PER CURIAM:
Petitioner Juan Manuel Mendez, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") summarily affirming a decision of an Immigration Judge ("IJ"), which denied Mendez's application for cancellation of removal. In re Juan Manuel Mendez, No. A78 428 394 (B.I.A. Dec. 9, 2005), aff'g No. A78 428 394 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 28, 2004). The IJ denied Mendez's petition on the grounds that he had not demonstrated that his removal would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to his United States
Petitioner argues that the IJ erred as a matter of law by applying the wrong standard for determining whether the hardship caused by his removal would be "exceptional and extremely unusual." Our Circuit's precedent is that "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" determinations are generally discretionary judgments that we lack jurisdiction to review, De La Vega v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 141, 145-46 (2d Cir.2006), unless they raise "constitutional claims or questions of law," 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); accord Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 38-39 (2d Cir.2008). Notwithstanding these precedents, Petitioner asserts that we have jurisdiction to review his claim regarding the construction and application of the hardship standard, arguing that "so far as De La Vega holds that hardship determinations are discretionary, that holding is based on inapplicable reasoning and case law regarding a previous version of the Cancellation statute, which differs in critical ways from the current one."
We disagree with Petitioner that we can disregard the limitations set forth in De La Vega and Barco-Sandoval, and we adhere to our holdings in these cases that we cannot review the accuracy of an IJ's fact-finding or the wisdom of his discretion. Nevertheless, we conclude that Petitioner has raised questions of law that we have jurisdiction to consider, see Barco-Sandoval, 516 F.3d at 39, and, upon doing so, we hold that the BIA, which summarily affirmed the IJ's decision, committed errors of law in denying Petitioner's eligibility for cancellation of removal. Consequently, we remand the petition to the BIA for consideration of whether, absent such errors, a hardship determination is appropriate in this case.
BACKGROUND
Because the agency has not questioned Petitioner's credibility, we take the facts asserted by him to be true. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271-72 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that, where there is no adverse credibility determination in the decision being reviewed by this Court, we assume that the petitioner is credible). Petitioner entered the United States in 1989, at age fifteen, and has lived in this country ever since. In 1998, he married; his wife is also present in the United States without documentation. Petitioner and his wife have two children: their son, Jesus Manuel, was born in 1992, and their daughter, Daisy, was born in 1999. Both children are United States citizens.
Petitioner's daughter suffers from severe asthma. Petitioner testified that she has about twenty-five asthma attacks a year and that her condition requires the use of a home nebulizer as well as an inhaler. She also requires regular visits to the emergency room for serious attacks.
Shortly after he was born, Petitioner's son was diagnosed with Grade II Vesicoureteral Reflux. This disease causes urine to reflux from the bladder back to the kidneys and liver, causing staph infections, scarring, and tissue damage. Ultimately, the condition can lead to kidney or liver failure. Jesus received treatment for this condition until age seven, at which point tests showed that his kidneys were normal. He must see a specialist every year, however, to ensure that there are no recurrences or lasting effects.
Petitioner testified that there are "not many jobs available" in the part of Mexico that he is from, and that his relatives would be unable to support him and his family if he returned. As a result, he would be unable to pay for his children's medical care or education there. Moreover,
Additionally, Petitioner's children are unfamiliar with Mexican culture and not fully comfortable speaking Spanish. Petitioner testified that his son is in an honors program and wants to be a lawyer, a doctor, or a police officer. In Mexico, Petitioner did not think he would be able to pay for the education necessary for his son to pursue these fields. In short, Petitioner concluded that relocating to Mexico would be a "disaster" for his children.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service
DISCUSSION
In order to demonstrate eligibility for cancellation from removal, Petitioner must show that he:
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The Government stipulated that Petitioner meets the first three requirements. Accordingly, the only contested issue before the agency was whether Petitioner demonstrated that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his children.
The IJ found that it would not. She wrote that, "[w]hile it is clear from the evidence of record that the respondent's children will, in fact, suffer a hardship, one which might even be characterized or classified as an extreme hardship, the Court finds that there is insufficient evidence on which the Court can conclude that this hardship to his children would be exceptional and extremely unusual." The BIA summarily affirmed.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), this Court lacks jurisdiction to review "any judgment regarding the granting of relief under ... [8 U.S.C. § 1229b]." Notwithstanding this provision, Petitioner contends that "8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) does not strip courts of jurisdiction to review nondiscretionary decisions regarding an alien's eligibility for the relief specified in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)." Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 59, 62-63 (2d Cir.2005) (emphasis added). That is, "[o]btaining... cancellation of removal is a two-step process. First, an alien must prove eligibility
Petitioner points out that, based on this analysis, we have previously held that we retain jurisdiction to review certain agency determinations regarding two of the four eligibility requirements for cancellation of removal: (a) that an alien has not been convicted of certain crimes, see Rodriguez, 451 F.3d at 62-63; and (b) that an alien "has been a person of good moral character," see Sepulveda, 407 F.3d at 62-64.
