There can be no doubt of the correctness of the master's finding with regard to the work done by Cooper & Son prior to June 3, 1891. This work was done under a contract made May 23, 1890, between Cooper & Son and Chadick, who was at the time general manager of the Choctaw Coal and Railway Company, and who, by authority of the board of directors, had arranged with the Judiciary Committees of Congress for the location of the United States court at South McAlester, upon condition that the company would provide the officers of the court, free of all cost, with suitable quarters. While the contract was not signed by Chadick, but by Cox, the architect, it was so signed under special authority from Chadick, and it provided that the work was to be done to the satisfaction and under the supervision of the architect. Bills were rendered for this work, which were certified by the chief engineer and assistant manager of the company. Mr. Chadick
The principal matter in dispute relates to the proper interpretation of the order of October 13, 1891, referring the claim of Cooper & Son to the master, "to ascertain the amount justly and equitably due as the true value of the work done and materials furnished," and to the refusal of the master, under the terms of this order, to permit the appellants to prove the cost and value of the building, without reference to any contract. In this connection, the master found that the contract under which the work was done was executed by agents of the receivers, having authority so to do, and under special direction and approval of the receivers themselves, and of the court; that the work was performed and materials furnished in reliance upon this contract; that the receivers knew of this, and with such knowledge approved of this work, received the benefit of it, and took possession of the hotel; and also that the work was done in strict accordance with the plans and specifications. While the findings of the master in this particular are not absolutely binding upon the court, there is a presumption in their favor, and they will not be set aside or modified in the absence of some clear error or mistake. Camden v. Stuart, 144 U.S. 104, 118.
On June 3 the receivers ordered the work to be stopped, and a bill to be rendered for what had been done up to that time, saying that the receivers would "then furnish you with designs and directions as to the work to be done, and you
"GENTLEMEN: We have been advised by Maj. William Nelson, master, of the following order of the United States court: `You are hereby directed to finish up court-room, all the offices on lower floor of hotel building, and also such rooms on the second floor as may be necessary, in accordance with estimates to be hereafter furnished.'"
In the meantime, and in consequence of the same conference, Chadick instructed the architect, Mr. Cox, to make the plans and specifications of what was required for the accommodation of the court, and send them up to Muscogee for the inspection of Major Nelson, the master. He sent them there on June 6. The master appears to have submitted them to the judge and marshal, who approved of them, and directed the work to be done, though no order of court was entered to that effect, and no question of price was considered, this matter being left to the receivers. Upon the return of these plans and specifications to Mr. Cox, the architect, he drew up a contract in compliance with them, sent one copy to Mr. Cooper, with specifications annexed, and another copy to Mr. Chadick's office. Cooper & Son, who appear to have already seen the plans and specifications, addressed Mr. Chadick a letter under date of June 24, agreeing to do the work for $10,250. Chadick testified that his recollection was that the receivers accepted the proposition, though he seems never to have formally answered the letter. But however this may be, a contract was drawn up bearing date July 7, and signed by Cooper & Son, and by Cox, as supervising architect, not at the foot of the contract itself, but at the end of the specifications, which followed the contract. Mr. Cox testified that Chadick ordered the work to go ahead, and knowing the amount, he inserted it in the contract; that Mr. Chadick came
In this connection Mr. Gowen, the principal witness for the appellants, states that, shortly after his appointment, permission was asked of the court to enter into a contract for the roofing of the building, and an order procured to that effect, and that he concurred in the making of a contract for this work; that he gave the matter no further consideration until March, when his attention was called to the fact that the inside work was still going on; that he then called Mr. Chadick's attention to the matter, who said that nothing was being done beyond making the building weathertight, and undertook to have authority procured to do the necessary work in closing the building. Subsequently, upon Chadick's representations that their offices were so cramped as to greatly interfere with the efficient transaction of business, he agreed to the fitting up of quarters in the hotel building, and after
Upon the occasion of his next visit, which was in the latter part of May, he learned that the work was still progressing, and had an altercation with Mr. Chadick upon the subject, in which he reminded him that he had undertaken to have the work entirely stopped, to which Mr. Chadick stated that he thought he would be able to make an advantageous use of the building upon its completion, and that he had assumed the responsibility for the continuance of the work, although against Mr. Gowen's wish. The result of this conversation was the stoppage order of June 3, which was designed to prevent Cooper's entering into any further arrangement without his concurrence and the prior approval of the court. He further stated that he never saw or heard of the letter of June 24 of Cooper & Son, proposing to do the work for $10,250, although he knew and saw that work upon the court-rooms and offices was going on, and was informed by Mr. Chadick that this was being done by direction of the court; and that he believed that Cooper was going on with the work without furnishing an estimate or making any contract, as had been the case heretofore, and felt certain that Mr. Cooper would not be allowed any excessive sum; that the first intimation he had of the existence of the contract was on August 29, when he was asked to sign such contract as a prerequisite to Mr. Cooper's allowing the marshal to take possession of the rooms fitted up for the court and its officers; he declined to sign the contract; never promised to pay Mr. Cooper the amount claimed, because he was not satisfied that the price named therein was a proper one, and that he subsequently obtained an appraisement by builders of his own employment, who reported that the charges were grossly excessive. He further stated that he never gave Mr. Cox authority to bind the receivers by estimates or contracts such as this
It seems that, near the end of August, when Mr. Cooper had this conversation with Mr. Gowen, he was told there was going to be a change in the administration; that Gowen was going to take charge as managing receiver; that he was
On October 8, this petition was filed, alleging that the work subsequent to June 3 was done by virtue of direct authority from Messrs. Chadick and Gowen and Major Nelson, the master in chancery, and in compliance with the specifications signed by Cooper & Son and Cox. The answer of Gowen denied the contract of July 7, though it admitted an arrangement made with Mr. Chadick, with the approval of the judge and special master, to make certain alterations and additions to the hotel building, to fit it up for a court-room and the rooms necessary for the officers of the court.
