MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from a decree dismissing a bill in chancery on demurrer. The complainant below, who is appellant here, according to the statements of the bill, is a corporation of West Virginia, organized for the purpose of carrying on a transportation business on the Ohio River, together with a general wharf and commission business; its principal office being located at the city of Parkersburg. It is the owner of several steamboats duly enrolled and licensed under the acts of Congress, and plying between Pittsburgh, Wheeling, Parkersburg, Cincinnati, and Covington. The bill was filed against the city of Parkersburg and its recorder and wharfmaster, to restrain the collection of certain demands for wharfage, and to recover back money previously paid on that account. It is contended that the city ordinance, under which the wharfage was demanded, is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States; and this is the ground on which the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States was invoked. The bill alleges that many years ago the city of Parkersburg caused to be constructed on the banks of the Ohio River at that place a wharf or public landing, to be used by the various steamboats trading on the river and landing at said city; and that said wharf is still controlled by the city under a certain ordinance passed by the mayor and common council in March, 1865, a copy of
The bill alleges that under and by virtue of this ordinance the city of Parkersburg has, ever since the organization of the complainant, required it and its agents to pay the charges provided in the ordinance for all the steamboats owned or controlled by it, which have discharged or received freight or passengers, or landed at the said wharf, and that the payments have been made under protest.
The bill then makes the following charge:—
"Your orator further alleges that, as it is advised and believes, the said ordinance is wholly null and void, and is in conflict with those provisions of the Constitution of the United States relating to the regulations of inter-state commerce and prohibiting any State, without the consent of Congress, from laying any duty of tonnage; and that the operation of the same tends to and does abridge the free use of the Ohio River by your orator, to which it is legally entitled by virtue of the enrolment and license of its steamboats under the laws of the United States as aforesaid. As by reference to said ordinance will appear, the rates of charges made by said city of Parkersburg upon steamboats landing at or in front of the wharf of said city
The bill further alleges that the rates charged by the ordinance are unreasonable, extortionate, and oppressive, and are made and levied as a tax upon commerce for the express purpose (under the assumed pretence of wharfage dues) of replenishing its treasury and increasing its revenue; that the cost of the wharf has been collected over and over again; that it is allowed to remain in bad repair; and that the wharfage dues collected have been used for other city purposes, paying its debts, &c.; that in the year 1876 over $2,700 was collected from various boats and vessels, less than $50 of which was spent on the wharf; and the same thing in other years. These facts are stated for the purpose of showing the extortionate character of the ordinance, and that it is used for the purpose of laying duties and imposts on imports and exports.
The bill further shows that for the recent refusal of the complainant to pay these wharfage charges the city of Parkersburg has instituted suits against it before the recorder under said ordinance; wherefore it prays a decree to restrain all further proceedings against the complainant by said suits or otherwise, from enforcing any judgment recovered by the city for the violation of said ordinance, or otherwise interfering with the rights of the complainant to the free use of the Ohio River by means of its steamboats; and for the recovery of moneys already exacted from it under said ordinance, amounting to over $2,000; and that the ordinance may be declared null and void.
To this bill the defendants demurred, and upon argument of the demurrer the bill was dismissed. From that decree the present appeal is taken.
It is conceded by the bill that the wharf for the use of which the charges are made, though public in the sense of being open to the use of the public, belongs to the city of Parkersburg; that it was built and is maintained by the city as its property; and the ordinance on its face shows that the charges imposed for landing at or using it are imposed as and for wharfage, and nothing else. It may be extortionate in amount; but it is wharfage. The allegations of the bill that it is not real wharfage, but a duty of tonnage, in the name and under the pretext of wharfage, cannot be received against the terms of the ordinance itself. This would open the door to an inquiry, in every case of wharfage alleged to be unreasonable, which would lead to great inconvenience and confusion. Neither courts nor juries would have any practicable criterion by which to judge of the secret intent with which the charge was made, whether as wharfage or as a duty of tonnage. Such an inquiry, if allowed, would bring into question not only the intent of municipal, but of legislative bodies. When the question is one of reasonable or unreasonable wharfage, we know what to do with it. It is a question known to the laws; and the modes of
It is contended, indeed, that the terms of the ordinance in question show that it was intended to exact a duty of tonnage, and is not confined to the prescription of charges for wharfage; and the words "anchor at or in front of any public landing or wharf," as describing vessels to be charged, are relied on as sustaining this view, since, as contended, they embrace vessels not using the wharf. But we do not understand this to be the meaning and effect of the words. The whole phrase should be taken together, and thus read, it is evidently confined to vessels
It is undoubtedly a general rule of law, in reference to all public wharves, that wharfage must be reasonable. A private wharf, that is, a wharf which the owner has constructed and reserves for his private use, is not subject to this rule; for, if any other person wishes to make use of it for a temporary purpose, the parties are at liberty to make their own bargain. That such wharves may be had and owned, even on a navigable river, is not open to controversy. It was so decided by this court in Dutton v. Strong, 1 Black, 23, and in Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497. Whether a private wharf may be maintained as such, where it is the only facility of the kind in a particular port or harbor, may be questioned. Sir Matthew Hale says: "If the King or subject have a public wharf unto which all persons that come to that port must come and unlade or lade their goods as for the purpose because they are the wharves only licensed by the King, according to the statutes of 1 Eliz., cap. 11, or because there is no other wharf in that port, as it may fall out where a port is newly erected; in that case there cannot be taken arbitrary and excessive duties for cranage, wharfage, pesage, &c.; neither can they be inhanced to an immoderate rate, but the duties must be reasonable and moderate, though settled by the King's license or charter." Hargrave's L.T. 77.
