MEMORANDUM OPINION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
LISA PUPO LENIHAN, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. PREFACE
In Spring 2020 the global Covid-19 pandemic necessitated the closure of campuses worldwide and a temporary transition of essentially all United States post-secondary instruction to online. The question before this Court, as before numerous others nationwide, is not whether this sweeping alteration in the educational experience of students previously receiving a traditional on-campus post-secondary education was foreseeable, voluntary, or avoidable by either party. Clearly it was not. Nor is the question whether Defendant was justified in closing its campus. Clearly it was. Nor is the question whether the university made appropriate efforts in response to an unprecedented public health crisis. Surely it did. The question is: did the educational institution have a contractual obligation to provide in-person, on-campus learning to the Plaintiffs? And: (a) If so, is it excused from financial liability for a difference in value between the institution's traditional education and the virtual education necessitated (a difference perhaps informed by its own online course fees), as by, e.g., a force majeure clause in its contract?
These are the questions that must inform the assignment of this portion of the pandemic losses — of education, employment, savings, homes, friendships, family, life itself — which befell us. And they are ones on which District and State Courts across the country continue to be divided. For the reasons set forth fully below, the Court finds in answer to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiffs have stated a claim for (a) breach of contract under Pennsylvania law or, in the alternative, (b) unjust enrichment/quantum meruit. It further concludes that they have failed to state a claim for conversion.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs (Rafael Figueroa, Kahlil Cabble, Ty'Anthony Scott, and Ryan Petty) and the putative class members are students who were participating in Defendant's on-campus educational program for the Spring 2020 semester. Defendant, Point Park University ("PPU" or "University"), is a private university with a principal campus located in downtown Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The University offers major fields for undergraduate students, as well as a number of graduate programs. It offers the traditional on-campus post-secondary degree program in which Plaintiffs were enrolled, and which was being provided to them in the first part of their Spring 2020 semester. It also offers an
The university requires, as do some others, that students electing to "proceed[] with the online registration process" accept the "financial registration terms and conditions" set forth in the one-page document of the same name. The Financial Registration Terms and Conditions (the "FRTC") provides, as one would expect, specific payment obligations being assumed by the student. These include the section headings: Financial Responsibility, Late Fees/Business (Student Accounts) Hold, Collection Costs and Credit Reporting and Collection Communications.
Plaintiffs allege that in exchange for amounts charged for their traditional education, Defendant undertook to provide benefits and services unique to in-person learning — such as an active, urban campus environment "in the heart of Downtown Pittsburgh"; "a full calendar of [on-campus] student activities and events"; and the friendships, collaborations and social interactions of campus life. ECF No. 34 at 7; see e.g., Complaint at ¶ 42. These additional benefits and services are assertedly represented through various PPU materials made available to students, such as PPU's website, catalogs, promotional materials, circulars, and other admission papers and publications. See e.g., Complaint at ¶¶ 42-43. Plaintiffs therefore allege that, under Pennsylvania law, these writings contained terms of their implied-in-fact contract with PPU.
In March 2020, part-way through the Spring semester and in response to the pandemic and government mandates, PPU closed its campus facilities and in-person services and activities and moved all classes to virtual learning platform(s).
ECF No. 27 at 1.
Plaintiffs' putative class action brings claims for breach of contract, and in the
Defendant moved to dismiss on February 3, 2021 and filed its Brief in Support at ECF No. 26. Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition and Defendant's Reply thereto were timely filed at ECF No. 27 and 28, respectively. There followed three (3) filings in April of Supplemental Authorities by Defendant and each party's May 2021 supplemental briefings. ECF Nos. 29-31, 34-35. The Court has considered the parties' briefs, together with the cases subsequently cited. It has also conducted a careful independent review of relevant Pennsylvania law (particularly regarding the contractual relationship between students-universities) and a multitude of decisions in nationwide student-university pandemic refund cases issued both prior and subsequent to the parties' filings in this action.
III. APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has summarized the standard to be applied in deciding motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):
Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014). See also Plastic Surgery Ctr., P.A. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 967 F.3d 218, 229 (3d Cir. 2020) ("The court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the [nonmoving party]'s favor.").
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider "the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record" together with any document "integral to or explicitly relied upon in [framing] the complaint." Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiffs Have Stated a Claim for Breach of Contract Under Pennsylvania Law
1. Pennsylvania Student-University Relationships are Governed by the Law of Implied Contracts
Under Pennsylvania law, the basic elements of a breach of contract claim are "(1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms, (2) a breach of the contract, and (3) resultant damages." Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C. v. Law Firm of Malone Middleman, P.C., 635 Pa. 427, 137 A.3d 1247, 1258 (2016) (quoted in McCabe v. Marywood Univ., 166 A.3d 1257, 1262 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (considering action for breach of implied contract premised on university's website and "various publications and materials")).
In Pennsylvania, as in other states, "the relationship between a private educational institution and an enrolled student is contractual in nature...." Swartley v. Hoffner, 734 A.2d 915, 919 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) ("Based upon the prior statements of our Court, as well as the numerous learned decisions of other courts, we now hold that....").
In Cavaliere, the Pennsylvania Superior Court considered whether the student-plaintiffs, who assertedly received "inadequate and improper instruction, in breach of an alleged implied contract for a quality education" could state a cause of action. Id. at 398-99 (emphasis added). The Court noted the rationale for declining to recognize a cause of action for educational malpractice. Id. at 401-02. It also noted, however, that in certain situations a private educational institution may be subject to an action for breach of contract. Id. at 402 (citing with approval Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 89 A.D.2d 85, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (N.Y. 1982) and Malone v. Academy of Court Reporting, 64 Ohio App.3d 588,582 N.E.2d 54 (1990)).
Because the multi-faceted contractual relationship between a university and its students is generally not documented within a single integrated express writing, it is comprised of — and the courts look to the many different representations provided to the students during their enrollment. That is, student-university contracts are considered under the law of implied (or
Swartley v. Hoffner, 734 A.2d 915, 919 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999). See also McCabe, 166 A.3d at 1261 (looking to the "various publications and materials produced by Marywood", including the "website and literature" relied on by plaintiff "as the terms of an implied contract" in assessing university's alleged breach of contractual duty).
In Pennsylvania, as elsewhere, "breach of contract actions brought by a
For Plaintiffs to maintain a claim for breach of contract, the Complaint allegations must of course be "sufficient to draw the reasonable inference that the parties engaged in conduct giving rise to an implied-in-fact contract" under the presently applicable standard. 8 KT.TV, LLC v. Entest Biomedical, Inc., 2011 WL 5374515, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2011). And ultimate determinations of a contract's existence and terms are for the finders of fact. Ingrassia Constr. Co. v. Walsh, 337 Pa.Super. 58, 486 A.2d 478, 483 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
2. Under Pennsylvania Law, Plaintiffs State a Claim for Breach of Implied Contract Based on Reasonably Foreseeable Reliance on Defendants' Written Representations of In-Person On-Campus Education Provided at a Premium
Applying the law of Pennsylvania more specifically to the case before this Court on Motion to Dismiss:
The FRTC is an unintegrated document (1) setting forth express written undertakings solely on the part of the student, and (2) which on its face requires reference to external documents and/or representations to complete otherwise amorphous or ambiguous terms.
Plaintiffs point to the written materials informing their contractual relationship with Defendant (e.g., promotional materials, circulars, admissions papers, and publications) assertedly evidencing a mutual understanding that tuition and other charges on students' accounts were paid for components of their traditional post-secondary education, i.e. one delivered in-person and on campus. Complaint at ¶ 42-43.
3. Plaintiffs' Claim is Not Barred as a Claim of Educational Malpractice
Finally, and relatedly, Plaintiffs raise no claim of "educational malpractice". Defendant asserts, however, as an alternative ground for dismissal, that Plaintiffs' claims are not viable because they cloak what is essentially an impermissible challenge to PPU's academic discretion. See ECF No. 26 at 13-14; id. at 2 ("[C]ourts widely agree that complaints attacking educational quality and pedagogical choices are inherently speculative and do not survive dismissal.").
