The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to render the original judgments against the companies and to maintain the ancillary bill is challenged at the outset. These objections require notice before considering the controversy upon its merits. It is insisted that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to render the judgments at law because of the provisions of the act of August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433, 434, providing that no Circuit Court shall have cognizance of any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note in favor of any assignee, or subsequent holder if such instrument be payable to bearer, unless such suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover, if an assignment or transfer had not been made. As the notes were made payable to the order of "Markham B. Orde, Treas.," and there is no allegation that Orde was not a citizen of the State of Illinois, of which State the defendant companies were corporations and citizens, it is insisted that the jurisdiction must fail, under the provisions of the statute just referred to. Assuming without deciding that this question
It is further argued that the entire proceedings were fraudulent and collusive; that no money was in fact loaned, and that they were the result of a conspiracy between corporations of Illinois to obtain the jurisdiction of the Federal court, and its decision on the controverted rights of the parties under the statutes of the State. We have examined the supplemental records submitted since the argument in this court, on this branch of the case, and think the charges of bad faith and conspiracy are not sustained. We have no doubt that the money was loaned by the Guaranty Trust Company to these corporations and that the original judgments were bona fide. As to the conspiracy to get the case into the Federal Court, with a view to the decision of the rights of the parties therein, we are not aware of any principle which prevents parties having the requisite citizenship and a justiciable demand from seeking the Federal courts for redress, if such be their choice of a forum in which to have contested rights litigated. Having a proper cause of action and the requisite diversity of citizenship confers jurisdiction upon the Federal courts, and in such cases the motive of the creditor in seeking Federal jurisdiction is immaterial. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 310; Dickerman v. Northern Trust Company, 176 U.S. 181, 190; Lehigh Mining and Manufacturing Company,
It is true that the judgments were taken and the receivers appointed on the same day, and it is quite likely that the receiverships were in view when the judgments were taken, and that preparations had been made in that direction, but we perceive in this no legal objection to the jurisdiction of the court. It is further insisted by the counsel for the city that the ancillary bills cannot be sustained upon their merits. But we think a case was made out by the allegations of the bills, especially when considered with reference to the admissions of the answer, which showed that the extent and character of the property rights of the corporations whose rights and franchises were the subjects of the receivership were in direct and serious controversy between the company and the receiver on the one hand and the city on the other. While it may be that there would have been no interference on the part of the city with the property while it was in the hands of the court's receivers, still the record shows that the city strenuously contested the asserted rights of the corporations to the franchise to use the streets of the city for ninety-nine years, the term claimed to have been granted to them by the act of February, 1865. It was the claim of the city that as to many of the ordinances granting rights in a number of the streets, the right to the use and occupancy of them would expire July 30, 1903. The city had asserted in a number of ways its purpose to treat the rights of the companies and whatever franchises they had as terminated at that date. It declared its purpose to resume possession of the streets and resort to all legal means to protect its rights against what were deemed the unfounded claims of the companies as to the extended franchises. Without going into further detail upon this branch of the case, we think that the attitude and claims of the city cast a cloud upon the title to this property which was in the hands of the receivers to be administered
A further preliminary question is made in the contention that the leases under which the various transfers were made, and which are supposed to have vested title in the Chicago Union Traction Company, are void for want of corporate power in the companies to make or receive the same. We do not think the city of Chicago is in a position to raise that question. The corporations have undertaken to transfer the rights of the lessor companies, and the lessees have gone into possession thereof, and the same are now in possession of the receivers under authority of the court. All of the companies are parties to the suit, and the rights and franchises of all are by order of the court vested in the receivers. They hold the title to all these rights to be sold at judicial sale, or otherwise dealt with as the court may direct. In this view we cannot see that it is material to inquire into the validity of the intermediate transfers between the companies. No contract is undertaken to be enforced with the city of Chicago which depends upon the validity of these transfers. The city has no power to invalidate them, and the State has not attempted to inquire into their validity by a proceeding in quo warranto. In such case, we think, the principle laid down in Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U.S. 282, 293, is controlling: "The question whether a corporation having capacity to purchase and hold real estate for certain defined purposes, or in certain quantities,
Passing now to the merits of the case, we will first notice the objection that the acts of 1859, 1861 and 1865 are unconstitutional. The Illinois constitution of 1848 contained the provision that no private or local law shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. The acts are attacked upon the ground that they are violations of this requirement. But we do not think that these objections are tenable. The title of the act of February 14, 1859, is "An act to promote the construction of horse railways in the city of Chicago;" the title of the act of February 21, 1861, is "An act to authorize the extension of horse railways in the city of Chicago;" the title of the act of February 6, 1865, is "An act concerning horse railways in the city of Chicago." In People v. People's Gas Light Company, 205 Illinois, 482, the Illinois cases were reviewed and the conclusion reached that the purpose of the constitutional provision is accomplished if the title is comprehensive enough as reasonably to include within the general subject or the subordinate branches thereof, the several objects which the statute seeks to effect. And it was held that the generality of the title is no objection to a law so long as it is not made to cover legislation incongruous in itself and which by no fair intendment can be included as having necessary or proper connection. In the case of Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, a statute of New Jersey was before this court which was claimed to be unconstitutional, because it embraced more than one subject, not expressed in its title. The provision of the New Jersey constitution was "To avoid improper influences which may result from intermixing in one and the same act, such things as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object,
Without taking time to analyze the acts in this connection we pass to what we deem more important features of the case.
