Rehearing En Banc Denied October 28, 2004.
MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which SILER, J., joined. BALDOCK, J. (pp. 528-534), delivered a separate opinion concurring in the judgment of dismissal only.
OPINION
MOORE, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant DLX, Inc. ("DLX") appeals from the dismissal of its § 1983 action against Defendants-Appellees the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental
I. BACKGROUND
The Lilley Cornett Woods ("Woods"), in Letcher County, Kentucky, is a tract of land owned by the state and maintained by Eastern Kentucky University as a wildlife refuge and research facility. The Woods are designated a National Natural Landmark as "[p]robably the only surviving virgin tract of any size in the Cumberland Mountains section of the mixed mesophytic forest, which is characterized by a great variety of tree species." National Park Service, National Registry of Natural Landmarks, http://www.nature.nps.gov/ nnl/Registry/USA—Map/States/Kentucky/nnl/lcw/index.htm. The surface rights to the Woods were originally purchased by Kentucky from the Kentucky River Coal Company, which retained the mining rights; a portion of the property was also purchased from the Cornett heirs. In 1975, the South-East Coal Company obtained a lease from the Kentucky River Coal Company to mine coal, including coal under the Woods, pursuant to which South-East acquired a permit from the state to mine 3,000 acres. Immediately before filing the amendment to South-East's then-existing permit that is at issue in this case, South-East filed for bankruptcy. DLX purchased all of South-East's assets, including the leases with Kentucky River and the state permit. At that point, DLX had a lease and permit allowing it to mine approximately 3,000 acres, which did not include any mining under the Woods. All the coal remaining in the lease is either under the Woods or can only be accessed by DLX through the land under the Woods.
DLX applied for Amendment No. 3 to the existing permit, which proposed an additional 130 acres to be added to the 3,000-acre permit area. DLX submitted an initial plan to the Cabinet, which responded with a "deficiency letter." DLX resubmitted, adding "a pillar design for subsidence control." Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 73 (Hearing Officer's Report and Recommendation). After additional deficiency letters, a seventy-five-foot vertical cover between mine operations and the surface was proposed in a third submittal; further deficiency letters resulted in a fourth submittal which left a 250-foot vertical cover, and proposed a fifty-percent recovery, that is, that half the coal in the area was extractable under the plan. No deficiency letter was issued by the Cabinet, but DLX in reassessing its fourth submittal decided that the proposal was unfeasible, and that a 250-foot cover would result in only twenty-five-percent recovery. DLX therefore withdrew its fourth proposal, submitting a fifth proposal instead which provided for fifty-percent recovery, but only a 110-foot vertical cover. This proposal was submitted with a letter requesting that the permit be issued or denied "as is." J.A. at 73 (Report). On April 25, 1994, the application was denied, for six reasons: the potential danger to the old-growth forest portion of the Woods; a failure to demonstrate that the mining operation could be feasibly accomplished under
The Hearing Officer of the Cabinet affirmed the decision of the Cabinet to deny the permit, finding both that the Cabinet could provide extra protection for the old-growth portion of the Woods that is not required for second-growth forests and that the Cabinet had a sufficient basis for determining that the 110-foot vertical cover proposed by petitioner was inadequate to minimize the impact to the hydrologic balance of the Woods. Noting that the petitioner bore the burdens of production and persuasion, the officer concluded that DLX failed to carry its burden of showing "that a 110-foot vertical cover would minimize disturbances to the hydrologic balance within the old-growth portion of the Lilley Cornett Woods." J.A. at 93 (Report). This report was adopted by then-Secretary Phillip J. Shepherd without comment.
Although Kentucky law allows a permit applicant to seek judicial review of a Secretary's final Order under KRS § 350.0305, DLX immediately filed a state-court takings claim, asserting that the denial of a permit to mine under the Woods constituted a regulatory taking of its property in violation of the Kentucky constitution. DLX expressly reserved its federal claims, noting,
RESERVATION OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
DLX hereby reserves its Federal claims. DLX will pursue in Federal court any remedies it may have under the United States Constitution or under United States statutes or regulations.