We have said that the reasonableness of wharfage must be determined by the local law until some paramount law has been prescribed. By this we mean, that until the local law is displaced or overruled by paramount legislation adopted by Congress, the courts have no other guide, no other law to administer on the subject than the local or State law. Our system of government is of a dual character, State and Federal. The States retain general sovereignty and jurisdiction over all local matters within their limits; but the United States, through Congress, is invested with supreme and paramount authority in the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among the several States. This has been held to embrace the regulation of the navigable waters of the United States, of which the Ohio River is one. In the exercise of this authority over navigable waters Congress has, from the commencement of the government, erected light-houses, break-waters, and piers, not only on the sea-coast, but in the navigable rivers of the country; and has improved the navigation of rivers by dredging and cleaning them, and making new channels and jetties, and adopting every other means of making them more capable of meeting the growing and extending demands of commerce. It has extended its supervision in an especial manner to the Ohio River. Amongst other things, it has overcome the obstacle presented by the falls at Louisville by the construction of an
Now wharves, levees, and landing-places are essential to commerce by water, no less than a navigable channel and a clear river. But they are attached to the land; they are private property, real estate; and they are primarily, at least, subject to the local State laws. Congress has never yet interposed to supervise their administration; it has hitherto left this exclusively to the States. There is little doubt, however, that Congress, if it saw fit, in case of prevailing abuses in the management of wharf property, — abuses materially interfering with the prosecution of commerce, — might interpose and make regulations to prevent such abuses. When it shall have done so, it will be time enough for the courts to carry its regulations into effect by judicial proceedings properly instituted. But until Congress has acted, the courts of the United States cannot assume control over the subject as a matter of Federal cognizance. It is Congress, and not the Judicial Department, to which the Constitution has given the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States. The courts can never take the initiative on this subject.
There are cases, it is true, which are so national in their character, and in which it is so essential that a general or national rule should exist, that any interference by the State legislatures therewith is justly deemed to be an invasion of the power and authority of the general government; and in such cases the courts will interpose to prevent or redress the
But the case before us is not one of the kind referred to. Though the use of public wharves may be regulated by Congress as a part of the commercial power, it certainly does not belong to that class of subjects which are in their nature national, requiring a single uniform rule, but to that class which are in their nature local, requiring a diversity of rules and regulations. To quote the words of Mr. Justice Curtis in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 319, "The power to regulate commerce embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every port; and some, like the subject now in question [which was pilotage], as imperatively demanding that diversity which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation... . Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. That this cannot be affirmed of laws
No words could be more fitly applied to the subject of the regulation of wharves than are here used by the court in reference to pilotage. It is true no act of Congress has relegated the subject of wharfage to the States, as was done in the case of pilotage; but this was not necessary: the regulation of wharves belongs prima facie, and in the first instance, to the States, and would only be assumed by Congress when its exercise by the States is incompatible with the interests of commerce; and Congress has never yet assumed to take that regulation into its own hands, or to interfere with the regulation of the States.