The principal controversy in this case turns upon the construction
It is said to have been the settled understanding of all concerned, and in accordance with the then existing policy of the State, that the act of 1859 was a franchise directly granted by the State, giving the full right to use the streets of the city for the term of the corporate life of the companies, subject only to the designating power of the city as to streets to be used. In this connection it may be observed that the Supreme Court of Illinois in Chicago Union Traction Company v. City of Chicago, 199 Illinois, 484, 525, distinctly stated that the act of 1859 recognized the power of the common council to pass the ordinance of August 16, 1858. "There," it is said in the opinion, "was no other action of the common council, taken before the passage of the act of February 14, 1859, except the ordinance of August 16, 1858. By the use of the words, `with such rights and privileges as the said common council has prescribed,' the legislature could not have referred to any other action of the common council than the passage of the ordinance
Under the ordinance of 1858 the council undertook to authorize
The act under consideration nowhere assumes to fix the duration of the grant, nor excludes the conclusion that it is embraced in the terms and conditions which are to be fixed by contract with the city. If the franchise to use the streets, without regard to municipal action, was fully conferred by the legislative act under consideration, then the company had only to take possession of the streets, subject to regulations as to running of cars, etc., by the city council. On the contrary, under the terms of this act, the city, by withholding its consent, could prevent the use of the streets by the corporations. No way is pointed out by which this consent could be compelled against the will of the council. That body might, for reasons sufficient to itself, under the terms of this act, by withholding assent, determine that it was undesirable to have the corporations in control of the use of the streets.
While the decisions of the Supreme Court of the State are not binding upon us in determining whether a contract was made which is entitled to protection under the Federal Constitution, we may notice the case of Chicago City Railway Company v. People ex rel. Story, 73 Illinois, 541. That was a proceeding in quo warranto against the Chicago City Railway Company, asking to declare a forfeiture of its franchise to operate upon a portion of Indiana avenue. The grounds relied upon were that the railway company had not obtained the consent of two-thirds of the owners of the property fronting on the avenue within fifteen months from the passage of the
What, then, was conferred in the franchise granted by the State? It was the right to be a corporation for the period named, and to acquire from the city the right to use the streets upon contract terms and conditions to be agreed upon. The franchise conferred by the State is of no practical value until supplemented by the consent and authority of the council of the city. After the passage of the act of 1859 the common council of the city on May 23, 1859, passed an ordinance authorizing the extension and operation of certain horse railways in the streets of the south and west divisions of the city, and granting the use thereof to the Chicago City Railway Company. The city purported to act under authority of the act of 1859, and by virtue of the powers and authority otherwise vested in the common council by law. By this ordinance the term of use and occupation was fixed at "during all the term in the said act of the fourteenth of February, A.D. 1859, specified and prescribed." On the same day the council passed an ordinance granting rights in certain streets to the North Chicago City Railway Company. This ordinance contained this language: "The rights and privileges granted to the said company by this ordinance, or intended to be, shall continue and be in force for the benefit of said company for the full term of twenty-five years from the passage of this ordinance, and no longer." On February 21, 1861, the legislature passed an act incorporating the Chicago West Division Railway Company for the term of twenty-five years, the corporation to possess
Before the passage of the act of 1865 a number of ordinances were passed, conferring the privilege of using streets, in most cases with a time limit definite in character. The record discloses that by an agreement of July 29, 1863, the Chicago City Railway Company had agreed to convey to the Chicago West Division Railway Company certain rolling stock, equipment, etc., together with "all and singular the franchises, rights, privileges and immunities" of the Chicago City Railway Company in and upon certain streets. "conferred, given or granted by or under any or all acts of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois, and any and all ordinances of the city of Chicago or contracts with the common council." In this contract it was also provided that if at any time it should be adjudged that consent to the sale by the council of the city of Chicago is, or was, necessary to secure to the grantee company the rights and privileges embraced in the contract, the grantor company would do all in its power by reasonable and proper effort to secure such consent of the common council. By the deed of transfer of July 30, 1863, the grantor company conveyed its rights, privileges and franchises in the use and occupation of certain streets, "to have and to hold the above bargained and granted premises and property to the party of the second part, etc., for and during all the time which the said party of the first part might hold, exercise and enjoy the same under its present charter and any and all extensions thereof." On December 13, 1859, the Chicago City Railway Company by agreement gave to the North Chicago City Railway Company permission and authority to make, construct and use for
It thus clearly appears, at least up to the passage of the act of 1865, that legislation upon the subject recognized and enforced the right and authority of the city of fix the term during which the streets might be occupied by street railway companies. The legislature had confirmed the ordinance of the city fixing the term at twenty-five years and until the city should see fit to purchase the property of the railway company. It had required the companies to obtain the authority of the city before using the streets, such use to be upon terms and conditions, and with such rights and privileges as the city had or might thereafter prescribe by contract with the companies.
We find no intention evidenced in legislative action thus far to prevent the municipal authorities from exercising the important and far-reaching authority of fixing by contract with the persons or corporations to whom franchises are granted by the State the term during which the occupancy shall continue. This feature of the right to use the streets, it need hardly be said, is of most vital importance to both parties. Some latitude of time is essential to the value and stability of the investment to be made. An unduly long period might conclude municipal action when changing conditions and growing population demanded it in the public interest.
We come now to the act of 1865. Does its interpretation justify the contention that by its terms the State took from the local authorities the control which had been theretofore recognized, the right and authority to determine upon what terms and for what length of time the railways might occupy the streets, and without other consideration than the building, equipment and operation of the roads, conferred upon the companies the right to use and occupy for ninety-nine years to
". . . and any and all acts or deeds of transfer of rights, privileges or franchises between the corporations in said several acts named, or any two of them, and all contracts, stipulations, licenses and undertakings, made, entered into or given, and as made or amended by and between the said common council and any one or more of the said corporations, respecting the location, use or exclusion of railways in or upon the streets, or any of them, of said city, shall be deemed and held and continued in force during the life hereof, as valid and effectual, to all intents and purposes, as if made a part, and the same are hereby made a part of said several acts."