J.A. at 67 (State Ct. 1st Am. Compl.). After the state trial court dismissed the case for lack of ripeness, an intermediate court reversed, and the Supreme Court of Kentucky granted the Cabinet's petition for review. See Commonwealth v. DLX, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 624, 625 (Ky.2001). That court decided the case on the basis of exhaustion of administrative remedies, rather than ripeness. See id. ("We conclude that DLX failed to exhaust its administrative remedies."). Because DLX had not appealed the Secretary's final order before filing a takings claim, it could not proceed on the state constitutional takings claim. Id. at 626-27. Two justices (of seven) dissented, noting that DLX was prevented from raising its constitutional claims in the administrative proceedings, and that it would have been prevented from doing so in its appeal from the decision of the Cabinet. Id. at 627 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting). As the decision was one of state law only, a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court was not sought.
One year after the Kentucky Supreme Court dismissed DLX's state constitutional claim, DLX filed in federal district court, alleging a violation of the Fifth Amendment actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Kentucky immediately moved for dismissal
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can either attack the claim of jurisdiction on its face, in which case all allegations of the plaintiff must be considered as true, or it can attack the factual basis for jurisdiction, in which case the trial court must weigh the evidence and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists. See RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1133-35 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir.1994); Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir.1990). As the district court made essentially no factual findings in deciding it that lacked jurisdiction, we will treat this as a "facial" 12(b)(1) motion. We review a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) de novo where it requires no fact-finding. See Cob Clearinghouse Corp. v. Aetna United States Healthcare, Inc., 362 F.3d 877, 880 (6th Cir.2004); RMI, 78 F.3d at 1135 (in factual attack, district court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error).
B. Rooker-Feldman
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, named for Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), stands for the proposition that a party aggrieved by a state-court decision cannot appeal that decision to a district court, but must instead petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. This circuit has devised a number of formulae for determining when a district court lacks jurisdiction under the Rooker—Feldman doctrine; broken down to essentials, there are two categories of cases barred by the doctrine. First, when the federal courts are asked to "engage in appellate review of state court proceedings," the doctrine necessarily applies. Peterson Novelties, Inc. v. City of Berkley, 305 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir.2002). In determining when a plaintiff asks for appellate review, we have in the past looked to the relief sought, see Dubuc v. Mich. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 342 F.3d 610, 618-19 (6th Cir.2003), or asked the question whether the plaintiff alleges "that the state court's judgment actively caused him injury [rather than] that the judgment merely failed to redress a preexisting injury," Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 461 n. 1 (6th Cir.2003). See also Hutcherson v. Lauderdale County, 326 F.3d 747, 755 (6th Cir.2003) ("`[T]he fundamental and appropriate question to ask is whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment.'") (quoting Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir.1996)); Tropf v. Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir.2002) (The doctrine "precludes federal court jurisdiction where the claim is a specific grievance that the law was invalidly—even unconstitutionally—applied in the plaintiff's particular case.") (internal quotation marks and citations (omitted)).
The second category of cases barred by Rooker-Feldman is those which allege an injury that predates a state-court determination, but present issues inextricably intertwined with the claim asserted
Peterson Novelties, 305 F.3d at 391. See, e.g., Anderson v. Charter Township of Ypsilanti, 266 F.3d 487, 492-94 (6th Cir.2001) (applying "inextricably intertwined" test to hold Rooker-Feldman abstention appropriate).
