The International Coal Company operated a mine in the Clearfield District and, with its competitors, shipped between 1890 and 1902 large quantities of coal in interstate commerce. In 1904 it sued the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, basing its action, in part, on the fact that prior to April 1, 1899, the Railroad Company had paid other
In view of this ruling, the case, as finally submitted to the jury, involved plaintiff's right to recover on account of shipments made after April 1, 1899. On that date the carrier increased the rates and discontinued the payment of rebates, except that for the purpose of saving shippers against loss, it made a difference between what is called "free coal" and "contract coal." Under this practice, where coal had been sold for future delivery, the carrier collected the published tariff rate, but rebated the difference between it and the lower rate in force when the contract of sale had been made. When after April 1, 1899, the plaintiff applied for allowances, its demand was rejected, with the statement that all its contract coal would be protected in the same manner as others in the Clearfield District. The International Coal Company had no overlapping or unfulfilled contracts and claiming that it did not learn of the practice to protect such contracts until, in 1904, it brought this suit. It proved that between April 1, 1899, and April 1, 1901, it had shipped about 40,000 tons on which it had paid the full tariff rate, while other companies shipping from and to the same places at the same time had been allowed on their contract coal rebates of 5, 10, 15, 25 or 35 cents per ton. Plaintiff recovered a verdict.
Under the statute there are many acts of the carrier which are lawful or unlawful according as they are reasonable or unreasonable, just or unjust. The determination of such issues involves a comparison of rate with service, and calls for an exercise of the discretion of the administrative and rate-regulating body. For the reasonableness of rates, and the permissible discrimination based upon difference in conditions are not matters of law. So far as the determination depends upon facts, no jurisdiction to pass upon the administrative questions involved has been conferred upon the courts. That power has been vested in a single body so as to secure uniformity and to prevent the varying and sometimes conflicting results that would flow from the different views of the same facts that might be taken by different tribunals.
None of these considerations, however, operates to defeat the courts' jurisdiction in the present case. For even if a difference in rates could be made between free and contract coal, none was made in the only way in which it could have been lawfully done. The published tariffs made no distinction between contract coal and free coal, but named one rate for all alike. That being true, only that single rate could be charged. When collected, it was unlawful, under any pretense or for any cause, however equitable or liberal, to pay a part back to one shipper or to
In view of this imperative obligation to charge, collect and retain the sum named in the tariff, there was no call for the exercise of the rate-regulating discretion of the administrative body to decide whether the carrier could make a difference in rates between free and contract coal. For whether it could do so or not, the refund of any part of the tariff rate collected was unlawful. It could not have been legalized by any proof, nor could the Commission by any order have made it valid. The rebate being unlawful it was a matter where the court, without administrative ruling or reparation order, could apply the fixed law to the established fact that the carrier had charged all shippers the published or tariff rate and refunded a part to a particular class. This departure from the published tariff was forbidden, and § 8 (24 Stat. 382) expressly provided that any carrier doing any act prohibited by the statute should be "liable to the person injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of any such violation, together with reasonable attorneys' fees."
2. But although this suit was brought to enforce a cause of action given by this section to any person injured, it is a noticeable fact that in its pleading the plaintiff
The fact that this provision measuring the amount of recovery by rebate was omitted from the Act, as finally reported to both Houses and passed, is not only significant, but so conclusive against the contention of the plaintiff that it quotes — not the report of the conference committee — but a statement,
3. There were many provisions in the statute for
4. It is said, however, that it is impossible to prove the damages occasioned one shipper by the payment of rebates to another; and that if the plaintiff is not entitled to recover as damages the same drawback that was paid to its competitor, the statute not only gives no remedy but deprives the plaintiff of a right it had at common law to recover this difference between the lawful and the unlawful rate.
We are cited to no authority which shows that there was any such ancient measure of damages, and no case has been found in which damages were awarded for such discrimination. Indeed, it is exceedingly doubtful whether there was at common law any right of action for any sort
In one of these cases the suit was brought by a shipper to recover damages because the railroad refused to carry out a contract to discriminate in his favor. In others the court treated the low rate as evidence of what was a reasonable rate and thereupon gave judgment for damages as for an overcharge. Union Pacific R.R. v. Goodridge, 149 U.S. 680, 709, involved the construction of the Colorado statute, which did not, as does the Commerce Act, compel the carrier to adhere to published rates, but required the railroad to make the same concessions and
Having paid only the lawful rate plaintiff was not overcharged, though the favored shipper was illegally undercharged. For that violation of law, the carrier was subject to the payment of a fine to the Government and, in addition, was liable for all damages it thereby occasioned, the plaintiff or any other shipper. But under § 8, it was only liable for damages. Making an illegal undercharge to one shipper did not license the carrier to make a similar undercharge to other shippers, and if having paid a rebate of 25 cents a ton to one customer, the carrier in order to escape this suit had made a similar undercharge or rebate to the plaintiff, it would have been criminally liable, even though it may have been done in order to equalize the two companies. For, under the statute, it was not liable to the plaintiff for the amount of the rebate paid on contract coal, but only for the damages such illegal payment
5. On various dates between April 1, 1899, and April 1, 1901, the International Company made shipments of coal from the Clearfield District to points in New Jersey, Massachusetts, and New York, its heaviest shipments being to South Amboy, New York Harbor. The aggregate was 40,000 tons, on which the lawful rate was paid. During the same period four other companies shipped to the same points, receiving rebates of from 5 to 35 cents per ton, but the amount of tonnage on which such rebates were paid does not appear. There was no proof of injury — no proof of decrease in business, loss of profits, expense incurred or damage of any sort suffered — the plaintiff claiming that, as matter of law, the damages should be assessed to it on the basis of giving to it the same rate, on all its tonnage, that had been allowed on any contract coal shipped, on the same dates, whether such tonnage was great or small.
