JOHN E. CONERY, Judge.
This case comes before the Court on a reversal and remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court.
In the underlying appeal, the plaintiff, Garrett Bass (Mr. Bass), sought to reverse the trial court's June 8, 2020 judgment granting the defendant Christopher Sepulvado's exception of peremption pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 198, thereby dismissing Mr. Bass's petition to establish the paternity of S.J.S.
The Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently granted writs, remanding this case to this Court by Per Curiam opinion, as follows:
Bass v. Sepulvado, 21-1124, p. 1 (La. 2/15/22), 332 So.3d 1174, 1174.
After reviewing the supreme court's decision in Kinnett v. Kinnett, 20-1134 (La. 12/10/21), 332 So.3d 1149, we find that a reversal of the underlying trial court judgment and remand to the trial court is required.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Before beginning a discussion of the factual and legal issues on remand, we find from the uncontroverted facts in the record, the following:
Finding error of fact and law, we reverse the trial court and remand for further proceedings in light of the supreme court's ruling in Kinnett, 332 So.3d 1149.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Consideration here begins with the supreme court's directive to consider "whether the requirements of La.C.C. art. 198[
The supreme court began its discussion in Kinnett with the foundational consideration of the burden of proof applicable to consideration of the one-year peremptive period of Article 198. The supreme court explained:
Id. at 1154 (emphasis added). It is on this basis that we find that a de novo review of the record is now required.
Unlike the situation in Kinnett, Mr. Bass's Petition to Establish Paternity is perempted on its face as he filed the avowal action on November 25, 2019 and alleged therein that the minor child, S.J.S., was born on January 5, 2018. He thus filed the petition more than one year after the child's birth.
Given the burden of proof set forth in Kinnett, 332 So.3d 1149, Mr. Bass was required to bear the burden of demonstrating that his Petition to Establish Paternity was not perempted. Mr. Bass was therefore required to prove that 1) Ms. Edwards acted "in bad faith" as to Mr. Bass's paternity of S.J.S. and that 2) the Petition to Establish Paternity was filed within one year of the day he knew or should have known of his paternity. See La.Civ.Code art. 198. See also Kinnett, 332 So.3d 1149.
Review of the hearing transcript, however, indicates that the parties and trial court proceeded under an incorrect burden of proof, one requiring Mr. Sepulvado to prove that Ms. Edwards was not in bad faith rather than one requiring Mr. Bass to prove the reverse. At the beginning of the hearing on the exception of peremption, the trial court asked the parties how they wished to proceed with the following colloquy reflecting some degree of confusion regarding the burden of proof:
Following that discussion, the order of hearing followed as if Mr. Sepulvado was required to bear the burden of proof on the exception of peremption, i.e., 1) counsel for Mr. Sepulvado introduced exhibits and called witnesses on behalf of Mr. Sepulvado, 2) counsel for Mr. Bass called witnesses on behalf of Mr. Bass;
Following counsel for Mr. Sepulvado's rebuttal questioning, however, counsel for Mr. Bass attempted to recall another witness on rebuttal but was denied that opportunity as seen by the following colloquy:
After counsel for Mr. Sepulvado declined to call additional witnesses, the trial court took the matter under submission with no additional comment and filed a judgment with no reasons or findings a few days later.
The trial court's failure to either offer oral or written reasons complicates this court's review, as it is difficult to determine if the application of the incorrect burden of proof affected the trial court's ruling. As the supreme court explained in Kinnett,
Id. at 1154.
Given the factual circumstances of Kinnett, the supreme court concluded that there "was no legal error that materially affected the outcome or interdicted the fact-finding process. To the contrary, the district court was informed on the proper burden of proof, then determined the critical facts." Id. at 1154-55. Thus, the supreme court concluded that the fifth circuit had fallen into error in performing a de novo review. Id.
