether an existing provision of a state statute requiring the protection of places of work in the manner specified in the statute2 remains effective as a statute of the United States applicable to the particular parcel after the federal government acquires exclusive jurisdiction of a parcel of realty on which work is being done.

The decedent, an employee of a rigging company, a sub-contractor engaged in the construction of the New York post office, fell from an unplanked tier of steel beams down a bay and was killed. In an action of tort against the general contractor, his administratrix narrowed the scope of the charges of negligence until violation of the quoted sub-section of the Labor Law only was alleged. The trial court found that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligent failure to plank the beams as required by the statute. The Appellate Division affirmed3 on the ground that the Labor Law provision continued effective over the post-office site after the transfer of sovereignty, and the Court of Appeals by an order of remittitur, 21 N.E.2d 217, also affirmed on the same ground with a statement that in its affirmance it necessarily passed upon the validity and applicability of § 241 (4) of the Labor Law under Article I, § 8 of the Constitution. 280 N.Y. 651, 730; 20 N.E.2d 1015; 21 N.E.2d 217.

The language of the Court of Appeals and the record show indubitably that a determinative federal question was decided.4 The conclusion as to the continued vitality of existing state statutory regulations in the protection of workmen in ceded federal areas makes it substantial.5 The motions to dismiss or affirm the appeal are denied.6

If the quoted provision of the Labor Law is operative even though exclusive jurisdiction had already vested in the United States, it is unnecessary to determine whether exclusive jurisdiction had actually passed to the United States. The state courts assumed that federal sovereignty was complete through consent by the state and we make the same assumption. Does the acceptance of sovereignty by the United States have the effect of displacing this sub-section of the New York Labor Law? We think it did not. The sub-section continues as a part of the laws of the federal territory.

It is now settled that the jurisdiction acquired from a state by the United States whether by consent to the purchase or by cession may be qualified in accordance with agreements reached by the respective governments.7 The Constitution does not command that every vestige of the laws of the former sovereignty must vanish. On the contrary its language has long been interpreted so as to permit the continuance until abrogated of those rules existing at the time of the surrender of sovereignty which govern the rights of the occupants of the territory transferred.8 This assures that no area however small will be left without a developed legal system for private rights. In Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. McGlinn, supra, a Kansas statute relating to recovery against a railroad for the injury to livestock on its right of way existed at the time of the cession to the United States of exclusive jurisdiction over Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation. It was held that the statute was carried over into the law covering the Reservation. Conversely, in Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, supra, an Arkansas statute relieving innkeepers, passed after cession of Hot Springs Reservation, was held unavailing as a defense to a Reservation innkeeper's common-law liability in accordance with Arkansas law before the cession. Such holdings assimilate the laws of the federal territory, where the Congress has not legislated otherwise, to the laws of the surrounding state.

The Congress has recognized in certain instances the desirability of such similarity between the municipal laws of the state and those of the federal parcel. Since only the law in effect at the time of the transfer of jurisdiction continues in force, future statutes of the state are not a part of the body of laws in the ceded area. Congressional action is necessary to keep it current. Consequently as defects become apparent legislation is enacted covering certain phases. This occurred as to rights of action for accidental death by negligence or wrongful act.9 After this statute was held inapplicable to claims under state workmen's compensation acts further legislation undertook to extend the provisions of those acts to the places under federal sovereignty.10 With growing frequency the federal government leaves largely unimpaired the civil and criminal authority of the state over national reservations or properties.11 While exclusive federal jurisdiction attaches, state courts are without power to punish for crimes committed on federal property.12 This has made necessary the legislation which gives federal courts jurisdiction over these crimes.13 The tendency toward a uniformity between the federal and surrounding state territory has caused a series of congressional acts adopting the state criminal laws.14 Through these concessions our dual system of government works cooperatively towards harmonious adjustment.

It is urged that the provisions of the Labor Law contain numerous administrative and other provisions which cannot be relevant to the federal territory. The Labor Law does have a number of articles.15 Obviously much of their language is directed at situations that cannot arise in the territory. With the domestication in the excised area of the entire applicable body of state municipal law much of the state law must necessarily be inappropriate. Some sections authorize quasi-judicial proceedings or administrative action and may well have no validity in the federal area. It is not a question here of the exercise of state administrative authority in federal territory.16 We do not agree, however, that because the Labor Law is not applicable as a whole, it follows that none of its sections are. We have held in Collins v. Yosemite Park Company17 that the sections of a California statute which levied excises on sales of liquor in Yosemite National Park were enforceable in the Park, while sections of the same statute providing regulation of the Park liquor traffic through licenses were unenforceable.18

But the authority of state laws or their administration may not interfere with the carrying out of a national purpose.19 Where enforcement of the state law would handicap efforts to carry out the plans of the United States, the state enactment must, of course, give way.20

May it be said that the continued application of § 241 (4) of the Labor Law21 will interfere with the construction of the building upon this site? This is like other squares in the city. There are, of course, differentiations because of its ownership, but ownership as such has nothing to do with the safety requirements. It is true that it is possible that the safety requirement of boarding over the steel tiers may slightly increase the cost of construction to the government, but such an increase is not significant in the determination of the applicability of the New York statute. In answer to the argument that a similar increased cost from taxation would "make it difficult or impossible" for the government to obtain the service it needs, we said in James v. Dravo Contracting Co.22 that such a contention "ignores the power of Congress to protect the performance of the functions of the National Government and to prevent interference therewith through any attempted state action." Such a safety requirement is akin to the safety provisions of Maryland law which in Baltimore & Annapolis Railroad Co. v. Lichtenberg23 were held applicable to trucks of an independent contractor transporting government employees under a contract with the United States.

Finally the point is made that a provision requiring boarding over of open steel tiers is a direct interference with the government. This is said to follow from the fact that the contract for the construction of the post office is an instrumentality of the federal government. As a corollary to this argument, error is assigned to the refusal of the trial court to admit in evidence a clause of the contract between the United States and the appellant reading, "State or Municipal Building Regulations do not apply to work inside the Government's lot lines."24 While, of course, in a sense the contract is the means by which the United States secures the construction of its post office, certainly the contractor in this independent operation does not share any governmental immunity.25 Nor do we think there was error in refusing to admit the clause of the contract as to building regulations. The quoted sentence is in a section of the contract relating to "licenses, permits, etc." We are of the opinion that it is intended to relieve the contractor from provisions as to types of material, fire hazards and the like, which are covered by the New York City Building Code.

Such a safety regulation as § 241 (4) of the New York Labor Law provides is effective in the federal area, until such time as the Congress may otherwise provide.26

Affirmed.