MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, Jr., Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. (R. Doc. 9). The motion is opposed. (R. Doc. 10). Based on the undisputed facts and the applicable law as set forth below, Plaintiff's motion should be granted and the action should be remanded to state court.
William E. Bartel (Plaintiff),
Trinidad Corporation filed a Notice of Removal on May 14, 2014. (R. Doc. 1). The remaining served Defendants, Central Gulf Lines, Inc., Marine Navigation Company, and Apex Oil Company, Inc., consented to the removal. (R. Doc. 2).
On June 13, 2014, the Plaintiff moved to remand this action to state court. (R. Doc. 9). Plaintiff asserts that removal is improper because (1) his Jones Act claims are non-removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a), and (2) his general maritime law claims are non-removable pursuant to the "saving to suitors" clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).
II. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
Plaintiff's primary argument for remand is that his Jones Act claims are made non-removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a). (R. Doc. 9-1 at 2). Plaintiff then explains that because his general maritime claims arise out of the same operative facts as his Jones Act claims, the entire action becomes non-removable. (R. Doc. 9-1 at 3-4). Plaintiff further argues that nothing in the 2011 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits the Court to exercise removal jurisdiction over his general maritime claims, while severing and remanding his Jones Act claims. (R. Doc. 9-1 at 4-5).
Plaintiff also argues that his general maritime claims are not removable to federal court. (R. Doc. 9-1 at 5-9). Plaintiff argues that the "saving to suitors" clause in the admiralty jurisdiction statute is the historical basis for non-removability of general maritime claims. (R. Doc. 9-1 at 5-6). Accordingly, despite decisions in this district holding otherwise, the 2011 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 did not make general maritime claims removable. (R. Doc. 9-1 at 5-9).
In opposition, Defendants argue that in light of the 2011 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, this Court has held that general maritime claims are removable and the assertion of a Jones Act claim does not prevent the removal of actions in which general maritime claims are alleged. (R. Doc. 10 at 3-6). Defendants do not argue, however, that Plaintiff has fraudulently pled claims under the Jones Act or has otherwise waived any challenge to the removal of the Jones Act claims.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
It is well settled that when faced with a motion to remand the removing party bears the burden of establishing the facts necessary to show that federal jurisdiction exists. Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995). The federal removal statute "is subject to strict construction because a defendant's use of that statute deprives a state court of a case properly before it and thereby implicates important federalism concerns." Frank v. Bear Stearns & Co., 128 F.3d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1997). Any doubts regarding whether removal jurisdiction is proper should be resolved against federal jurisdiction. Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2000).
The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, provides a cause of action in negligence for a seaman who is injured in the course of his employment.
Because Plaintiff alleges causes of action under both the Jones Act and general maritime law, the Court must determine whether his general maritime claim under § 1333(1) is removable under the current version of § 1441(c) when joined with his properly pled Jones Act claim. Section 1441(c) provides that actions involving both federal question claims and claims made non-removable by statute may be removed in their entirety, subject to severance and remand of the non-removable claim:
(1) If a civil action includes—
(A) a claim arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States (within the meaning of section 1331 of this title), and
(B) a claim not within the original or supplemental jurisdiction of the district court or a claim that has been made nonremovable by statute, the entire action may be removed if the action would be removable without the inclusion of the claim described in subparagraph (B). (2) Upon removal of an action described in paragraph (1), the district court shall sever from the action all claims described in paragraph (1)(B) and shall remand the severed claims to the State court from which the action was removed. Only defendants against whom a claim described in paragraph (1)(A) has been asserted are required to join in or consent to the removal under paragraph (1).
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)(1)-(2).
Section 1441(c) permits removal of a "claim" not within the original or supplemental jurisdiction of the district court, or a "claim" that has been made non-removable by statute, when joined with a claim arising under federal law. Both the pre-amendment and post-amendment versions of § 1441(c) require that the "civil action" include "a claim" within the meaning of § 1331.