Does a fair interpretation of this clause of the act extend all the franchises, privileges and contracts theretofore made for the term of ninety-nine years? This clause deals with:
1. The transfers of rights, privileges or franchises between the corporations.
2. Comprehensively speaking, the contracts made between the city and the companies.
The definition of "rights and privileges," as the terms are used in this act, is not difficult to find. It is contained in the context of the act confirming "such rights and privileges, immunities and exemptions, as the common council has [prescribed], or may by contract with said parties, or any or either of them, prescribe." This definition conforms to the use of the terms in prior acts of the legislature on the subject as well as to ordinances of the city granting the use of the streets. The rights and privileges intended are such as have been derived from contracts with the city. Franchises in the sense we have stated have been the grants of the State. Licenses and all other privileges have been obtained from the city, acting under the authority of the acts of the legislature in the manner outlined earlier in this discussion. As to the deeds and acts of transfer of rights, privileges and franchises, as well
What does this mean? It cannot operate to extend the contract rights and privileges, obtained directly from the city before or after the transfer by one company to the other, ninety-nine years, for as to these the act distinctly declares that the contracts, stipulations, licenses and undertakings, between the council and the companies shall stand "as made or amended." This declaration is in the past tense, and can have no reference by any fair construction to future engagements.
The contracts by this clause in all their terms, including time limits, are written into the original acts of 1859 and 1861, as if made a part thereof. Much discussion has been had as to the proper interpretation of the ambiguous expression "during the life hereof." For the companies it is insisted that its meaning is to extend all franchises and contracts, and whether the latter have been or may thereafter be made to the end of the ninety-nine years, so as to give the railways the franchise to use the streets for that period by an irrevocable grant, irrespective of any limitations by state or municipal action subsequently undertaken. To give this act the construction insisted on by the companies is inconsistent with the policy of the State, declared in the act of 1859, which ratified the ordinance of 1858, and gave additional rights in the streets only upon obtaining the consent of the city. It practically reads out of the act the preceding clause of the very section under consideration, which expressly recognizes the authority of the city council to control the use of the streets by contracts which it has made or may make in the future. To say that contracts, the terms and conditions of which are left to agreement with the city, could only be made upon terms of extension to ninety-nine years, is to nullify in an important particular
This construction is in harmony with the policy of the State, as evidenced in its prior legislation on the subject, and in the earlier part of the section under consideration, it gives some meaning to all parts of the act, and makes its provisions consistent with each other. It preserves local control of streets for railway purposes, which the legislature in all of the acts under consideration has sought to protect. Considering the act as a whole, it has the effect to extend the life of the corporations to ninety-nine years and to authorize the use of the streets of Chicago, with the consent and upon terms agreed upon with the council, and this right may be acquired in like manner during the extended life of the corporations for such periods as may be contracted for. Contracts already made are affirmed as made. The transfers between the companies are validated.
Further contracts may be entered into and amendments made without resort to new legislation empowering the corporations,
While it is true that if by the act the State had conferred a grant of the right to use the streets for the period of ninety-nine years, entitled to the protection of the contract clause of the Constitution, such right could not be impaired by any subsequent legislation, it is worthy of note, as showing the continuous legislative policy of the State, that in the act of March, 1867, amending the charter of the city of Chicago, it was provided that no grant of the right to use the streets should be given, or those already given extended, unless by a vote of three-fourths of all the aldermen elected, and that no grant, consent or permission theretofore given or made, or thereafter given, should in any case be extended until within one year of the expiration of the grant, consent or permission, and in case of veto by the mayor such grant or permission should receive the vote of three-fourths of all the aldermen. This act shows a consistent policy of local control, and is inconsistent with the theory of a grant already made for the use of the streets for ninety-nine years.
In reaching the conclusions herein stated as to the proper construction of the act of 1865, amending the act of 1859, we are not unmindful of the fact that much can be said in favor of the view contended for by the learned counsel for the companies. The construction of this act, as we have said, is by no means free from difficulty.
It is true that Governor Oglesby in his message returning this act with his veto gave it a construction which would maintain the right to use the streets for the period of ninety-nine years. While his construction was assumed rather than demonstrated, and the stress of his argument was upon the impropriety and constitutional invalidity of thus postponing the right of the city to purchase, it may be admitted that his interpretation of the act sustains the view contended for by
Since the decision of the Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat
This principle has been declared axiomatic as a doctrine of this court. Fertilizing Company v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659,
The effect of the act of 1865 was to affirm the contracts as made between the council and the companies; these contracts must stand as concluded, unless changed by subsequent agreement between the parties. As we have said, the principal question in the case concerns the construction of the act of February 14, 1859, as amended by the act of February 6, 1865. The learned Circuit Court, holding the opinion that the right to use the streets was extended for the prolonged term of the corporate life of the companies, also held that the adoption of
It was held by the learned Circuit Court that the amending act of 1865 had application to the North Chicago City Railway Company, and had the effect to extend the corporate life of that company. We think this is a correct view. By the tenth section of the act of 1859 all the grants, powers, privileges, immunities and franchises conferred upon Parmalee and others, by the act for the south and west divisions of the city of Chicago, were conferred upon certain persons by the corporate name of the North Chicago City Railway Company, for the north division of the city, in the county of Cook, as fully and effectually as if they had been by a separate act incorporated, with all of said grants, powers, immunities, privileges and franchises. By the first section of the act of 1865 the corporate lives of the Chicago City Railway Company, created by the first section of the act of 1859, and the Chicago West Division Railway Company, created by the first section of the
We believe this view is sustained by reason and authority. Holbrook v. Nichol, 36 Illinois, 161. The rule was thus stated in Farrell v. State, 54 N.J. Law, 421: "As a rule of construction, a statute amended is to be understood in the same sense exactly as if it had read from the beginning as it does amended. People v. Circuit Judge, 37 Michigan, 287. In Conrad v. Nall, 24 Michigan, 275, a section in the chapter of the code was amended, and it was held that it was not intended to operate independently of the other provisions of the chapter, but that the whole chapter in its present form must be read as one act. The rule is correctly stated in Endlich on Statutes, section 294, as follows: `A statute which is amended is thereafter, and as to all acts subsequently done, to be construed as if the amendment had always been there, and the amendment itself so thoroughly becomes a part of the original statute, that it must be construed, in view of the original statute, as it stands after the amendments are introduced and the matters superseded by the amendments eliminated.'" This view is strengthened by the language of the second section, which speaks of the deeds of transfer of rights between the corporations, in said several acts, or "any two of them."
