MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MANISH S. SHAH, District Judge.
Plaintiff Thomas Moorer spent almost seven years in pretrial detention, accused of murdering Edward Ramos. A jury found him not guilty. He alleges that officers of the Chicago Police Department didn't have probable cause to detain him for the murder. There are gaps in the record as to how Moorer became a suspect; police officers lost the victim's cellphone; other evidence suggested that Moorer didn't commit the crime; and CPD officers and the state's attorneys relied on photo array and in-person lineup identifications that Moorer alleges were unreliable. Moorer brings claims for unlawful pretrial detention, false imprisonment, and spoliation of evidence against CPD officers and the City of Chicago. Defendants move for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, their motion is granted.
I. Legal Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movants show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). I construe all facts and draw all inferences in favor of Moorer, the nonmoving party. Robertson v. Dep't of Health Servs., 949 F.3d 371, 377-78 (7th Cir. 2020). I need only consider the cited materials, but I may consider "other materials in the record." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
A. The Shooting
Someone murdered Edward Ramos.  ¶¶ 30-33.
A man with the lower part of his face covered and dressed in black clothing stepped out from the gangway to the building.  ¶ 13. He brandished a gun and confronted Kindelan and Rivera. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. The two women backed away and the man followed, coming into an area lit by streetlights. See id. ¶¶ 14-15. The parties dispute whether the man removed his mask at this point, but agree that he told Kindelan and Rivera to go away. Id. ¶ 15. The man then forced Walter to the apartment door. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. Rivera and Kindelan got back in the car with Hernandez. Id. ¶ 18. When they saw a second man emerge from the gangway, the women drove away and Hernandez called 911. Id.
The first man held a gun to Walter's head and told him to knock on the apartment door.  ¶ 19. Two other men were also in the gangway. Id. Walter banged on the door. Id. ¶ 20. Martinez and Edward, inside the apartment's living room, looked through the peep hole and then Edward opened the door. See id. ¶¶ 21, 24. The masked man rushed into the apartment and began shooting. Id. ¶ 22. There was a struggle for the gun, and Edward and Martinez fell to the ground. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. The man, whose face was now uncovered, fired several shots while standing, hitting Martinez in the leg. Id. ¶ 23. Miguel had been ironing clothes in a bedroom. Id. ¶ 24. After he heard the shots, Miguel looked into the living room, saw Edward struggling with the man, and ran out the back door. Id. Edwin heard the struggle, saw a man on top of Edward and Martinez, and ran to assist. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. The man hit Edwin in the head with the gun, but Edwin punched the assailant, causing the man to drop the weapon. Id.
Disarmed, the man ran out of the apartment the way he'd come.  ¶ 28. Edwin followed, but outside he saw a second man pointing a gun at him. Id. ¶ 29. The first man told his accomplice to start shooting. Id. Edwin lunged backwards into the doorway while Edward came past him, into the line of fire. Id. ¶ 30. Edward was shot in the chest. See id. ¶ 32. The man and his two accomplices fled. Id. ¶ 31. Edwin, Martinez, Miguel, and Walter carried Edward to a car, and Edwin drove his brother and Martinez to a hospital. Id. ¶¶ 32-33. Edward died later that night. Id. ¶ 33.
B. Initial Investigation and Photo Array
Officers of the Chicago Police Department arrived at the scene minutes after the shooting.  ¶ 34. Detectives Timothy McDermott, Matthew Benigno, and Steven Becker were assigned to the case. Id. ¶¶ 3, 37. They canvassed the area while forensic investigators gathered physical evidence. Id. ¶¶ 37-47. At a police station, other CPD officers—detectives Brian Tedeschi, John Valkner, Emiliano Leal, Nicholas Spanos,
At 1:30 in the morning on August 28, detective Valkner interviewed Edwin.  ¶ 7. Edwin said that he recognized the man who entered the apartment.  ¶ 53;  ¶¶ 7-8, 24. He said that his brother had sold drugs to the man, who went by the nickname, "Boom," and that a dispute had arisen over an unpaid debt. See  ¶ 53;  ¶¶ 8, 24. Edwin said that he had seen Boom on two earlier occasions, and that Boom made threatening phone calls to his brother during the week before the shooting.  ¶ 54;  ¶ 8. Edwin told detectives that they could find Boom's contact information in Edward's cell phone.  ¶ 54; see  ¶ 9.
A cell phone was recovered at the scene of the crime.  ¶ 42. A forensic investigator collected and transported physical evidence to his office, id. ¶ 46, but detective McDermott requested that the investigator turn over the cell phone to him rather than inventory it. Id. ¶ 47;  ¶ 66. The investigator gave the phone to McDermott.  ¶ 47;  ¶ 66. Having finished his work at the scene, McDermott returned to the police headquarters at around 4:20 a.m.  ¶ 69. While McDermott said that he or someone else should have documented and inventoried the phone, it was never inventoried, and the record is silent as to what became of it after the investigator gave the phone to McDermott.  ¶ 67;  ¶ 71.
