Opinion
MARKMAN, J.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of pandering, M.C.L. § 750.455; MSA 28.710, and accepting the earnings of a prostitute, M.C.L. § 750.457; MSA 28.712. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction for accepting the earnings of a prostitute,
The facts of this case were accurately set forth in the published decision of the Court of Appeals:
A Grand Rapids police officer, taking part in an undercover operation designed to curtail prostitution, called defendant's massage service from a hotel room and made an appointment for a massage at a cost of $75 an hour. Defendant agreed to send over a blonde in her mid-twenties with a nice figure. Shortly thereafter, a masseuse calling herself "Heather" and later identified as Christine Hanlon arrived at the hotel room. Hanlon had the officer disrobe and proceeded to give him a nonsexual
The pandering statute, M.C.L. § 750.455; MSA 28.710, sets forth eight activities for which a defendant may be charged:
Defendant was charged under the second clause, to "induce, persuade, encourage, inveigle or entice a female person to become a prostitute...." The Court of Appeals, relying on People v. Cook, 96 Mich. 368, 370, 55 N.W. 980 (1893), concluded that this section of the statute was created to penalize individuals who induce
The clear dispute in this case is with respect to the phrase "to become a prostitute." The prosecutor contends that any time a defendant induces a female
We review questions of statutory construction de novo. McAuley v. General Motors Corp., 457 Mich. 513, 518, 578 N.W.2d 282 (1998). In doing so, our purpose is to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent. Murphy v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 447 Mich. 93, 98, 523 N.W.2d 310 (1994). We begin by examining the plain language of the statute; where that language is unambiguous, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed—no further judicial construction is required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written. Tryc v. Michigan Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich. 129, 135, 545 N.W.2d 642 (1996). We must give the words of a statute their plain and ordinary meaning, and only where the statutory language is ambiguous may we look outside the statute to ascertain the Legislature's intent. Turner v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 448 Mich. 22, 27, 528 N.W.2d 681 (1995); Luttrell v. Dep't of Corrections, 421 Mich. 93, 365 N.W.2d 74 (1984).
In determining the plain meaning of the phrase, "to become a prostitute," we consider not only the meaning of the phrase itself, but also "its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme." Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995). "The fair and natural import of the terms employed, in view of the subject matter of the law, is what should govern," People ex rel Twitchell v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127, 168 (1865)(COOLEY, J.), and as far as possible, effect must be given to every word, phrase, and clause in the statute. Gebhardt v. O'Rourke, 444 Mich. 535, 542, 510 N.W.2d 900 (1994). Where, as here, the Legislature has not expressly defined terms used within a statute, we may turn to dictionary definitions to aid our goal of construing those terms in accordance with their ordinary and generally accepted meanings. Oakland Co. Bd. of Co. Rd. Comm'rs v. Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Ass'n, 456 Mich. 590, 604, 575 N.W.2d 751 (1998).
The word "become" means "to come, change, or grow to be (as specified): to become tired "or"to come into being; develop or progress into: She became a ballerina." Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997), p. 121. A "prostitute" is "a woman who engages in sexual intercourse for money; whore; harlot." Id., p. 1084. Thus, "to become a prostitute" means to change, grow to be, or develop into a woman who engages in sexual intercourse for money.
We begin by examining People v. Cook, supra, a case with more than one hundred
The prosecutor contends that changes in the statutory language since Cook indicate a legislative intent to address the holding in Cook and broaden the scope of the pandering statute. In Cook, the offense in dispute was that of encouraging a female to "enter [a house of ill repute] for the purpose of becoming a prostitute"; however, under the corresponding section of the current statute, the offense is now completed by merely procuring a female inmate "for a house of prostitution." From this, the prosecutor concludes that the Legislature, in response to Cook, broadened the language to proscribe procuring a female to become an inmate of a house of prostitution regardless of whether she was already a prostitute. This is not an unreasonable conclusion. However, following this theory to its logical conclusion, we must also presume that the Legislature remained aware of the holding in Cook when it chose to include the term "to become a prostitute" in the next clause of the same statute—the clause at issue here. Moreover, there remains support within the current statutory language, adopted in 1931,
Under the eighth clause of the pandering statute, it is a felony to "receive or give or agree to receive or give any money or thing of value for procuring or attempting to procure any female person to become a prostitute or to come into this state or leave this state for the purpose of prostitution." This clause consists of two components—first, one may not exchange money in an attempt to procure a female "to become a prostitute," and second, one may not exchange money in an attempt to procure a female to come into or leave this state "for the purpose of prostitution." This supports a conclusion that "to become a prostitute" is distinguishable from performing an act of prostitution.