Like most other jurisdictions, this Court's jurisdiction does not recognize an action for general "educational malpractice"
This Court concurs, therefore, with the significant majority of Courts across the country which have considered whether a similar post-pandemic claim should be precluded as a claim for educational malpractice and concluded it should not.
4. Summary of Analysis Regarding Denial of Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs' Breach of Contract Claim
To summarize, then, the Court's determination on Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim:
Plaintiffs sufficiently plead an implied contract under Pennsylvania law "to provide in-person, on-campus instruction, experiences, and activities." ECF No. 34 at 4. They specifically allege that PPU promised — in the official materials promulgated in electronic and print form during the students' enrollment — a particular method of instruction
B. In the Alternative, Plaintiffs Have Stated a Claim of Unjust Enirchment or Quantum Meruit
Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs (a) may not state a claim for unjust enrichment as a matter of law because they have an adequate remedy under their breach of contract theory and (b) fail to plead facts sufficient to state a claim. ECF No. 26 at 15. Plaintiffs respond that their unjust enrichment claim is pled in the alternative and sufficiently. ECF No. 27 at 18-20.
A contract implied-in-law, known as a "quasi-contract" or "unjust enrichment", is a legal fiction created by common law courts to permit recovery by contractual remedy in cases where there is found to be, in fact, no contract, but where circumstances are such that justice warrants a recovery as though there had been a promise. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 4 (1981). Thus, a party with an otherwise adequate remedy at law cannot claim unjust enrichment. However, as there are sometime inadequacies in contractual remedies at law, it is widely accepted practice to pursue unjust enrichment in the alternative at the pleading stage.
Indeed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d) permits plaintiffs to plead such alternative legal theories. See, e.g., Vantage Learning (USA), LLC v. Edgenuity, Inc., 246 F.Supp.3d 1097, 1100 (E.D. Pa. 2017) ("Rule 8(d)(2) nonetheless permits a plaintiff to plead unjust enrichment in the alternative in certain circumstances, even where the existence of a contract would preclude recovery...."). Plaintiffs may plead unjust enrichment or quantum meruit at this juncture, despite their assertion of PPU's breach of a governing implied contract (which Defendant disputes while contending a governing express contract comprised solely of the FRTC). See, e.g., Southersby Dev. Corp. v. Twp. of S. Park, 2015 WL 1757767, at *15 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2015) ("[P]laintiffs may plead an unjust enrichment claim in the alternative... where there is some dispute as to whether a valid, enforceable written contract exists.") (citations omitted); Bergeron, 2020 WL 7486682, *9 (same); Omori, 533 F.Supp.3d at 55-56 (denying motion to dismiss unjust enrichment claim as precluded by breach of contract action where university simultaneously "disputes the existence of any contract between the parties requiring in-person instruction and access to on-campus facilities and resources").
A right of recovery under the doctrine of unjust enrichment is essentially equitable, its basis being that in a given situation it is contrary to equity for one to retain a benefit which has come to him at the expense of another. To state a claim for unjust enrichment under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must allege: (1) benefits conferred on defendant by plaintiff; (2) appreciation of such benefits by defendant; and (3) acceptance and retention of such benefits under such circumstances that it
Plaintiffs allege (1) they paid tuition and other fees to PPU, and PPU provided a traditional in-person on campus education for the first portion of the Spring 2020 semester and an online education for the second portion; but (2) it was reasonable for Plaintiffs to have expected, in reliance on PPU's specific representations, a continuation of their traditional education for the entire Spring semester. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs' favor, and despite PPU's provision of grades and academic credit, it cannot be said as a matter of law that PPU's actions were not unjust under the circumstances. See, e.g., Durbeck, 547 F.Supp.3d at 150 ("Even if [Plaintiffs] received a substantial benefit from [their] payments of tuition and fees, it may still be inequitable for [the university] to retain their full value.") (quoting Rhodes, 513 F.Supp.3d at 1360). Whether the partial failure of consideration alleged was de minimis or sufficient to justify at least partial reimbursement of tuition and/or other fees paid to PPU is, as Plaintiffs duly note, "a matter of proof" appropriate for a later stage of the proceedings. ECF No. 27 at 20.