But police reports show that Edwin identified a cell phone as belonging to his brother, and that Edwin and Valkner searched the contacts of the phone and located an entry for "Boom" associated with the number (773) 754-2075.  ¶ 9;  ¶ 70. Later, however, Edwin said that he assumed his brother's phone had been password-protected, couldn't remember going through the contacts in Edward's phone with detectives, and didn't know what happened to Edward's cellphones after the "incident."  ¶ 10. Valkner couldn't remember looking at a phone with Edwin or who had given him the phone.  ¶¶ 11, 68.
A CPD officer ran a nickname search for "Boom" in a database.  ¶ 55; see  ¶ 24.
Detectives gave Edwin two books or "a bunch of papers" that included the photographs of six people on each page. See  ¶ 56;  ¶ 31.
An unknown CPD officer created a photo array of six photographs, including Moorer's. See  ¶¶ 58-59; [154-36]; [154-37]. Detective Tedeschi logged into the CPD's mug shot database, used to create photo arrays, and performed his first command at 1:30 a.m.  ¶ 57. The computer system could create photo arrays in several ways: based on a suspect's mugshot, demographic information, or by inputting a specific name or identifying number.  ¶¶ 34-35. It generally took ten to twenty minutes to put together a photo array. Id. ¶ 42. Once created, a photo array could be saved, but if it was not, there was no way to tell whether the system generated a photo array. Id. ¶ 35. Tedeschi said that he didn't believe he had made the array in this case. Id. ¶ 42. No one saved the photo array including Moorer in the system, see id. ¶ 36, but paper copies of the array were preserved. See id.;  ¶ 58; [154-36]; [154-37].
In the photo array, Moorer's photograph appears in the middle position of the bottom row, and the fillers appear to be the same race and sex as Moorer.  ¶ 59; see [154-36].
After returning to the station at 4:20 a.m., detective McDermott called Assistant State's Attorney Maria Augustus.  ¶¶ 69, 72. Augustus came to the station where she was briefed on the investigation, reviewed police reports, and reinterviewed witnesses with McDermott. Id. ¶ 73. After the interviews, at 7:50 a.m., McDermott and Augustus mutually agreed to issue an investigative alert with probable cause to arrest Thomas Moorer. Id. ¶¶ 75-76;  ¶ 43. McDermott didn't pressure Augustus to issue the alert or recommend charges.  ¶ 76.
C. Moorer's Arrest and the In-Person Lineups
McDermott's shift ended, and detectives Cardo and Gonzalez took over the investigation.  ¶ 77. The detectives went to Moorer's last known address and set up surveillance. Id. ¶ 79. At about 3:25 p.m. on August 28, Moorer left his house and got into a car. Id. ¶ 80;  ¶ 45. Police officers stopped the vehicle, and Moorer was taken into custody and brought to the police station.  ¶ 80;  ¶ 45. Moorer agreed to speak with detectives.  ¶ 81;  ¶¶ 53, 55. He denied being involved in the crime and said that he had been home the day of the shooting with his sisters and his sisters' children.  ¶ 82;  ¶¶ 53, 55.
Cardo and Gonzalez learned that Moorer's nickname was "Boomer," rather than Boom.  ¶ 48. The detectives didn't see any injuries on Moorer's body or blood on his clothing or his person, see id. ¶ 52, officers tracked the phone associated with Boom at locations that were different from where Moorer's vehicle and home were, id. ¶¶ 44, 46, and Moorer's car didn't match the description of the vehicle seen leaving the crime scene. Id. ¶ 54. Moorer didn't own a cell phone, didn't have one in his possession when he was arrested, and police officers never found a connection between Moorer and the number for Boom. Id. ¶ 47. Officers never secured a search warrant or asked to search Moorer's home. Id. ¶ 95.
Cardo and Gonzalez called Edwin, Miguel, Walter, Kindelan, Hernandez, and Rivera, and asked them to return to the station to view an in-person lineup.  ¶ 83. Some of the witnesses sat together at the police station before viewing the in-person lineup. See  ¶ 89. Cardo and Gonzalez assembled the lineup, including Moorer and four other individuals selected from lockups in the area.  ¶¶ 84-85; see [154-38]. Moorer was the only person in the photo array and the live lineup, and was not placed in different positions during the lineup.  ¶ 88. All of the lineup participants appeared to be Black men.  ¶ 85.
Walter viewed the lineup first, identified Moorer, but was only eighty percent certain.  ¶ 92. Detective Gonzalez treated his lack of confidence as a negative identification. Id. Rivera went next and identified Moorer as the person she had seen with a gun. Id. ¶ 93. Edwin identified Moorer right away. Id. ¶ 94. Edwin also thought that another man present at the attack was in the lineup, but detectives told him to ignore that other man and focus only on the man who entered the apartment. Id.; [154-22] at 41. Hernandez and Kindelan identified Moorer as the person they had seen in the gangway.  ¶¶ 95-96. Miguel viewed the lineup later on the evening of August 28th, and positively identified Moorer as the man whom he seen wrestling with Edward. Id. ¶ 97.