Petitioner asserts that there is no compelling reason to differentiate the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" determination from the other eligibility requirements. He claims that the plain language of the cancellation of removal statute suggests no difference between the four requirements, and that there is no compelling argument why, for example, the definition of "physical presence" or "good moral character" is more a question of statutory construction than the definition of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship."
Petitioner asserts that, in comparison with hardship requirements found in other sections of the INA, the language for cancellation of removal suggests that we have jurisdiction here. The hardship determination for cancellation of removal requires that an alien "establish[] that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence." 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). In contrast, other sections of the INA require that an alien establish extreme hardship "in the opinion of the Attorney General" or "to the satisfaction of the Attorney General." This language was used for suspension of deportation, the predecessor of the current cancellation of removal law. But it was not included with respect to cancellation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (suspension of deportation) (repealed 1996); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1) (§ 212(i) relief).
Petitioner points to our decision in Kalkouli v. Ashcroft, 282 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam), where we held that we lack jurisdiction to review the hardship determination for suspension of deportation because the plain language of the provision—"in the opinion of the Attorney General"—"clearly entrusts the decision to the Attorney General's discretion." Id. at 204. Petitioner argues that this additional clause, which is now lacking as to cancellation of removal, suggests a significant difference in the statutes and that we should not treat the clause in the other INA hardship provisions as surplusage. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) ("[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir.2000) ("[W]e are required to `disfavor interpretations of statutes
Finally, Petitioner contends that any doubt should strongly favor a construction permitting review because of the "strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action," St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298,121 S.Ct. 2271, and the "`longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien,'" id. at 320, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)).
Petitioner has presented substantial arguments. Were we operating on a clean slate, we would be inclined to hold that the question of whether an alien has established "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" is a determination that we have jurisdiction to review, just as we can review decisions dealing with the other eligibility requirements for cancellation of removal. We are, however, bound by prior decisions of our Court. See United States v. Snow, 462 F.3d 55, 65 n. 11 (2d Cir.2006) ("[A] prior decision of a panel of this court binds all subsequent panels `absent a change in law by higher authority or by way of an in banc proceeding' ...." (quoting United States v. King, 276 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir.2002))). In Barco-Sandoval, this Court held that the determination of whether "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" is present for the purposes of cancellation of removal is beyond our jurisdiction to review, except in those rare cases where the BIA decision on whether this kind of hardship exists is made "`without rational justification or based on an erroneous legal standard,'" Barco-Sandoval, 516 F.3d at 39 (quoting Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir.2006) ("Xiao Ji Chen II")), or rests on fact-finding "which is flawed by an error of law," id. 516 F.3d at 40. We therefore find ourselves unable to accept Petitioner's arguments set out above.
We need not decide in this case whether the circumstances concerning the health issues faced by Petitioner's children, considered in light of the questionable availability of medical care for their health needs in the event they return to Mexico with their parents, are so extreme that an agency decision finding no "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" would be "without rational justification or based on an erroneous legal standard," Barco-Sandoval, 516 F.3d at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted), under the standards the BIA has established for determining whether an application for cancellation of removal demonstrated an "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship." See In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 2002); In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319 (BIA 2002); In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001).
Instead, we dispose of this petition by noting that the agency's decision rests on fact-finding "which is flawed by an error of law." Barco-Sandoval, 516 F.3d at 40. For example, although Petitioner testified that his nine-year-old daughter has around twenty-five asthma attacks each year, several of which require emergency visits to the hospital; that she must use a home nebulizer, a specialized piece of equipment, in addition to an ordinary inhaler; and that doctors do not expect her to outgrow her asthma, the IJ did not address any of these factors. Furthermore, the IJ stated
In addition, although the IJ concluded that Petitioner's son, who suffers from Grade II Vesicoureteral Reflux—a condition that may lead to kidney or liver failure—was "cured or ... certainly in remission," the IJ did not address the fact that the son's yearly examinations are highly specialized and that Petitioner's area of Mexico, if he and his family are removed, has few doctors—let alone kidney specialists—and that Petitioner testified that he will not be able to travel to see specialized doctors or to pay for treatment.
We readily acknowledge that the agency does not commit an "error of law" every time an item of evidence is not explicitly considered or is described with imperfect accuracy, but where, as here, some facts important to the subtle determination of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" have been totally overlooked and others have been seriously mischaracterized, we conclude that an error of law has occurred.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we grant this petition and remand the case to the BIA to evaluate— cleansed of these errors—whether Petitioner established that his citizen children will suffer "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" in light of the standards the BIA itself established in In re Monreal-Aguinaga and subsequent cases.
The petition for review is GRANTED, and the case is REMANDED to the BIA for consideration consistent with this opinion.
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