Considering the multitude of instances in which discrimination has been practiced by carriers, in ancient and modern times, it is remarkable how little is to be found in decisions or text books which treat of the elements and measure of damages in such cases. In the absence of any
The statute gives a right of action for damages to the injured party, and by the use of these legal terms clearly indicated that the damages recoverable were those known to the law and intended as compensation for the injury sustained. It is elementary that in a suit at law both the fact and the amount of the damage must be proved. And although the plaintiff insists that in all cases like this the fact and amount of the pecuniary loss is matter of law, yet this contention is not sustained by the language of the act, nor is it well founded in actual experience, as will appear by considering several usual and every-day instances suggested by testimony in this record. For example: —
If plaintiff and one of the favored companies had both shipped coal to the same market on the same day, the rebate on contract coal may have given an advantage which may have prevented the plaintiff from selling, may have directly caused it expense, or may have diminished or totally destroyed its profits. The plaintiff, under the present statute, in any such case being then entitled to recover the full damages sustained; —
But the plaintiff may have sold at the usual profit all or a part of its 40,000 tons at the regular market price, the purchaser, on his own account, paying freight to the point of delivery. In that event not the shipper but the purchaser, who paid the freight, would have been the person injured, if any damages resulted from giving rebates. To say that seller and buyer, shipper and consignee, could both recover would mean that damages had been awarded to two where only one had suffered; —
Or, to take another example — a favored dealer may have shipped 10,000 tons of coal to the open New York market, receiving thereon a rebate of 35 cents a ton, or $3,500. The plaintiff at the same time may have shipped 20,000 tons and sold the same at the regular market price.
In order to avoid this anomalous, yet logical, result it is now suggested that, as in the overcharge cases (Denaby v. Manchester Ry., L.R. 11 App. Cases, 97), the plaintiff should only recover a rebate on 10,000 tons, or on the same weight upon which the carrier had allowed a drawback to the competitor. But, while less drastic, this is still an arbitrary measure and ignores the fact that the same anomalous result would follow if there had been, say, ten dealers, each shipping 10,000 tons on the same day. For each of the ten would have been as much entitled as plaintiff to recover $3,500 on their several shipments of 10,000 tons, and the ten verdicts would aggregate $35,000, because of the payment of $3,500 to the favored shipper.
It is said, however, that while there may be no presumption that a shipper was injured because the carrier paid a rebate on a single shipment, or on an occasional shipment, yet it could recover if rebates had been so habitually given as to establish a practice of discrimination. Proof that rebates were customarily paid, would come nearer showing that injury was suffered but would still fall short of proving the extent of the damage, and is not the theory on which the plaintiff proceeds. For it argues that whenever it showed that a lower rate had been charged on contract coal sold in 1899 it was entitled to recover the same rate on shipments made by it to the same place on the same day in 1901, even though there had been no competition in the two sales and without proof that there had been any fall in market prices, diminution in its profits, decrease in its business, or increase in its expenses. It
6. To adopt such a rule and arbitrarily measure damages by rebates would create a legalized, but endless, chain of departures from the tariff; would extend the effect of the original crime, would destroy the equality and certainty of rates, and, contrary to the statute, would make the carrier liable for damages beyond those inflicted and to persons not injured. The limitation of liability to the persons damaged and to an amount equal to the injury suffered is not out of consideration for the carrier who has violated the statute. On the contrary, the act imposes heavy penalties, independent of the amount of rebate paid, and as each shipment constitutes a separate offense, the law in its measure of fine and punishment is a terror to evil doers. But for the public wrong and for the interference with the equal current of commerce these penalties or fines were made payable to the Government. If by the same act a private injury was inflicted a private right of action was given. But the public wrong did not necessarily cause private damage, and when it did, the pecuniary loss varied with the character of the property, the circumstances of the shipment and the state of the market, so that instead of giving the shipper the right to recover a penalty fixed in amount or measure, the statute made the guilty carrier liable for the full amount of damages sustained, — whatever that might be and whether greater or less than the rate of rebate paid.
7. This conclusion, that the right to recover is limited to the pecuniary loss suffered and proved, is demanded by the language of the statute, the construction put upon it years ago in the Parsons Case, and is the view taken in the only other case we find in which this question, under the Act to Regulate Commerce, has been construed. In
Another case, on facts quite like those here involved, is that of Hoover v. Pennsylvania R.R., 156 Pa. St. 220, where the statute, like the Commerce Act, gave the party injured a right of action for damages suffered. In violation of the state law the railroad allowed a manufacturing company a rebate of 20 cents a ton on coal shipped. In a suit for the recovery of damages the trial court charged the jury that the difference between the high and low rate was the measure of recovery. This was reversed, the court saying (p. 244): "The amount of injury suffered is the measure of the single damages to be allowed. But it does not at all follow that the amount of injury suffered is the difference in the rates charged. It might be, or it might not be, but, in any event, it must be a subject of proof. . . . It does not appear that the plaintiffs sold their coal for any less than the current market price, . . . except when they and the other dealers were engaged in a war of prices and sold it far below the actual cost, in a struggle to capture the market."
In view of the express provisions of § 8 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, it was error to refuse to charge that "to entitle the plaintiff to recover, the jury must be satisfied that it sustained some loss or injury due to the fact
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY, dissenting.
The judgment under review sustains a recovery in behalf of a Company shipping coal in interstate commerce, that was charged and paid the lawful published rates of freight, for the difference between the rates thus charged and paid and the less rates customarily allowed to other shippers of coal during the same period and between the same termini. 173 Fed. Rep. 1. The action is based upon §§ 2 and 8 of the Interstate Commerce Act.