In sum, whether and to what extent the parties have entered into a contractual relationship for the provision of in-person on-campus educational services will be better resolved following discovery.
C. Plaintiffs Have Failed to State a Claim for Conversion
Defendant asserts that under Pennsylvania law, "a claim for conversion cannot stand when there is a contract between the parties that governs the same disputed funds." ECF No. 26 at 17 (citing Scott v. PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 785 F.App'x 916, 920 (3d Cir. 2019)). It also asserts that Plaintiffs have failed to allege breach of any duty "imposed by law as a matter of social policy." Id. See also Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.2d 825, 829 (Pa. 1992).
Under Pennsylvania law, the required elements of a conversion claim are: "(1) the deprivation of another's right of property in, or use or possession of, a chattel, or other interference therewith, (2) without the owner's consent, and (3) without lawful justification." Vavro v. Albers, 2006 WL 2547350, at *13-14 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2006) (quoting McKeeman v. Corestates Bank, N.A., 751 A.2d 655, 659 n. 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)). See also Shonberger v. Oswell, 365 Pa.Super. 481, 530 A.2d 112, 114 (1987) (citing Stevenson v. Economy Bank of Ambridge, 413 Pa. 442,197 A.2d 721, 726 (1964)).
As in other states, money may be a chattel for the purposes of conversion in Pennsylvania. Id. (citing Pearl Assurance Co. v. National Ins. Agency, 30 A.2d 333, 337 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1943)). As conversion contemplates re-delivery of goods, however, the funds must be able to be described, identified, or segregated in the manner that a specific chattel can be. See, e.g., Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. v. Am. Fin. Mortgage Corp., 579 Pa. 275, 855 A.2d 818, 827, n. 21 (2004) (funds must be in some way "identifiable"); In re Zambrano Corp., 2010 WL 8354694, at *6 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2010) (funds can be identified by, e.g., description or segregation from other funds). And, however they are identified, there must be "an obligation on the part of the defendant to return the specific coin or notes [e]ntrusted to his care", rather than an obligation to return monies generally. Alexander & Co. v. Goldstein, 13 Pa.Super. 518, 522 (1900).
The Court concurs with other courts to have considered students' claims of conversion against their universities in a pandemic tuition/fee restitution context and concluded that such claim cannot be maintained. First, a plaintiff may not ordinarily recover for the tort of conversion for a breach of duty that simply restates a contractual obligation. See e.g., Nguyen, 529 F.Supp.3d at 1058 ("An omission to perform a contract obligation is never a tort, unless that omission is also an omission of a legal duty.") (citations omitted).
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss will therefore be granted as to this claim.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that Plaintiffs' claims for (a) breach of an implied contract for a traditional in-person, on-campus experience for the Spring 2020 semester and (b) unjust enrichment or quantum meruit in the alternative are not precluded and that, drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor, Plaintiffs have sufficiently identified facts that suggest a plausible entitlement to recovery/restitution. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 25, will therefore be denied as to those Counts of the Complaint. The Court further concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim of conversion, and Defendant's Motion will therefore be granted as to that Count. A separate Order will be entered.
FootNotes
ECF No. 34 at 4-5. Plaintiffs further allege that the full-time undergraduate tuition costs were (a) approximately $15,600 (almost $20,000 for the Conservatory of Performing Arts) per semester, or approximately $2,600 (approximately $3,400 in the CPA) per 3-credit course. In comparison, the "full online" undergraduate tuition cost was approximately $1,400 per 3-credit course. See Complaint at ¶¶ 21-22.