DLX's claim is of the second type: the injury alleged is the permit denial that predates the state-court proceedings, not the state-court decision itself, and the relief that DLX requests is monetary. Therefore, the doctrine bars jurisdiction only to the extent that the district court must determine that the state court decided an issue wrongly in order for DLX's claim to succeed. Here, the state court decided that administrative exhaustion was a necessary component of a state constitutional takings claim; that although certain exceptions applied to that requirement, DLX met none of them; and that DLX had failed to exhaust administratively its claims. See DLX, 42 S.W.3d at 624-26. As administrative exhaustion is explicitly not a component of a federal takings claim,
C. Williamson County Prong-Two Ripeness and Administrative Exhaustion
Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186-91, 194-96, 105 S.Ct. 3108, sets out two requirements for a federal regulatory-takings claim to be ripe. First, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the decisionmaking body has come to a "final" decision, allowing the federal courts to assess how much use of the property is allowed and therefore whether the regulatory decision amounts to a taking. Id. at 186-91, 105 S.Ct. 3108. This has become known as "prong-one ripeness," and will be discussed in more detail below, as an issue of fact remains as to whether DLX satisfies prong-one ripeness. The district court, however, apparently relied on prong-two ripeness, which requires that a plaintiff "seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so." Id. at 194, 105 S.Ct. 3108. This refers only to an action for just compensation or inverse or reverse condemnation, but not to review procedures. "Exhaustion of review procedures is not required." Id. at 194 n. 13, 105 S.Ct. 3108. That administrative exhaustion is not required is part of the
Kentucky argues on appeal that despite this clear language from Williamson County, an exhaustion requirement still applies. Kentucky cites to a number of Kentucky state cases, two district court cases, and a Federal Circuit case in which the plaintiff apparently never satisfied Williamson County prong-one ripeness, in never having pursued a permit. This sparse precedent is unavailing in the face of clear Supreme Court precedent that exhaustion is never required in a § 1983 case (except pursuant to Congressional reform) and that there is no exception for takings claims. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 193, 194 n. 13, 105 S.Ct. 3108.
The district court apparently held that because the state-court action was dismissed on the basis of a lack of jurisdiction, "DLX has not yet been denied just compensation." J.A. at 407 (D. Ct. Op. at 10). But DLX has been denied just compensation in a state suit; it sought compensation and none was awarded. That the decision was not "on the merits" in the strictest sense does not mitigate DLX's injury; its property has allegedly been taken through the denial of its permit application, and an attempt to remedy that injury in the state court has been defeated by a rule of state law. DLX has no more remedy to seek in state court; the time for application for review of the Cabinet's decision is long past, and any state-court action it files will be dismissed for want of exhaustion. DLX has been denied a federal right through the operation of a state procedural rule without analogue in federal law, and its complaint is ripe.
In its brief, Kentucky attempts to defend this aspect of the district court's holding by arguing that DLX is precluded from arguing "that it has pursued its state condemnation remedy or that the state condemnation remedy was inadequate, because it did not invoke it correctly." Appellees' Br. at 24. But Williamson County is clearly concerned with ripeness, not with giving state decisionmakers adequate opportunity to right a wrong. This is demonstrated by the Williamson County Court's staunch refusal to require administrative exhaustion. "Remedial procedures" are not required by Williamson County, because the value isn't allowing state decisionmakers to arrive at a decision, but instead is ensuring that an injury has actually occurred. DLX has not received just compensation in a state action for the same; its federal claim is ripe under Williamson County prong two. See Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 283 (4th Cir.1998) (even where plaintiff made bad-faith effort in state court, "no clear basis under Williamson County to determine that [the] takings claim is other than finally ripe for adjudication in a federal forum.").