I agree with the view of the court that the suit was maintainable without any previous action by the Interstate Commerce Commission. I agree also that "even if a difference in rates could be made between free and contract coal, none was made in the only way in which it could have been lawfully done. The published tariffs made no distinction between contract coal and free coal, but named one rate for all alike. That being true, only that single rate could be charged."
Were the question before us, I should be inclined to say that the Interstate Commerce Act does not admit of a difference in rate for substantially the same transportation service, at the same time and under substantially similar circumstances, based upon the mere fact that the coal of one shipper has been previously sold, under "contract" or otherwise, while the coal of the other shipper has been sold but at a different time, or remains to be sold on its arrival at market. Such a discrimination is in effect based upon the mere ownership of the goods transported, which has recently been condemned by this court. Interstate Com. Com. v. Del., Lack. & Western R.R., 220 U.S. 235,
The court, while sustaining the right of action upon the facts presented in this record, reverses the judgment and awards a new trial, on the ground that under the statute there is no presumption of loss on the part of the shipper against whom the discrimination is made, and therefore no established measure of damages in favor of the plaintiff; that § 8 of the Act, in giving a right of action for damages to the injured party, indicated the legislative intent that the responsibility of the carrier to a shipper injured by discrimination in rates should be measured not by the amount of the discrimination, but by the consequential injury accruing to the shipper because of the discrimination, and that without special proof of resulting damage there can be no recovery.
With great respect, I feel constrained to dissent from the view thus taken of the Act of Congress, and from the result to which it leads in this case.
I have not been able to bring myself to accept that view, and, on the contrary, consider that § 2 of the act deals with the prohibited discrimination in rates as a direct pecuniary injury to the disfavored shipper, precisely equivalent in amount to the discrimination; that the Act looks upon the common carrier as a public servant, bound to treat all shippers alike; that it recognizes that the established and published rates, while reasonable in law may be unreasonable in fact, and are proven to be so when the carrier customarily charges less to favored shippers; that it treats the customary allowance to favored shippers of rebates or drawbacks as an admission by the carrier that the higher rate charged to the disfavored shipper is excessive and extortionate in fact by precisely the amount of the rebate; that the disfavored shipper is the "person injured," within the meaning of § 8, and
The precise error attributed to the trial judge is the refusal to charge, as requested, that "To entitle the plaintiff to recover, the jury must be satisfied that it sustained some loss or injury due to the fact that the defendant was
Since the recovery was based upon a discrimination arising from the payment of rebates to the other shippers on coal shipped by them in fulfillment of contracts made long before, so that the coal upon which the rebates were allowed did not and could not come into direct competition with the plaintiff's coal in the market, it is presumable that there was no consequential injury to the plaintiff attributable to this particular series of rebates, nor any provable injury aside from the fact that more money was exacted from plaintiff than ought to have been exacted on principles of equality. A reversal of the judgment upon the ground adopted by the court is equivalent to a denial of the right of action in this case, and apparently in all cases except in the rare instance where merchandise on which rebates are allowed happens to come into direct market competition with the goods of the complaining shipper.
Not only in the present case, but in most cases, it is impossible to trace actual consequential damages to the particular discrimination, and so the view adopted virtually nullifies the right of action given by § 8 of the Act, so far as concerns persons injured by the discriminations that are prohibited by § 2.
Section 8 says in terms that for anything done by the common carrier, contrary to the prohibition of the Act, it shall be "liable to the person or persons injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of any such violation." Each of the preceding seven sections contains prohibitions, from the violation of which damage may result to the shipper; especially the first four, of which § 1 prohibits unjust and unreasonable charges; § 2 prohibits discriminations in charges, by whatever device accomplished; § 3 prohibits "any undue and unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular
The word "damages," according to its customary usage, is at least as properly applicable to the immediate and direct result of imposing higher charges upon one shipper than are customarily charged under similar circumstances and for a like service to other shippers, as it is to the ultimate consequences of such discrimination. The purpose that runs throughout the Act is to require equality of treatment. How can this be so easily accomplished as to treat the damage as being complete when the freight bill is paid, based upon rates that are higher than those charged to other shippers, and to require equality by insisting upon a return of the excess?
Courts everywhere are insistent that remote and consequential and speculative damages shall be excluded from consideration, and that only those directly and proximately resulting from the injury shall be considered. What can be more direct and proximate as damage to a shipper against whom a discrimination is practiced, than the measure of the discrimination as shown by a comparison of freight bills? And what can be more remote and speculative than to enter into considerations arising out of the mode in which the shipper transacts his business,
But it is said that whatever view might otherwise be entertained, a particular (and, as I think, a very strained) meaning must be attributed to the word "damages" as used in the Interstate Commerce Act, because of the course of proceedings in Congress that resulted in the enactment of that statute. It is pointed out that § 2 of the original bill provided in terms that in the case of a rate discrimination, the carrier should be liable to the disfavored shipper "for the difference between such higher rate and the lowest rate charged upon like shipments during the same period," with a similar provision respecting rebates and drawbacks, and it is said that because this provision was finally omitted from the Act, the result is not only significant but conclusive evidence of a legislative intent that the "damages" in § 8, so far as discriminatory rates are concerned, are to be measured in some other manner. If § 8 had in terms prescribed any other measure than that which was in the original § 2, or if any other had been then known to the law, I could appreciate the force of the argument. The course of the debate in Congress, as quoted in the opinion, shows that Senator Cullom, who was the chief sponsor for the bill, and a member of the Senate Conference Committee, explained the change as
As a great English judge said,
Prior to the passage of the Act, while the courts of England perhaps did not recognize a right to recover for unjust discriminations unless the rate charged to the complaining party was of itself excessive, the weight of authority in this country was to the contrary, as pointed out by this court in Interstate Commerce Commission v. B. & O. Railroad, 145 U.S. 263, 275. And see Hays v. Pennsylvania Co. (1882), 12 Fed. Rep. 309, and note; Samuels v. Louisville & N.R. Co. (1887), 31 Fed. Rep. 57; Cook v. Chicago &c. Ry. Co., 81 Iowa, 551, 563; Louisville E. & St. R.R. Co. v. Wilson, 132 Indiana, 517, 525. The Interstate Commerce Act and the reports and debates in Congress that preceded it are replete with evidence that the Act was intended to give to the shipper against whom discrimination was practiced at least as ample remedy as he would have against exactions that were for any other reason unjust or extortionate.