The power of the States to legislate in matters of a local character, where Congress has not by its own action covered the subject, is quite fully discussed by Mr. Justice Field in delivering the opinion of this court in County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, where the distinction taken in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, between those subjects which are national in their character and require uniformity of regulation, and those which are local and peculiar to particular places, is commented upon and enforced. Amongst other things, it is there said: "Where from the nature of the subject or the sphere of its operation the case is local and limited, special regulations adapted to the immediate locality could only have been contemplated. State action upon such subjects can constitute no interference with the commercial power of Congress, for when that acts the State authority is superseded. Inaction of Congress upon these subjects of a local nature or operation, unlike its inaction upon matters affecting all the States and requiring uniformity of regulation, is not to be taken as a declaration
It is not necessary to cite other cases. The principle laid down in Cooley v. Board of Wardens has become fully recognized and established in our jurisprudence; and it is manifest that no subject can be more properly classified as local in its nature, and as requiring the application of local regulations, than that of wharves and wharfage.
From this view, it is plain that the courts of the United States have no authority to ignore the State laws and regulations on the subject of wharves and wharfage, and to declare them invalid by reason of any supposed repugnancy to the Constitution or laws of the United States. As already remarked, the courts cannot take the initiative in this matter. Congress must first legislate before the courts can proceed upon any such ground of paramount jurisdiction. If the rates of wharfage exacted are deemed extortionate or unreasonable, the courts of the United States (in cases within their ordinary jurisdiction) as well as the courts of the States must apply and administer the State laws relating to the subject; and these laws will probably, in most cases, be found to be sufficient for the suppression of any glaring evils. At all events, there is not, at present, any Federal law on the subject by which relief can be obtained.
In the various bridge cases that have come before the courts of the United States, where bridges (or dams) have been erected by State authority across navigable streams, the refusal to interfere with their erection has always been based upon the absence of prohibitory legislation by Congress, and the power of the States over the subject in the absence of such legislation. Where the regulation of such streams by Congress has been only of a general character, such as the establishment of ports and collection districts thereon, it has been held that the erection of bridges, furnished with convenient draws, so as not materially to interfere with navigation, is within the power of the States, and not repugnant to such general regulation. The
It is believed that no case can be found in which State laws, or regulations under State authority, on subjects of a local nature, have been set aside on the ground of repugnance to the power of regulating commerce given to Congress, unless it has appeared that they were contrary to some express provision of the Constitution, or to some act of Congress, or that they amounted to an assumption of power exclusively conferred upon Congress.
In Gibbons v. Ogden it was held, that, as the navigation of all public waters of the United States is subject to the regulation of Congress, a license granted under the laws and by the authority of the United States to a steamboat to carry on the coasting trade entitled such boat to navigate all such waters, notwithstanding the existence of a State law granting to certain individuals the exclusive right to navigate a portion of said waters lying within the State; and that such exclusive grant was void as being repugnant to the regulation made by Congress. Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the opinion of the court in that case, said: "The court will enter upon the inquiry, whether the laws of New York, as expounded by the highest tribunal of that State, have, in their application to this case, come into collision with an act of Congress, and deprived a citizen of a right to which the act entitles him."
Subsequent cases which we have already cited in this opinion are to the same effect. Crandall v. State of Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; Ward v. Maryland, 12 id. 418; Welton v. State of Missouri, 91 U.S. 275; Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 id. 259; People v. Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, ante, p. 59.
State of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, &c. Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, was a peculiar case. The Wheeling bridge, as originally constructed, presented a complete obstacle to the passage of steamboats with high chimneys, such as navigated the Ohio River to and from Pittsburgh; and hence presented a case of interference with navigation analogous to that of the exclusive monopoly granted to Fulton and Livingston by the State of New York, which was the ground of complaint in the case of
This case, therefore, cannot be relied on, any more than the other cases referred to, to show that the courts of the United States have any peculiar jurisdiction as such to vindicate the supposed rights of commerce and navigation against the laws of the States, in matters of a local nature, such as the regulation of wharfage is, where no express provision of the Constitution is violated, and no act of Congress has been passed to regulate the subject. As no act of Congress has been passed for the regulation of wharfage, and as there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent the States from regulating it, so long
The effect of this conclusion upon the present case is obvious. The gravamen of the bill is really nothing but a complaint against exorbitant rates of wharfage. These rates are established by a municipal body, itself the proprietor of the wharves, and professing to act under the authority of State law. It cannot be supposed that the law authorizes exorbitant charges to be made; but whether the charges exacted are exorbitant or not can only be determined by that law. It is clear, therefore, that the complainant in filing its bill in the United States court on the ground that the wharfage complained of is in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, has totally misconceived its rights, and the proper means of obtaining redress. Unless it has some other ground for coming into the Federal court, it must seek redress in the State courts; and whether the question of reasonableness of wharfage is submitted to the determination of the one forum or the other, it is only determinable by the laws of the State within whose jurisdiction the wharf is situated. Since the parties are all citizens of West Virginia, and since the case cannot be sustained as one "arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States," there was no error in the decree dismissing the bill of complaint. The decree of the Circuit Court is, therefore,
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissenting.
