GAJARSA, Circuit Judge.
Todd R. Haebe, a Special Agent with the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") in San Jose, California, appeals a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB" or "Board" or "board"). In a split decision,
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from Mr. Haebe's law enforcement efforts on the morning of March 30, 1995, and the report he filed several weeks later describing the events of that morning. The incident in question on the morning of March 30 resulted in Mr. Haebe reporting to authorities in Portland, Oregon that a Mr. Ricardo Ortiz Alcala would be arriving in Portland on a flight that morning. This resulted in the arrest of Mr. Alcala at the Portland airport and he was found to be carrying four pounds of methamphetamine. Mr. Haebe reported the incident on a DEA Form 6 that he signed on April 18, 1995 (the "Report"). Initial Decision at 2-3.
Early in the morning of March 30, 1995, Mr. Haebe was paged at home by a confidential informant ("CI") who worked as an airline ticket agent at the San Jose, California Airport. The CI contacted Mr. Haebe because the CI noticed that Mr. Alcala fit the profile of a suspected drug trafficker.
The DEA's Office of Professional Responsibility investigated the Report and eventually filed two charges against Mr. Haebe. The first charge, with five specifications, was Making False Statements. The second charge, with two specifications, was Failure to Follow Written Instructions. In leveling these charges, the DEA in essence alleged that Mr. Haebe never went to the San Jose Airport on the morning of March 30, 1995, and thus never observed Mr. Alcala directly. Rather, under the DEA's theory, Mr. Haebe took the observations of the CI and used them as his own when he wrote the Report.
Based on these charges, the DEA removed Mr. Haebe, effective on March 14, 1997. Mr. Haebe filed a timely appeal to the MSPB. The MSPB assigned the case to the AJ, who held a hearing and took testimony from various witnesses, and issued his initial decision. The AJ reversed all specifications of both charges against Mr. Haebe. The Department of Justice ("DOJ") filed a timely petition for review by the full MSPB. The MSPB granted the petition for review, and overturned the AJ's decisions on charge one, specifications two and three, and charge two, specification one. Mr. Haebe filed a timely appeal to this court for charge one. We have jurisdiction over Mr. Haebe's appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). The content of both the AJ's initial decision and the MSPB's reversal are central to the disposition of this case. We will discuss each decision in turn for those charges and specifications that the MSPB reversed, however, Mr. Haebe seeks our review only for the specifications under charge one.
A. The AJ's Initial Decision
The AJ's twenty-page opinion reflects a three-day hearing and extensive consideration and discussion of disputed issues that the AJ resolved in large measure based on his assessment of the credibility and demeanor of the various witnesses who testified.
Presence of Mr. Haebe at the San Jose Airport — charge one, specification two
The DEA charged that Mr. Haebe made knowingly false statements about his observations of Mr. Alcala, in essence alleging that Mr. Haebe did not go to the San Jose Airport that morning in response to the page from the CI. In his Report, Mr. Haebe stated that he observed Mr. Alcala purchase the ticket, appear nervous, and saw him proceed through security to the gate, avoiding eye contact at security and looking around as if to identify law enforcement.
Throughout the case, Mr. Haebe maintained in both his deposition and hearing testimony that he personally made these observations of Mr. Alcala documented in the Report. The AJ characterized the DEA's view of the situation as "based on the contention that known times of events precluded [Mr. Haebe] from carrying out his claimed observations." Id. at 8. The AJ noted that the only two times not based on the recollection of witnesses are the times supplied by the airline records, a ticket sale at 6:32 a.m., and departure of the flight at 7:00 a.m.
Mr. Haebe testified to the AJ as follows. He received the page from the CI between 6:00 6:30 a.m. on the morning of March 30. Mr. Haebe called the CI and discovered that Mr. Alcala inquired about a flight to Redmond, Oregon. This piqued Mr. Haebe's interest because of another arrest several weeks earlier of a person carrying methamphetamine who wanted to travel to Redmond. The CI described Mr. Alcala as a Hispanic adult male, wearing a black sweatshirt
The CI was interviewed and deposed a number of times from the beginning of the investigation up to the hearing, and also submitted affidavits. See Final Decision at 178 n. 4. While noting that among the CI's various statements there were some differences, the AJ noted that they were not great differences. Initial Decision at 12 n. 16. Significantly, in the CI's last two affidavits and at the hearing, the CI testified that Mr. Alcala approached the ticket counter twice, after the first encounter the CI paged Mr. Haebe, but the CI could not remember whether Mr. Alcala purchased the ticket on the first or second visit. Id. at 13.