The converse is present in this case. Although neither the trial court nor the parties in this matter had the benefit of Kinnett, as it was subsequently rendered, the parties and the trial court nonetheless proceeded to the hearing under the incorrect burden of proof. That application resulted, in the least, in Mr. Bass assuming a defensive posture and in being denied the opportunity to proceed on rebuttal as he would have otherwise. Further, it is "[w]hen the findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses" that "the manifest error-clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the findings of fact[.]" Hebert v. Rapides Par. Police Jury, 06-2001 (La. 4/11/07), 974 So.2d 635, 654 (on rehearing). That deferential standard is in place as "only the factfinder is cognizant of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said." Id. (citing Rosell, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989)). That deferential standard is therefore not applicable in this case, as it was in Kinnett, since the trial court in this case made absolutely no factual findings or credibility determinations. We therefore find that a de novo review is required, but even applying the manifest error standard of review, because of the state of the record, reversal and remand is necessary.
In this case, the state of the record makes it impossible to provide any meaningful review given the supreme court's direction on remand to consider whether the requirements of La.Civ.Code art. 198 have been met in light of Kinnett, 332 So.3d 1149. Kinnett provides the following directive regarding the subjective and credibility-based nature of the bad faith exception to peremption under La.Civ.Code art. 198:
Id. at 1155 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Moreover, and most importantly to a resolution in this case, the supreme court in Kinnett stated: "We also note that deceit can result from silence. If Ms. Kinnett knew her husband was not the father and Mr. Andrews was, her silence could constitute bad faith deception." Id. at 1155 n.3 (emphasis added).
Mr. Bass's primary contention in opposition to Mr. Sepulvado's exception of peremption is deceit by silence. Mr. Bass claims that he was deceived by Ms. Edwards as she continued to live with her former husband after she became pregnant but did not inform him of his possible paternity. In fact, Ms. Edwards testified that while she eventually informed others, including Mr. Sepulvado, of Mr. Bass's paternity, she did not inform Mr. Bass of his likely paternity until
Her testimony at the hearing was also clear that she never informed Mr. Bass of his possible paternity until August 10, 2019.
Given the deficiencies in the record resulting in part from the erroneous burden of proof applied at trial, we conclude that a new hearing is required. A remand for a new hearing will permit the parties to proceed under the burden of proof identified in Kinnett and to present their evidence in light of the standard of "bad faith" discussed therein.
We further note that the original hearing in this matter occurred in June 2020, when S.J.S. was two (2) years old and well before the supreme court released Kinnett, 332 So.3d 1149, in October 2021. S.J.S. is now over four (4) years old. A new hearing under the appropriate burden of proof will afford the parties the opportunity to take all of the circumstances of this case into account. It will further allow the trial court to make the credibility and factual findings necessary for further review as may be supported by the law and evidence, given that credibility determinations were explained to be critical in determining the "bad faith" exception to the peremptive period of La.Civ.Code art. 198 discussed in Kinnett. We accordingly remand this matter for a new hearing.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court's June 8, 2020 judgment is reversed. This matter is remanded for a new trial on the Exception of Peremption filed by Defendant-Appellee Christopher Sepulvado. Costs of this appeal are to be shared equally by the parties pending final resolution of this case.
SAVOIE, J. dissents and assigns written reasons.
This matter is before us on remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court. We are ordered to consider whether the requirements of La.Civ.Code art. 198 were met in the present case in light of the Louisiana Supreme Court's recent decision in Kinnett v. Kinnett, 20-1134 (La. 10/10/21), 332 So.3d 1149. The majority finds that the state of the record precludes us from making such a decision and remands to the trial court for a new hearing. I respectfully disagree.
Initially, I would point out that I disagree with the majority's list of uncontroverted facts. For example, included as an uncontested fact is that on August 10, 2019, "[a]fter Ms. Edwards and Mr. Bass were engaged, Ms. Edwards told Mr. Bass `that there was a possibility that [S.J.S.] was his.'" As discussed later in this dissenting opinion, several witnesses testified that Mr. Bass knew of his paternity prior to this date and as early as the summer of 2017. Mr. Bass's knowledge of his possible paternity, specifically when Ms. Edwards' told him he was the minor child's father, is part of the central issue in this case.