The city of Chicago has constantly recognized the corporate existence of this company and has made numerous agreements with it as such corporation. In Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 50, in considering a contract between the North Chicago City Railway Company and the city as to the extent of street improvement by way of paying, etc., which could be required of
While not conceding the soundness of the contention that the right of purchase is extended to all the property of the railway companies by reason of the unity of the system, there are certain ordinances confirmed by the act of 1865 which require special attention. As we have seen, by the ordinance of May 23, 1859, permission was given to lay a street railway on and along certain streets and bridges in the south and west divisions of the city of Chicago, "and the same to keep, maintain and use and to operate thereon railway cars and carriages during all the term of the said act of February 14, 1859, specified and prescribed, in the manner and upon the conditions hereinafter designated." On the same day, May 23, 1859, a grant was made to the North Chicago City Railway Company of the right to use certain streets, the rights and privileges granted to be in force for the benefit of the company for the full term of twenty-five years from the passage of the ordinance and no longer. This difference in the grants to the two railway companies is significant. In the ordinance of 1858 the
In considering the effect of the ordinances passed by the common council of the city of Chicago in the period from February, 1859, to May 3, 1875, it may be well to briefly summarize the terms of these ordinances. They will be found in the margin.
This ordinance contained this proviso, "but nothing in this section contained, or the acceptance hereof, shall in any manner impair, change or alter the existing rights, duties, and obligations of the city or of said companies, respectively, from and after the said term of years hereinbefore mentioned."
We thus perceive a consistent purpose running through the grants to the north side company to adhere to the term of the original ordinance of May 23, 1859, limiting the right to use the streets to the period of twenty-five years, "and no longer," by reference in subsequent ordinances, to the prior ordinance. We do not regard the exceptional character of the ordinance of October 26, 1874, amended April 26, 1875, as overcoming, as to other ordinances, the general purpose reflected in them. That ordinance was a grant in part to the
As to the west side companies we find running through the ordinances making grants in the divisions covered by that system a purpose to preserve the original permission of the ordinance of August 16, 1858, which granted the use of the streets for the term of twenty-five years and until purchase by the city. The language used in the ordinance of May 23, 1859, granting the use of the streets, is "during all the term in said act of the fourteenth of February, A.D. 1859, specified and prescribed." This ordinance and similar ones passed prior to the act of February 6, 1865, were confirmed by that act, and rights under them were reserved by the compromise ordinance of July 10, 1883. We hold that when streets were occupied under the authority of these ordinances the company has the right to the use of the streets until the city shall purchase under the contracts thus made.
In the west side system, the ordinance of August 17, 1864, is silent as to the term of the grant. We do not think this indicates any intention on the part of the city, even if it had the power under legislative acts then in existence, to confer the right in perpetuity to the occupancy of the streets, a point which we do not feel called upon to decide. The other ordinances by direct terms or references to prior ordinances have made the grants for the west side system for the term of twenty-five years, and until purchase by the city, in the manner stated, and we do not think there was any intention to depart from the plan in this one ordinance omitting specifically to name a definite time of occupancy. At this time there had been no extension of the life of the corporation, and it was specifically limited to twenty-five years.
In reaching this conclusion we are not unmindful of the decision of this court in Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' Railway Company, 184 U.S. 368, 395, holding that although a corporation
It is contended that whatever rights would otherwise be included in contracts confirmed by the act of 1865, they were lost to the companies by accepting the privileges conferred in the "power ordinances" of June 7, 1886, and March 30, 1888. But prior to the passage of those ordinances was the so-called "compromise ordinance" of July 10, 1883, as amended August 6, 1883, settling certain controversies as to license fees and street paving, and extending the time of operation for twenty years, and further providing: "But nothing in this section contained, or the acceptance hereof, shall in any manner impair, change or alter the existing rights, duties and obligations of the city, or of said companies, respectively, from and after the expiration of the said term of years hereinbefore mentioned." In the North Chicago City Railway ordinance and the West Chicago City Railway Company ordinance clauses are inserted to the effect that privileges as to time after the expiration of the term of twenty years are to be governed by ordinances theretofore passed. In view of this reservation we are of opinion that whatever rights and privileges the company had in the streets after the expiration of the time limitation in the "power ordinances" were not lost by the acceptance of privileges conferred in those ordinances.
It is contended that the railway companies had no power to accept ordinances, for the use of other than animal power in the operation of railways, because of the titles of the various
The learned Circuit Court held that privileges granted under ordinances of the town of Jefferson were limited to twenty years. This ruling, it is contended by the Chicago West Division Railway Company, is erroneous, because of the act of 1859, which provided: "Section 5. The said corporation is hereby authorized to extend the said several railways herein authorized to be built in the manner aforesaid to any point or points within the county of Cook, in this State; and to enable said corporation to construct any or all of the railways therein authorized, or their appendages, the said corporation is hereby vested with power to take and apply private property for the purposes and in the manner prescribed," etc. Section 6: "The said corporation is hereby authorized,
Before the passage of the act of 1865, incorporating the board of trustees of the town of Lake View, the supervisors granted permits to use some of the highways of Lake township. This authority was exercised under sections five and six of the act of February 14, 1859. We cannot agree that the duration of these permits would be in perpetuity, because of the fact that no time was specifically named in them. The extension into
The cases in the state courts are much divided as to the right of a municipal corporation, because of its charter power of controlling the streets, to grant the use thereof to a street railway company. Some of the cases are collected in Detroit Citizens' Railway Company v. Detroit, 64 Fed. Rep. 628, 637.