Although the CI's memory of the incident was not complete, based on the CI's testimony the AJ found the CI to be honest and credible, and the AJ explicitly based this credibility finding on the CI's demeanor.
Observation of Mr. Alcala's bag — charge one, specification three
The DEA charged that Mr. Haebe included the following statement in the Report: "[t]he individual checked one bag described as a brown bag with vinyl stripes on it;" and that when read in context the statement conveys the impression that Mr. Haebe observed the bag. Mr. Haebe testified that he did not see what, if anything, Mr. Alcala checked as baggage,
The AJ described the testimony of Mr. Haebe's immediate and second-level supervisors, explaining that the San Jose DEA had a policy of concealing that a CI was involved in an incident. Initial Decision at 5-6. The agent could apply this policy when he or she believed it to be advisable. Mr. Haebe testified that he was following this policy when he completed the Report. Id. at 5. According to the second-level supervisor's testimony, the primary stipulation to the policy was that in concealing a CI's identity the agent should have personally observed the events reported. Mr. Haebe's immediate supervisor, Mr. Meyrick, testified that the statement about the bag was not a falsification and fell within the policy.
Failure to distribute a copy of the Report to the Portland DEA — charge two, specification one
The DEA charged that Mr. Haebe failed to distribute the Report to the Portland, Oregon, DEA office, and that this constituted a failure to follow written instructions. Mr. Haebe testified that he simply made an error and forgot to check a box on the form to indicate distribution to the Portland Office. Both his immediate supervisor, Mr. Meyrick, and his second-level supervisor, Mr. London, testified that they regarded the omission as simply a clerical error, frequently made by agents, and an issue of joint responsibility because an agent's supervisors are supposed to correct the report when they sign off on it.
The AJ credited the testimony of Mr. Haebe's supervisors that the omission was a simple clerical error, and credited Mr. Haebe's testimony that the error was inadvertent and not motivated by a desire to keep the allegedly falsified Report away from the Portland DEA office. Therefore, the AJ concluded that the DEA had not proven its case that this first specification of charge two warranted formal discipline. Initial Decision at 4.
B. The MSPB's Final Decision
The MSPB sustained the AJ's reversal of the DEA regarding charge one, specifications one, four, and five, as well as charge two, specification two.
Presence of Mr. Haebe at the San Jose Airport — charge one, specification two
The MSPB strung together various circumstantial evidence findings to conclude that the preponderance of the evidence showed that Mr. Haebe falsified the observations he recorded on the Report by adopting the information the CI gave him. Id. at 176-77. Expressly acknowledging that its finding was "contrary to the AJ's finding," and citing interviews of the CI early in the investigation, the MSPB found that the CI called Mr. Haebe after Mr. Alcala purchased his ticket, id. at 177, rather than after the initial inquiry by Mr. Alcala as the CI testified to the AJ. The MSPB supported its counter-finding with the following observations: (i) the CI had stated that normally the CI paged an agent after a ticket was purchased, even
Based directly on its circumstantial evidence counter-finding that the CI first called Mr. Haebe after Mr. Alcala purchased the ticket, the MSPB found that Mr. Haebe did not observe Mr. Alcala before he boarded the plane. To support this inference, the MSPB explained how the timing could not have possibly worked out, especially given the CI's statement that the CI saw Mr. Alcala in his window seat on the plane at "approximately 6:45 a.m." Id. at 178-79. The MSPB compiled additional circumstantial evidence against Mr. Haebe.
Observation of Mr. Alcala's bag — charge one, specification three
With respect to specification three, the MSPB overturned the AJ's conclusion because it found the AJ's determination to be primarily based on the testimony of Mr. Haebe's immediate supervisor, who stated that the Report's description of the bag was within the policy of protecting confidential informants, and the fact that Mr. Haebe was never explicitly warned that such an approach violated the policy. Id. at 182. Rather, according to the MSPB, the testimony of the second-level supervisor controls, who testified that the policy stipulated that an agent must personally
Failure to distribute a copy of the Report to the Portland DEA — charge two, specification one
The MSPB held that under charge two, proof of intent is not required. See Final Decision at 183 (citing Botto v. United States Postal Serv., 75 M.S.P.R. 471, 476 (1997); Hamilton v. United States Postal Serv., 71 M.S.P.R. 547, 555-57 (1996)). As a result, the DEA had no need to prove that Mr. Haebe was motivated to keep the Report away from the Portland DEA office as opined by the AJ. Further, there is no "de minimis" exception for a charge of failing to follow written instructions. See Final Decision at 184 (citing Pepper v. Veterans Admin., 8 MSPB 197, 8 M.S.P.R. 524, 526-28 (1981); Ceja v. Def. Logistics Agency, 27 M.S.P.R. 531, 533 (1985) (explaining that de minimis nature only impacts the penalty)). Because the form was not sent, the charge is met: "we find that this specification is proven and that there is a nexus between the misconduct and the efficiency of the service."