As a matter of practical construction, the course adopted by the Interstate Commerce Commission in reparation cases is most convincing, not only of what was deemed to be the intent of Congress, but of the fact that no other measure of reparation is practicable saving that which is based on the rate differential. In every case that has arisen, so far as I can discover, the difference in rate has been adopted as the basis of reparation. The cases will be referred to below.
Reference is made in the opinion to the declaration of this court (by Mr. Justice Brewer) in Parsons v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 167 U.S. 447, 460, that "before any party can recover under the Act he must show not merely the wrong of the carrier, but that that wrong has in fact
In short, Parsons had made only "local" shipments (Iowa to Chicago), and had paid the regular published rates therefor. The court held that he was not injured, under the particular circumstances of the case, by the failure of the Railway Company to file and publish a certain tariff of through rates, applicable not to Chicago shipments, but only to those destined to New York and other points on the Atlantic seaboard. And so the decision was, that he had no ground of action. The case has no proper bearing, as an authority, upon the question of the measure of damages; but if it is to be employed as an authority at all upon that question, the declaration of the court, that if Parsons had been entitled to recover, his damages would have been measured by the rates differential, ought not to be overlooked.
The fact is that in the Parsons Case, while the plaintiff claimed that the carrier was guilty of a discrimination in rates, this court upon an analysis of his petition — upon a demurrer to which the case was determined — found there was no infraction of § 2, because the plaintiff had made no shipments that entitled him to the lower rates of which he complained; so that there was no real basis for his action except the failure of the carrier to publish or file the rates as required by § 6 of the Act. The gist of the complaint was that the carrier, which operated a system of railroad from points in Nebraska through Iowa to Chicago, for the purpose of giving unlawful preference to the shippers of corn and oats in Nebraska, and to unlawfully discriminate against the plaintiffs and other Iowa shippers, put in force from Nebraska points a certain freight tariff on corn and oats in car load lots to Rochelle, Illinois, when
The words italicised (not so in the original) serve, I think, to show that the court was merely negativing a recovery on the part of one who might have shipped, but did not ship, and was not negativing, but on the contrary affirming, arguendo, the theory that in the event of the existence of a right of action the measure of damages would have been the difference in rates.
The opinion herein refers to and undertakes to distinguish the three English cases to which I have already referred — Great Western Ry. Co. v. Sutton (1869), L.R. 4 H.L. 226; London &c. Ry. v. Evershed (1878), L.R. 3 App. Cas. 1029; and Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. Manchester &c. Ry. Co. (1885), L.R. 11 App. Cas. 97 — and states that they "do not support the proposition that damages can be recovered without proof of what pecuniary loss had been suffered as a result of the discrimination;" that "the court treated the low rate as evidence of what was a reasonable rate, and thereupon gave judgment for damages as for an overcharge;" and that "the Act of
Since the English decisions referred to were rendered prior to the adoption of our Act, and afforded a construction of the English acts from which ours was taken, it is of the utmost importance that the terms of the respective Acts of Parliament and the precise grounds of the decisions should be clearly understood.
The first of those acts is the so-called Equality Clause, being § 90 of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, (8 and 9 Vict. c. 20), enacted to consolidate in one act, certain provisions usually inserted in the "special acts" under which railway companies were incorporated. Section 90 is set forth in full in the margin.
The other act, under which some controversy had arisen in the English courts about the allowance of damages
The courts of England have held that because § 2 of this act establishes rights beyond those existing at the common law, and § 3 gives an extraordinary remedy therefor, and § 6 excludes other remedies, there can be no recovery in an ordinary action for damages based upon the mere infringement of the provisions of § 2; but it has been queried whether for a violation of § 2, if such violation involves an unlawful extortion of money for carriage, the ordinary remedies at law for extortion may not be applicable. This question was reserved by the House of Lords in the Denaby Colliery Case, 11 App. Cas. 97, 112. But the Court of Appeal having in that case declared (L.R. 14 Q.B. Div. 225) that the remedy by § 6 was exclusive, the same court three years after the enactment of our Interstate Commerce Act (Rhymney Ry. Co. v. Rhymney Iron Co., 25 Q.B. Div. 146, 150), adhered to that view. And see, on the same subject, Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co. v. Greenwood (1888), L.R. 21 Q.B. Div. 215.
So far as I have observed, the English courts have never wavered upon the question of allowing the difference in freight charges to be recovered by the disfavored shipper, for violations of the Equality Clause of the act of 1845; nor ever sanctioned the view that there could be any other measure of damages. Nor can I find that any other measure of damages has been suggested for a violation of the act of 1854 in respect of a rate discrimination. The controversy about that act has been whether any suit could be maintained at all for a violation of it.
But, as this court has repeatedly pointed out, the provisions of the second section of the Interstate Commerce Act respecting equality of rates are modeled after the Equality Clause (§ 90) of the English act of 1845; while the third section of our Act is modeled after the English act of 1854.
In Interstate Commerce Commission v. Balt. & Ohio R.
In Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U.S. 197, 222, the court (by Mr. Justice Shiras) said: "Similar legislation by the Parliament of England might render it profitable to examine some of the decisions of the courts of that country construing its provisions. In fact, the second section of our act was modeled upon section 90 of the English `Railway Clauses Consolidation Act' of 1845, known as the `Equality Clause,' and the third section of our act was modeled upon the second section of the English `act for the better regulation of the traffic on railways and canals' of July 10, 1854, and the 11th section of the act of July 21, 1873, entitled — `An act to make better provisions for the carrying into effect the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, and for other purposes connected therewith.'"
In Interstate Commerce Commission v. Del., Lack. & Western R. Co., 220 U.S. 235, 253, the court (by Mr. Chief Justice White) said: "It is not open to question that the provisions of § 2 of the Act to Regulate Commerce were substantially taken from § 90 of the English Railway Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, known as the Equality Clause. Texas & Pac. Railway v. Interstate Com. Com., 162 U.S. 197, 222. Certain also is it that at the time of the passage of the Act to Regulate Commerce that clause in the English
Now, what was the construction of the Equality Clause of the act of 1845, that had been adopted by the English courts, in the cases thus cited by this court as controlling evidence of what Congress intended in enacting the second section of our act?
The Great Western Ry. Co. v. Sutton (1869), L.R. 4 H.L. 226, was an action brought and judgment recovered for "the amount of certain alleged overcharges." But they were "overcharges" only in the sense that they were the differential between the rates charged to the plaintiff and those charged to others. The opinions of the judges being called for by the Lords, Mr. Justice Blackburn delivered the prevailing view, expounding the subject historically, as follows (p. 237): "At common law a person holding himself out as a common carrier of goods was not under
Mr. Justice Blackburn, after referring to the special acts that governed the case (what, in this country, would be called the "charter" of the company), by one of which the act of 1845 was incorporated into it, and saying that the rights of the parties must depend upon the effect of certain other sections in conjunction with § 90 of the act of 1845, which was, to leave the company free to charge what it thought fit for parcels not exceeding five hundred pounds in weight, "subject, however, to the effect of the proviso for equality contained in the 90th section of the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, and the similar proviso for equality contained in the former special act of this company (7 and 8 Vict., c. 3, sec. 50)," then proceeded to say:
"Then comes the question, what is the legal effect of this proviso for equality? I think it appears from the preamble of the 90th section of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, that the legislature was of opinion that the changed state of things arising from the general use of railways made it expedient to impose an obligation on railway companies acting as carriers beyond what is imposed on a carrier at common law. And if this be borne in mind, I think the construction of the proviso for equality is clear, and is, that the defendants may, subject to the limitations in their special Acts, charge what they think fit, but not more to one person than they, during the same time, charge to others under the same circumstances. And I think it follows from this that if the defendants do charge more to one person than they, during the same time, charge to others, the charge is, by virtue of the statute extortionate. And I think that the rights and remedies of a person made to pay a charge beyond the
He then proceeds to show that the weight of authority was very much in favor of this view, citing many previous cases; and wherever the measure of recovery is referred to it is in such terms as these: "The excess might be recovered back under a count for money had and received," (p. 240); "the plaintiff recovered the overcharge under a count for money had and received," (pp. 241, 242). Referring to Garton v. Bristol and Exeter Railway Co. (1861), 1 B. & S.
He then reviews some later cases in which, for the first time, a difference of opinion had arisen, with the final result of concluding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Four other judges present concurred. Baron Bramwell (p. 250) alone took a different view; not, however, respecting the measure of damages, but upon the question whether the Equality Clause had been violated.
The House of Lords followed the majority of the judges and affirmed the judgment below, Lord Chelmsford delivering an elaborate opinion, in which, after discussing the evidence upon which the violation of the Equality Clause depended, he proceeded as follows (p. 262): "The last subject to be considered is the form of the action; whether an action for money had and received will lie to recover back overcharges made upon the carriage of the plaintiff's goods, not absolutely but relatively to the charges made to other persons. It was argued for the defendants that the charge upon the plaintiff's packed parcels, being warranted by the 10 and 11 Vict., ch. 226, and being reasonable, and within the absolute discretion of the company, the plaintiff was not injured by other persons being charged less than he was. But this is a fallacious way of viewing the question. The plaintiff's complaint is not that others are charged less than himself, but that the fact
London & North Western Ry. Co. v. Evershed (1878), L.R. 3 App. Cas. 1029; 5 Eng. Rul. Cas. 351; was an action by a shipper to recover from the carrier an amount equivalent to the rebates given to another shipper in violation of the Equality Clause. The House of Lords sustained the action, the Lord Chancellor (Ld. Cairns) saying (p. 1035): "The one right, to my mind, the clear and undoubted right, of a public trader is to see that he is receiving from a railway company equal treatment with other traders of the same kind doing the same business and supplying the same traffic. In my opinion that is not the case with regard to this plaintiff, and therefore I think he is entitled to recover the moneys he had paid under protest." Lord Hatherly said (p. 1035): "My Lords, I have come to
Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire Railway Co. (H.L. 1885), L.R. 11 App. Cas. 97, was an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals, reported in L.R. 14 Q.B. Div. 209; and the case came there from the Queen's Bench Division (Matthew and Day, JJ.), whose decision is reported L.R. 13 Q.B. Div. 674. The questions discussed in the Divisional Court were (a) whether certain "group rates" constituted a violation of the Equality Clause of the Consolidation Act, 1845, § 90, and, if so, whether the damages for breach of that enactment were limited to the amount of overcharges (and what was the measure of such overcharges), or whether general damages could also be recovered. (b) Whether an action lay for breach of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, § 2, in view of the prohibition of § 6 of the same act; and, if so, whether the damages for breach of this act were limited to the amount of overcharges, or whether general damages could also be recovered. The "group rates" comprised the rates from
In the Court of Appeal (14 Q.B. Div. 209), the very special facts of the case are set forth. The court (per Lindley, L.J.) affirmed the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division that no action would lie in respect of any breach of the provisions of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, § 2. Next, it was held that the "grouped rates" were not a violation of the acts of 1845, because the termini were not the same; the reasoning being (p. 223) that the words "passing only over the same portion of the line" meant passing between the same points of departure and arrival, and passing over no other part of the line.