Assistant State's Attorney Augustus reinterviewed Edwin, Miguel, Walter, Hernandez, Kindelan, and Rivera.  ¶ 99. The six witnesses gave videotaped statements of their accounts of what happened during the home invasion. Id. The witnesses confirmed that they had read and understood the lineup advisory forms and that they had positively identified Moorer in the photo array, physical lineup, or both. Id. ¶ 100.
On August 29, Martinez was released from the hospital and came to the police station to view a physical lineup.  ¶ 102. He had not viewed the photo array. See  ¶¶ 67-68, 102;  ¶ 88. Detectives Cardo and Gonzalez assembled another physical lineup, including Moorer and four "fillers." Id. ¶ 103. Moorer was placed in a different position in this lineup than he had been in the previous one.  ¶ 88. The parties agree that all of the subjects in the lineup appeared to be Black men of approximately Moorer's age, but dispute whether they were the same approximate height and weight.  ¶ 104. Martinez read and signed the advisory form before viewing the lineup. Id. ¶ 105. Martinez viewed the lineup and identified Moorer as the person who struggled with Edward and subsequently shot and killed him. Id. ¶ 106.
That night, detectives investigated Moorer's claim that he had been home during the time of the shooting.  ¶ 107;  ¶ 57. In his initial interview with detectives, Moorer told Gonzalez to call a woman who would confirm his whereabouts, and it's reasonable to infer that Moorer meant police officers should speak to his girlfriend. See  ¶ 56.
At Moorer's home, McDermott and Folino spoke to Vaneglen Moorer and Jeanetta Nobles.  ¶ 58;  ¶¶ 107-110.
At some point after their interviews at Moorer's residence, Vaneglen and Nobles were taken to the police station.  ¶ 111; see  ¶ 60. The parties dispute whether Vaneglen had a choice to go to the police station or not. See  ¶ 61;  ¶ 113.
D. The Grand Jury, Pretrial Detention, and Acquittal
At 12:15 a.m. on August 30, Augustus approved three felony charges against Moorer: first degree murder, attempted murder, and aggravated battery with a firearm.  ¶ 114;  ¶ 59. McDermott, Gonzalez, and Cardo said that they didn't pressure or lie to Augustus in order to coerce her into approving the charges.  ¶ 115.
In September 2010, a grand jury heard testimony from Vaneglen and Nobles, along with Edwin, Miguel, Rivera, Kindelan, and Hernandez. Id. ¶¶ 116-19. The state introduced the advisory forms and photo arrays documenting the witness identifications of Moorer. Id. ¶ 119. The grand jury returned a 135-count indictment charging Moorer with first-degree murder, among other crimes. Id. ¶ 120.
As part of its pretrial preparations, the state conducted testing on the physical evidence from the crime and studied the phone records of the number associated with Boom.  ¶¶ 121-22. Investigators compared Moorer's DNA to samples found at the crime scene. Id. ¶ 121;  ¶ 65. A brown hat found at the scene had DNA from two profiles, but neither matched Moorer.  ¶ 65. Similarly, Moorer was excluded as a match for DNA found on two pieces of black cloth, a portion of a collar, and a t-shirt. Id. The state subpoenaed phone records for the number associated with Boom and hired an expert to analyze cell tower information to determine the phone's location at the time of the shooting.  ¶ 122. The expert was unable to determine where the phone had been located during the shooting because it had been turned off. Id. ¶ 123. The expert was able to determine that the records were inconsistent with the phone being used near Moorer's home on August 27 or 28, 2010. Id. The phone number associated with Boom continued to be used after Moorer was arrested. See  ¶ 12. One of the prosecutors in Moorer's trial later said that the cell phone could have contained exculpatory evidence. Id. ¶ 92.
Four years after Moorer's arrest, the city fired detective McDermott because he appeared with another CPD officer in a photograph with an African American man, posing as if McDermott were a hunter and the man was his prey.  ¶ 105.
Moorer's criminal trial was held in July 2017, almost seven years after his pretrial detention started.  ¶ 127. Edwin, Martinez, Miguel, Hernandez, Rivera, and Kindelan testified for the prosecution and reaffirmed their identifications of Moorer as one of the shooters. Id. ¶ 128. A professor of psychology testified for the defense that the photo array and live lineups including Moorer weren't reliable. Id. ¶¶ 130-31.
The jury found Moorer not guilty on all counts.  ¶ 134. Ten months later, Moorer filed this lawsuit. .
A. Fourth Amendment: Unlawful Detention
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. A seizure, including pretrial detention, is reasonable only if it was based on probable cause to believe the detainee had committed a crime. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 476 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). The Fourth Amendment governs both detentions that happen before legal process and pretrial detentions that occur after legal process. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S.Ct. 911, 919 (2017); see also Kuri v. City of Chicago, 990 F.3d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 2021). Unlawful pretrial detention occurs when either "the police hold someone without any reason before the formal onset of a criminal proceeding," or when "legal process itself goes wrong—when, for example, a judge's probable-cause determination is predicated solely on a police officer's false statements." Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 918.