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Our standard of review for MSPB decisions is governed by statute, which directs us to set aside MSPB actions, findings, or conclusions found to be:
5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2000).
Under this standard, we will reverse the MSPB's decision if it is not supported by "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Brewer v. United States Postal Serv., 227 Ct.Cl. 276, 647 F.2d 1093, 1096 (Ct.Cl.1981) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126, (1938)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144, 102 S.Ct. 1005, 71 L.Ed.2d 296 (1982). This court's review "must determine whether, considering the record as a whole, the agency's evidence is sufficient to be found by a reasonable factfinder to meet the evidentiary burden applicable to the particular case." Jacobs, 35 F.3d at 1545 (quoting Bradley v. Veterans Admin., 900 F.2d 233, 234 (Fed.Cir.1990)). The question before us is not how the court would rule upon a de novo appraisal of the facts of the case, but whether the administrative determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Hayes v. Dep't of the Navy, 727 F.2d 1535, 1537 (Fed.Cir.1984).
B. Credibility Determinations and the Relationship Between the MSPB and Its Administrative Judges
The MSPB "has the power to determine questions of fact and law in the first instance," however, under statute and
There is an exception to this otherwise straightforward description of the MSPB's power when the MSPB invokes its privilege to refer and delegate a case to an administrative judge. By availing itself of the privilege established under its own regulations, the MSPB is not free to overturn an administrative judge's demeanor-based credibility findings merely because it disagrees with those findings.
Although not necessarily a counter-balance to the full MSPB's power, we have sanctioned this deference requirement as springing from a fundamental notion of fairness as expressed by this court in Jackson: "great deference must be granted to the trier of fact who has had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, whereas the reviewing body looks only at `cold records.'" Jackson, 768 F.2d at 1331 (citations omitted). In Jackson, this court held that the deference requirement derived from the substantial evidence standard expressed by the Supreme Court in Universal Camera v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951), and interpreted by the Ninth Circuit in Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 565 F.2d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir.1977), and the Supreme Court's recognition that the "evidence supporting
Thus, with respect to conflicting determinations concerning demeanor-based credibility, the administrative judge "is without question the better judge of who to believe." Jackson, 768 F.2d at 1332. Accordingly, we have held:
Kimm, 61 F.3d at 892 (citing Chauvin, 38 F.3d at 566); see also Jackson, 768 F.2d at 1331.
Both Mr. Haebe and the government present to us an intricate twist to the deference requirement, asserting that there are two levels or thresholds of deference, as follows: the MSPB must give (i) deference to the administrative judge's findings based on issues of credibility, Connolly, 766 F.2d at 512, and (ii) "special deference" where such findings are implicitly or explicitly based on the demeanor of witnesses who testified before an administrative judge, Chauvin, 38 F.3d at 566; Jackson, 768 F.2d at 1331. We, however, do not read our precedent as creating or endorsing any such distinction because our cases have only required deference when an administrative judge was able to observe the demeanor of a testifying witness and, as a result, the administrative judge's findings were explicitly or implicitly based on the demeanor of a witness.
The consequence of the deference requirement is that if the MSPB's reasons for overturning demeanor-based credibility determinations are not sufficiently sound, its decision does not survive substantial evidence review. Chauvin, 38 F.3d at 566 ("[T]he board majority did not articulate a sufficient reason for its disbelief of Chauvin's testimony."). In light of the "sufficiently sound" requirement for overturning AJ credibility determinations, the MSPB has established procedural directives for administrative judges under its decisions in Hillen
When the demeanor-based deference requirement is not in play, the MSPB is free to re-weigh the evidence and substitute its own decision as to the facts or the law commensurate with the substantial evidence standard, Jackson, 768 F.2d at 1330, but it cannot substitute its judgment on issues of credibility based on the demeanor of witnesses.
