In the course of his employment for a commercial cleaning company, plaintiff sustained an eye injury while cleaning grease from the exhaust system in a restaurant kitchen. Plaintiff was standing on the ground while a coworker was lying on the exhaust hood four feet above him. As the coworker handed plaintiff a pressurized bottle containing a chemical used for cleaning, the bottle slipped from plaintiff's hands and, upon impact with the floor, sprayed the chemical into plaintiff's eye. Plaintiff commenced this action alleging, among other things, a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1). Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the basis that Labor Law § 240 (1) was inapplicable to the facts of this case.
We affirm. Labor Law § 240 (1) requires that contractors and owners provide adequate safety devices to protect employees against elevation related hazards and imposes liability for injuries proximately caused by the failure to so provide (see Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 N.Y.2d 513, 521 ; see also Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 N.Y.3d 280, 286-290 ). However, not all gravity-related risks fall within the parameters of the statute (see Labor Law § 240 ; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494,
Here, we reject plaintiff's argument that his injuries were attributable to the type of gravity-related risk within the purview of Labor Law § 240 (1). Plaintiff, himself, testified that when he grabbed the bottle, it slipped out of his hands and, after it hit the floor, the hose connected to the bottle became detached, resulting in its contents coming into contact with his eye. Inasmuch as plaintiff had taken hold of the bottle from his coworker and it was not being lowered when it fell to the ground, there was no elevation differential between the falling object and plaintiff (see Jordan v Blue Circle Atl., 306 A.D.2d 741, 743 ), and there is no evidence that the bottle fell "because of the [conceded] absence . . . of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute" (Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 N.Y.2d 259, 268  [emphasis omitted]). We also note that the bottle was not in the process of being hoisted or secured and that plaintiff was not injured as a result of being struck by the falling bottle (see Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d at 500-501). Significantly, the injury suffered by plaintiff was not the direct consequence of the application of the force of gravity to the bottle (compare Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 N.Y.3d 599, 604 ). Plaintiff was simply "`exposed to the usual and ordinary dangers of a [workplace], and not the extraordinary risks envisioned by Labor Law § 240 (1)'" (Cundy v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 273 A.D.2d 743, 744 , lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 766 , quoting Rodriguez v Margaret Tietz Ctr. for Nursing Care, 84 N.Y.2d 841, 843 ). We, therefore, conclude that Supreme Court properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiff's cross motion.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.