But it was held that the Company had violated the Equality Clause by charging to the defendant greater
In the House of Lords (11 App. Cas. 97), it was held, that where the railway company carried coal from a group of collieries situate at different points along their line, and charged all the collieries with one uniform set of rates in respect of such carriage, the owners of the colliery nearest to the point of arrival were not entitled to maintain an action for overcharges merely on the ground that the difference in distance showed that the same rate was a discrimination against the shorter haul. The Lords affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal to the effect (a) that the railway had not in the above respect infringed the provisions of § 90 of the act of 1845. They affirmed the decision (b) that in this particular case an action would not lie for breach of the act of 1854, because undue or unreasonable preference or prejudice, within the meaning of that act, had not been proven. The question whether under any circumstances an action lies for breach of the act of 1854 was reserved. And (c) upon the question of the coal carried from the appellants' colliery to Grimsby at the same time that less rates were charged on Bannister's coal because of its ultimate destination for shipment on American steamers or for points south of Harwich, the House of Lords affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal that the allowances made to Bannister were a violation of the Equality Clause of the act of 1845.
But upon the now important question of damages the House of Lords (reversing the Court of Appeal) held that the appellants were entitled to recover the overcharges, the amount
There was a difference of opinion among the Law Lords as to whether the Colliery Company was entitled to recover the amount of the overcharge computed upon the entire tonnage transported for them, or only upon the less tonnage that had been carried at the reduced rate for Bannister during the same period. The Lord Chancellor (Halsbury) held to the former view; the Earl of Selborne and, apparently, Lord Blackburn, to the latter. In the end, the view of the Lord Chancellor prevailed. But the Lords all agreed that an inequality in the rates charged to two shippers for the same service was to be treated as conclusive evidence that the disfavored shipper had been overcharged; and that the rate differential — described as "overcharge" — was to be adopted as the measure of the compensation to be awarded for a violation of the Equality Clause.
The Lord Chancellor said (p. 112): "The remaining question, namely, what the appellants are entitled to recover from the company upon the hypothesis that they have been overcharged, is one which does not seem to me to be surrounded by the difficulty that has been assumed to exist. The arbitrator, to whom this question must go back, will be able to find on what quantities of coal the appellants were charged, during the periods when the railway company were carrying for Bannister at a less rate; and if the principle is laid down by your Lordships that the appellant's coal ought to have been carried at the same rate, I am unable to see the difficulty of ascertaining the amount of overcharge."
The Earl of Selborne said upon this topic (p. 116): "I agree with the arbitrator in holding this to be a case of overcharge, and not a question of damages; and I should answer his question (upon the authority of Sutton's Case
Lord Blackburn, after quoting what was said in the Court of Appeal (as quoted above), upon the question of damages, said (p. 124): "I am not satisfied with the way in which Lindley, L.J., deals with Evershed's Case, and the mode in which the Divisional Court had applied it. I think that it cannot be right to calculate the amount of overcharge on all the coal sent by the defendants from their colliery to Grimsby for shipment, without reference to the quantity of coal on which, or the time during which, the less rate was charged to Bannister for coal carried from the defendants' colliery. The arbitrator has not found, and I do not think he was bound to find in the
Lord FitzGerald said simply (11 App. Cas. 125): "My Lords, I have read the two elaborate opinions which have been delivered by my noble and learned friend near me, and my noble and learned friend opposite, and I entirely concur in the order which it is proposed to make, and have nothing to add."
But the Syllabus (11 App. Cas. 98) expresses the view of the Lord Chancellor, and the order for judgment (p. 126) shows that this view prevailed.
The order was — "That the arbitrator must ascertain what quantity of coal carried under the same circumstances and on the same portion only of the line was charged at the higher rate to the defendants at the time the lower rate was charged to Bannister, the fact that the coal was shipped on the American steamboats or to the south of Harwich not being a difference in the circumstances; and so ascertain the amount of the overcharge."
The very clear result of these three important decisions of the House of Lords was that the amount of the difference in rates was to be treated as so much money unlawfully exacted from the disfavored shipper, and recovered accordingly.
There is not the least doubt that Congress, in passing the Interstate Commerce Act, had in mind these then recent decisions of the English court of last resort, and intended to adopt the principle those cases had established with respect to the Equality Clause of the English act of 1845, viz., that just as, at the common law, a shipper who had been charged an unreasonable rate could recover back
To this extent, at least, I deem the question of the measure of damages for unlawful discrimination, contrary to § 2 of the Interstate Commerce Act, to be covered by the previous decisions of this court, already cited (145 U.S. 283; 162 U.S. 222; 220 U.S. 253), which pointed out that the Equality Clause furnished the model for § 2 of the Interstate Commerce Act, and that it was adopted by Congress with the construction that had been put upon it by these same decisions of the House of Lords. Were the matter res nova, I should entertain no doubt of the propriety of adhering to the English rule.
Whether the House of Lords was right in the Denaby Main Colliery Case in allowing a recovery by the aggrieved shipper based upon the rate differential as applied to his entire tonnage, or whether it should have been limited to a tonnage not exceeding the tonnage of the favored shipper on which the rebate was allowed, if that was less than the tonnage of the aggrieved shipper, may be a question of some doubt. This court in the present case is not called upon to pass upon it.