Moving on to the analysis, Kinnett is very similar procedurally and substantively to Bass. In Kinnett, DNA evidence proved Mr. Andrews to be the minor child's biological father. This evidence resulted in Mr. Andrews intervening in the divorce proceeding of Mr. and Ms. Kinnett in order to establish paternity and obtain custody of the child. Mr. Andrews alleged that Mrs. Kinnett concealed the fact that he may be the father. He also alleged unconstitutionality of La.Civ. Code art. 198. In response, Mr. Kinnett filed an exception of peremption, alleging the avowal action was untimely under La.Civ.Code art. 198. After a hearing, the trial court found Mr. Andrews' avowal action was perempted under La.Civ.Code art. 198 and upheld the constitutionality of Article 198. Mr. Andrews appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal. The Fifth Circuit reversed the ruling of the trial court on the merits, finding that Mr. Andrews' avowal action was not perempted, however, it did not address the constitutionality of Article 198. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit found that the trial court applied the wrong burden of proof and performed a de novo review of the record. After a review of the record, the Fifth Circuit found that Ms. Kinnett did deceive Mr. Andrews and further found that Mr. Andrews' petition was timely, reversing the trial court. The supreme court reversed the Fifth Circuit, finding Mr. Andrews was not deceived, and his avowal claim was perempted. The Kinnett case was remanded to the Fifth Circuit "for the limited purpose of addressing Mr. Andrews' constitutional challenge."
At the outset of the opinion in the present case, the majority determines that a de novo review of the record is required, rather than a manifest error review. In making this determination, the majority finds that the trial court applied the wrong burden of proof. The majority notes that the supreme court "began its discussion in Kinnett with the foundational consideration of the burden of proof applicable to consideration of the one-year peremptive period of Article 198." The supreme court in Kinnett did so because the issue of who held the burden of proof was argued by the parties at both the trial court and appellate court levels. This issue is absent in Bass. Neither party in the present case argued that the trial court applied the wrong burden of proof. Burden of proof is not assigned as an assignment of error by Garrett Bass. The only issue presented by Garrett Bass in his brief to this court is "[w]hether or not the trial court errored [sic] in finding that the premptive [sic] period in the petition for paternity had lapsed or that the action for paternity was not timely filed."
Considering the petition is perempted on its face, I agree with the majority that Mr. Bass bears the burden of proving the peremptive period was interrupted; however, I do not agree that the trial court proceeded under an incorrect burden of proof. The majority relies on the order of the proceedings at the trial court level to prove that the trial court applied the wrong burden. As explained in the majority opinion, Mr. Sepulvado introduced and called witnesses, then Mr. Bass introduced and called witnesses, and finally both parties called witnesses on rebuttal. At that point, the case was submitted to the court for judgment. I do not find any error with the way the hearing proceeded, and certainly cannot ascertain the burden of proof applied based on the order of events.
The majority also finds fault with the trial court's failure to offer either oral or written reasons, stating that it complicates this court's review to determine whether the trial court applied the wrong burden of proof. Again, burden of proof is not an issue on appeal in this case that was argued by either party. Regardless, "a trial court is never required to give oral reasons and is not required to give written reasons for its `findings of fact and reasons for judgment' unless requested by a party in most types of non jury cases." Gathen v. Gathen, 10-2312, p. 9 (La. 5/10/11), 66 So.3d 1, 12 (quoting La.Code Civ.P. art. 1917).