Here, Plaintiff filed a civil action in state court alleging Jones Act and general maritime claims, and Defendants removed the action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Plaintiff's action does not assert a claim that arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Supreme Court has held that maritime claims, for which federal courts have original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333, do not "arise under" the Constitution, law, or treaties of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 378 (1959) (finding it "clear that the words of [the `arising under'] statute do not extend, and could not reasonably be interpreted to extend, to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"), superseded by statute on other grounds, 45 U.S.C. § 59, as recognized in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 33 (1990); In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Emphatically, claims in admiralty, whether designated in rem or in personam, do not fall within" the category of claims arising under federal law.) (citing Romero, 358 U.S. at 378).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's action, which alleges a non-removable Jones Act claim but no claim falling under this Court's federal question jurisdiction, is not removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
Defendants do not raise any specific statutory argument for why the Court should find removal jurisdiction in this action. Instead, Defendants rely on decisions by two judges in this district, including the district judge on this case, holding that after the 2011 amendments, general maritime claims are removable in the absence of a separate basis for subject matter jurisdiction. See Provost v. Offshore Serv. Vessels, LLC, No. 14-89-SDD-SCR, 2014 WL 2515412, at *3-4 (M.D. La. June 4, 2014); Garza v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 13-742-SDD-SCR, 2014 WL 1330547, at *4-5 (M.D. La. Apr. 1, 2014); Harrold v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., No. 13-762-JJB-SCR, 2014 WL 688984, at *3-4 (M.D. La. Feb. 20, 2014); Bridges v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 13-477-JJB-SCR, 2013 WL 6092803, at *4-5 (M.D. La. Nov. 19, 2013).
The four decisions in this district allowing removal of general maritime claims under the admiralty jurisdiction statute are distinguishable from the instant action. In one of those cases, the plaintiff did not allege a Jones Act claim at all. See Provost, 2014 WL 2515412. Two of the cases were removed on the basis of federal question jurisdiction under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, and the defendants specifically alleged that the plaintiffs had fraudulently pled their Jones Act claims.
Here, Plaintiff has alleged a non-removable Jones Act claim. There is no allegation that the Court has original federal question jurisdiction. The Jones Act claims are brought against all Defendants, and none of those Defendants argues that the Jones Act claims are improperly pled. Although Plaintiff does invoke some jurisprudence engaging in pre-2011 "separate and independent" claim analysis, his primary arguments focus on the non-removability of his Jones Act claims under the current version of § 1441(c). Accordingly, the four decisions in this district allowing for the removal of general maritime claims are distinguishable.
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff's Jones Act claims are not removable under § 1445(a), and Plaintiff's general maritime claims are not removable under § 1441(c), the Court need not determine whether Plaintiff's general maritime claims would be removable in the absence of Plaintiff's Jones Act claims.
IT IS THE RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand be GRANTED, and the action be remanded to the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
A number of courts have disagreed with the analysis in Ryan, however, concluding that the changes to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 under the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, § 1441, 125 Stat. 758, 759 (2011), did not legislatively abolish the basis for non-removal of general maritime claims. See Gregoire v. Enter. Marine Servs., LLC, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2014 WL 3866589, (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2014); Grasshopper Oysters, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, LLC, No. 14-934, 2014 WL 3796150 (E.D. La. July 29, 2014); Perrier v. Shell Oil Co., No. 14-490, 2014 WL 2155258 (E.D. La. May 22, 2014); Porter v. Great Am. Ins. Co., No. 13-3069, 2014 WL 3385148 (W.D. La. July 9, 2014); Gabriles v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 14-669, 2014 WL 2567101 (W.D. La. June 6, 2014); Figueroa v. Marine Inspection Servs., ___ F. Supp. 2d. ___, 2014 WL 2958597 (S.D. Tex. July 1, 2014); Alexander v. Seago Consulting, LLC, No. 14-1292, 2014 WL 2960419 (S.D. Tex. June 23, 2014); Rogers v. BBC Charting Am., LLC, No. 13-3741, 2014 WL 819400 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2014); Cassidy v. Murray, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2014 WL 3723877 (D. Md. July 24, 2014); In re Foss Mar. Co., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2014 WL 2930860 (W.D. Ky. June 27, 2014); Pierce v. Parker Towing Co., Inc., No. 14-73, 2014 WL 2569132 (S.D. Ala. June 9, 2014); Coronel v. AK Victory, No. 13-2304, 2014 WL 820270 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 2014); Bartman v. Burrece, No. 14-80, 2014 WL 4096226 (D. Alaska Aug. 18, 2014); see also David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, Recent Developments in Admiralty and Maritime Law at the National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 38 TUL. MAR. L.J. 419, 477-78 (2014) ("The statutory-language exegesis in Ryan is thorough and careful, but we think the judge's conclusion that Romero (probably through congressional inadvertence) has become a dead letter seems too radical to be acceptable. We do not believe the Fifth Circuit will agree with the Ryan court.").