MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves the application of §§ 3 (b) and 20 (d) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
Evidence adduced at the hearing before a Deputy Compensation Commissioner tended to establish the following facts. On the morning of September 10, 1931, Bowers discovered a broken fastening on a door leading into an alley in the rear of the premises and engaged a carpenter to make repairs. The latter, while so occupied, hearing a sound like the bursting of an electric light bulb, followed by groans, entered the store and found Bowers lying on the floor. Death ensured without recovery of consciousness. An automatic pistol, owned by the decedent, which he kept in a drawer under a counter, was found in the partly closed drawer. There was blood in the drawer and on the counter near it. The bullet had entered the chest about three and one-half inches to the left of the median line and one inch above the nipple, emerged from the back of the body approximately in line with the point of entrance, and lodged in a paint can on a shelf behind the drawer about five feet above the floor. The ejected shell lay some twelve feet to the left of the drawer where it would naturally fall if the decedent had stood in front of the drawer, between the counter and the shelf, and held the pistol in his right hand pointing at his chest. Ballistic tests traced shell and bullet to the pistol. There were no identifiable fingerprints upon the weapon, but an indistinct print of the side of a finger was discernible. The front of Bowers' shirt bore grains of unburned powder which, with the condition of the materials about the hole in the garment, indicated that the muzzle of the weapon had been held within two or three inches of the body. No rags or other material were discovered such as would suggest that Bowers was
The parties agree the injury was self-inflicted, but are in controversy as to whether it was accidental or intentional. According to the respondent's evidence, Bowers was in good health, of a happy disposition, and in good financial condition; his accounts were in order; on the evening before his death he had written to his mother a cheerful letter in which he stated he would soon write her again; and the same evening he had promised a friend to bring him from the store some goods which the friend desired to purchase. The petitioners adduced evidence that Bowers had suffered from an infection of the ear and undergone a mastoid operation; about ten days before his death he visited a specialist to whom he complained of pain in the ear and headaches which seemed to be increasing. He was advised another mastoid operation might be necessary and was sent to a hospital for an X-ray examination. He submitted to the examination, which disclosed the presence of pus in the middle ear, but did not thereafter return to the physician whom he had consulted.
The Deputy Commissioner denied an award of compensation, holding claimant had failed to establish that Bowers' duties required the use of a weapon and there was therefore no showing that his injury arose out of his employment. Upon a bill filed
The Deputy Commissioner reconsidered the case upon the record as originally made before him and, finding the death suicidal, again refused an award. The respondent then instituted the present proceeding to have this action set aside. The Supreme Court denied relief, but the Court of Appeals reversed,
In the view that the case does not fall within Rule 38, the respondent opposed the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The objection might be valid if the statute were confined in its operation to the District of Columbia. We will not ordinarily review decisions of the United States Court of Appeals, which are based upon statutes so limited or which declare the common law of the District. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, however, is national in scope, and a decision with respect to its enforcement constitutes a precedent of general application. We therefore granted the writ because of the important question as to the effect of § 20 (d).
We hold that the decision of the Deputy Commissioner should not have been annulled. The relevant substantive section of the act directs that no compensation shall be payable if the injury was occasioned by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself; the adjective section creates a presumption that the injury was not so occasioned, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary. The question is whether, as the court below thought, the presumption has the quality of affirmative evidence. The answer must be that it has not.
When a trier of facts is to be persuaded of the truth of a disputed proposition, one or the other of the parties, — the proponent or the opponent, — has the burden of going forward with evidence. In the present instance, the fact that the wound was self-inflicted permits but one of two conclusions: either the decedent accidentally killed himself, or he committed suicide. Considerations of fairness and experience in human affairs induce fact-finding bodies, where there is a balance of probability, to
For these reasons we are of opinion the Court of Appeals erred in holding that as the evidence on the issue of accident or suicide was, in its judgment, evenly balanced, the presumption must tip the scales in favor of accident. The only matter for decision was whether the affirmative finding of suicide was supported by evidence. It is clear that it was so supported and that the court should therefore not have set aside the Deputy Commissioner's order.
The judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Reversed.
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