The act of 1859, section six, required the consent of the supervisor to the extension of the railways into townships of Cook County outside of Chicago. When the supervisor became a member of the township board of trustees and that board gave its consent, we think this satisfied the requirement of the act in that respect. The legislature might have given the railway
As we understand the decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois, the power to control the streets and highways by the township trustees, given by the act of March 5, 1867, would include the right to authorize their use for street railway purposes. In Chicago Municipal Gas Light Co. v. The Town of Lake, 130 Illinois, 42, 54, the court held: "The power to control and regulate the streets, alleys and other public places within the limits of the town of Lake, and abate any obstructions, encroachments or nuisances thereon, was given, in its charter, to the corporate authorities of the town. Under this power the town could lawfully permit any use of such streets and alleys that is consistent with the public objects for which they are held, and could make a grant of a right of way for the purpose of laying gas pipes and mains under the surface." In People v. Blocki, 203 Illinois, 363, 368, the same court said, having reference to a grant of the right to lay switch tracks in the street: "The street, at the time said permits were granted, was under the control of the board of trustees of the town of Lake, and under the power conferred upon that municipality by law it was authorized to allow the use of said street for any purpose not incompatible with the purpose for which it was established, and to allow a railroad track to be laid therein was not a use incompatible with the purpose for which it was established." In City of Quincy v. Bull, 106 Illinois, 337, on page 349 it was said: "In this State there is vested in municipal corporations a fee simple title to the streets. Under the power of exclusive control over streets, it is very well settled by decisions of this court that the municipal authorities may do anything with, or allow any use of, streets which is not incompatible
The question remains as to the term for which the rights granted by the trustees and the municipality of Lake View were to be held. The ordinances making these grants required the company to perform certain duties to the municipalities, such as the laying of pavement subject to the approval of the trustees. On April 16, 1887, the incorporated town of Lake View became incorporated as the city of Lake View under the Cities and Villages Act of 1872. On July 15, 1889, the territory included in the city of Lake View was annexed to the city of Chicago. We think in such case that the terms granted would not extend beyond the life of the corporation conferring them where there was no attempt to confer a definite term, assuming, without deciding, that it was within the authority of the municipality to grant a perpetuity. Our attention has been called to a late case decided in the Supreme Court of Illinois, People ex rel. v. Chicago Telephone Co., not officially reported, in which it was held that where trustees of villages and towns have granted rights extending telephone privileges not for a definite period, that such grants could not be construed to be perpetuities and did not extend beyond the lives of the corporations granting them. The court says: "The ground of the defendant's claim that the ordinance does not limit its charges in the annexed territory is that before the annexation the minor municipalities had granted to it the right to occupy the streets therein for its business, without any limits as to time. If the grants had been for terms of
This seems to us a reasonable view, and being the construction of the highest court of the State of Illinois, we are willing to accept it. Furthermore, these grants in Lake View were mere extensions of the old system, which, as we have seen, was limited in its rights to use the streets received from the city to the term of twenty-five years, extended twenty years by the compromise ordinance. In the absence of express language conferring a longer term, we do not think it was intended to extend the grant beyond the period already permitted to the system by grants from the city.
As we have said, we do not deem it necessary to take up all the questions which were raised and determined by the Circuit Court in considering the case and settling the decree in that court. Upon further proceedings the judgment of this court is only to be held conclusive upon matters specifically stated in this opinion.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA, with whom concur MR. JUSTICE BREWER and MR. JUSTICE BROWN, dissenting.
This case as to questions common to all the railways depends mainly upon the acts of 1859 and 1865 — incidentally upon the act of 1861. The latter act may be omitted from special consideration, as it depends upon the others. Private Laws of Illinois, 1861, p. 340. It incorporated the Chicago West Division Railway Company and gave to that company all the powers conferred upon the other companies by the second, third, fourth and sixth sections of the act of 1859.
It will be observed of the acts of 1859 and 1865 that they created corporations respectively for the period of twenty-five and ninety-nine years, and empowered them to construct, maintain and operate a single and double track railway in Chicago.
The acts, as was remarked by the Circuit Court, fall into three divisions: (1) The granting part, the authority of the companies to construct railways; (2) the identifying part, the designation of the streets by the common council; (3) the terms and conditions of the occupation of the streets by the companies and the manner in which the terms and conditions shall be prescribed.
The meaning of the third division is one of the chief controversies in the case; in other words, the extent of the authority of the common council — whether it was virtually an authority to grant rights in the streets or authority to regulate the rights conferred by the legislature; or, as it is aptly expressed by the Circuit Court, whether it was an authority to fix by stipulation with the companies that which relates "to the physical side of the occupancy of the streets or the administrative side of the operation of the lines."
"The said corporation is hereby authorized and empowered to construct, maintain and operate a single or double track railway, with all necessary and convenient tracks for turn-outs, side tracks and appendages, in the city of Chicago and in, on, over and along such street or street, highway or highways, bridge or bridges, river or rivers, within the present or future limits of the South and [or] West Divisions of the city of Chicago, as the common council of said city have authorized said corporators or any of them or shall from time to time authorize said corporations, or either of them, so to do, in such manner and upon such terms and conditions and with such rights and privileges, immunities and exemptions as the said common council has or may by contract with said parties, or any or either of them, prescribe; and any and all acts or deeds of transfer of rights, privileges or franchises between the corporations in said several acts named, or any two of them, and all contracts, stipulations, licenses and undertakings made, entered into or given, and as made or amended by and between the said common council, and any one or more of the said corporations, respecting the location, use or exclusion of railways in or upon the streets, or any of them, of said city, shall be deemed and held and continued in force during the life hereof, as valid and effectual, to all intents and purposes, as if made a part, and the same are hereby made a part, of said several acts: Provided that it shall be competent for the said common council, with the written consent or concurrence of the other party or parties, or their assigns, to any of said contracts, stipulations, licenses or undertakings, to amend, modify or annul the same."