"Applying the wrong burden of proof is ... inherently prejudicial because it casts a more onerous standard than the law requires on one of the parties." Leger v. Leger, 854 So.2d 955, 957 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2003). However, in this particular case, the majority reasons that the trial court placed the more onerous burden on Mr. Sepulvado, rather than Mr. Bass. Even though he was tasked with the more onerous burden at trial, the trial court still ruled in Mr. Sepulvado's favor. Thus, Mr. Sepulvado was not prejudiced by any alleged incorrect burden shift. When discussing whether to apply the manifest error review, the Kinnett court explained that "[a] legal error occurs when a trial court applies incorrect principles of law and such errors are prejudicial." Kinnett, 332 So.3d at 1154 (emphasis added). "Legal errors are prejudicial when they materially affect the outcome and deprive a party of substantial rights." Id. In this case, even assuming the trial court applied the incorrect burden of proof, Mr. Sepulvado was not prejudiced, the parties were not deprived of substantial rights, and the outcome was not materially affected.
In summary, I do not find any confusion over whether the trial court applied the proper burden of proof. First, neither party argued that the trial court applied the improper burden of proof. Therefore, it is not an issue before this court. Further, this court cannot assume that the trial court applied the incorrect burden of proof based on a lack of oral or written reasons when the trial court is not required to give those reasons. Similarly, I do not believe the order in which the trial court proceeded at the hearing is evidence that the trial court applied the wrong burden of proof. For these reasons, I would apply the manifest error standard in reviewing this case.
The majority opines that, even applying the manifest error standard, a reversal and remand is warranted. The majority arrives at this opinion by finding that the deferential standard is not applicable in this case. When reviewing a case under the manifest error standard, great deference is given to the findings of fact. Hebert v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 21-10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/4/21), 325 So.3d 1090, writ denied, 21-1358 (La. 11/17/21), 327 So.3d 992. The majority opinion finds that the deferential standard is not applicable because "the trial court in this case made absolutely no factual findings or credibility determinations." This is incorrect. The trial court held a hearing in which evidence was taken, witnesses testified, and arguments were made. The trial court then ruled in favor of Mr. Sepulvado. The trial court clearly had to make findings of fact and judge credibility in order to reach a conclusion and rule on the exception.
As stated previously, a trial court is not required to give oral or written reasons. We, as a reviewing court, cannot conclude, in the absence of oral or written reasons, that a trial court made no factual findings or credibility determinations. "[A] reviewing court must review the record in its entirety to determine whether the trial court's finding was clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous." Stobart v. State through Dept. of Tramp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993). In the present case, the trial court found that Mr. Bass's petition was filed untimely. It is our job, as the reviewing court, to review the record and determine whether the trial court was manifestly erroneous. While oral or written reasons may make our job easier, we cannot neglect our duty due to a lack of reasons given by the trial court.
We must now resolve the issue that is on appeal and on remand — the exception of peremption. Regarding manifest error review, this court in Hebert, 325 So.3d at 1093, explained:
This matter was previously before us on this same exception of peremption. I wrote a dissenting opinion in that case, Bass v. Sepulvado, 20-608 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/30/21) (unpublished opinion), rev'd and remanded per curiam, 21-1124 (La. 2/15/22), 332 So.3d 1174. I will incorporate the applicable analysis from that dissent into this one:
Judge Kyzar gives an excellent and thorough recitation of the trial testimony in his dissenting opinion. I incorporate and adopt that discussion here.
"[T]he action shall be instituted within one year from the day the father knew or should have known of his paternity." La.Civ.Code art. 198. In the Petition to Establish Paternity, Garrett Bass stated that he was in a sexual relationship with Ms. Edwards from October 2016 through October 2017. Therefore, Mr. Bass was in a sexual relationship with Ms. Edwards during her pregnancy up until she was approximately seven months pregnant, wherein it was admitted that they repeatedly had unprotected sex. Further, several witnesses testified that Mr. Bass did, in fact, know of his paternity by the summer of 2017. As such, I do not find that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding that this action was not instituted within one year from the day Mr. Bass knew or should have known of his paternity. Therefore, in order for Mr. Bass's petition to be timely, Mr. Bass must prove the one exception to La.Civ.Code art. 198 — if the mother in bad faith deceives the father concerning his paternity.
