STALLSMITH v. LINDER PSYCHIATRIC GROUP, INC.

ORDER

CAROLYN K. DELANEY, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff's motion for class certification came on regularly for hearing on January 20, 2016. Brian Crone and Erick Turner appeared for plaintiff. Alden Parker appeared for defendants. The parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to Title 28, United States Code Section 636(c)(1). Upon review of the documents in support1 and opposition, upon hearing the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS:

In this action, plaintiff alleges she was not paid minimum wage for all hours worked, was not paid for overtime, was not provided meal and rest breaks, and was not provided proper itemized wage statements.2 Plaintiff seeks past due wages, interest and penalties. Plaintiff contends that defendants pay employee clinicians only one hour for each patient visit, regardless of how much time is spent preparing the paperwork after each clinical visit. Plaintiff also assert that clinicians are not paid for time spent preparing for patient visits, preparing administrative paperwork, preparing clinical notes after visits, responding to telephone calls from patients, waiting for no-show patients, performing mandated reporting requirements, waiting between patient visits, responding to mandatory insurance audits, and attending staff meetings.

Plaintiff's proposed class comprises all employees of defendants from November 18, 2010 to the present who are currently or formerly employed as a clinician/provider and who are/were paid pursuant to a "Piece Meal Employment Agreement" or a "Participation Agreement." In the moving papers, plaintiffs proposed eleven subclasses based on the various claims raised in the complaint, e.g. "minimum wage" subclass, "overtime wage" subclass, "missed meal" subclass, etc. In the reply brief and at the hearing, plaintiff now proposes just one subclass comprising "all members of the proposed plaintiff class who were regularly denied meal breaks as a result of defendants' policies and practices."

To certify a class, plaintiff must demonstrate that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, there are questions of law or fact common to the class, the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In addition to satisfying the requirements of subsection (a), plaintiff must also show that the action is one of the three types of class actions described in subsection (b). Plaintiff here contends class certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3) (questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and that class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating controversy).4 Among other arguments, defendants contend that plaintiff fails to demonstrate numerosity, commonality, or typicality. Dispositive is plaintiff's failure to establish that there are questions of law or fact common to the proposed class.5 Among the requirements of Rule 23(a), plaintiff must meet the "rigorous" commonality standard established in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011) (requiring that class members' claims "depend upon a common contention . . . [whose] truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke."). Plaintiff fails to demonstrate commonality on the causes of action plead in the first amended complaint.

With respect to the first cause of action for failure to pay minimum wages, individualized determinations will need to be made as to each class member to evaluate whether the compensation paid under defendants' policies resulted in payment of less than the minimum wage. The declarations submitted by plaintiff from various employees all claim different amounts of allegedly uncompensated time and for different kinds of tasks, none of which were recorded. Thus individual inquiries will have to be made regarding the employees' weekly scheduled appointments and the estimated unrecorded time worked. In addition, each employee was paid different hourly rates, again requiring an individuated analysis to determine whether minimum wage was paid.6

Plaintiff also alleges a claim for failure to pay overtime wages. The employer is not liable for overtime pay where the employee fails to notify the employer of the overtime work. As with the minimum wage claim, to show liability each class member will have to prove the amount of overtime worked and that the employer had knowledge of such.7 Because a separate factual inquiry must be made as to each class member in order to prove this claim, commonality is lacking. Similarly, plaintiff's claim for wage statement violations, which is based on plaintiff's claim that defendant failed to pay class members for all hours worked, is derivative of plaintiff's other claims and requires individual analysis as to each class member.

With respect to plaintiff's claim for meal and rest period violations, plaintiff must prove that defendants effectively precluded class members from taking these breaks. The declarations submitted by plaintiff do not support a claim that there existed a uniform policy or practice that prohibited class members from taking the meal or rest breaks, and such a claim is directly contradicted by defendants' Employee Handbook of Personnel Policies and Procedures, which authorized employees to take meal and rest breaks. As with plaintiff's other claims, individualized analysis of each member's claims regarding missed breaks would be required in order to assess the employer's liability.

Plaintiff's other claims, for waiting time penalties,8 unfair competition9 and Labor Code § 55810 penalties are derivative of plaintiff's claim for unpaid compensation. Because the underlying claims upon which these causes of action are predicated lack commonality, plaintiff fails to demonstrate commonality of these claims as well.

Plaintiff also makes a claim for breach of contract. Plaintiff alleges defendant LPG (Linder Psychiatric Group, Inc.) breached the contract by failing to afford a minimum of 35 hours of work per week, failing to pay the contractually specified rate of pay for each worked hour per pay period, and failing to afford plaintiff and the class members employee benefits. The employee agreements submitted by plaintiff show the lack of commonality with respect to the claim for breach of contract insofar as the number of hours a particular clinician was required to be available for work varied from 20 hours per week, to 32 hours per week, to 35 hours per week, depending on the terms of the specific contract for that individual. Whether defendant LPG breached its obligation to "afford" each class member the number of hours specified in the individual contracts will require an analysis with respect to each employee of the efforts undertaken by defendant LPG to schedule appointments for each clinician and other factors which may have restricted the availability of each clinician. As discussed above, the issue of whether defendants failed to pay the contractually specified rate of pay for each hour worked lacks commonality. With respect to benefits, the employee contracts submitted in connection with the motion vary in whether benefits are even included in the contractual obligation. For these reasons, plaintiff fails to demonstrate commonality of her claims and the motion for class certification will be denied.11

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Arguments raised in the reply which were not addressed in plaintiff's opening brief are hereby stricken as is the evidence submitted in connection therewith. Defendants' objections on the basis of hearsay are sustained.

2. Plaintiff's motion for class certification (ECF No. 25) is denied.