D. Res Judicata and England Reservation 4
The availability of federal courts to hear federal constitutional takings
A number of circuits have addressed this problem in a number of different contexts. Some plaintiffs have in fact litigated their federal claims in state court, and wish to avoid issue preclusion that they feel is unfair. Others chose not to litigate their federal claims in state court, and some in doing so made an explicit reservation of their federal claims to federal court, as DLX did. The courts of appeals have responded in various ways, but no court has held that where a plaintiff reserves its federal claims in an England reservation,
While Kentucky cites three cases for the proposition that res judicata applies regardless of the need to ripen under Williamson County, closer examination of these cases reveals that none requires that claim preclusion apply where, as here, plaintiffs have made an England reservation of their federal claims. In Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Board of County Commissioners, 142 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir.1998), the court noted first that the "plaintiffs asserted federal claims in the state court proceedings, which were fully adjudicated." Id. at 1324. Therefore, both issue preclusion and claim preclusion would have operated to bar the plaintiff's claim in Wilkinson. The court then refused to decide "whether it is possible to reserve a federal claim, or, if so, what must be done to reserve such a claim, because at no time did plaintiffs attempt to do so." Id. at 1324-25. In Palomar v. Mobilehome Park Ass'n v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 363 (9th Cir.1993), again, the plaintiff had asserted its federal claims in state court, and no attempt at reservation was made. Finally, in Peduto v. City of North Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725 (3d Cir.1989), the plaintiffs asserted their federal claims in state court, and again made no attempt to reserve their claims. Id. at 726-27, 729 n. 5. See also Rainey Bros. Constr. Co. v. Memphis & Shelby County Bd. of Adjustment, 967 F.Supp. 998, 1004 n. 5 (W.D.Tenn.1997) (res judicata applies where plaintiff brought federal claims in state court; because plaintiff made no reservation, court "expressly declines whether such a reservation would be effective."), aff'd, 1999 WL 220128 (6th Cir. Apr.5, 1999).
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit in cases since Palomar has indicated that the reach of that case may be confined to issue preclusion, rather than claim preclusion, where a reservation has been made. See San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco, 364 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir.2004) ("The City does
The weight of circuit-level authority is therefore clearly in favor of allowing DLX's England-style reservation in its Kentucky state-court action to prevent the application of the doctrine of claim preclusion in its subsequent federal-court takings action. We join our sister circuits in holding that a party's England reservation of federal takings claims in a state takings action will suffice to defeat claim preclusion in a subsequent federal action. It is unnecessary to decide in this case whether or not the Second Circuit's holding in Santini that issue preclusion is also inapplicable is the better rule, because the Kentucky Supreme Court did not decide any issues that affect DLX's right to recovery on its federal claim. Therefore, the doctrine
E. Williamson County Prong-One Ripeness
As noted above, Williamson County's first ripeness requirement for federal regulatory takings claims in federal court is that the state or local decisionmakers have made a final decision, such that a federal court assessing whether or not a taking has occurred can look to that decision in assessing what use can be made of the property. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186-91, 105 S.Ct. 3108. Kentucky vigorously asserts that DLX has not adequately demonstrated a final decision on the part of the Cabinet; DLX equally vigorously asserts that in fact a final decision has been made. The parties focus their attention on the amount of vertical cover required by the Cabinet: DLX argues that the Cabinet is immovably settled on a 250-foot vertical cover; Kentucky argues that some amount of vertical cover between 110 feet and 250 feet may be acceptable to the Cabinet.
Williamson County itself concerned a developer's application for a construction permit from the local planning commission. In 1973, a predecessor in interest to the plaintiff had submitted a preliminary design to the commission, which was approved; the design was continuously reapproved during development and construction, even after the zoning laws changed, through 1980. A final plan was submitted in 1980, which was disapproved by the Commission; after a change in ownership, revised plans were submitted, which were also disapproved. These decisions were held not to be final by the Court, however, because variances could be sought for "five of the Commission's eight objections to the" plan. Id. at 188, 105 S.Ct. 3108. Until those variances were sought and rejected, the takings claim was not yet ripe. The next Term, the Court applied the ripeness requirement again in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 352, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986), holding that a developer who had only submitted one proposal that had been rejected did not have a ripe takings claim, noting, "Rejection of exceedingly
DLX argues that its application for a permit providing less than 250 feet of vertical cover would have been futile, and points to testimony elicited during the administrative hearing from the Cabinet reviewer, Larry Peterson ("Peterson"). Kentucky responds that Peterson's testimony actually reveals that the officer might have been willing to approve less vertical cover, if DLX had submitted additional data supporting such a move. It seems at first blush that Kentucky has the better of this argument—DLX's futility argument is based on a mischaracterization of Peterson's testimony, and examining that testimony reveals that he would have been receptive to a permit application stipulating less vertical cover accompanied by additional data:
J.A. at 359 (Tr. of Admin. Hr'g). In its reply brief, DLX argues that no previous case requires a plaintiff to submit scientific surveys before finality will be found, and asserts that DLX could have proven no set of scientific facts that would have convinced the decisionmaker to allow DLX's permit.