As Defendant observes, although a claim for pro rata reimbursement of housing expenses is made on behalf of class members, no presently named Plaintiff is specifically alleged to have a claim for unreimbursed housing fees. ECF No. 26 at 5-6. Plaintiffs fail to respond to Defendant's assertion that any housing fee claim should be dismissed for lack of standing. ECF No. 26 at 10, n. 4; see also generally ECF No. 27 and 34. The Court nonetheless finds that (1) Plaintiffs clearly have standing to bring this action; (2) questions regarding, e.g., adequacy of representation are appropriately addressed during class certification proceedings; and (3) questions regarding, e.g., determinations of damages are also appropriately addressed during later proceedings. Cf. Patel, 526 F.Supp.3d at 22-23 (directing plaintiffs to provide a more definite statement of named plaintiffs' parking-fee claim if any).
See also, generally, 15A Am.Jur.2d Colleges and University, Section 25,
As noted, supra, in Swartley the Pennsylvania Superior Court cited with approval the examples of representational materials set forth by the District Court of Vermont in Merrow. More recently, that same Vermont District Court made clear (as did the Pennsylvania Superior Court in McCabe) that the university representations encompassed under the Swartley-Merrow standard include those made in online materials/websites. See Patel v. Univ. of Vt. & State Agric. College, 526 F.Supp.3d 3 (D. Vt. 2021).
In light of Defendant's briefings, the Court emphasizes the clarity with which its survey of decisions revealed both (1) a decades-long and wide adoption of the general principles set forth in the treatise cited above — i.e., student-university contracts are considered under the jurisprudence of implied contract and courts generally broadly consider official materials promulgated by a university in determining the specific representations on which its students might reasonably rely; and (2) that Pennsylvania law has developed in accord with these same principles.
Cf. also ECF No. 26 at 2 ("Pennsylvania law is clear that contracts between universities and their students must be comprised of express, written promises and cannot be supplemented (or changed) by implied contract terms or course of conduct."). After careful and informed consideration, the Court must strongly differ with this parenthetical quotation to the extent it is intended to read the law of implied contracts out of the Pennsylvania Court cases applying it or to confine consideration of the parties' contractual relationship to the terms of the FRTC. The Court further notes that Plaintiffs sub judice assert written representations in university-promulgated materials properly considered under governing Pennsylvania law.
In other words, Swartley's requirement that the alleged breach be "linked" to (e.g., based on) a (sufficiently definite) written representation is consistent with and guides — and does not abrogate — other longstanding rules of contract interpretation. The question of reasonable expectation/reliance remains, in Pennsylvania student-university contract actions as in others. See id. (considering the circumstances and "context of the provisions" cited by plaintiff in concluding her "tortured interpretation" ran "contrary to notions of plain meaning, logic and common sense" and "as a result" dismissing claim). Cf. Hickey, 535 F.Supp.3d at 378 (implied contractual relationship between student-university recognized under Pennsylvania law "arises where the obligations and intentions ... are not specifically expressed, but rather `inferred from acts in the light of the surrounding circumstances'") (citing Liss & Marion, P.C. v. Recordex Acq. Corp., 603 Pa. 198, 983 A.2d 652 (Pa. 2009)).
Reading the FRTC to commit PPU only to presenting charges on students' accounts for payment, without more, would leave it potentially void for want of consideration. Similarly, reading it to commit PPU only to registering students in exchange for payment of any amount of tuition and other mandatory fees charged to them, without more, would raise questions of its unenforceability as a contract of adhesion. Were the FRTC to be void, unenforceable or (on the basis of its retention of a unilateral right to modify its terms) any obligations illusory, the Court would still consider the promises allegedly made in the other materials promulgated by the University and comprising part of its implied-in-fact contract. See e.g., Rhodes v. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ., Inc., 513 F.Supp.3d 1350, 1358 (M.D. Fla. 2021) (finding plaintiffs adequately pleaded breach of contract, noting that "surely those on-campus students are paying for something") (emphasis in original); Patel, 526 F.Supp.3d at 13-14 (distinguishing cases pursuing only breach of express contract claim and noting that: "It is beyond reasonable dispute that some contract exists between [university] and its students [and w]hich terms may be reasonably inferred ... is a factual issue."); id. at 14-15 (distinguishing Horrigan v. Eastern Michigan Univ., 2020 WL 6050534 (Mich. Ct. Cl. Sept. 24, 2020) (where plaintiff relied "on an alleged express agreement presumably the Tuition Agreement" which "did not contain promises about the method of instruction") and four other cases); Nguyen, 529 F.Supp.3d at 1054 (noting that university "correctly asserts that [express written agreement] did [not] promise to provide in-person instruction or access to on-campus services" but "neglects to mention [that said writing] is not inclusive of all terms of the contract"); id. (noting plaintiff's allegation that university "made the promise ... in its `marketing, advertisements, and other public representations' ... [and a]s such, these statements" were also part of the implied contract).