It is obvious, as far as words can accomplish it, and as directly as words can accomplish it, the companies were granted
That such grant must come from the State is, of course, not denied, but it is urged, that the grant of rights passed to the railway companies through the agency of the city, the city receiving a delegation of the State's power. This is based upon the words of the city's charter, and the authority given in the acts of 1859 and 1865 to designate the "terms and conditions" upon which the streets might be occupied.
The view I take of the acts makes it comparatively unimportant to consider the city's charter. There seemed to be a necessity for the acts, and they were complete in themselves, independent of other grants of power, except what were continued or confirmed by them. If the charter was adequate to invest in the city plenary power over the streets, we may wonder at the enactment of those statutes and many years of misapprehension of them and concern about them. Counsel for the companies assert, and the assertion does not seem to be denied, that an injunction was issued by the Circuit Court of Cook County, restraining the laying of tracks under the ordinance of 1858. The extent of the power of the city, however, I shall presently consider more at length, and will now pass to those parts of the act which the city insists conferred authority on the common council.
The stress of the argument is on the words "terms and conditions," in the third division. The city contends, and the court decides, reversing the decree of the Circuit Court, that the authority of the city to prescribe terms and conditions of the occupation of the streets included the authority to fix the time of occupation. I dissent from that interpretation for several reasons. It is opposed to the context in which the words "terms and conditions" are used. It is opposed to their primary and natural meaning. It would be a careless employment of them, and disregard or destroy distinctions
The act of 1859 was certainly a direct grant from the State to the companies for the time of their charter life, and the necessity or the advisibility of conferring authority upon the city to limit the time of occupancy of the streets could not have entered into the head of anybody. No conditions existed which suggested the necessity or prudence of giving such authority. The time of occupancy expressed in the ordinance of 1858, the time of the life of corporations prescribed in the act of 1859, and the time for which the franchises conferred by that act could be exercised, all coincided. It could not have occurred to any one that twenty-five years, the term fixed in all the instruments, was injuriously long and demanded authority somewhere to limit its excess. To these considerations as proof that the words "terms and conditions" were not intended to give authority to prescribe a time
By an ordinance passed in 1859 the time of occupation was expressed to be "during all the term in the said act of the fourteenth of February, A.D. 1859, specified and prescribed." This, as said by counsel for the companies, "is a distinct recognition of the fact that the term for the enjoyment of the franchise was to be found in the statute, and was not among the elements of the contract which the ordinance might prescribe."
With the act of 1859 there came a change — differences from the act of 1859 of conspicuous and striking import. These differences were too full of meaning not to be considered enlargements of the act of 1859, and they were not misunderstood. The lives of the corporations were extended to ninety-nine years. There is no dispute about this, and it would seem necessarily that the other provisions were on account of and completed the purpose of the extension. And the extension had some valuable purpose. It was certainly not for the purpose only of extending the time of the abstract beings with nothing to do — no functions to exercise, no rights, no obligations — and the latter might, we can conceive, be as necessary for the public to enforce as the former for the companies to exercise. Union Traction Co. v. City of Chicago, 199 Illinois, 484. It would be a strange confusion and confounding of purposes to make the existence of a corporation more important than that which it was created to do. Necessarily, life and functions went together, the term of the rights and obligations of the corporations coinciding with the term of their life.
This coincidence of the life and the rights of the corporations being kept in mind, we can easily resolve whatever ambiguities are in the statute of 1865. It will give to every word a use and meaning, and keep distinct the power which was exercised by the legislature and the powers to be exercised by the common council. Let me, at the expense of repetition, enter into some detail. The act of 1865, amending the act of
Upon what reasoning is the conclusion based? Before considering the question, however, let me refer to the statement in the opinion that "the council made and the companies accepted specific ordinances fixing the time of occupancy, as had been done in the original ordinances of May 23, 1859. And neither before nor after the passage of the act of 1865 was the ninety-nine year term recognized or acted upon in ordinances granting the use of streets." I am uncertain as to the conclusion deduced from the statement. It needs some explanation. Standing alone it may produce an erroneous impression. If the companies accepted the ordinances, conceding the power of the city, without protest or reservation of their rights under the act of 1865 to longer terms of occupancy, there could be no controversy over the interpretation of the act of 1865. Other considerations would supervene and demand attention. Counsel for the city contended for an estoppel against the companies, and because the court has not responded to that contention, but discusses and bases its opinion upon the meaning of the act, I also have discussed its meaning as necessary to the case and determinative of it;
First, let me quote the language of the act of 1865, separated from the parts which I think are not relevant to the present part of the discussion: "The said corporation is authorized and empowered to construct, maintain and operate a single or double track railway . . . in the city of Chicago, and in, on, over and along such street or streets . . . as the common council of said city have authorized said corporators, or any of them, or shall from time to time authorize said corporations, or either of them, so to do, in such manner and upon such terms and conditions . . . as the said common council has (prescribed)
The language is orderly and, to me, unmistakable in its relations and meaning. What element is omitted necessary to the clear expression of a definite purpose? Not one. We have already seen that the rights given would have been, if there had been no other expression of time, coincident with the life of the corporations, but time was not left to implication, however clear the implication might have been. It was expressed. It is true it is not said that the rights, contracts, etc., shall be "held and continued in force" for ninety-nine years. If it
There are various answers offered, some accepting that meaning, others disputing it. One counsel for the city submits rather tentatively that the words "during the life hereof" may be words of limitation, and that "the grants by the common council thus ratified by the act should continue for their full term," unless "the corporate existence of one or more of the corporations be terminated by dissolution or forfeiture within the period for which its privileges in the streets were granted." It is said "thus construed, the act means precisely and exactly what it says, that is, during the life, i.e., during the corporate lives of the several companies, the contracts made with them by the common council are as valid and effectual as if made part of the act. . . ."