Because resolution of this question requires factual inquiry, and the question is one on which the district court did not pass, we decline to resolve this factual question on appeal. Assuming all of DLX's allegations in its federal complaint to be true, namely, "The actions of the Commonwealth rendered more than one million tons of high quality coal unmineable," J.A. at 7 (Compl.¶ 14), jurisdiction exists; to deny jurisdiction based on a factual attack seems inappropriate without further proceedings below. We therefore choose to rely on Eleventh Amendment immunity in affirming the district court.
F. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Finally, Kentucky
But closer examination of each of these authorities reveals that they are concerned not with abrogating the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court, but with noting that the Fifth Amendment's requirement of just compensation forces the states to provide a judicial remedy in their own courts. "[T]he Constitution mandates the availability of effective remedies for `takings' and for the coercive collection of taxes, and accordingly requires courts to provide those remedies, `the sovereign immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own courts notwithstanding.'" Hart & Wechsler, supra, at 379 (quoting Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 110, 115 S.Ct. 547, 130 L.Ed.2d 454 (1994)). Reich explicitly holds that the requirement of a remedy for unconstitutional taxes does not trump "the sovereign immunity States enjoy in federal court, under the Eleventh Amendment." 523 U.S. at 110, 118 S.Ct. 1003. First English makes clear that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is a self-executing remedy, notwithstanding sovereign immunity. See 482 U.S. at 316 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2378. Therefore, had DLX brought a federal claim with its state claim in state court, the Kentucky courts would have had to hear that federal claim, and likely could not have required exhaustion as a prerequisite to hearing the federal claim, see Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 146-47, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988),
Although Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999), might seem to foreclose the requirement that states be susceptible to suit in their own courts on takings claims, a close reading of Alden reveals that it would present no bar to such a claim. In Alden, the Court held only "that the powers delegated to Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power to subject nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts." Id. at 712, 119 S.Ct. 2240. The Alden Court specifically preserved Reich's promise of a state-court remedy, noting, "The obligation arises from the Constitution itself; Reich does not speak to the power of Congress to subject States to suits in their own courts." Id. at 740, 119 S.Ct. 2240. Thus, where the Constitution requires a particular remedy, such as through the Due Process Clause for the tax monies at issue in Reich, or through the Takings Clause as indicated in First English, the state is required to provide that remedy in its own courts, notwithstanding sovereign immunity. See SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 650 N.W.2d 1, 8-9 (S.D.2002) ("South Dakota's sovereign immunity is not a bar to SDDS's Fifth Amendment takings claim."); Boise Cascade Corp. v. Oregon, 164 Or.App. 114, 991 P.2d 563, 565-69 (1999) (relying on First English in holding that "at least some constitutional claims are actionable against a state, even without a waiver or congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity, due to the nature of the constitutional provision involved"). But see Manning v. Mining & Minerals Div. of the Energy, Minerals, & Natural Res. Dep't, 135 N.M. 487, 90 P.3d 506 (Ct.App.2004) (rejecting Boise Cascade), cert. granted, 135 N.M. 565, 92 P.3d 11 (2004).
