Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the appellants is denied.
At or near the intersection of Borden Avenue and 23rd Street in Queens, a vehicle operated by the defendant Mickoy O. Holness, also known as Mickey O. Holness, struck the rear of a vehicle owned and operated by the plaintiff. At the time of the accident, Holness was operating the vehicle in the course of his employment with the defendant Fresh Direct Holdings, LLC (hereinafter Fresh Direct). The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries. After joinder of issue, but before any discovery was conducted, the plaintiff moved, inter alia, for summary judgment on the issue of liability as against Fresh Direct and Holness (hereinafter together the appellants). The Supreme Court granted that branch of the motion. We reverse the order insofar as appealed from.
"A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle" (Nsiah-Ababio v Hunter, 78 A.D.3d 672, 672 ; see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129 [a]; see generally Pawlukiewicz v Boisson, 275 A.D.2d 446, 447 ; Maxwell v Lobenberg, 227 A.D.2d 598, 598-599 ). Accordingly, a rear-end collision establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision (see Tutrani v County of Suffolk, 10 N.Y.3d 906, 908 ; Klopchin v Masri, 45 A.D.3d 737 ; Starace v Inner Circle Qonexions, 198 A.D.2d 493 ; Edney v Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth., 178 A.D.2d 398, 399 ). A nonnegligent explanation may include evidence of a mechanical failure, a sudden stop of the vehicle ahead, an unavoidable skidding on wet pavement, or any other reasonable cause (see DeLouise v S.K.I. Wholesale Beer Corp., 75 A.D.3d 489, 490 ). Moreover, evidence that a plaintiff's vehicle made a sudden lane change directly in front of a defendant's vehicle, forcing that defendant to stop suddenly, is sufficient to rebut the inference of negligence (see Reitz v Seagate Trucking, Inc., 71 A.D.3d 975, 976 ; cf. Tutrani v County of Suffolk, 10 NY3d at 908).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions either are without merit or have been rendered academic by our determination.