Probable cause is an absolute bar to a claim for unlawful detention. See Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 249 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006)). Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge would allow a prudent person to believe that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense. Camm v. Faith, 937 F.3d 1096, 1105 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Gower v. Vercler, 377 F.3d 661, 668 (7th Cir. 2004)). Probable cause is assessed objectively, based on the conclusions that the arresting officer reasonably might have drawn from information known to him. Young v. City of Chicago, 987 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted).
A grand jury indicted Moorer,  ¶ 120, and that's prima facie evidence of probable cause. Coleman v. City of Peoria, Illinois, 925 F.3d 336, 351 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Wade v. Collier, 783 F.3d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 2015)). The presumption of probable cause after a grand jury has indicted a defendant can be rebutted by "evidence that law enforcement obtained the indictment through improper or fraudulent means." Id. (citations omitted). In other words, Moorer must show that defendants knew that there was no probable cause to seize him or intentionally or recklessly provided false information to the grand jury. See id. (citing Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 444 (7th Cir. 2013)); Olson v. Champaign County, Ill., 784 F.3d 1093, 1100 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) (officers act unreasonably if they intentionally or recklessly provide false information).
A single identification from a credible eyewitness is sufficient for probable cause. Hart v. Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 587 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 996 (7th Cir. 2000)); Phillips v. Allen, 668 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted) ("Identification by a single eyewitness who lacks an apparent grudge against the accused person supplies probable cause for arrest."). But to establish probable cause, police officers can't rely on identifications that are the product of "coercion or manipulation." Hart, 798 F.3d at 587 (citing Phillips, 688 F.3d at 917). Moorer wants the eyewitness identifications in his case to be assessed using the two-step process used in the Due Process context, see  at 36, but that is not the test for probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. See Phillips, 688 F.3d at 915; Coleman v. City of Peoria, Illinois, 925 F.3d 336, 347-48 (7th Cir. 2019). Instead, to show that officers lacked probable cause to detain him on the basis of a coerced or manipulated identification, Moorer must show that defendants used a forbidden technique "to trick a person into making an unreliable identification." Phillips, 688 F.3d at 917. Or, Moorer must show that a jury could infer that the officers did not believe that the identifications were truthful. See Robertson v. Dep't of Health Servs., 949 F.3d 371, 377-78 (7th Cir. 2020).
Moorer argues that the identifications in his case were unreliable, overly suggestive, and that—because of gaps in the record about how he became a suspect, missing evidence, unfollowed leads, and evidence that pointed away from him— defendants knew that the eyewitnesses were mistaken or lying when they identified him as being involved in the murder. See  at 36-45.
1. The Police Officers Were Not Required to Discount the Witnesses' Identifications
By pointing out inconsistencies between the witnesses' identifications of Moorer and their earlier and later statements to detectives, see  at 16-18, 26-29, 40-41, Moorer challenges the eyewitnesses' credibility. See Coleman v. City of Peoria, Illinois, 925 F.3d 336, 351 (7th Cir. 2019). It's true that some of the witnesses' identifications don't line up with how they otherwise described the shooting and the suspect. For instance, Moorer had facial hair at the time of his arrest, see [154-42], but in their initial statements none of the witnesses described the first shooter as having a mustache. See  ¶¶ 3-4, 13, 16, 19, 21, 23;  ¶ 50.
2. There Is No Evidence that the Identifications Were Coerced or Manipulated
Moorer offers a long list of reasons why both the in-person and photo array lineups in his case were overly suggestive or unreliable, and therefore not a suitable basis for probable cause. See  at 36-45.
First, Moorer argues that the fillers in both the array and lineups didn't match the described weight of the offender. See  at 38. Some of the witnesses said the suspect was between 180-250 pounds, see  ¶¶ 3-4, 7, 21, 23, but not all of the witnesses estimated the masked man's weight. See id. ¶¶ 13, 16, 19. The demographics of the fillers in the in-person lineups weren't recorded, see  ¶ 85, but it's reasonable to infer that they were smaller than the 250-pound estimate given by some of the eyewitnesses. See [154-38]; [154-42]. The fillers in the photo array all weighed between 175-195 pounds, see [154-36], and were therefore lighter than the description given by three of the eyewitnesses, but fit the lower end of the description. See  ¶¶ 3, 7, 21, 23.
An examination of the photographs and the demographics of the photo array fillers shows lineups of men reasonably similar in weight to the suspect witnesses described. See [154-36]; [154-38]; [154-42]. In other words, the discrepancies in size between the fillers in both the array and in-person lineups and the description given by some of the eyewitnesses wasn't so great as to make the array and lineups overly suggestive. See United States v. Curry, 187 F.3d 762, 769 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Funches, 84 F.3d 249, 253 (7th Cir. 1996)) (participants in a lineup must have "descriptive features within a reasonable range of similarity to each other").