III. CONCLUSION
Because Kentucky enjoys sovereign immunity in the federal courts from DLX's federal takings claim, the district court was correct to dismiss the DLX's complaint for want of jurisdiction. The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I respectfully concur in the Court's judgment of dismissal only. Although the Court's Eleventh Amendment analysis appears sound, in my opinion we need not reach the Eleventh Amendment question. Rather, the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision implicates the Rooker-Feldman doctrine thereby precluding the necessity of resolving the myriad of issues raised in this case. In the alternative, because the "England-reservation" doctrine is inapplicable, res judicata bars DLX's federal takings claim. I will discuss each issue in turn.
I.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review state court decisions; only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to correct state court judgments. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).
In this case, DLX's federal takings claim is "inextricably intertwined" with the Kentucky state court judgment. Specifically, the Kentucky Supreme Court dismissed DLX's state takings claim for want of jurisdiction based on its application of federal law; namely, the standards set forth in Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985). See Commonwealth v. DLX, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 624, 627 (Ky.2001). DLX then filed a federal takings claim in district court. To ensure DLX's takings claim was ripe for review, the district court, like the Kentucky Supreme Court, applied the Supreme Court's two-prong ripeness test from Williamson. Under Williamson, a Fifth Amendment takings claim is not ripe for review until (1) the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision inflicting an actual, concrete injury, and (2) if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner has used the procedure and been denied just compensation. 473 U.S. at 193-95, 105 S.Ct. 3108. The ripeness test is conjunctive: both prongs must be satisfied.
Accordingly, the district court first sought to determine whether a final decision inflicting an actual, concrete injury existed under prong one. The district court indicated, however, a close reading of the Kentucky Supreme Court opinion revealed that the court had already decided Williamson prong one and determined no final decision, and thus no injury existed. See DLX, Inc., 42 S.W.3d at 626-27. In my opinion, the district court properly read the Kentucky Supreme Court's opinion. In DLX, Inc., the Kentucky Supreme Court dismissed DLX's state takings claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 627. The court reasoned the state agency had not yet arrived at a final, definitive position inflicting an injury because DLX failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. See id. The Kentucky Supreme Court relied upon the Williamson decision to reach its conclusion that no final decision inflicting an injury existed. See id. at 626-27. The Kentucky Supreme Court explained that "until a statute has been applied, there can be no unconstitutional
Id. (quoting Williamson, 473 U.S. at 190-91, 105 S.Ct. 3108) (emphasis added) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
The district court, after considering the Kentucky Supreme Court's analysis, reasonably concluded Rooker-Feldman applied. The district court reasoned it would have to review the Kentucky Supreme Court's conclusion that DLX did not have a final decision, and hold the opposite, in order to satisfy Williamson's first prong. While the Kentucky Supreme Court appears to have commingled two distinct doctrines (i.e., exhaustion and finality), see Williamson, 473 U.S. at 192, 105 S.Ct. 3108, I nevertheless agree with the district court's conclusion that the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision implicates the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the Kentucky Supreme Court decided Williamson prong one and indicated it lacked jurisdiction over DLX's takings claim based on the lack of a final decision.
The Court in this case attempts to avoid Rooker-Feldman by distinguishing between DLX's state and federal takings claims. See Court's Op. at 8. The Court's analysis does not persuade me, however, because the claims are indistinguishable. See Anderson, 266 F.3d at 495 (holding Rooker-Feldman barred jurisdiction because
In sum, the case, in my opinion, should be dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The purpose of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is to avoid duplicative appeals and proscribe lower federal courts review of state court decisions. Here, DLX availed itself of state procedures and cannot now take a second bite at the judicial apple in federal court.
II.
Aside from the Rooker-Feldman issue, I disagree with the Court's res judicata analysis and its application of the "England reservation" doctrine. See Court's Op. at 11.