Other counsel for the city leave a choice of interpretations. They say "the expression during the life hereof" is vague and ambiguous. It may be capable of three interpretations: As meaning the life of the act; or the life of the deeds, licenses and contracts; or the lives of the railway corporations, respectively. They incline rather to the second, and say that "during the life hereof" means the life of the section or the matters mentioned in the section, and "hereof" should be changed to "thereof." The court accepts neither of the interpretations, but gives its authority to another. It was apparent that the interpretations advanced by counsel were too restricted and ignored too much the words of the act. It was apparent that the clause referred to the lives of the corporations (ninety-nine years), continued something for those lives, and the court selects as the things so continued "the acts or deeds of transfer between the corporation so far as
I concede the rule to be that nothing passes by a grant of franchises, such as those conferred by the acts under review, unless it be clearly stated or necessarily implied, but I do not think the statutes under review call for an application of the rule. Whatever is ambiguous in the acts yields a definite and consistent purpose and meaning by the application of the simple rules of interpretation. In such case there is no place for the rule of strict construction. Our reports abound in cases where, against bold and able controversy, public grants have been sustained, and where division in the court has marked with emphasis the strength of the doubts which existed. And we have taken care to warn against a misunderstanding of the rule in a case of significant import. It will be conceded, I think, that the power of taxation is the highest attribute of sovereignty, one the most necessary to it, and against the limitation of which all intendments proclaim. The Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206. Limitations of this power have been sustained in favor of private individuals arising from statutes of disputable meaning. In Citizens' Bank v. Parker, 192 U.S. 73, interpreting the charter of the bank, it was held that the bank was exempt from a license tax, and we there said that the rule of strict construction is to be used to solve ambiguities, not to create them. There was a dissent that pressed the rule against the reasoning and conclusions of the court.
Returning then to the argument of the court, not required by any rule to find ambiguity in the statutes, but required by every rule to solve if found, what is that argument? Its first premise is the assumption that it was the policy of the State to vest in the city the control of the streets. Some control, yes; but how much? Was it a policy of unlimited or qualified
The case was based on the act of 1859, and the right derived from it as distinguished from rights derived from an ordinance of the city. It was said: "It is a misconception of the law to suppose the railway company derives its powers to construct a railroad from any ordinance of the city. All its authority is from the State, and is conferred by its charter. The city has delegated to it the power to say in what manner and upon what conditions the company may exercise the franchises conferred by the State, but nothing more." The reason given was that the ordinance emanated from a source not "competent to grant a franchise." That power the legislature alone possessed. The date of the ordinance was November 13, 1871. It is manifest, therefore, that the policy of the State of Illinois up to 1871, and necessarily in 1859 and 1865, was not to give its municipal corporations the authority to grant a right in the streets, but only empowered them to regulate the right. And it was necessary to decide the kind and the extent of authority that was vested in the city. It was urged that the ordinance passed on purported to grant "special privileges" or "franchises," and was therefore void under the constitution of 1870. The court replied that the ordinance did not grant a franchise and that by no construction could the constitution be said to be a "limitation upon the municipal corporation to designate certain streets and fix the conditions upon which a railway company, organized under a special charter previously granted or under a general law since the adoption of the constitution, might lay its track." (p. 548).
This view acquired emphasis from the dissenting opinion, which took issue with the court and virtually made the city the source of the rights of the railway and not the State, and,
The case was decided in 1874, and the principle it declared is the exact contention of the railways to-day, and, to the strength of the reasoning of the court, may be added the consideration that the property acquired and the investments made under the sanction of the decision for thirty-two years now claim its protection against impairment. Such considerations should prevail over ambiguity, could ambiguity ever have been asserted to exist. It received its solution and should never again be brought forward to cloud the meaning of the statute.
The distinction between the plenary and the limited control over the streets by the city is substantial in the controversy between it and the railway companies. Manifestly, the power to grant a franchise is not the same as the power to designate streets on which the franchise can be exercised. Of course, the streets must be designated before the franchise can be exercised, and therefore the power to designate may be magnified and confounded with the other power. It is so magnified, and the inability of the railroads to compel any action upon the part of the city is urged and dwelt on by counsel. The argument is that, as the city could have refused to designate any street, it had the right to exact anything of the railroads. In other words, the defects in the remedies of the railway companies enlarged the power of the city and changed the nature of the grant to the companies. Or it may be put this way, the power given to the city as a subordinate instrumentality of the State may be employed to defeat the purpose of the State. This cannot be done. Appeal of City of Pittsburg, 115 Pa. St. 4; Atlantic City Water Works Co. v. Consumers' Water Company, 44 N.J. Eq. 427; Galveston, &c., R. Co. v. Galveston, 90 Texas, 398; S.C., 91 Texas, 17; Homestead
In the grant of franchises from the State and their regulation merely by the city there was no inconsistency, and this division of functions was not only natural of itself, but comported with the policy of the State, as explained in Chicago City Ry. Co. v. The People, supra. The decision cannot, it seems to me, be explained away. It was nearer in time to the enactment of the statutes than we are to-day, and it is the conditions of that time we should try to realize. This is not as easy as it seems to be. Whatever we may profess, it is not easy to realize the conditions, thoughts and purposes of another time. In 1859 nothing indicated the necessity of giving the city the power now contended for. In 1859 there could be no foresight of the development of street railways. Then they were just beginning to be thought of as a means of transportation and the city was as eager to procure them as capitalists to construct them. It is said that time is the wisest thing on earth, and taking to ourselves its wisdom, in 1906, we are sure we would have seen in an enterprise just starting, and yet tentative, the growth it might attain and the measures that would be necessary to restrain and control it. But if there was anyone capable of such prophecy the act of 1859 did
The situation in 1859 was exceedingly simple. Certain persons had been given the power by an ordinance of the city to construct a street railway. The right under the ordinance was questioned — maybe it had been adjudged illegal, and the act of 1859 was passed. It explicitly gave, in my opinion, the right to construct and operate railways in the streets and gave authority to the city only to regulate the exercise of the right. But granting that some of its words are ambiguous — granting that the words "terms and conditions" can be interpreted to authorize a limitation of time — such interpretation is not the only one of which they are susceptible. We should, therefore, consider whether that interpretation can be adhered to in view of the other provisions of the act of 1865.