Moorer's related argument that the photo array isn't a reliable source of probable cause because he appeared to be the largest person also fails. See  at 37-38; United States v. Traeger, 289 F.3d 461, 474 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Moore, 115 F.3d 1348, 1361 (7th Cir. 1997)) (police officers conducting lineups are required to make "reasonable efforts under the circumstances to conduct a fair and balanced presentation," not "search for identical twins in age, height, weight, or facial features"). It's debatable whether Moorer appears to be the largest person in the photo array. See [154-36]. His height and weight according to the array demographics was close to that of the fillers, see id., but he actually weighed significantly more—235-245 pounds—at the time the photograph was taken. See  at 1.
Moorer next argues that the photo array can't be relied on because the top three fillers appeared bald even though no witness described the offender that way. See  at 38. While the photograph of one of the men in the array is so light as to make identifying facial features impossible, the five other men in the array (including Moorer) have either short hair or none at all. See [154-36]; [154-37]. Given that only one of the witnesses had described the perpetrator's hairstyle,  ¶ 19, which didn't match Moorer's hair or that of any of the fillers, it wasn't suggestive to include bald men in the array because most of the witnesses hadn't identified any particular hair style for the suspect. See United States v. Galati, 230 F.3d 254, 260 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that insubstantial differences in hair style did not make an array overly suggestive where the men pictured "all fit the general descriptions" offered by the witnesses); United States v. Gonzalez, 863 F.3d 576, 585 (7th Cir. 2017) (photo array was suggestive where only a suspect and one other man in the array matched the witness's description of a particular hairstyle).
That Moorer wore a dark shirt didn't make the in-person lineups an unreliable source for probable cause, either. See  at 37. In general, identifications aren't overly suggestive where a suspect wears an article of clothing associated with the description given by witnesses. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 6 (1970); United States v. Williams, 522 F.3d 809, 810-11 (7th Cir. 2008). Here, Moorer wasn't the only person wearing a dark shirt in the initial in-person lineup, seen by five of the witnesses. See [154-38]. Only some of the witnesses described the attacker as having worn a black shirt, see  ¶¶ 3-4, 7, 13, 16, 19, 21, 23, and Moorer wore a shirt with lettering on it for the lineups, see [154-38]; [154-42], which isn't how any of the witnesses described the suspect. None of the witnesses who identified Moorer in the in-person lineups said they did so because of what he was wearing.  ¶¶ 60, 68.
Moorer also argues that the in-person lineups were unreliable because he was the only person who appeared in both the photo array and the in-person lineups (conducted within days of the photo array). See  at 37-38;  ¶¶ 68, 92-97. The problem for Moorer here is that, although suggestive, this is not a forbidden practice. So the photo array could still be considered when evaluating probable cause. See United States v. Sanders, 708 F.3d 976, 989 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Griffin, 493 F.3d 856, 865 (7th Cir. 2007)) ("[T]here is nothing per se impermissible about placing the same suspect in two different identification procedures."). Absent some evidence to suggest that Moorer's repeated appearance in different identification procedures was designed to have him selected or that the officers did not genuinely suspect him, the lineup identifications could support probable cause in his case.
On that front, Moorer does challenge the identifications on the basis of allegedly coercive or manipulative conduct by some of the CPD defendants. See  at 37-39. If a police officer coaches a witness by leading them to identify a particular person, that identification cannot provide probable cause. See Hart v. Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 588 (7th Cir. 2015); Phillips v. Allen, 668 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 2012). On this basis, Moorer challenges photo array identifications made by Edwin and Kindelan, and the in-person identification made by Miguel. See  at 38-39.
Before the identifications, each of the witnesses was presented with and signed an advisory form explaining that a suspect wouldn't necessarily be in the array or lineup and that the witness wasn't required to make an identification. See  ¶¶ 61-63, 87-88. And the witnesses weren't told who to identify or where Moorer was in the array or lineup. Id. ¶¶ 65, 91.
After Edwin initially identified Moorer's photograph from the results of the nickname search, detectives asked him if a separate photograph of Moorer was "the person that you picked," and then had Edwin sign that printout. See  ¶ 32. It's reasonable to infer, as plaintiff suggests, that the second printout of Moorer's photograph was, in fact, the photo array. See id.;  ¶¶ 56, 67; [154-37] at 4. CPD officers appear to have used the photo array to confirm Edwin's initial identification, which he made minutes before from among the results of the nickname search.
Defendants didn't coerce Kindelan's photo array identification by documenting her choice, either. After Kindelan identified Moorer, detective Leal circled Moorer's photograph on Kindelan's copy of the array in order to verify her identification.  ¶ 66. The officers didn't coach or manipulate Kindelan because Leal documented an identification that the witness had already made; he didn't tell Kindelan who to pick out. See id.