In People v. Slipson, 154 Mich.App. 134, 397 N.W.2d 250 (1986), the Court of Appeals considered the statutory language before us with respect to two charges against the defendant, and, as in the instant
A review of the related case law suggests that this Court has long treated the term "prostitute" as describing a person's status or chosen livelihood.
This interpretation does not, as the prosecutor contends, obstruct justice by exonerating individuals who are merely "fortuitous enough to encourage someone who was already a prostitute to continue to engage in such activity." For example, in the instant case, defendant was, in fact, charged with and convicted of accepting the earnings of a prostitute. MCL 750.457; MSA 28.712.
Indeed, each of the eight activities proscribed by the pandering statute describes activities that go beyond similar, but arguably less harmful, activities proscribed elsewhere, suggesting a legislative intent to punish more severely the more harmful activities. For example, procuring females to reside in a house of prostitution, or causing them to remain there, are felonies under the first, third, and fourth clauses of the pandering statute, and are punishable by up to twenty years imprisonment. MCL 750.455; MSA 28.710. This is far more severe than the misdemeanor imposed for merely letting a house, knowing that the lessee intends to use the house for purposes of prostitution, M.C.L. § 750.454; MSA 28.709, which carries a penalty of six months in the county jail or a $250 fine. It is reasonable to conclude that those who deal directly with females—bringing them into and causing them to remain in an environment devoted to prostitution—create a greater harm than the person who merely owns the house. Similarly, under the sixth clause of the pandering statute, facilitating interstate prostitution activities carries a separate and more severe penalty of up to twenty years imprisonment, M.C.L. § 750.455; MSA 28.710, than the misdemeanor imposed for aiding and abetting a single act of prostitution, M.C.L. § 750.450; MSA 28.705, M.C.L. § 750.451; MSA 28.706, which carries a penalty of up to ninety days in jail or a $100 fine. Each clause of the pandering statute evidences a legislative intent to punish more severely those who make more harmful contributions to prostitution activities. Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended to punish more severely those who recruit females into the practice of prostitution than those who merely facilitate a female's existing decision to engage in additional acts of prostitution.
With respect to the prosecutor's burden of proof, obviously, the most direct evidence in the majority of cases will be the complainant's testimony itself—a credible complainant's testimony that she never performed an act of prostitution before the defendant enticed her to do so may well suffice to prove this element to a jury. Relevant to this is M.C.L. § 750.453; MSA 28.708, which compels witnesses to testify in prostitution-related cases and provides them with immunity from prosecution, except
In the instant case, the prosecutor failed to present evidence demonstrating, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Carlton and Hanlon were not prostitutes before their employment with defendant, or that defendant induced, persuaded, inveigled, or enticed them to become prostitutes. At best, the evidence merely showed that defendant induced, persuaded, inveigled, or enticed Carlton and Hanlon to perform acts of prostitution. Consequently, the Court of Appeals properly reversed defendant's pandering conviction.
Affirmed.
WEAVER, C.J., and MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, MARILYN J. KELLY, TAYLOR, CORRIGAN, and YOUNG, JJ., concurred with MARKMAN, J.
FootNotes
(2) First, that the defendant [forced / persuaded / encouraged / tricked] [ state name] to be a prostitute. A prostitute is a person who does sexual acts for money.
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