The Botts Court went on to say that, while "[t]here is authority that suggests [website/other] promotional statements, on their own, may not amount to an express, enforceable promise to provide in-person education.... [T]his is not a typical contract situation where there is an express document with delineated terms that a plaintiff can reference.... [And] even if [University]'s `promotional statements do not constitute a binding [or express] promise of in-person education,' they `can help define the scope of an implied contract.'" Botts, 2021 WL 1561520, *13 (citations omitted). It concluded that, read in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the promotional materials identified "tout the University's on-campus resources and facilities" and "imply in-person participation." It further concluded — where plaintiff also alleged that the University (1) expected/sometimes required on campus attendance, (2) charged significantly less for online degree programs, (3) customarily and historically offered on-campus and in-person educational services, and (4) began the Spring semester in-person and on campus — that "the allegations are sufficient to support a claim that, at the very least, [University] and plaintiff had an implied contract for in-person, on-campus instruction." 2021 WL 1561520, *16.
See also e.g., Doe v. Emory Univ., 2021 WL 358391, *6 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 201) (holding that "promotional statements ... help define the scope of any implied contract" and when combined with allegations concerning defendant-school's "customary practice and the Plaintiffs' payment of tuition", a plausible implied-in-fact contract was pled); Metzner, 528 F.Supp.3d at 33 ("Plaintiffs have alleged more than mere "aspirational" language [where Bulletin and website] tout such features as "state-of-the-art facilities," "outdoor spaces," "classroom and immersive experiential learning," and "the beauty of New England" and Plaintiffs further allege [university] charges students significantly less for online degree programs."); id. ("Such allegations in combination with the parties' alleged course of conduct allow the reasonable inference that the parties may have at least implicitly entered into a specific agreement for on-campus instruction...."); Arredondo, 2021 WL 1588995, *2 (finding allegations that defendant's website and social media marketing materials — both depicting and promoting "in-person instruction and on-campus experiences... support that defendant made sufficiently specific representations to infer a contractual promise to provide at least some in-person instruction and on-campus services"); Nguyen, 529 F.Supp.3d at 1054 (collecting cases).
The Court also rejects an assertion that as a matter of law Defendant fulfilled its promises and owed no further obligation to students who received the opportunity to complete course grades and/or academic credits. See, e.g., Patel, 526 F.Supp.3d at 11 (Plaintiffs "bargained for in-person instruction and studies ..., access to [university] buildings and amenities, participation in on-campus student activities and physical proximity to the [city] ..."); Durbeck, 547 F.Supp.3d at 147 ("Plaintiffs plead an implied-in-fact contract for far more than just `academic requirements, courses or programs of study'"); Ford v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 507 F.Supp.3d 406, 416 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) ("[W]hat a student expects to receive in exchange for tuition money covers much more territory than simply the right to take classes."); Bergeron, 2020 WL 7486682, at *7-8; Botts, 2021 WL 1561520, *13 (rejecting university's contention that its only obligation was that "if the student complies with the terms prescribed..., the student will obtain a degree"). Cf. e.g., Complaint at ¶ 42 ("The true college experience doesn't just happen in classes.... It's what happens when you live on campus.") (quoting PPU website section describing student's "home" on "unique urban campus" and opportunities, activities and events on-campus and in the city).
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