C. Analysis
The DOJ argues that the MSPB is not overturning the AJ's credibility determinations but is instead reweighing the evidence more completely or differently than the AJ, all the while fully "acknowledging" the AJ's demeanor-based credibility findings. We find that this characterization of the Final Decision understates the reach and grasp of the MSPB's analysis and misapplies the standards we have articulated in Jackson, Chauvin and Kimm. The DEA needed to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence, which is the "degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue." 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(2) (2001). Our review is to determine whether the MSPB had substantial evidence to conclude that the DEA so proved its case, but in evaluating substantial evidence we review whether the MSPB properly applied the demeanor-based deference requirement.
Presence of Mr. Haebe at the San Jose Airport — charge one, specification two
The DOJ argues that intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. While we agree with this proposition at some level, here the MSPB carried the principle too far and eviscerated the critical and valid demeanor-based credibility findings made by the AJ. The DOJ offered reasons for its substituted findings, but its proffered reasons are not sufficiently sound to carry the day. Central in the MSPB's error is its finding that the CI first called Mr. Haebe after the ticket was purchased. By substituting this finding for the AJ's demeanor-based finding that the CI testified to have first called Mr. Haebe after the initial inquiry by Mr. Alcala,
The MSPB seeks to alter this finding with an amalgamation of circumstantial evidence, which might be persuasive against a baseline substantial evidence review, but which definitely does not stand up under the demeanor-based deference requirement. In short, with proper attribution to the AJ's findings, the MSPB has not shown by substantial evidence that a reasonable fact-finder would have found it more likely than not that the CI only first called Mr. Haebe after the ticket was purchased. See Chauvin, 38 F.3d at 566. The AJ recognized as much when he concluded that the DEA had not proven this point. Initial Decision at 15.
The DOJ argues that the MSPB provided sufficiently sound reasons to substitute its findings for that of the AJ. These reasons spring from the imprecision of the CI's earlier interviews and statements.
Another aspect of the MSPB's error is its treatment of the AJ's findings concerning Mr. Haebe's testimony. The DOJ argues, under its false notion of two levels of deference, that the AJ's credibility determination is based only on Mr. Haebe's reputation, and therefore the MSPB need only afford deference to the AJ's findings, not special deference. Besides the error concerning two deference levels, this contention is questionable because it seems that the AJ implicitly gauged Mr. Haebe's demeanor because the AJ credited Mr. Haebe's testimony. We need not decide this point however, because under the demeanor-based deference requirement arising from the CI's testimony the MSPB's reasons for substituting its findings are not sufficiently sound.
The lack of sufficient soundness is especially apparent considering that the most important finding against Mr. Haebe's version of events is the counter-finding the MSPB made: that the CI only first called after the ticket was sold. This finding went against the CI's demeanor-based testimony which had been credited by the AJ. Remove this counter-finding from the MSPB's analysis, and its reasons for rejecting Mr. Haebe's version of events do not withstand substantial evidence review. The MSPB's reasons include some items of mere speculation by the MSPB, such as that it is "inherently improbable" that Mr. Haebe forgot his pager and failed to find a clock to record the time of his observations. These facts could just as easily support Mr. Haebe's version of events: he was rushing to the airport to respond, and at the airport kept his attention focused on Mr. Alcala from his vantage just outside the terminal. Also questionable is the MSPB's use of the assertion that the description of Mr. Alcala was "more typical of a CI." Again, to the extent there was sparseness in the description, this could also support Mr. Haebe's version of events: his observation points were never close enough to note additional specific details. The MSPB even uses against Mr. Haebe his continual contention that his observations of Mr. Alcala, other than the luggage bag, were correct and his own. The MSPB says Mr. Haebe's failure to explain why his statements are incorrect is evidence against him. But this rather seems akin to saying that the fact that Mr. Haebe will not confess is a reason to believe him guilty. This in essence reverses the burden of proof against Mr. Haebe. The fact that these alternative interpretations of the evidence exist might not normally substantiate a reversal under the substantial evidence standard, however, here they demonstrate that plausible alternative views of the other, non-demeanor-based evidence, comport with the AJ's demeanor-based findings. Because an interpretation exists where the non-demeanor-based evidence does comport, the AJ's demeanor-based determinations are dispositive.
