MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Suit was brought by the United States in the District Court for Delaware to set aside sales made by it to the Chemical Foundation of a number of patents, copyrights, trademarks, and other similar properties — which for brevity will be referred to as "patents" — seized pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, c. 106, 40 Stat. 411, as amended by the Act of March 28, 1918, c. 28, 40 Stat. 460, and the Act of November 4, 1918, c. 201, 40 Stat. 1020, and other Acts. The complaint alleges that a number of domestic manufacturers as a result of war conditions had been able to combine and monopolize certain chemical industries in this country; and, fearing that at the end of the war German competition would destroy the monopoly, they conspired to bring about transfers and sales of the patents at nominal prices to themselves or to a corporation controlled by them; that the patents so obtained would control the industries in question and perpetuate the monopoly, and that the sales were procured through the fraudulent deception of the President, the Alien Property Custodian, and other officials.
The chemical industries in question are closely related to the production of explosives, gases, and other things directly used in waging war, as well as the production of dyestuffs and medicines essential to the welfare of the people. At the outbreak of the war many necessary medicines and other substances as well as most of the dyestuffs used in this country were imported from Germany or were manufactured under patents owned by enemy Germans. The amount of such things here produced was small. Importations were hindered by the blockade, and ceased when this country entered the war. To meet the demand, numerous plants were developed, and, by 1919, chemicals, dyestuffs, medicines and the like were being produced here in large quantities. A number of associations of manufacturers were formed for the advancement of such industries; they included in their membership the producers of nearly all the dyestuffs and like chemicals made in this country. Mr. A. Mitchell Palmer was the Alien Property Custodian until he was
In February, 1919, the Chemical Foundation was incorporated under the laws of Delaware. The certificate of incorporation discloses that it was created and empowered to purchase enemy-owned patents seized by the Custodian and to hold the "property and rights so acquired in a fiduciary capacity for the Americanization of such industries as may be affected thereby, for the exclusion or elimination of alien interests hostile or detrimental to the said industries, and for the advancement of chemical and allied science and industry in the United States"; to grant to the United States non-exclusive licenses to make, use and sell the inventions covered by the patents, and also to grant like licenses, on equal terms and without advantage as between licensees, to American citizens and corporations under control of American citizens. The board of directors is authorized to prescribe the terms and conditions of such licenses. It may refuse to issue any license or may revoke any license granted by it. The corporation is required to enforce its rights and to protect the rights of its licensees. The authorized capital stock is $500,000, consisting of 5,000 shares of the par value of $100 each; 4,000 shares constitute non-voting preferred stock, the holders of which are entitled to a cumulative dividend of six per centum per annum, and 1,000 shares constitute the common stock, the holders of which are entitled to dividends not exceeding six per centum per annum after dividends on the preferred stock have been provided for. The preferred stock is subject to redemption at par plus
The President, by executive order, December 3, 1918, declared: "I hereby vest in Frank L. Polk all power and authority conferred upon the President by the provisions of Section 12" of the Trading with the Enemy Act as amended. Mr. Polk was then Counselor for the Department of State, but was not so described in the order, He made two orders, dated respectively February 26, 1919 and April 5, 1919, to authorize the Custodian to sell at private sale to the Foundation, without advertisement, at such places and upon such terms and conditions as to the
Prior to and contemporaneously with the organization of the Foundation, the representatives of the chemical industries cooperated with those of the Custodian in making lists of the patents to be seized, and sold by the Custodian to the Foundation. Mr. Garvan, the Custodian, from time to time commencing April 10, 1919, executed and delivered to the Foundation various assignments of the patents. The considerations paid by the Foundation to the Custodian amounted in all to $271,850.00. The President, February 13, 1920, made an executive order which was held by both courts below to constitute a ratification of the transactions. And, pursuant to that order, the Custodian confirmed the assignments theretofore made.
The pertinent provisions of the Act are in § 12 as amended. "The alien property custodian shall be vested with all of the powers of a common-law trustee in respect of all property, other than money, which has been or shall be, or which has been or shall be required to be, conveyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid over to him in pursuance of the provisions of this Act, and, in addition thereto, acting under the supervision and direction of the President, and under such rules and regulations as the President shall prescribe, shall have power to manage such property and do any act or things in respect thereof or make any disposition thereof or of any part thereof, by sale or otherwise, and exercise any rights or powers which may be or become appurtenant thereto or to the ownership thereof in like manner as though he were the absolute owner thereof: Provided, That any property sold under this Act, except when sold to the United States, shall be sold only to American citizens, at public sale to the highest bidder, after public advertisement of time and place of sale which shall be where the property or a major portion thereof is situated, unless the President stating the reasons therefor, in the public interest shall otherwise determine: . . . [40 Stat. 460].