The city of Parkersburg — which has been created a port of delivery in conformity with the laws of the United States — exacts and collects for the use of its wharf by boats engaged in commerce on the Ohio River certain fees or dues, called wharfage charges, which, pursuant to the ordinance of May 17, 1865, are, in every case, measured by the tonnage or capacity of the boat so using the wharf.
It is conceded by the demurrer to the bill that from these fees the city has long since been reimbursed for the actual cost of constructing the wharf; that the amount annually collected
The opinion of the court, if I do not wholly misapprehend it, proceeds upon the broad ground that municipal wharfage charges, even where measured by the tonnage of the boat, and however much in excess of fair and reasonable compensation, are not duties of tonnage within the meaning of the Constitution, and that their exaction infringes no right given or secured by the Constitution or the existing statutes of the United States. If, however, such charges are duties of tonnage, or if their collection violates any right, so given or secured, then a case unquestionably arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States, of which the Circuit Court, under the act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, can take original jurisdiction, without reference to the citizenship of the parties.
I had supposed, and am still of opinion, that a vessel or boat, duly enrolled and licensed under the laws of the United States (as those of the appellant are conceded to be), and engaged in commerce upon the Ohio, a public navigable water, is entitled, in virtue of the Constitution and laws of the United States, to enter any port on that river, and also to land at any wharf established for public use, without being subjected (apart from mere police regulations) to any burden, tax, or duty therefor, beyond reasonable compensation to the owner of the wharf for its use.
Such I have understood to be the doctrine announced in Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577; Packet Company v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80; Packet Company v. St. Louis, 100 id. 423; Vicksburg v. Tobin, id. 430.
The court holds that Congress, under the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, may, by statute, provide for the protection, through the courts, of those engaged in commerce upon the public navigable waters of the United States against unreasonable charges for
In the opinion of the court a duty of tonnage is defined to be a charge, tax, or duty on a vessel for the mere privilege of entering or lying in a port. The city of Parkersburg cannot, therefore, constitutionally impose a charge, tax, or duty upon, or for the exercise of, that privilege. Now, do the Constitution and the existing laws of the United States extend their protection no further than to secure the bare, naked right of entering a port free from local burdens or duties upon its exercise? May not the boat, in virtue of the Constitution and existing laws, also land at any wharf, at least at any public wharf, on the Ohio River for the purpose of discharging and receiving freight and passengers? Of what value would be the right to enter the port without the privilege of landing its passengers and freight? Is not the substantial privilege of landing passengers and freight necessarily involved in the right of entering the port? If so, it would seem that the right to land a boat at a public wharf on a navigable water of the United States is as fully protected by the Constitution and the existing laws of the United States as that of entering the port. A charge, tax, or duty imposed upon the exercise of the right to land is consequently, for every practical purpose, as much a duty of tonnage as a charge, tax, or duty upon the privilege of entering the port. The constitutional provision that "no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage;" the power given Congress to regulate commerce among the States; the statutes of the United States, in the exercise of that
For its protection additional legislation does not seem to be necessary, since the Circuit Court has original jurisdiction of all suits arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States when the matter in dispute exceeds a prescribed amount.
These principles are entirely consistent with the city's ownership of the wharf and with the right to demand fair compensation for its use. As decided in the before-mentioned cases, the city may require all who use its wharf by landing thereat, or in any other way, to pay what such use is reasonably worth. It cannot, as the court states, rightfully demand more. Reasonable compensation for the use by boats of the additional facilities furnished to commerce by means of wharves, even when such compensation is measured by the capacity of the boats, is not, within the meaning of the Constitution and the laws of the United States, an infringement of the right of free commerce upon the public navigable waters of the United States. Upon this ground the wharfage charges imposed by the cities of St. Louis, Vicksburg, and Keokuk were sustained. But it is an entirely different matter when a municipal corporation assumes in effect, if not in terms, to burden the constitutional privilege of entering the port of any city, situated on a public navigable stream, with the condition that if the boats land at the public wharf of that city, it must submit to the payment of larger compensation for the use of that wharf than the corporation has the legal authority to demand. It requires no further legislation by Congress to enable the courts of the Union to protect
For the reasons stated, I dissent from the opinion and judgment.
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