Observation of Mr. Alcala's bag — charge one, specification three
Under specification three of charge one, the DEA claimed that Mr. Haebe's "actions constitute making a false statement." Initial Decision at 18. The DEA brought this charge because it surmised that read in context, Mr. Haebe's statement that Mr. Alcala "checked one bag described as a brown bag with vinyl stripes on it" implies
For Mr. Haebe's actions to "constitute making a false statement," the agency must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Haebe's situation falls within the standard set forth in Naekel v. Department of Transportation, 782 F.2d 975 (Fed.Cir.1986) and its progeny. Specifically, the DEA must prove that Mr. Haebe (i) supplied wrong information, and (ii) did so with the intention of defrauding, deceiving or misleading the agency. Id. at 977-78; see also Jacobs v. Dep't of Justice, 35 F.3d 1543, 1546 (Fed.Cir.1994); Bradley v. Veterans Admin., 900 F.2d 233, 236 (Fed.Cir.1990); Dennis v. Dep't of Health & Human Svs., 804 F.2d 670, 672 (Fed. Cir.1986); Kumferman v. Dep't of Navy, 785 F.2d 286, 290 (Fed.Cir.1986); McIntire v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 55 M.S.P.R. 578, 585-86 (1992). Because the DEA's burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence, our review is "whether the [Board] conclusion that the agency proved the charge against petitioner by a preponderance of the evidence is supported by substantial evidence." Jacobs, 35 F.3d at 1546 (quoting Dixon v. Dep't of Transp., 8 F.3d 798 (Fed.Cir.1993)). In addition:
Id. at 1546.
Neither the MSPB nor the AJ properly analyzed the Naekel test in its review of Mr. Haebe's case. The DEA "must prove all of the elements of the substantive offense with which an individual is charged." King v. Nazelrod, 43 F.3d 663, 666 (Fed.Cir.1994). The Naekel test applies here, but in a singular manner because under the policy Mr. Haebe was authorized to prepare a Report that provided less-than-complete, or even deceiving or misleading information, with respect to the CI. Thus, under the first part of the test, whether Mr. Haebe provided wrong information must be viewed from the perspective of the policy. Under the second part of the test, whether Mr. Haebe had the intent to defraud, deceive or mislead the agency collapses into whether he intended to go beyond the policy, that is, whether he intended to violate the policy. If his intent was to apply the policy but he blundered in doing so,
In Naekel, the MSPB sustained the Federal Aviation Administration's ("FAA") decision to remove Mr. Naekel from his position for submitting two instances of allegedly false information in connection with an application for employment. Naekel, 782 F.2d at 976-77. This Court reversed, holding that there was no direct evidence of intent to deceive or mislead the FAA, and that the circumstantial evidence upon which the FAA attempted to derive intent inferentially was insufficient, even "woefully inadequate," to prove intent. Id. at 978-79. This Court found "the [B]oard's decision ... that the agency satisfied its evidentiary burden [to be unreasonable]." Id. The first instance of allegedly false information was Mr. Naekel's response on an employment application concerning whether he was fired from a fill-in job he held for one month, but which ended when he refused to follow a direct order to land a plane in bad weather, an action which in his estimation "might have cost someone their life." Id. This Court found that Mr. Naekel did not possess the requisite intent to deceive the FAA because (i) he reasonably believed that the temporary, fill-in job was not material to employment, (ii) after consulting legal counsel, he reasonably believed that being "fired" was not the proper way to characterize the event, and (iii) in earlier FAA applications he had characterized the removal from the job as being fired, and thus the FAA could not have been misled. Id. at 977-79. The second instance of allegedly false information was Mr. Naekel's response to whether he had ever resigned under threat of removal, where he had resigned from a job he intended to take in Chicago before he reported to work but after he completed some initial training. He resigned because the agency mishandled his travel expenses for an interview. This Court held that "by the time the proposed removal and resignation occurred, Naekel's employment by the agency had already ended." Id. at 980. Thus, this Court found that the agency had not proved intent to deceive because the circumstances surrounding the situation were ambiguous and did not support characterizing the resignation as anything other than how Mr. Naekel's characterized it: the employment ended because it was "mutually unsatisfactory." Id. at 980-82.