"After the end of the war any claim of any enemy or of an ally of enemy to any money or other property received and held by the alien property custodian or deposited in the United States Treasury, shall be settled as Congress shall direct: . . ." 40 Stat. 424.
It is conceded that when seized the patents belonged to enemy Germans and that they were lawfully taken over by the Custodian. The purpose of the Trading with the Enemy Act was not only to weaken enemy countries
As originally enacted, § 12 gave the Custodian in respect of properties in his possession "all of the powers of a common-law trustee." He was authorized, acting under the supervision and direction of the President and under rules and regulations prescribed by the President, to manage the property and do any act or things in respect thereof, or make any disposition of it by sale or otherwise, and to exercise any rights appurtenant to its ownership, "if and when necessary to prevent waste and protect such property and to the end that the interests of the United States in such property and rights, or of such person as may ultimately become entitled thereto, or to the proceeds thereof, may be preserved and safeguarded." The Custodian was a mere conservator and
There is no support for a construction that would restrain the force of the broad language used. Congress was untrammeled and free to authorize the seizure, use or appropriation of such properties without any compensation to the owners. There is no constitutional prohibition against confiscation of enemy properties. Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch 110, 122; Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268, 305, et seq.; Kirk v. Lynd, 106 U.S. 315, 316; Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239, 245; White v. Mechanics Securities Corp., 269 U.S. 283, 300. And the Act makes no provision for compensation. The former enemy owners have no claim against the patents or the proceeds derived from the sales. It makes no difference to them whether the consideration paid by the Foundation was adequate or inadequate. The provision that, after the war, enemy claims shall be settled as Congress shall direct conferred no rights upon such owners. Moreover, the Treaty of Berlin prevents the enforcement of any claim by Germany or its nationals against the United States or its nationals on account of the seizures and sales in question.
While not denying the power to confiscate enemy properties, the United States argues that, as construed below,
The language of the statute is too plain to be misunderstood. Except as affected by the proviso, the Custodian's dominion over the property, and power to dispose of it — acting under the President as provided — were as unlimited as are the powers of an absolute owner; and the power of the President to determine terms and
The United States argues that the executive order of December 3, 1918 was void, and that the one of February 13, 1920 did not authorize or ratify the transactions.
Section 5 (a) of the Act provides that "the President may exercise any power or authority conferred by this Act through such officer or officers as he shall direct." The language of the executive order is: "I hereby vest in Frank L. Polk all power and authority conferred upon the President by the provisions of Section 12 . . ." Obviously all the functions of his great office cannot be exercised by the President in person. The contention that power to determine how enemy property should be sold could not be delegated to another is not sustained. This court has had occasion to consider a like question in Central Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 567; Stoehr v. Wallace, supra, 244, and Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 53. These decisions sustain the delegation here involved.
It is argued that the order was not made in conformity with the statute because to "vest" power in another is not to "act through" him, and because the order did not show that Mr. Polk was an officer. But, if two constructions are possible, and one of them would render the order useless and the other give it validity, the latter is to be adopted. Cf. Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375,
And the validity of each of the orders made by Mr. Polk is attacked by the United States on the ground that it was too broad and constituted an attempt to give to the Custodian the very power granted to the President by the Act; that is, the power to determine that enemy properties should be disposed of otherwise than as specified in the proviso. But the contention cannot prevail. Each of the orders sufficiently described the patents seized and authorized a private sale to the Foundation without advertisement. This was enough to indicate a determination to take these sales out of the class covered by the proviso. And it is insisted that the orders were induced by misrepresentation and were made without knowledge of the material facts. But both courts found that the United States failed to establish any conspiracy, fraud or deception alleged. Findings of fact concurred in by two lower courts will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Washington Sec. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 76, 78. Under this rule the findings must be accepted. The presumption of regularity supports the official acts of public officers and, in the absence of clear evidence to the
We agree with the lower courts that the sales and transfers of the patents were ratified and confirmed by the President's order of February 13, 1920. It is urged that there was no ratification because it is not shown that the President had knowledge of the material facts; that he did not intend to ratify the sales of patents, and that the language used in the order is not broad enough to include the patents, trademarks and copyrights in question.