Miguel said that detectives, calling him into the station to view the in-person lineup, told him that a suspect had been arrested and that it was the person he had identified in the photo array. See  ¶ 88. Conducting the lineup after priming the witness in this way was suggestive, because telling Miguel that the person he had previously identified had been arrested was likely to push the witness into identifying that person in a subsequent lineup. See United States v. Jones, 454 F.3d 642, 649 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Gregory-Bey v. Hanks, 332 F.3d 1036, 1045 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Traeger, 289 F.3d 461, 473-74 (7th Cir. 2002)) (suggestive procedures are those "that have been orchestrated to yield the identification of one particular suspect"). The suggestiveness of Miguel's in-person lineup identification meant that it couldn't contribute to probable cause; but Miguel's earlier photo array identification could. See  ¶ 68. And there's no basis from which to infer that the other identifications in this case were similarly tainted. See Hart, 798 F.3d at 590. In other words, that Miguel's in-person identification was suggestive isn't a basis for liability under the Fourth Amendment, which depends on the existence of probable cause. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S.Ct. 911, 919 (2017); Phillips, 668 F.3d at 917.
The techniques and procedures officers used during the array and lineups fell below the standards prescribed by police best practices. Department of Justice guidelines suggest moving a suspect's position in each lineup, see U.S. Department of Justice, Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement 30 (October 1999), but the CPD defendants placed Moorer in the same position in the photo array given to all of the witnesses and in all but one of the in-person lineups.  ¶ 88. It is reasonable to infer that the officers involved in the investigation also participated in the identifications, so they did not use a "double-blind" method wherein "the administering officer does not know who is and is not a suspect." Hart v. Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 588 n.1 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
Moorer hasn't pointed to any constitutionally forbidden technique that defendants used in order to coerce or manipulate every eyewitness into identifying him, and the bulk of the identifications were not so tainted, suggestive, or unreliable that they couldn't support the probable cause defendants needed to detain Moorer. See Phillips v. Allen, 668 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 2012); Hart, 798 F.3d at 587.
3. Other Procedural Problems, Missing Evidence, and Exculpatory Evidence
Although imperfect or even shoddy as an evidence-gathering technique, the identification procedures used here did not require the officers to eliminate Edwin's initial identification or Martinez's lineup pick of Moorer from the probable cause assessment; and at a minimum, separately and as corroboration of each other, those two identifications established probable cause to believe Moorer committed a crime. But if defendants nonetheless knew or should have known that Moorer wasn't guilty, the officers couldn't rely on otherwise valid identifications. See Hart v. Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 591 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) ("A police officer is permitted to rely on information provided by an eyewitness as long as the officer reasonably believes the witness is telling the truth."); Reynolds v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 765 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (an officer can rely on the complaint of a single witness to establish probable cause "unless the officer has a reason to question the witness' account"). Citing gaps in the record as to how he became a suspect, the loss of the victim's cell phone, exculpatory evidence, and failure to follow leads, Moorer claims that's what happened here: defendants knew or should have known that he was innocent and so they had reason to doubt the identifications. See  at 41-45.
Moorer is right that it's not entirely clear how he became a suspect. Edwin played the central role in first identifying Moorer,
From these holes and discrepancies in the record, Moorer implies that a jury could fill the gaps with an inference that defendants set him up. But flawed policework is not a sufficient basis from which to draw that inference. See Askew v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 2006) (police failure to follow correct procedures is a normal occurrence not "sufficient to permit second-guessing and damages"); Coleman v. City of Peoria, Illinois, 925 F.3d 336, 348 (7th Cir. 2019) (describing a similar "cold search" for suspects in a database as police not following best practices). The initial array that Edwin viewed appears rushed, it was poorly documented, and police records don't explain the precise order of operations that night, but it's not reasonable to infer from those procedural flaws that detectives knew Moorer was innocent. See Askew, 440 F.3d at 896; Hart, 798 F.3d at 588 (finding no Fourth Amendment liability where police officers failed to follow correct procedures but there was no evidence that procedural flaws led to a constitutional violation). There's no evidence that the detectives were aware of Moorer until after Edwin identified him, and they didn't just hand Moorer's photograph to Edwin: they asked him to look through a series of mugshots, with Moorer's being one among many. See  ¶ 56. No jury could infer from that process that defendants knew Moorer wasn't the murderer.
Officers mishandled evidence, too. But the fact that defendants lost or destroyed Edward's cellphone doesn't show that they knew Moorer was innocent.
Finally, Moorer argues that defendants had reason to doubt the identifications because evidence pointed away from him and defendants failed to adequately follow leads that would have shown he didn't commit the crime. See  at 42-44. The evidence that pointed away from Moorer at the time he was charged included: (1) Moorer's nickname was Boomer, not Boom, as indicated by a tattoo on Moorer's arm,  ¶ 48; (2) he didn't weigh as much at the time of his arrest as the man some of the witnesses had described, see id. ¶ 1; (3) detectives didn't find injuries on Moorer or blood on his clothing, see id. ¶ 52; (4) the phone number associated with Boom was known to be pinging at locations different from where Moorer lived or where his car was, see id. ¶¶ 46; and (5) Moorer's car didn't match the description of the offenders' vehicle. Id. ¶ 54.