In this state of the case, and on October 13, Mr. Gowen, as receiver, and the Life Insurance Company, by its attorney, appeared before the court and submitted to it the so-called Ardmore order, which was entered by the court with the consent of all the parties. This order, upon its face, is undoubtedly susceptible of the interpretation put upon it by the appellants, and authorized the master to receive testimony as to the actual value of the work done and materials furnished, irrespective of any contract between the parties; and yet in view of the antecedent facts it does not seem probable that the court thereby intended to rule out all evidence of the contract. The petition of Cooper & Son relied upon their arrangement with Chadick as a contract. The answer denied the contract, and under these allegations it can scarcely have been intended by Cooper & Son to waive entirely the benefit of such contract, if it existed. In fact, it would appear that, prior to this order, it had been determined by the court that such contract was made, since in the final decree, which was entered on January 19, 1892, it is said "that in the order there made October 13, 1891, the court, upon the evidence then
If such contract existed, was within the competency of the parties, and was proven to the satisfaction of the court, it superseded the necessity of introducing testimony as to the actual value of the work done.
We think the testimony fully justified the master in his finding that a contract had been made with Mr. Chadick for the work. The stoppage order of June 3 indicated an intention on the part of the receivers to furnish Cooper & Son with further designs and directions as to the work to be done, for which work they anticipated a bid, and agreed to submit the same to the court for its approval or disapproval. Within a few days thereafter, plans and specifications, furnished by the architect of the receivers, with a notice that the court had ordered the court-room, all the offices on the lower floor of the hotel building, and also such rooms on the second floor as might be needed, to be finished up, were sent to Cooper & Son; and after an examination of the plans and specifications, they made a bid for a certain amount, which Chadick, acting for the receivers, accepted verbally. Cooper & Son thereupon signed the plans and specifications, with the architect, and proceeded to do the work in reliance upon the contract. Whether the contract was actually signed by the receivers was quite immaterial, so long as the terms of the contract were agreed upon and understood between the parties, and, as observed by the court below, "when Cooper & Son were directed to proceed with the work called for by the plans, the contract between the parties was closed, and the preparation and signing of a formal writing would only have called into existence additional evidence of the fact."
In the very case of Vanderbilt v. Central Railroad Co., 43 N.J. Eq. 669, so strongly relied upon by appellants, it was remarked in the opinion of the court, p. 684:
"It must have been contemplated that in the performance of those multifarious duties some degree of discretion might be accorded to the receiver. Whether a power to exercise such discretion would not be assumed to exist in every case without a special order need not be considered, for it is clear that the chancellor may accord such discretionary power to a receiver by a general order — such as was made in this cause... .
"If the contract has been completely performed and its performance accepted by the receiver, and the claim is merely for compensation, relief of that nature would seem necessarily
The work done having thus received the sanction and approval of the court, it can make no difference, so far as the legal aspect of the case is concerned, whether the contract was executed by one or both of the receivers. Indeed, in view of the fact that two or more receivers of a railway are frequently appointed who sometimes reside at considerable distances from each other, we are unwilling to say that a contract may not lawfully be made by one of such receivers, which shall be binding upon the estate. The necessities of the case may sometimes require that contracts of a local character shall be made, where it is inconvenient, or perhaps impossible, to obtain the consent of the other receiver. So, if by arrangement between themselves one is constituted managing receiver, his authority may have a broader scope and may approximate to that of a sole receiver. Mr. Chadick may have made an injudicious bargain in agreeing to pay $10,250 for the job, but so long as no bad faith is imputed to him and no fraud or mistake is charged, it is difficult to see how the company can escape payment. The contract having been fully performed, evidence of the actual value of the work and materials was irrelevant, and in this view of the case the master did not err in ruling it out and holding the receivers to the contract. "The true value of the work done and materials furnished" may be, with entire appropriateness, said to be the value which the parties have deliberately and knowingly put upon them, and "the amount justly and equitably due" the contractor under such circumstances is the amount which the receiver has promised to pay him. In addition to this, there was extra work performed
The fact that the court did not direct the computation to be made irrespective of the contract, and that it subsequently recognized the validity of the claim and directed it to be paid, is inconsistent with the idea that it did not intend that the contract should be respected. If Mr. Gowen, who appears to represent more particularly the interests of the bondholders and knew the work was being done, had desired to know the terms upon which Cooper & Son were doing the work, he might easily have informed himself, as he had done before, and called the attention of the court to the matter, when it may be assumed the court would have protected his rights. His testimony that he did not suppose the work was being done under contract is somewhat inconsistent with his stoppage order of June 3, which plainly contemplated a contract for future work.
There was no error in the court ordering the bill of Cooper & Son to be paid as a preferred claim. The work had been commenced before the receivership and was done in good faith, for the benefit of the company and the receivers. The building must either have been finished or the work already done become a total loss to the company. It appears to have been constructed for the accommodation of the officers of the road, and in other respects in furtherance of the interests of the road, and is an asset in the hands of the receivers, which may be sold, and the money realized therefrom applied to the payment of the claim. The fact that it is not covered by the mortgage renders it the more equitable that the proceeds of this sale shall be applied to the payment of the cost of its construction.
The decree of the court below is, therefore,