FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Feng Ying Li says the Board of Immigration Appeals, or BIA, abused its discretion in denying her sixth motion to reopen her removal proceedings. We disagree and will deny her petition for review.
Li, a native and citizen of China, entered the United States in 1998 without valid documentation. She applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, claiming Chinese officials intended to sterilize her for having a child. The Immigration Judge, or IJ, found her not credible and denied her application in 1999. The BIA affirmed in 2002, ordered her removal, and granted her voluntary departure. Li remained in the United States, had two more children, and filed five motions attempting to reopen her case. Each attempt was unsuccessful.
In April 2016, Li asked the BIA to reopen her case a sixth time. She claimed entitlement to seek asylum based on changed conditions in China. She'd adopted Christianity in 2012, she said, and conditions for Christians in China had deteriorated since her hearing before the IJ in 1999. Conditions for individuals who'd violated China's population-control policies had also worsened since 1999, she claimed. The BIA denied Li's motion, finding that she failed to show changed country conditions worthy of relief. This timely petition for review followed.
The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2, and we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion and will disturb the BIA's decision only if it's arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.
Li's sixth motion to reopen is time- and number-barred, so she must point to material evidence of "changed country conditions" that couldn't have been presented during her hearing before the IJ in 1999.
Li first says the BIA abused its discretion by overlooking evidence of increased government persecution of Christians in China since 1999. We disagree. The BIA honored its duty to explicitly consider the materials Li submitted.
Before the BIA, Li cited just two of the eighty-eight documents on religious freedom she attached as exhibits to her motion.
Li falters for similar reasons on appeal. She points us to one page of the Commission on International Religious Freedom's 2014 Annual Report and one page of the U.S. State Department's 2011 report on China.
In any event, Li's adoption of Christianity is a change in her personal circumstances that does not evidence changed country conditions. Where an applicant "intentionally alters" her own personal circumstances knowing she's been ordered removed from the United States, that alteration doesn't in itself constitute changed country conditions.
Li next asks us to remand because the BIA took administrative notice of, but failed to provide her the opportunity to respond to, a 2015 State Department report discussing China's easing of its one-child policy. This, Li argues, violated her Fifth Amendment due process rights. We don't think it did.
Courts have held that the BIA must give the "opportunity to challenge, for both truth and significance, facts of which the BIA takes administrative notice."
Before taking notice of the 2015 State Department report, the BIA addressed the only temporally relevant document Li submitted to support her contentions about China's family-planning policies: a partial version of a 2015 congressional report on China. That document says: "Faced with a rapidly aging population, a shrinking pool of working-age people, international condemnation, and high levels of public dissatisfaction, the Chinese government eased its coercive population control policies somewhat in 2013, allowing couples to have two children if at least one spouse was an only child."
In sum, while Li had no opportunity to give her take on the 2015 State Department report, the BIA used it merely to confirm what the 2015 congressional report said. The BIA's reliance on this administratively noticed document was therefore not dispositive. No due process violation occurred here.
Li's next contention is that the BIA abused its discretion by overlooking evidence of worsening conditions for violators of China's family-planning policies since 1999. She claims the BIA ignored her argument that "enforcement" of family-planning policies took a "materially more coercive direction" where "forced sterilizations and abortions are now commonplace" in her home province of Fujian.
The BIA first declined to reevaluate documents Li submitted that it had already analyzed and rejected in decisions denying Li's earlier motions to reopen. Li suggests on appeal that, in so doing, the BIA "shirked [its] responsibility" to examine the record fully.
With regard to the new materials Li submitted, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that they fail to show changed country conditions warranting relief. Substantial evidence supported the BIA's finding. As explained above, Li submitted just one document addressing the state of China's family-planning policies in 2015: part of a 2015 congressional report. That report discusses the easing of China's one-child policy as of November 2014 in "all 31 provincial-level jurisdictions in China" and the easing of its reproductive-services permit system (or birth-permit system) as of July 2015.
The other congressional reports Li submitted from 2012, 2013, and 2014 predate these 2015 easing measures, so the BIA's rejection of them as not probative of changed country conditions in 2015 or 2016 is supported by substantial evidence. We therefore reject Li's contention that the BIA abused its discretion by overlooking evidence of worsening family-planning enforcement since 1999.
Li ends with two requests. She asks us to "remand this case, without vacatur of the [BIA's] decision," to the BIA in accordance with a procedure the Second Circuit has adopted.
For these reasons, we will deny Li's petition for review.