Moorer argues that defendants didn't thoroughly investigate his case. See  at 42-43. He claims defendants should have conducted a gun-shot residue test, searched his home and car, investigated a second shooter, and interviewed alibi witnesses,
Defendants needed only a single eyewitness identification to supply probable cause. Coleman v. City of Peoria, Illinois, 925 F.3d 336, 346 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Hart v. Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 587 (7th Cir. 2015)). They had seven. See  ¶¶ 56, 68, 92-97, 106. Moorer has marshaled evidence to suggest that his detention was the product of subpar policework, but a jury could not conclude that defendants had reason to doubt the identifications, or to know that Moorer wasn't the murderer. The bulk of the identifications were a reliable source of probable cause, and defendants didn't know that Moorer was innocent. Defendants had probable cause to detain Moorer for murder.
4. Proximate Cause
Even if defendants lacked probable cause to detain Moorer, his Fourth Amendment claim would still face another challenge. To hold defendants liable under § 1983, Moorer needs to prove that defendants were the ones who caused a violation of his rights. See Hoffman v. Knoebel, 894 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2018). He can't, and so his § 1983 claim fails for a lack of causation as well.
Section 1983 creates a form of tort liability for the deprivation of constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities. Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S.Ct. 911, 916 (2017) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976)). But liability under § 1983 depends on a showing that the defendant's act was both "the cause-in-fact of the injury and its proximate cause." Hoffman, 894 F.3d at 841 (citing Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 582 (7th Cir. 2012)). An indictment generally breaks the chain of causation between an unlawful arrest and § 1983 tort liability. See Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 1996)) ("[T]he State's Attorney, not the police, prosecutes a criminal action ... [T]he chain of causation [between a wrongful arrest and post-indictment tort liability] is broken by an indictment, absent an allegation of pressure or influence exerted by the police officers, or knowing misstatements by the officers to the prosecutor."). To succeed on a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention against an arresting officer, Moorer must show "some postarrest action which influenced the prosecutor's decision to indict." Id. (quoting Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enf't Task Force, 239 F.3d 892, 902 (7th Cir. 2001)); see Young v. City of Chicago, 987 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 2021) (allegations of police misconduct can undermine probable cause and support Fourth Amendment liability for unlawful pretrial detention); Coleman v. City of Peoria, Illinois, 925 F.3d 336, 351 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted) (finding that the presumption of probable cause resulting from an indictment can be rebutted by "evidence that law enforcement obtained the indictment through improper or fraudulent means").
Moorer argues that defendants failed to tell the prosecuting attorney all of the relevant facts after the arrest, and that defendants revealed the timeline of the interviews and certain witness statements in supplemental reports only after charges had been brought. See  at 46-47. But the reports submitted after charges had been brought don't reveal anything about what the attorneys knew at the time of the indictment. See [165-3]; [165-4]. And there's no evidence that the state's attorneys weren't aware of the procedures during the identifications, the timeline of identifications, the missing cellphone, the continued use of the phone number after Moorer was arrested, Moorer's lack of injuries, or the inconsistencies between Moorer's appearance and the descriptions given by the witnesses. See  ¶ 115.
The undisputed facts show that after the photo array identifications, the state's attorney came to the police station where she was updated on the investigation, reviewed police reports, and reinterviewed witnesses. Id. ¶ 73. After the in-person identifications, the state's attorney interviewed the six eyewitnesses who identified Moorer and two of Moorer's alibi witnesses, Vaneglen and Nobles. Id. ¶¶ 99, 111. Detectives Cardo, Gonzalez, and McDermott all testified that they never pressured the state's attorney or otherwise coerced her into approving the charges against Moorer. Id. ¶ 115.
There were flaws in the investigation, but it's not reasonable to infer from those flaws that the state's attorneys didn't know about aspects of the investigation or that a reasonable attorney in their position would have dropped the charges had they been aware. See Armstrong v. Daily, 786 F.3d 529, 553 (7th Cir. 2015) (discussing § 1983's causation requirement for a Due Process claim based on the destruction of exculpatory evidence). The state's attorneys knew about the progress of the investigation, interviewed the identifying and alibi witnesses, and weren't pressured or promised anything by police officers in exchange for indicting Moorer. See  ¶¶ 73, 99, 111, 115. Moorer hasn't offered any evidence that defendants influenced the attorneys' decision to indict. See  at 46-47.
Defendants had probable cause to detain Moorer before his trial. Alternatively, the grand jury's indictment severed the causal link between defendants' actions and Moorer's alleged injury.
B. False Imprisonment
That defendants had probable cause to detain Moorer also defeats his state-law claim for false imprisonment. See Poris v. Lake Holiday Prop. Owners Ass'n, 368 Ill.Dec. 189, 203 (2013) (citing Martel Enters. v. City of Chicago, 223 Ill.App.3d 1028, 1034 (1st Dist. 1991)) ("Probable cause is an absolute bar to a claim for false imprisonment.").