The Kinnett case is instructive. The question for the court in Kinnett, the supreme court explained, was "whether Ms. Kinnett made a deliberate representation to Mr. Andrews regarding his paternity that she knew was false." Id. at 1155. The supreme court stated, "The credibility of Ms. Kinnett's belief as to her child's father is the critical issue." Id.
In the present case, the trial court heard all of the testimony, looked at the totality of the evidence, and weighed the credibility of the witnesses. Mr. Bass and Ms. Edwards both testified that she did not tell him that he was the father of the minor child until August 2019. However, at the hearing, several witnesses disputed this fact, stating that Mr. Bass knew as early as the summer of 2017. One witness, Brenda Carter, Ms. Edwards's co-worker, about two months into Ms. Edwards's pregnancy, Ms. Edwards did not come into work. Ms. Edwards called, crying hysterically, to say she told Mr. Bass about the pregnancy, that the child was his, and that he told her he wanted nothing to do with the baby. In fact, Ms. Carter recounted that Ms. Edwards told her he wanted Ms. Edwards to have an abortion.
Regarding Ms. Edwards belief about the paternity of her child, that is unclear from the record. Her testimony in her deposition and at trial is contradictory. At one point, she testifies that she did not know who the father of her baby was. At another point, she states that she knew it was Mr. Bass's early on. There is no testimony in the record that Ms. Edwards ever told Mr. Bass that the child was Mr. Sepulvado's. Therefore, based on the record we cannot find that Ms. Edwards made a deliberate representation to Mr. Bass regarding his paternity that she knew was false. See Kinnett, 332 So.3d 1149.
The majority orders this case remanded to the trial court for a new hearing because the majority is "unable to make [] a credibility determination [as to bad faith silence], either of Ms. Edwards or the other witnesses, given the cold record before us[,]" citing to a footnote in the Kinnett case that "deceit can result from silence." In doing so, the majority determines that the trial court failed to make a credibility assessment of Ms. Edward's testimony. This is incorrect. As stated previously in this dissent, a full hearing was held wherein evidence was adduced, witnesses testified, and arguments were made. It is clear from the record that the trial court was required to weigh the credibility of the witnesses in order to rule on the exception in this case. It is also clear from the record that the trial court did make a credibility assessment of Ms. Edward's testimony and found her testimony lacking in credibility. As such, while deceit can result from silence, the trial court found that was not the case in this matter.
The manifest error standard of review indeed applies here, and the trial court, after hearing the evidence, determined that Mr. Bass did not prove that he was deceived by Ms. Edwards. I can find no manifest error in that decision based on the evidence. The trial judge heard the witnesses and was in the best position to determine the weight and credibility to be afforded thereto. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court granting the exception.
KYZAR, Judge, dissents and assigns reasons.
I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority to remand this matter to the trial court for reconsideration of its judgment sustaining the exception of peremption pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 198. The purpose of our reconsideration of this case, on reversal and remand from the supreme court, was solely to determine if the requirements of La.Civ.Code art. 198 were met in light of the supreme court's decision in Kinnett v. Kinnett, 20-1134 (La. 12/10/21), 332 So.3d 1149. A review of the record reflects that the issue of Ms. Edwards' bad faith and whether Mr. Bass proved an exception to the peremption rule were fully addressed and rejected by the trial court as reflected by its judgment. I would affirm the judgment.
In his petition to establish his paternity of the child, Mr. Bass very plainly acknowledged the status of Mr. Sepulvado as the legal father of the child, as follows: "[S.J.S.] was born during the marriage between Defendants and therefore defendant Christopher Sepulvado is legally presumed to be the father of [S.J.S.]" As the child was born during the Sepulvados' marriage, Mr. Sepulvado had the opportunity to disavow his paternity but chose not to do so within one year of the child's birth. La.Civ.Code arts. 187, 189. Thus, he is not only the child's presumptive father, but also her legal father.
As this matter involves a legal father, Mr. Bass was obligated to present his avowal action within one year of the child's birth as required by La.Civ.Code art. 198. However, due to inaction on his part, Mr. Bass must rely on the only exception provided, which allows the period to be extended in the event he was deceived as to his paternity.
