It is admitted that whatever value the medicine possesses was given to it by its original manufacturer, Moses Atwood. He lived in Georgetown, Massachusetts. He manufactured the medicine there. He sold it with the designation that it was his preparation, "Atwood's Vegetable Physical Jaundice Bitters," and was manufactured there by him. As the medicine was tried and proved to be useful, it was sought for under that designation, and that purchasers might not be misled, it was always accompanied with a label, showing by whom and at what place it was prepared. These statements were deemed important in promoting the use of the article and its sale, or they would not have been continued by the assignees of the original inventor. And yet they could not be used with any honest purpose when both statements had ceased to be true. It is not honest to state that a medicine is manufactured by Moses Atwood, of Georgetown, Massachusetts, when it is manufactured by the Manhattan Medicine Company in the city of New York.
Any one has an unquestionable right to affix to articles manufactured by him a mark or device not previously appropriated, to distinguish them from articles of the same general character manufactured or sold by others. He may thus notify the public of the origin of the article and secure to himself the benefits of any particular excellence it may possess from the manner or materials of its manufacture. His trade-mark is both a sign of the quality of the article and an assurance
The object of the trade-mark being to indicate, by its meaning or association, the origin or ownership of the article, it would seem that when a right to its use is transferred to others, either by act of the original manufacturer or by operation of law, the fact of transfer should be stated in connection with its use; otherwise a deception would be practised upon the public, and the very fraud accomplished, to prevent which courts of equity interfere to protect the exclusive right of the original manufacturer. If one affix to goods of his own manufacture signs or marks which indicate that they are the manufacture of others, he is deceiving the public and attempting to pass upon them goods as possessing a quality and merit which another's skill has given to similar articles, and which his own manufacture does not possess in the estimation of purchasers. To put forth a statement, therefore, in the form of a circular or label attached to an article, that it is manufactured in a particular place, by a person whose manufacture there had acquired a great reputation, when, in fact, it is manufactured by a different person at a different place, is a fraud upon the public which no court of equity will countenance.
This doctrine is illustrated and asserted in the case of The Leather Cloth Company (limited) v. The American Leather Cloth Company (limited), which was elaborately considered by Lord Chancellor Westbury, and afterwards in the House of Lords on appeal from his decree. 4 DeG. J. & S. 137, and 11 House of Lords' Cases, 523.
In that case, an injunction was asked to restrain the defendant from using a trade-mark to designate leather cloth manufactured by it, which trade-mark the complainant claimed to own. The article known as leather cloth was an American invention, and was originally manufactured by J.R. & C.P.
The defendant having used on goods manufactured by it a mark having some resemblance to that used by the complainant, the latter brought suit to enjoin the use. Vice-Chancellor Wood granted the injunction, but on appeal to the Lord Chancellor the decree was reversed and the bill dismissed. In giving his decision the Lord Chancellor said that the exclusive right to use a trade-mark with respect to a vendible commodity is rightly called property; that the jurisdiction of the court in the protection of trade-marks rests upon property, and that the court interferes by injunction because that is the only mode by which property of that description can be effectually protected. But, he added:
"When the owner of the trade-mark applies for an injunction to restrain the defendant from injuring his property by making
And again:
"Where a symbol or label, claimed as a trade-mark, is so constructed or worded as to make or contain a distinct assertion which is false, I think no property can be claimed in it, or, in other words, the right to the exclusive use of it cannot be maintained."
When the case reached the House of Lords the correctness of this doctrine was recognized by Lord Cranworth, who said that of the justice of the principle no one could doubt; that it is founded in honesty and good sense, and rests on authority as well as on principle, although the decision of the House was placed on another ground.
The soundness of the doctrine declared by the Lord Chancellor has been recognized in numerous cases. Indeed, it is but an application of the common maxim that he who seeks equity must present himself in court with clean hands. If his case discloses fraud or deception or misrepresentation on his part, relief there will be denied.
Long before the case cited was before the courts, this doctrine was applied when protection was sought in the use of trade-marks. In Pidding v. How, 8 Simons, 477, which was before Vice-Chancellor Shadwell in 1837, it appeared that the complainant was engaged in selling a mixed tea, composed of different kinds of black tea, under the name of "Howqua's Mixture," in packages having on three of their sides a printed label with those words. The defendant having sold tea under the same name, and in packages with similar labels, the complainant applied for an injunction to restrain him from so doing. An ex parte injunction, granted in the first instance, was dissolved, it appearing that the complainant had made false statements
In Perry v. Truefitt, 6 Beav. 66, which was before Lord Langdale, master of the rolls, in 1842, a similar ruling was had. There it appeared that one Leathart had invented a mixture for the hair, the secret and recipe for mixing which he had conveyed to the plaintiff, a hair-dresser and perfumer, who gave to the composition the name of "Medicated Mexican Balm," and sold it as "Perry's Medicated Mexican Balm." The defendant, one Truefitt, a rival hair-dresser and perfumer, commenced selling a composition similar to that of plaintiff, in bottles with labels closely resembling those used by him. He designated his composition and sold it as "Truefitt's Medicated Mexican Balm." The plaintiff thereupon filed his bill, alleging that the name or designation of "Medicated Mexican Balm" had become of great value to him as his trade-mark, and seeking to restrain the defendant from its use. It appeared, however, that the plaintiff, in his advertisements to the public, had falsely set forth that the composition was "a highly concentrated extract from vegetable balsamic productions" of Mexico, and was prepared from "an original receipe of the learned J.F. Von Blumenbach, and was recently presented to the proprietor by a very near relation of that illustrious physiologist;" and the court, therefore, refused the injunction, the master of the rolls holding that, in the face of such a misrepresentation, the court would not interpose in the first instance, citing with approval the decision in the case of Pidding v. How.
In a case in the Superior Court in the city of New York — Fetridge v. Wells, 4 Abbott (N.Y.), 144 — this subject was very elaborately and ably treated by Chief Justice Duer. The plaintiff there had purchased a recipe for making a certain cosmetic, which he sold under the name of "The Balm of a Thousand Flowers." The defendants commenced the manufacture and sale of a similar article, which they called "The Balm of Ten Thousand Flowers." The complainant, claiming the name
"Those who come into a court of equity, seeking equity, must come with pure hands and a pure conscience. If they claim relief against the frauds of others, they must themselves be free from the imputation. If the sales made by the plaintiff and his firm are effected, or sought to be, by misrepresentation and falsehood, they cannot be listened to when they complain that, by the fraudulent rivalry of others, their own fraudulent profits are diminished. An exclusive privilege for deceiving the public is assuredly not one that a court of equity can be required to aid or sanction. To do so would be to forfeit its name and character."
See also Seabury v. Grosvenor, 14 Blatchford, 262; Hobbs v. Francais, 19 How. (N.Y.) 567; Connell v. Reed, 128 Mass. 477; Palmer v. Harris, 60 Penn. St. 156. The doctrine enunciated in all these cases is founded in honesty and good sense; it rebukes fraud and encourages fair dealing with the public. In conformity with it, this case has no standing before a court of equity.
The decree of the court below dismissing the bill must therefore be affirmed; and it is so ordered.
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