The false imprisonment claim also fails because it is time-barred. Illinois law requires that actions against "a local entity or any of its employees for any injury" be brought "within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued." 745 ILCS 10/8-101. A false imprisonment claim accrues when a plaintiff is held pursuant to a warrant or other judicial process. See Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McFatridge, 604 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Mercado v. Vill. of Addison, 385 Ill.App.3d 1006 (2d Dist. 2008); Smith v. Boudreau, 366 Ill.App.3d 958 (1st Dist. 2006)); Kitchen v. Burge, 781 F.Supp.2d 721, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2011). Here, Moorer was indicted by the grand jury in September 2010, see  ¶¶ 116-120, and so he had until September 2011 to file his state-law false imprisonment claim. But his original complaint was filed on May 30, 2018, , which makes this claim untimely.
Summary judgment is granted to defendants on the false imprisonment claim.
C. Spoliation of Evidence
Negligent spoliation of evidence is a type of negligence, not an independent tort. See Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 509-510 (7th Cir. 2007); Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 166 Ill.2d 188, 192-193 (1995).
There is no general duty to preserve evidence under Illinois law, but one may arise if the parties are sufficiently related and it was foreseeable that the evidence would be used in future litigation. See Schaefer v. Universal Scaffolding & Equip., LLC, 839 F.3d 599, 609 (7th Cir. 2016). Moorer argues that McDermott owed him a duty to preserve evidence because proper police practices required detectives to document and inventory evidence,  at 49, but standard police practices aren't enough to show a duty under Illinois law. See Schaefer, 839 F.3d at 609; Boyd, 166 Ill.2d at 195. Moorer's lawyers never asked McDermott to preserve the evidence and McDermott didn't segregate the evidence for Moorer's benefit. See Boyd, 166 Ill.2d at 195; Martin v. Keeley & Sons, Inc., 365 Ill.Dec. 656, 665 (2012). McDermott never voluntarily undertook a duty to preserve the evidence for Moorer, either. See Martin, 365 Ill.Dec. at 662 (finding that a showing of voluntary undertaking requires that a plaintiff demonstrate "affirmative conduct by [defendant] showing [his] intent to voluntarily undertake a duty" to the plaintiff). The law—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—does impose a duty on police officers to preserve some evidence, but officers breach that duty only in a narrow set of circumstances. See United States v. Cherry, 920 F.3d 1126, 1140 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Fletcher, 634 F.3d 395, 407 (7th Cir. 2011)).
Assuming that the Due Process Clause can support a duty to preserve evidence under Illinois law, Moorer's claim fails because he hasn't shown a breach. Moorer agrees that the standard of care applicable to McDermott is that for an Illinois police officer solely engaged in law enforcement, see  at 49, and McDermott is liable only if he lost or destroyed the evidence in a willful and wanton way. 745 ILCS 10/2-202; Fitzpatrick v. City of Chicago, 112 Ill.2d 211, 214 (1986). Willful and wanton conduct "means a course of action which shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property." 745 ILCS 10/1-210; see McDowell v. Vill. of Lansing, 763 F.3d 762, 768 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Geimer v. Chicago Park Dist., 272 Ill.App.3d 629 (1st Dist. 1995)) ([willful] and wanton conduct "means more than mere inadvertence, incompetence, or unskillfulness").
It's not clear which general progress report Moorer alleges that McDermott lost, see  ¶¶ 23, 59, but it seems likely Moorer means the report from an initial interview with Kindelan. See  at 11. Moorer doesn't allege any connection between McDermott's conduct and the absence of that report, and the parties agree that Leal never made a report summarizing that interview. See  ¶ 52. Because there was no report to preserve and McDermott wasn't involved in the interview, McDermott didn't breach any duty to Moorer involving that general progress report.
As for the cellphone, McDermott requested that the forensic investigator turn over Edward Ramos's phone to him, rather than inventory it, and the investigator gave McDermott the phone.  ¶ 47;  ¶ 66. After that, the cellphone disappears from the record.  ¶ 67;  ¶ 71. McDermott said that he or someone else should have documented and inventoried it,  ¶ 67, but there's no evidence that McDermott intentionally lost or destroyed the evidence or acted with conscious disregard for Moorer's safety. While it's reasonable to infer that Edward's missing phone contained evidence that could have supported Moorer's case, that doesn't mean that McDermott destroyed the phone in a willful or wanton way. At most, the undisputed facts show that McDermott was inadvertent or incompetent in his handling of the evidence, and that's not enough to show negligent spoliation under Illinois law. See 745 ILCS 10/1-210; McDowell, 763 F.3d at 768.
Summary judgment is granted to defendant McDermott on the spoliation claim.
Thomas Moorer spent years in pretrial detention based on eyewitness identifications that were of questionable reliability. He was acquitted at trial. Moorer understandably seeks recompense for his pretrial detention, but because probable cause is a low bar, the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the officers from relying on the identifications and letting the lawyers, judge, and jurors resolve Moorer's guilt. Without any evidence to suggest that defendants knew the identifications were wrong or that the officers were the legal cause for detention after the prosecutor, grand jury, and court weighed in, a civil lawsuit under the Fourth Amendment simply does not lie.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, , is granted. Enter judgment and terminate civil case.