KENNY ARMSTRONG, Judge.
This case involves a post-divorce motion for contempt. In her motion, Appellant/Wife averred that Appellee/Husband was in violation of the final decree of divorce. The trial court did not find Appellee in contempt, but entered an order enforcing its final decree of divorce regarding sale of the marital residence, Appellant's access to the marital residence, and division of Appellee's 401-K. The trial court also declined to award Appellant half of Appellee's 2015 tax return. Because the trial court's order, on the motion for contempt, appears to deviate from its previous order regarding division of Appellee's 401-K, we reverse this portion of the trial court's order. The order is otherwise affirmed.
On March 17, 2016, Appellant Roshawnda Lynn Foster Portice ("Wife") and Appellee Timothy Alan Portice ("Husband") were divorced by final decree of the Circuit Court for Campbell County. As is relevant to this appeal, the final decree of divorce states:
In addition to the foregoing provisions, the final decree divided certain marital property and ordered Husband to pay Wife transitional alimony of $1,000 per month for 24 months.
On June 6, 2016, Wife filed a motion for contempt, alleging that Husband was in violation of the final decree of divorce. Specifically, Wife averred that:
The trial court heard Wife's motion for contempt on July 7, 2016. The appellate record does not contain a transcript of the hearing. On July 18, 2016, the trial court entered an order on the motion for contempt, wherein it stated, in relevant part:
The trial court reserved ruling on the issue concerning the 2015 Federal Income Tax return and the issue concerning Husband's alleged use of Wife's social security number after the divorce. On August 25, 2016, the trial court entered its final judgment, wherein it found, in relevant part, as follows:
Appellant raises five issues for review, as stated in her brief:
III. Standard of Review
Because this case was tried by the court sitting without a jury, we review the trial court's findings of fact de novo with a presumption of correctness, unless the evidence preponderates against those findings.
As an initial matter, we reiterate that the appellate record does not contain a transcript of the hearing on the motion for contempt. Rather, the record contains what purports to be Appellant's Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c) statement of the evidence. However, after reviewing this document, we conclude that it does not comport with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c) in that it does not "convey a fair, accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect to those issues that are the bases of appeal." A "statement of the evidence" should be just that—a statement of the evidence adduced at the hearing. Here, Appellant's filing is a reiteration, verbatim, of her appellate arguments as set out in her brief. Accordingly, Appellant's purported statement of the evidence, does not provide this Court with any evidentiary basis to review what actually transpired at the hearing on the motion for contempt. The Court of Appeals, being an appellate court, operates with the record created by the litigants in the trial court. When there is no transcript or statement of the evidence, we cannot know what the testimony in the trial court was. Thus, generally, when the appellant does not file a transcript or statement of the evidence, the appellate court presumes that the trial court's decision is supported by sufficient evidence.
In her first four issues, Appellant contends that the trial court violated its previous final decree of divorce in ruling on the motion for contempt. Specifically, Appellant argues that the trial court deviated from the holdings, in its March 17, 2016 order, concerning: (1) the sale of the marital residence; (2) Appellant's access to the marital residence to obtain property awarded to her in the divorce; (3) the division of the 2015 Federal Income Tax refund; and (3) the division of Appellee's 401-K. It is axiomatic that, "[i]n addition to any statutory authority provided, a court has inherent judicial authority to enforce its own orders and may compel compliance with them or issue appropriate additional orders to make the granted relief effective." 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, and Orders § 57 (2017). Concerning the interpretation of a court order, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that:
Concerning the sale of the marital residence, the March 17, 2016 order states that the marital "home will be immediately  placed on the market for sale with a Realtor agreed upon by the parties. . . ." In her motion for contempt, Wife avers that Husband violated the "immediacy requirement" contained in the final decree of divorce by not cooperating in selecting a realtor and putting the house on the market. In ruling on her motion for contempt, the trial court appears to simply enforce its previous order, stating that "Mr. Portice has 6 months to sell the marital home," and "30 days to obtain a realtor." The trial court did not deviate from its March 17, 2016 order because the substantive holding, i.e., that the marital residence would be sold, remains unchanged. The order on the motion for contempt simply enforces the trial court's previous order by setting a specific timeframe for procurement of a realtor and selling the house. Because the trial court has inherent power to issue "appropriate additional orders to make the granted relief effective," 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, and Orders § 57, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in enforcing its final decree of divorce by subsequently ordering a realtor to be named within 30 days and the marital home to be sold within 6 months.
Concerning Appellant's argument that the trial court deviated from its March 17, 2016 order "by not allowing Appellant access to . . . her belongings in the marital home." Despite Appellant's contention, in ruling on her motion for contempt, the trial court specifically held that "Ms. Portice shall have access to the marital home [to] retrieve personal belongings on July 16, 2016 at 9:00 a.m." From this plain, unambiguous language, the trial court's holding clearly allows Wife access to the marital home to retrieve her personal belongings. Accordingly, Appellant's contention that the trial court denied her "access to the marital personal property and her belongings in the marital home" is not supported by the record.
Turning to Appellant's argument that the trial court erred in denying her a portion of Appellee's 2015 Federal Income Tax refund, in its order on the motion for contempt, the trial court held that the 2015 tax return was Husband's property "because the asset was not specifically addressed by either party in the negotiations for divorce." Indeed, the final decree of divorce is silent concerning the parties' tax return(s); accordingly, there was nothing for the trial court to enforce, vis-à-vis the tax returns, in its order on the motion for contempt. Furthermore, because there is no transcript or statement of the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion for contempt, there is nothing for this Court to review so as to determine whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the 2015 tax return is Husband's property.
Concerning Appellant's argument that the trial court deviated from the March 17, 2016 final decree of divorce in denying Wife her share of Husband's 401-K, the final decree of divorce provides that "Wife shall receive one half . . . of Husband's retirement existing at the time of the divorce." However, in its July 18, 2016 order on the motion for contempt, the trial court states that: "Mr. Portice's 401-K retirement plan shall not be apportioned as part of the personal property split . . . because the asset was not specifically addressed by either party in the negotiation for divorce." In this regard, the July 18, 2016 order appears to conflict with the trial court's March 17, 2016 final decree of divorce. "Orders, like other written instruments, should be enforced according to their plain meaning."
In her final issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in not holding Husband in contempt for his alleged use of Wife's social security number to open accounts after the divorce. Tennessee courts have the inherent authority and discretion to punish for acts of contempt.
Here, Appellant alleged that, "since the divorce . . .," Husband was in contempt for "attempting to use Roshawnda's social security number . . ." Taking Appellant's allegation as true, Appellee's act does not provide an appropriate basis for a finding of contempt. The trial court's March 17, 2016 order does not address Appellee's alleged use of Appellant's social security number, nor is such conduct one of the grounds for contempt enumerated in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-9-102. Accordingly, had the trial court found Appellee in contempt for such conduct, we would reverse that finding under an abuse of discretion standard, finding that the trial court had applied an incorrect legal standard. Here, however, the trial court refused to find Appellee in contempt based on Appellant's lack of monetary damages. The trial court reached the correct result, i.e., a finding of no contempt, but its reasoning is flawed because Appellant had no basis for relief, under the contempt mechanism, for Appellee's alleged use of her social security number. This Court will affirm a decree correct in result, but rendered upon different, incomplete, or erroneous grounds.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's July 18, 2016 order to the extent that it holds that Appellee's 401-K will be awarded as Appellee's separate property. The order is otherwise affirmed. The case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary and are consistent with this opinion. Costs of the appeal are assessed to the Appellant, Rashawnda Lynn Foster Portice and her surety, for all of which execution may issue if necessary.