The DEA, like the FAA in its action against Mr. Naekel, brought insufficient circumstantial evidence to derive Mr. Haebe's intent inferentially. The DEA brought no direct evidence of Mr. Haebe's alleged intent to violate the policy. Indeed, the direct evidence submitted cuts the other way. Mr. Haebe testified directly that it was his intent to follow the policy in order to protect the identity of the CI. Initial Decision at 5. After hearing this testimony, the AJ acknowledged that Mr. Haebe's motivation for the ambiguous language was to protect the CI. Id. at 18. The circumstantial evidence the agency offers to derive intent inferentially is not, under any reasonable view, sufficient for the agency to prove intent under a preponderance of the evidence standard. Moreover, Mr. Haebe has a plausible explanation for his attempt to obfuscate the source of the information about the bag, see McKenna v. INS, No. 98-3366, 1999 WL 820417, 1999 U.S.App. LEXIS 25512, at *7 (Fed.Cir. October 13, 1999) (per curiam); Jacobs, 35 F.3d at 1548, because he testified that he did so in order to protect the identity of the CI and in reliance on the policy. The insufficiency of the agency's circumstantial evidence is evident from a
First, the MSPB notes that Mr. Haebe's statement was incorrect because it conveys the impression that he observed the bag when he did not. Final Decision at 182. Even assuming this finding to be supported,
Second, the MSPB recites that Mr. Haebe admits that he intended to use deceptive language to conceal the existence of the CI. Final Decision at 182. This, however, is not direct or circumstantial evidence of intent to violate the policy because the policy allows him to conceal the existence of the CI. The MSPB attempts to qualify its reliance on this basis through the testimony of the second-level supervisor, while discarding as "irrelevant" the testimony of Mr. Haebe's immediate supervisor. Id. at 182-83. To evaluate Mr. Haebe's intent, however, the immediate supervisor's testimony cannot be so easily discarded. Taken together, in order to evaluate all of the circumstantial evidence as a whole as required by our case law, Naekel, 782 F.2d at 978; Bradley, 900 F.2d at 234, the supervisors' testimony shows that the contours of the policy were not definitive for the ambiguous language Mr. Haebe used.
Third, the MSPB states that Mr. Haebe was "well aware" of the second-level supervisor's policy, but also acknowledges that Mr. Haebe was not warned with respect to the particular ambiguous structure of language he used in the Report. Final Decision at 183. Although the record is clear that Mr. Haebe was generally aware of the policy allowing an agent to provide less-than-complete or misleading information to protect the identity of a CI, we find no support in the record for the MSPB's assertion that Mr. Haebe was specifically aware of the second-level supervisor's stipulation to the policy. The AJ's findings are arguably contrary to the MSPB's assertion because the AJ found that Mr. Haebe had not been warned about language that would violate the stipulation. Thus, in addition to relying on an assertion without demonstrated record support, the MSPB adopted two conflicting
In sum, given the above-described problems with the sufficiency of the agency's circumstantial evidence to derive intent inferentially, a reasonable fact finder would not find that the agency has proven Mr. Haebe's intent to violate the policy by a preponderance of the evidence. Mr. Haebe testified directly as to his intent and had a plausible explanation for the ambiguous language. Given this opinion's reinstatement of the AJ's findings under specification two of charge one, motive is not circumstantial evidence in the agency's favor because, under the facts as found by the AJ that Mr. Haebe did go to the airport that morning and observed Mr. Alcala directly, Mr. Haebe had no motive to obfuscate his description of the bag other than to protect the CI. Thus, we reverse the decision of the MSPB with respect to specification three of charge one, and set aside the DEA's action because it was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence.
Finally, under both specifications of charge one, the AJ's analysis of the various credibility issues squarely meets the requirements of Hillen and Spithaler. In particular, the AJ carefully documented the required aspects of evaluating a witness as required by the MSPB in Hillen. The only aspect of Spithaler that is marginally lacking in the AJ's analysis is explanation of the authorities upon which his reasoning rests. However, to the extent this is error, it is harmless error here because the critical, material analysis is within the universe of facts surrounding the events of the morning of March 30, 1995.
III. CONCLUSION
The finding of the MSPB that Mr. Haebe wrongly falsified statements on the Report is not supported by substantial evidence because the MSPB's reasons for substituting its own credibility determinations for that of the AJ are not sufficiently sound. In addition, the MSPB misapplied the intent element of the falsification charge. Therefore, we reverse.
REVERSED.
COSTS
Costs to appellant.
FootNotes
The regulation sets out two conditions where the MSPB may grant review; it does not limit the MSPB's authority to review, which is plenary. Connolly, 766 F.2d at 510-12; see also 5 U.S.C. § 7701(e)(1)(B) (2000) (specifying that the Board may reopen and reconsider a decision of an administrative judge).
Id. at 458.
Initial Decision at 13.
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