The Polk order of February 26, 1919, described the property covered as "all of the letters patent, trade-marks and rights under letters patent and trade-marks, including all profits and damages . . . for the past infringement thereof which the Alien Property Custodian may seize or may have seized . . . and which he from time to time shall determine relate to the objects and purposes" of the Chemical Foundation. The President's order of confirmation recites that the Polk orders authorized the Custodian to sell "certain choses in action and rights, interests and benefits heretofore determined to belong to, or to be held for, by, or on account of, or for the benefit of persons heretofore determined to be enemies." The language last quoted was used to define the same properties that were covered by the Polk orders. That is, "choses in action and rights," etc., were used to
This order authorizes sales of the patents to be made and ratifies and confirms those theretofore made by the Custodian. The President will be presumed to have known the material facts and to have acted in the light of them. His intention to ratify the sales is plain. The comprehensive language used is broad enough to include the patents. Moreover, the statement that his reasons for the determination are given in the Polk orders shows
The United States contends that the sales were void because made in violation of § 41 of the Criminal Code, 35 Stat. 1088, 1097, and the rule of law forbidding sales by a public officer or fiduciary of trust property in his custody to himself or to a corporation of which he is the head.
Section 41 provides: "No officer or agent of any corporation .. . and no . . . person directly or indirectly interested in the pecuniary profits or contracts of such corporation . . . shall be employed or shall act as an officer or agent of the United States for the transaction of business with such corporation . . ." Violators are made punishable by fine and imprisonment. The United States lays much stress on these facts: Mr. Garvan, while director of the bureau of investigation, Joseph H. Choate, Jr., chief of the chemical division of that bureau, and Ramsey Hoguet, patent attorney for the Custodian, conferred with the representatives of the chemical industries to arrange to make the seizures and sales of the patents. Later, Mr. Garvan, then Custodian, acted for the United States in making the transfers to the Chemical Foundation of which he was the President. Mr. McKay and Mr. Corbett were directors and officers appointed by the Custodian of various corporations of which he had taken control. Before the transfers were made, Mr. Choate became the general counsel and Mr. Hoguet the patent attorney of the Foundation. Mr. Bannard and the other voting trustees were members of the Advisory Sales Committee — appointed by the President to see that sales of enemy properties were fairly made to qualified buyers. Without further reference to the facts relied on to support
Section 41 was enacted when there was no war, and long before the Trading with the Enemy Act. It lays down a general rule for the protection of the United States in transactions between it and corporations and to prevent its action from being influenced by anyone interested adversely to it. It is a penal statute and is not to be extended to cases not clearly within its terms or to those exceptional to its spirit and purpose. United States v. Noveck, 271 U.S. 201; Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224, 226; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212; United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486; Bishop on Statutory Crimes, (3d ed.), § 235. At the time of the enactment, there were no enemy properties to be dealt with; and, save the generality of the language used, there is nothing to indicate a legislative purpose to deal with that subject. The Trading with the Enemy Act is a war measure covering specifically, fully and exclusively the seizure and disposition of enemy properties. The authority of the President to authorize sales and to determine terms and conditions in lieu of those specified in the proviso, undoubtedly included the power to cause the Chemical Foundation to be incorporated to purchase and hold the patents, as specified, and to direct the selection of the directors, officers and voting trustees. The President, and under him the Custodian, acting for the United
Before the commencement of the trial, the District Court found that it was necessary that the testimony be taken down in shorthand and transcribed, and appointed an official stenographer for that purpose; and it was ordered that his fees be ultimately taxed as a part of the costs. By another order, counsel consenting, the court directed that the expense of printing 100 copies of the transcript, to be available for use in that court and on appeal, be advanced from time to time and borne in equal amounts by the parties and form a part of the taxable costs. The decree directs that the Chemical Foundation recover from the United States the money advanced by the Foundation on account of such fees and expenses, and orders the amount to be taxed as costs in the case. The government insists that this is erroneous.
The general rule is that, in the absence of a statute directly authorizing it, courts will not give judgment against the United States for costs or expenses. United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch 73, 91, 92; Shewan and Sons v. United States, 267 U.S. 86; United States v. Davis, 54 Fed. 147, 152, et seq. But the Foundation insists that under Equity Rule 50, taken with the consent of counsel and the orders, the court was authorized to direct that these items be taxed as costs and to give judgment against the United States therefor.
Equity Rule 50 in general terms provides that stenographers' fees shall be fixed by the court and taxed as costs, but it does not specify costs or judgment for money against the United States. The rule does not mention the United States and does not affect the sovereign prerogative not to pay costs. Congress alone has power to waive or qualify that immunity. But no statute authorizes
Decree modified and affirmed as modified.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND and MR. JUSTICE STONE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
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