In England, the plaintiffs initially sought to enjoin application of a state statute in federal court. The district court abstained to allow the state courts the opportunity to interpret the statute. See England, 375 U.S. at 413, 84 S.Ct. 461. The plaintiffs thereafter commenced state proceedings, but were unsuccessful. Upon returning to federal court, the plaintiffs revived their constitutional claims; however, the defendant argued the claims were precluded. The Supreme Court held preclusion did not bar the plaintiffs' federal claims because a party remitted to state court by an abstention order has the right to return to federal court. See id. at 415, 84 S.Ct. 461. Accordingly, under the England-reservation
The England-reservation doctrine thus applies only in a case where a party reserves federal questions in state court following federal court abstention. See id. at 421, 84 S.Ct. 461; see also Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 4471.1 at 247 (2002) (noting "[t]he core of the England-reservation rule remains unscathed. A party who clearly reserves federal questions following `Pullman' abstention ... can return to federal court for decision of the federal issues, free of preclusion."). Moreover, in order for the England-reservation doctrine to apply, the federal action must be brought first "affording the federal court the opportunity to decide whether to abstain. A plaintiff who elects to go to state court first is likely to be precluded from a second federal action, even if an express reservation is attempted." Wright & Miller, supra § 4471.1 at 250. In Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101-02 n. 17, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980), the Supreme Court explained why an England-reservation is inapplicable to cases first filed in state court rather than federal court:
(emphasis added). The procedural posture of this case differs significantly from England. Here, DLX did not initially file its takings claim in federal court, but first filed its claim in state court. Therefore, a federal court never had the opportunity to abstain and thus, the England-reservation doctrine is inapplicable.
The Court unnecessarily attempts to expand the England-reservation doctrine beyond the scope of federal abstention in this case. According to the Court, "given Williamson County's ripeness requirements, DLX could not have chosen to file a federal-court action first; therefore, the interaction of Williamson County's ripeness requirements and the doctrine of claim preclusion could possibly operate to keep every regulatory-takings claimant out of federal court." Court's Op. at 14. The Court then applies the England reservation doctrine and, to avoid claim preclusion, declares "[t]he weight of circuit-level authority is therefore clearly in favor of allowing DLX's England-style reservation." Id. at 18.
To begin, the Court's conclusion that "every regulatory takings claimant" would be excluded from federal court is not entirely accurate. Takings claimants who properly raise their federal claims in state proceedings may seek review in the United States Supreme Court if dissatisfied with the results they obtain from state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Next, courts have generally rejected use of the England-reservation doctrine in the takings context and many courts have declined to create an exception rendering res judicata and collateral estoppel inapplicable in Fifth Amendment takings cases. See Wright & Miller, supra § 4471.1 at 253 (citing cases); see also Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 128 (2d
See supra § 4471.1 at 253; see also Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd., 142 F.3d 1319, 1325 n. 4 (10th Cir.1998) (noting concern that the ripeness requirement "may, in actuality, almost always result in preclusion of federal claims, regardless of whether reservation is permitted"); Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass'n v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 364 (9th Cir.1993) (explaining that mere fact that Williamson requires takings claimants to first file in state court "does not prevent the doctrine of res judicata from barring subsequent federal action"); Peduto v. City of N. Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725, 729 (3d Cir.1989) (same); Griffin v. Rhode Island, 760 F.2d 359, 360 n. 1 (1st Cir.1985) (explaining England-reservation was inapplicable and that "[s]ection 1983 does not override state preclusion law by allowing plaintiffs to first proceed to judgment in state courts and then turn to federal courts for adjudication of federal claims."). In Allen, 449 U.S. at 104, 101 S.Ct. 411, the Supreme Court stated simply: "There is, in short, no reason to believe that Congress [through § 1983] intended to provide a person claiming a federal right an unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already decided in state court simply because the issue arose in a state proceeding in which he would rather not have been engaged in at all."
