Michael C. Niccum appeals his sentence following the trial court's revocation of his probation. Niccum raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court failed to properly award him accrued time and good time credit for time he spent in jail across three days pending the revocation proceedings. The State concedes that the trial court failed to properly award Niccum his accrued time but asserts that Niccum is not entitled to good time credit because the date of Niccum's arrest should be excluded from the calculation of good time credit. On this question of first impression, we hold that the calculation of good time credit is a function of the defendant's accrued time. As Niccum's accrued time is three days, he is entitled to one day of good time credit. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's omission of Niccum's credit time from its calculation of his sentence and remand with instructions for the court to award to Niccum three days of accrued time and one day of good time credit.
Facts and Procedural History
 In August of 2016, Niccum pleaded guilty to Level 4 felony dealing in methamphetamine and to being a habitual offender. The trial court ordered Niccum to serve an aggregate term of twelve years, with nine years executed and three years suspended to probation. However, the court provided that, if Niccum were to successfully complete rehabilitative programming while in the Department of Correction, it would modify the balance of his sentence. Niccum successfully completed that programming, and, beginning in March of 2018, the court ordered the balance of Niccum's sentence to be served as a suspended sentence of seven years, six months, and fifteen days.
 In January of 2021, the State filed its notice of probation violation, which it later amended. The amended notice alleged that Niccum had committed the new offense of Level 6 felony domestic battery as well as five new Class A misdemeanor offenses. At some point on February 27, 2021, Vigo County law enforcement apprehended and arrested Niccum. Niccum spent the remainder of February 27, all of February 28, and some portion of March 1 in jail before the court released him on his own recognizance.
 Thereafter, the court held a hearing on the State's notice of probation violation, after which the court revoked Niccum's probation and ordered him to serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentence of seven years, six months, and fifteen days in the Department of Correction. The trial court did not award Niccum any credit for the time he was actually in jail pending the revocation of his probation. This appeal ensued.
Standard of Review
 This appeal presents only a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Culver Cmty. Tchrs. Ass'n v. Ind. Educ. Emp. Rels. Bd., 174 N.E.3d 601, 604 (Ind. 2021). As our supreme court has stated:
Id. at 604-05 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, "when confronted with more than one statute on the same subject, we must try to harmonize any inconsistencies." State v. Reinhart, 112 N.E.3d 705, 711 (Ind. 2018).
 And, as we have explained:
Purdue v. State, 51 N.E.3d 432, 436 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
Niccum is Entitled to Three Days of Accrued Time and to One Day of Good Time Credit.
 Niccum contends that the trial court erred when it imposed the entirety of his previously suspended sentence without an offset for the time he spent in jail on February 27, February 28, and March 1. The State agrees that the trial court erred when it did not award Niccum credit for his accrued time on those days. However, the State suggests that we need to remand to the trial court for it to determine Niccum's accrued time.
 We agree with the parties that the trial court erred when it did not award Niccum the time he accrued against his
 Indiana Code section 35-50-6-0.5(1) (2021) defines accrued time as "the amount of time that a person is imprisoned or confined." The State does not dispute that that definition applied to Niccum on February 27 and continued to apply through February 28 and into March 1. And the State does not expressly refute Niccum's assertion that that span of time is three days.
 Indeed, in Purdue, the defendant was arrested at some point on January 29, was in jail for all of January 30, and was released at some point on January 31. On appeal, the State conceded that that span of time warranted "three days of credit" even though the defendant was in fact in jail for "48 hours." Purdue, 51 N.E.3d at 435 & n.7. And in Adams v. State, we relied on Purdue to conclude as follows:
120 N.E.3d 1058, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Under the same reasoning, Niccum has earned three days of accrued time for the time he spent in confinement across the three days of February 27, February 28, and March 1.
 The question on appeal thus turns to whether Niccum is entitled to any good time credit, and the parties' dispute on this issue presents a question of first impression.
And section 35-50-6-3.1(c) states that "[a] person assigned to Class B earns one (1) day of good time credit for every three (3) days the person is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing."
 Niccum asserts that, because he has three days of accrued time, those statutes entitle him to one day of good time credit. In response, the State asserts that Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.1(c) refers to "days," and that the proper interpretation of "day" excludes the "triggering event," that is, the day on which Vigo County law enforcement arrested Niccum. Appellee's Br. at 9-10. Thus, according to the State, February 27 does not count for the good time credit calculation under section 35-50-6-3.1(c).
Adams, 120 N.E.3d at 1062-63. We then held, following Purdue and the rule of lenity, that a six-to-eight-hour period of confinement entitled the defendant to "one day of accrued time." Id. at 1064.
 Here, the State again relies on Dobeski and related cases to assert that a "day" under the good time credit statute excludes the day of the triggering event. The State further asserts that Adams is not persuasive on the issue of good time credit because Adams was concerned about accrued time and the ambiguous statutory term "time," not "day." See id. at 1062-63.
 We are not persuaded by the State's argument. Dobeski was not about the calculation of good time credit, and we are not persuaded that our legislature intended the award of good time credit to be determined by our rules of procedure. Rather, the calculation of good time credit is a function of the defendant's accrued time.
 The statutory scheme for determining credit time makes our legislature's intent clear. Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.1(c) states that a person assigned to Class B earns one day of good time credit "for every three (3) days the person is imprisoned ... or confined." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, Indiana Code section 35-50-6-0.5(4) defines "[g]ood time credit" as "a reduction in a person's term of imprisonment or confinement awarded for the person's good behavior while imprisoned or confined." (Emphasis added.) And, again, the definition of "accrued time" is "the amount of time that a person is imprisoned or confined." Thus, accrued time is the amount of time a person is imprisoned or confined, and an award of good time credit turns on how many days the person is imprisoned or confined.
 The unambiguous language of the statutory scheme for determining credit time makes clear that our legislature intended the calculation of good time credit to be a function of the defendant's accrued time. The State's argument to the contrary contravenes the plain language of the statutes and would disharmonize the statutory scheme. See Reinhart, 112 N.E.3d at 711. We therefore reject the State's argument.
 As Niccum has earned three days of accrued time, he is entitled to one day of good time credit under Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.1(c). We reverse the trial court's imposition of the entirety of Niccum's previously suspended sentence and remand with instructions that the court award Niccum three days of accrued time and one day of good time credit against his sentence.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.