For the record before us does not present the question whether the plaintiff's recovery ought to have been measured by the tonnage of the favored shippers upon which the rebates were allowed. The plaintiff in error (defendant in the trial court) did not prefer any request or take any exception that would have based the recovery upon a computation of the favored tonnage. There was no evidence, indeed, of the amount of that tonnage; it being simply made to appear that of all the coal shipped by the Berwind-White Company (one of the favored shippers) during the period of rebating, only 10 per centum was contract coal on which rebates were allowed. How much
Defendant did request the trial court to instruct the jury that if the lower rate accorded to other shippers was not justified, "the amount which the plaintiff is entitled to recover is measured by the difference between the rate per ton which it paid on all its shipments during such period, and the rate per ton which the other shipper paid on his or its whole volume of shipments during such period." This, as the Circuit Court of Appeals correctly held (173 Fed. Rep. 6), in effect requested the court to charge, as fixing the measure of recovery, not the lowest rate charged by the railroad to another shipper, but the general average paid on all shipments made by such shipper. I agree with that court in the view that Congress made no such rule. It is inconsistent with anything in the English cases, or in any cases in this country to which attention is called.
The conclusion of this court that the right to recover in such a case as the present "is limited to the pecuniary loss suffered and proved," and that the fact that greater charges are exacted from the plaintiff than from his competitor for the like service is not evidence of such pecuniary loss, is, so far as I have been able to discover, entirely unsupported by authority. The Parsons Case (167 U.S. 447, 460) is cited as authority, but in my view is not properly to be so considered, for reasons already fully explained. The "only other case" is Knudsen-Ferguson Fruit Co. v. Michigan Central R. Co., 148 Fed. Rep. 968, 974. This was an action to recover a sum claimed to have been unlawfully exacted for the icing of a carload of fruit. At p. 974 the court said, arguendo: "To support a recovery under this section [§ 8] there must be a showing of some specific pecuniary injury. . . . He [the
On the other hand, Cook v. Chicago &c. Ry. Co., 81 Iowa, 551, 563, is a distinct authority for the proposition that in a case of discrimination in rates accomplished by means of rebating, the amount of the rebates furnishes the measure of damages; the court saying: "The only finding that can in any fairness be made is that after deducting the rebate the rate was reasonable; and that the exaction from the plaintiffs was unreasonable and the discrimination against them unjust." To the same effect is Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Wilson, 132 Indiana, 517, 525, where an instruction that the allowance of more favorable
The present decision ignores the practical construction that has invariably been placed upon the act by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
In Burgess v. Transcontinental Freight Bureau, 13 I.C.C. 668, 680, the Commission ruled upon the precise question now before us, in dealing with a case of rates held excessive per se, but only so held as the result of a comparison between the rates under attack and other rates customarily charged. The complainants claimed reparation by reason of shipments under the old rate. Defendants denied that such reparation should be awarded, even though the Commission were of the opinion that that rate was excessive, and this "for the reason that no damage upon the part of the complainants has been established." It appeared that the market was not affected by the rate, and that the freight had been added to the price paid by the consumer; and it was insisted that the complainants who had paid this freight rate had not been actually injured. The Commission said: "Such is not, in our opinion, the proper meaning of this term [damage]. These complainants were shippers of hardwood lumber to this destination, and they were entitled to a reasonable rate from the defendants for the service of transportation. An unreasonable rate was in fact exacted. They were thereby deprived of a legal right, and the measure of their damage is the difference between the rate to which they were entitled and the rate which they were compelled to pay. If complainants were obliged to follow every transaction to its ultimate result, and to trace out the exact commercial effect of the freight rate paid, it would never be possible to show damages with sufficient accuracy to justify giving them. Certainly these defendants are not entitled to this money which they have taken from the complainants, and they ought not to be heard to say that they should not
It is upon this theory that reparation has been awarded by the Commission from the beginning. After an examination of the reports of their decisions as exhaustive as the time at my disposal would permit, I think it entirely safe to say that in the thousands of reparation cases that have been passed upon, reparation has not been refused under circumstances at all resembling those of the case at bar; and that wherever reparation has been allowed it has been based upon the rate differential, and awarded to the shipper who paid the freight, without regard to whether or not he charged it over against his consignee. The same rule has been adopted in all cases, whether the rates charged to the complainant have been deemed unreasonable per se or not; indeed, where they have been thus denounced it has ordinarily been done as the result of comparison between the rate under attack and other rates on similar traffic. Illustrative decisions are cited in the margin.
What, then, is to be the measure of damages? Whatever it is to be, it is apparent that we must hence forward abandon the simple and direct method of computing the
It is said that under the rule of the Denaby Colliery Case it would follow that if there were, say, five dealers, each shipping 10,000 tons, to one only of whom rebates aggregating $3,500 had been allowed, each of the five would be as much entitled as plaintiff to recover $3,500 on their several shipments of 10,000 tons each, and the five verdicts would aggregate $17,500 because of the payment of $3,500 to the favored shipper. But if § 2 of the Act is to be given any vital force, it must be construed as estopping the carrier from saying that the amount actually charged, less the rebate, is less than ought to be charged on a shipment of 10,000 tons; and if he himself rebates $3,500 to one shipper, the requirement that he rebate the same to each of the four others, does not penalize the carrier. It simply requires him to do service for all at the rate which he himself has fixed in dealing with the favored shipper.
Nor can I see that this would "create a legalized, but endless, chain of departures from the tariff." If § 2 is enforced strictly in accordance with the English rule it will very clearly tend to prevent any departures from the lawfully established tariffs.