Perhaps most importantly, allowing a claimant to reserve its federal takings claim in state proceedings undermines the very purpose of Williamson's ripeness requirements. The ripeness requirements for federal takings claims stems from both Article III and the Fifth Amendment. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 186-87, 190-91, 105 S.Ct. 3108; Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 562 (6th Cir.2002). The ripeness requirements are of constitutional dimension because they assist in the determination of whether an injury has occurred for purposes of Article III's case or controversy requirement. See Arnett, 281 F.3d at 562. Further, the Fifth Amendment is a self-executing remedy in state courts and state compensation procedures are constitutionally required. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987). Based upon these antecedent precepts, Williamson's ripeness test compels that a state court make a federal constitutional ruling because the very purpose of state compensation procedures is to address the federal constitutional question. Allowing the reservation of the federal question in state court would undermine the role, as the Supreme Court has described, of state courts in adjudicating federal takings claims. As one commentator explained:
Thomas E. Roberts, Fifth Amendment Taking Claims in Federal Court, 24 Urb. Law. 479, 480 (1992).
In sum, the Court erred in applying the England-reservation doctrine in this case. A plaintiff, in my view, simply cannot make an England-reservation in non-abstention cases. Instead, res judicata applies to bar DLX's federal claim. We generally presume state courts are capable of adjudicating federal claims along with state claims. See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 85-86, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984); see also Donovan, 105 F.3d at 295. Moreover, the Supreme Court has clearly explained that states are required to adjudicate takings claims because, if a state provides just compensation, resort to a federal forum may be avoided. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194, 105 S.Ct. 3108.
Based on the foregoing, I respectfully concur only in the Court's judgment of dismissal.
FootNotes
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that making an unconstitutional-as-applied challenge in an administrative proceeding creates an exemption to the exhaustion-of-remedies requirement. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that DLX's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies by failing to appeal the Secretary's order, deprived the Franklin Circuit Court of subject-matter jurisdiction to hear DLX's takings claim.
Id. at 627. Because administrative exhaustion is explicitly not a component of a federal takings claim under Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194 n. 13, 105 S.Ct. 3108 ("Exhaustion of review procedures is not required."), the district court could have concluded that DLX had made out a regulatory taking of its property under the Fifth Amendment and was entitled to relief without undermining any of the state court's conclusions. DLX's federal takings claim and its state takings claim are not "indistinguishable," as the concurrence asserts, for this reason: the federal claim does not require administrative exhaustion, where the state claim does. Rooker-Feldman is thus inapplicable in this case.
The general rule for determining the question of res adjudicata as between parties in actions embraces several conditions. First, there must be identity of parties. Second, there must be identity of the two causes of action. Third, the action must be decided upon its merits. In short, the rule of res adjudicata does not act as a bar if there are different issues or the questions of law presented are different. Likewise, it has long been recognized that a party may not split his cause of action, therefore, if a cause of action should have been presented and the party failed to do so and the matter should again arise in another action, it will be held that the first action was res adjudicata as to all causes that should have properly been presented. We stated the rule in Hays v. Sturgill, 302 Ky. 31, 193 S.W.2d 648, as follows:
"The rule that issues which have been once litigated cannot be the subject matter of later action is not only salutary but necessary in the administration of justice. The subsidiary rule that one may not split up his cause of action and have it tried piecemeal rests upon the same foundation. To permit it would not be just to the adverse party or fair to the courts. So, as said in Combs v. Prestonsburg Water Co., 260 Ky. 169, 84 S.W.2d 15, 18: `The rule is elementary that, when a matter is in litigation, parties are required to bring forward their whole case; and "the plea of res judicata applies not only to the points upon which the court was required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time."'" 451 S.W.2d at 419 (first emphasis added). The error in Stemler thus seems to be in following Newman's formulation of the general rule of res judicata without noting the additional rule against claim-splitting. However this tangle of case law is to be resolved, it seems likely that even under Stemler's erroneous reading of Kentucky's res judicata rules, a state takings claim and a federal takings claim would be identical in both "subject matter" and "cause of action" for the purpose of claim-preclusion law.
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