First, I may lay down as a fundamental rule that we must seek the meaning of the act from its words, and that we should so exercise interpretation as " to bring a sense out of the words used, and not to bring a sense into them." McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N.Y. 593, 602. And with the consequences of the act we should not concern ourselves. This court has said that a plain meaning of a provision of a statute not contradicted by another provision must prevail, even against a charge of absurdity and injustice, unless they be so monstrous that all mankind would without hesitation unite in rejecting the meaning. Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 202. With these rules in mind, and by referring to section 2 of the act of 1865, it will be observed that its parts are providently arranged and its words are clear — so clear, that conjecture must be put
The section makes provision for certain things, to wit, (1) the acts or deeds of transfer of rights, privileges or franchises between the corporations; (2) contracts, stipulations, licenses and undertakings made and entered into "and as made or amended" between the corporations and the common council "respecting the location, use or exclusion of the railways in or upon the streets." And what is done with these things? The answer is in the following provision: "shall be deemed and held and continued in force during the life hereof as valid and effectual, to all intents and purposes, as if made a part, and the same are hereby made a part, of said several acts." Can a distinction be made between the things provided for? Which of those things shall "be deemed and held and continued in force during the life" of the corporations? I say life of the corporations, as that, it is decided, is the meaning of the phrase.
Considering the language of the provision, there can be but one answer. It permits no exception of any of the things, nor a distinction between them. A distinction is, however, asserted, and the provision is confined to the instruments transferring "franchises," as distinguished from the instruments transferring "rights and privileges," and is denied all application to the "contracts, stipulations, licenses and undertakings" between the companies and the city. In what way is this done and with what consequences?
It will be observed that the provision does not simply confirm or ratify either the acts or deeds of transfer or the contracts; it does more. It continues them in force and makes them valid and effectual for the life of the act, the conceded equivalent of the life of the corporations. The provision is not, therefore, that the contracts and privileges obtained from the city shall "stand as made," but shall be continued in force during the life of the corporations — a distinctly different purpose, one which the words of the act sustain and at the same time exclude the other. It was not a provision for simple ratification
Plainly, therefore, the phrase "during the life hereof" cannot be limited to the acts or deeds of transfer of franchises. To do so is not only to distinguish between the instruments of transfer of franchises and the instruments of transfer of rights and privileges, but is to detach the phrase and its correlated words from its immediate objects, the "contracts, stipulations, licenses and undertakings" entered into by the common council and the companies, and to leave those objects without provision — without connection with anything, coherence or purpose. Against this all the rules of interpretation protest, and the rules of construction cannot be invoked to justify a greater liberty. The purpose of construction, it is true, is to arrive at conclusions beyond the absolute sense of the text. Lieber, Hermeneutics, 53. But the integrity of the text cannot be disregarded. I do not overlook the fact that the court sees an inconsistency between the parts of section two and attempts to reconcile them. But in what way? As it seems to me, by magnifying the obscure in one part of the section and making it prevail over the manifestly clear in another part. By making the words "terms and conditions" doubtful necessarily, and which, as I think, can only by an extreme indulgence be given the meaning put upon them, dominate everything else, even to the breaking of the section into unrelated and meaningless parts. To my mind a strange situation is presented. The legislature of the State had in its mind, we are told, a simple purpose — the purpose to create corporations and to give them power to acquire rights from the city; and how did they express the purpose — simply, directly and obviously? No; but in such way that the words
There is another consideration of potent weight. The construction of the court was not the contemporary construction of the act of 1865. It was not the construction proclaimed by the Governor, justifying his veto of the act. He pointed out that the necessary effect of extending the lives of the corporations was to extend their rights in the streets of the city, and that he had received petitions signed by a large number of the citizens of Chicago, protesting against the measure as one which had been passed without their assent, or that of the corporate authorities, and that it extended the franchise for ninety-nine years in advance of the term already vested in the corporation. And he also pointed out that the right given to the city to purchase the railway property at the end of twenty-five years, secured to it by the ordinance of August 16, 1858, was also extended to ninety-nine years. And upon a fair construction the Governor said, "the act seems hardly susceptible of any other meaning," "and he had heard," he further said, "none other claimed for it." The Governor also considered the clause which continued in force the acts or deeds of transfer, and, so far as his words indicate, he perceived no difference between the instruments of transfer.
Seldom has a statute enacted at a distant time received so clear and influential proclamation of its meaning and effect as is afforded of the act of 1865, by the Governor's message. It seems now, forty years removed from the enactment of the law, that the Governor, who was close to its enactment, and the citizens of Chicago who protested against it, were mistaken in its meaning. And the Governor was part of the lawmaking power. It was his duty, therefore, to study the statute and
May 23, 1859 —
February 13, 1860 —
November 18, 1861 —
November 16, 1863 —
Excluding railways from certain streets named.
March 14, 1864 —
Releasing one street and substituting another.
March 28, 1864 —
Authority to remove from one street to another.
March 28, 1864 —
July 11, 1864 —
August 17, 1864 —
November 13, 1871 —
Extension of tracks on certain streets named.
March 8, 1875 —
April 19, 1875 —
On the north side we find the following:
May 23, 1859 —
January 18, 1864 —
August 11, 1864 —
May 8, 1871 —
November 20, 1871 —
October 26, 1874 —
April 26, 1875 —