It seems to me a strange view of the matter to deny direct reparation in specie to the aggrieved shipper, by the payment to him of an amount sufficient to leave the net rate charged to him equal to the lowest rate customarily charged to a competitor; and to base this denial on the theory that reparation will do more harm than good, by
Besides, if the theory of the opinion is to be adhered to, there will necessarily be as many different rates as there are differences in the circumstances of the disfavored shippers who seek redress because of rebates or other rate discriminations. One aggrieved party may receive damages far beyond the money equivalent of the discrimination; another may receive much less; still another may receive nothing at all. If we were to look to the outcome of these private actions for violation of the equality provision of § 2 of the Act, and treat them as amounting in the end to a determination of the freight rate, the inevitable result (on the theory adopted by the court) would be that one violation by the carrier would result in as many different rates as there were different shippers to be discriminated against.
But, with great respect, I again ask: What, in the present case, is to be the measure of damages? The plaintiff, upon shipments aggregating 40,000 tons of coal in two years,
The opinion says: "Of course, no part of such payment of lawful rates can be treated as an overcharge or as an extortion. Having paid only the lawful rate, plaintiff was not overcharged, though the favored shipper was illegally undercharged." This is not only unsupported by authority, but is, I submit, inconsistent with the result reached in the present case. The court decides that the plaintiff is injured, and entitled to maintain an action against the carrier under § 8, because the carrier has collected less compensation from a favored shipper for the like service. The rebates were merely the device by which the discount from the published rates was accomplished. How can such an action lie at all, except that § 2 makes the published and otherwise lawful rates unlawful and extortionate when less rates are charged to favored shippers, through the device of rebates or otherwise? It seems a mere play upon words to say that "the favored shipper was illegally undercharged." Certainly it is not to him that the right of action is given by § 8. In short, the opinion treats the imposition of the "lawful
The result is, the legal paradox: Injuria sine damno. The plaintiff is wronged, but not harmed; it may sue, but may not recover.
If the rate differential is not a proper element of damages in actions brought in the courts, I suppose it will not be proper for the Commission to adhere to it. Yet the sheer impossibility of adopting any other measure of damages, in the multitude of reparation cases that the Commission has to deal with, is perfectly obvious.
The result, upon the whole, is a virtual denial of private remedy for the most common and harmful of those discriminations that the Interstate Commerce Act was designed to prevent and to redress.
FootNotes
* * * * * * * *
"Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Senate bill, prohibiting discriminations, contained provisions in relation to the recovery of damages. These have been stricken out of said sections, and have been grouped together in one section, which is made section 8 of the committee bill. Except as to this rearrangement, substantially the only change made has been the addition of the provision of the House bill that `a reasonable counsel or attorney's fee' shall be allowed by the court in every case of the recovery of damages. The parts of said sections which are stricken out in consequence of the rearrangement referred to are all of section 2 after the word `unlawful,' in line 13, all of section 3 after the word `business,' in line 18, and lines 23 to 27, both inclusive, in section 4. No other change is made in section 2." 49 Cong. Rec.2d Sess., vol. 18, Part 1, p. 170.
Section 7 of the House Bill (H.R. 5667) provided that if any carrier should do an act forbidden or omitted to do an act required, or should violate the statute, such carrier should be "held to pay to the person or persons injured the full amount of damages so sustained . . . with reasonable counsel or attorney's fees. . . ." This bill was before the Conference Committee, and the House members, as required by the rules of the House, made a written statement of the action of the Conference, in which it was said (vol. 18, Part II, Cong. Rec., 49th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 695, 698, 774) that "the eighth section of the substitute bill" — being the eighth section of the present act — "contains the substance of the seventh section of the House Bill in regard to damages and counsel fees but expressed in somewhat different language."
SEC. 8. That in case any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall do, cause to be done, or permit to be done any act, matter, or thing in this act prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter, or thing in this act required to be done, such common carrier shall be liable to the person or persons injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of any such violation of the provisions of this act, together with a reasonable counsel or attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court in every case of recovery, which attorney's fee shall be taxed and collected as part of the costs in the case.
12 I.C.C. 418, 426; 14 I.C.C. 422, 434; 14 I.C.C. 523; 16 I.C.C. 528; 17 I.C.C. 578; 18 I.C.C. 259; 18 I.C.C. 212, 219; 18 I.C.C. 550; 18 I.C.C. 580.
By reason of published rates held unreasonable because in excess of rate afterwards voluntarily established by the carrier.
12 I.C.C. 13; 12 I.C.C. 141; 14 I.C.C. 118; 14 I.C.C. 577; 16 I.C.C. 190, 192; 16 I.C.C. 293; 16 I.C.C. 450; 20 I.C.C. 104.
By reason of published rates held unreasonable because in excess of rate afterwards established by the Commission.
12 I.C.C. 417; 14 I.C.C. 199, 205; 17 I.C.C. 251, 253; 17 I.C.C. 333; 18 I.C.C. 301.
By reason of rates held unreasonable because resulting from error in routing chargeable to the carrier.
14 I.C.C. 527; 18 I.C.C. 527.
By reason of published rates held unreasonable per se.
14 I.C.C. 525; 14 I.C.C. 577; 16 I.C.C. 469; 20 I.C.C. 12; 20 I.C.C. 104; 22 I.C.C. 283.
By reason of published rates held unreasonable because higher than obtainable by another route.
12 I.C.C. 141.
By reason of published rates held unreasonable because exceeding the sum of the locals.
13 I.C.C. 154; 14 I.C.C. 336; 14 I.C.C. 549; 14 I.C.C. 573; 14 I.C.C. 579; 16 I.C.C. 293; 16 I.C.C. 318; 16 I.C.C. 339; 21 I.C.C. 215.
Comment
User Comments