While going to considerable lengths in determining that the trial court applied the wrong burden of proof standard and that this somehow skewed its fact-finding process, the majority ignores its recognition that the peremption issue was fully litigated. Indeed, this issue was fully litigated, and another hearing will not change that except to give the opposing party a third bite at the apple when it knew or should have known of the correct order of the proceeding and the applicable burden of proof. The provisions of our law are very clear that once a prima facie case of peremption is presented, the burden shifts to the opponent to show the existence of an exception. At the original trial, Mr. Bass had two chances to establish Ms. Edwards' bad faith, once during cross examination of Mr. Sepulvado's witnesses and then again while presenting his own case. The majority now gives him a third shot at proving her bad faith and that he was deceived, when the trial court by its very judgment concluded that there was no proven exception to La.Civ.Code art. 198.
There is nothing about the colloquy at the beginning of the hearing that reflects that the burden of proof was altered in any way. Albeit the trial court asked counsel for Mr. Sepulvado if he had any further evidence to bolster his argument after he initially offered only the petition, which does provide a prima facie case for peremption, this did not alter the burden of proof. Counsel for Mr. Sepulvado answered in the affirmative and proceeded to offer testimony. The only affect this had on the proceeding was to allow counsel for Mr. Bass to fully hear and weigh all of Mr. Sepulvado's evidence before attempting to counter the same. This he could not do after being given this extra opportunity. Even assuming that the burden of proof was somehow placed on the mover, Mr. Sepulvado, which is only arguable at best, such clearly did not interdict the fact-finding process. Only in such a case would a de novo review be warranted. Evans v. Lungrin, 97-541 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731.
In his testimony, Mr. Sepulvado recounted that Ms. Edwards, also a party to the action, told him that she had informed Mr. Bass that he was the biological father of the child. In fact, his recitation of the conversation she related to him was very vivid:
Per the evidence, the child was born on January 5, 2018. At the time of Mr. Bass's conversation with Mr. Sepulvado in June or July 2017, Ms. Edwards was pregnant with the child, and Mr. Bass had, at the least, information that he may have been the biological father; thus, he was not deceived. Further, at the time of the December 2018 conversation between Mr. Bass and Ms. Edwards, as recounted by Mr. Sepulvado, the time limitation for Mr. Bass to file a paternity action had not yet expired. Mr. Sepulvado also recounted a telephone conversation he had with Mr. Bass, wherein Mr. Bass called to inquire why he was mentioned by name in Mr. Sepulvado's initial divorce petition against Ms. Edwards as the father of her then unborn child.
Brenda Carter, a former co-worker of Ms. Edwards, recounted that about one and a half to two months into Ms. Edwards' pregnancy, she (Ms. Edwards) confided to her that she had been involved in a relationship with Mr. Bass. She then recounted another conversation in April or early June 2017, wherein Ms. Edwards called to report that she would be late for work:
Phyllis Greer, Mr. Sepulvado's mother, testified regarding a conversation with Ms. Edwards in July 2017, when Ms. Edwards told her that she had confronted Mr. Bass with the news that he was the father of her child:
Even more testimony as to the issue came from Mr. Bass's former wife, Renata Bass, who testified about confronting her then husband in October 2017, about his affair with Ms. Edwards, at a time when Ms. Edwards was still pregnant with S.J.S.:
Later in her testimony, Ms. Bass stated that Mr. Bass "didn't admit that the child is not his a hundred percent." She said that "[h]e wasn't sure if the child could be his, but he wasn't sure."
The trial court heard Ms. Edwards' testimony that she did not tell Mr. Bass that he was the father of S.J.S. until August 10, 2019. She attempted to establish through extensive testimony why she thought Mr. Sepulvado was the biological father. She even testified that Ms. Carter, Mr. Sepulvado, and Ms. Greer all lied. Based on the judgment of the trial court, little if no credibility was given to Ms. Edwards' testimony.
Finally, Mr. Bass' testimony echoed Ms. Edwards' testimony that he first learned that he was S.J.S.'s biological father in August 2019. When asked if he had even considered that he might be the father after Ms. Edwards became pregnant during her affair with him, he said he had not because "I assumed it was [Mr. Sepulvado]." Based on the judgment of the trial court, little if no credibility was given to Mr. Bass' testimony.
The majority asserts that this court cannot presume that the trial court properly weighed the testimony or made credibility determinations, as we cannot determine from the record that such was done as there were no reasons for judgment. I disagree wholeheartedly. It is important here to note that during the testimony of Mr. Sepulvado, Ms. Carter, Ms. Greer, and Ms. Bass, counsel for Mr. Bass attempted to impeach these witnesses on several occasions; thus, it is clear the trial court was in a position to weigh these witnesses' testimonies and consider their credibility in arriving at its decision to sustain the exception of peremption. The fact that there are no reasons for judgment does not change that. "Appeals are taken from the judgment, not the reasons for judgment." Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm'n v. Oliver, 02-2795, p. 3 (La. 11/18/03), 860 So.2d 22, 24. "The written reasons for judgment are merely an explication of the Trial Court's determinations. They do not alter, amend, or affect the final judgment being appealed[.]" State in the Interest of Mason, 356 So.2d 530, 532 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1977).
Thus, taking into consideration the wealth of testimony at trial concerning Mr. Bass's knowledge of his potential paternity and the timing of his knowledge, it is clear that all of La.Civ.Code art 198 was fully considered by the trial court and I find no manifest error in its decision. Indeed, counsel for Mr. Bass argued vehemently that he was deceived such that the peremptive period did not began to run until the year immediately prior to the filing of his paternity action. The trial court rejected that argument as evidenced by its judgment sustaining the exception.
While I am mindful of the inequities of this case, given the undisputed fact that Mr. Bass is S.J.S.'s biological father, we must decide this case based on the law, not equity. Louisiana Civil Code Article 198 was enacted "to protect the child from the upheaval of such litigation and its consequences in circumstances where the child may actually live in an existing intact family with his mother and presumed father or may have become attached over many years to the man presumed to be his father." La.Civ.Code art. 198, Revision Comments—2005(e). It is not our function to question this purpose as the law is clear and unambiguous. On the other hand, Louisiana has long recognized that there are situations where children may enjoy dual paternity rights. Warren v. Richard, 296 So.2d 813 (La.1974), and Succession of Mitchell, 323 So.2d 451 (La.1975). As stated in Durr v. Blue, 454 So.2d 315, 318 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1984):
In Kinnett, the supreme court considered these equities, or inequities as the case may be, and held that while they may exist, the law already provides solutions for such situations. It noted that while "Article 198 focuses on the rights of the biological father to establish paternity[,]" "the rights of a child to establish filiation are addressed by La. Civ. Code art. 197, which provides in part, `[a] child may institute an action to prove paternity even though he is presumed to be the child of another man.'" Kinnett, 332 So.3d at 1157. The supreme court further noted that "[a] child's action is not subject to any peremptive period, except with regard to succession rights, where it must be brought within one year of the alleged father's death[]" and that a child "may institute an action to establish filiation to [the biological father], even though [the biological father's] avowal action is perempted." Id.
Here, the trial court did not err in applying the law, neither the text of the law nor the burden of proof thereon. The manifest error standard of review applies here, and the trial court, after hearing the evidence, determined that Mr. Bass did not prove that he was, in fact, deceived. I can find no manifest error in that decision. The trial court has already heard the witnesses, and it was in the best position to determine the weight and credibility to be afforded thereto. In fact, it had to do so in order to reach its decision considering the wealth of testimony on the issue. Another trial is a waste of judicial resources and, as stated earlier, only gives one side of this dispute another opportunity to meet a burden that he was unable to meet, arguably, twice previously. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court sustaining the exception of peremption.
FootNotes
(Emphasis added.)
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