OPINION
GARDEBRING, Justice.
This case raises for the first time the question of whether male-on-male sexual harassment is prohibited by the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn.Stat. ch. 363, and, if so, whether a plaintiff in such a case must show that the harassment affected one gender differently than the other or that the harasser was homosexual. The trial court granted defendants' (here the appellants) motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's sexual harassment claim, holding that a claim of sexual harassment between two heterosexual men in an all-male workplace is not actionable under the MHRA. The court of appeals reversed. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
S & K Trucking and Landscaping, L.L.C., hired the plaintiff Richard Cummings, in July 1992, as a seasonal truck driver, to haul snow, dirt, gravel, and blacktop. Cummings continued to work seasonally at S & K until he was notified on March 12, 1994, that he would not be recalled from a seasonal layoff. At all times during Cummings' employment with S & K, Charles Koehnen, who was co-owner of the business, acted as manager and was Cummings' direct supervisor.
On September 13, 1994, Cummings filed a charge against S & K with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, alleging that throughout his employment at S & K, Koehnen had subjected Cummings to "ongoing sexual harassment." The Department of Human Rights made a finding of probable cause on July 14, 1995, and Cummings brought this suit against Koehnen and S & K on October 27, 1995.
Further, he alleged that Koehnen would call him derogatory sexual names, including "fat faggot"; that he told Cummings to "bend over so I can do you in the ass"; and that on payday he threw Cummings' paycheck on the floor, made him bend over to pick it up, grabbed Cummings' hips, simulated anal sex, and said, "Once you had this you'll never go back to your wife." Cummings claimed these incidents, and other similar ones, occurred nearly every day, were unwelcome and substantially interfered with his employment by creating a hostile work environment.
The appellants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted, concluding that because both men were heterosexual and because Cummings had failed to present any evidence that the alleged harassment was "based on sex," he had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under MHRA. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a plaintiff need not prove the harassment was "based on" or "because of" gender or sexual orientation in order to state a claim for relief under the MHRA.
On an appeal from summary judgment, we must examine two questions, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the lower courts erred in their application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990). An appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn.1993). The construction of a statute is a question of law and thus fully reviewable. Hibbing Educ. Ass'n. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 369 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Minn. 1985).
Under the MHRA, it is an unfair employment practice for an employer "because of * * * sex * * * to discriminate against a person with respect to hiring, tenure, compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment." Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(2) (1996) (emphasis added). For purposes of sex discrimination, the term "discriminate" includes sexual harassment. Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 14
Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 41.
Thus, we have before us a statutory scheme that specifically includes within the definition of sexual discrimination claims for sexual harassment, which, in turn, is broadly defined to include a variety of specific behaviors.
As a threshold issue we must consider whether the MHRA allows claims for same-gender sexual harassment at all. Both parties to this matter concede that it does and we agree. The statutory language is written in gender-neutral terms, referring to the actors as "individual" and "employer." Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 41. Neither the definition of "discriminate" nor that of "sexual harassment" specifies that the gender of the victim and harasser must be different for the discrimination or harassment to be actionable. See Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subds. 14, 41. Thus, from the plain language of the statute, it is clear that the MHRA applies to same-gender sexual harassment.
At issue in this case is the nature of proof necessary to establish a claim of same-gender sexual harassment. Specifically, we are asked to consider whether a sexual harassment plaintiff must prove, in addition to the elements of sexual harassment set forth in section 363.01, subd. 41, that the harassment was "because of sex," an apparent requirement of section 363.03, subd. 1(2). Appellants argue that a plaintiff must prove that the harassment was "because of sex" and that the phrase must have one of two meanings: that the harassment resulted in the disparate treatment of one gender or that the conduct was motivated by the harasser's actual sexual interest in the victim, that is,
Cummings, on the other hand, argues that separate proof of the "because of sex" element is unnecessary because sexual harassment is specifically included in the meaning of "discrimination, based on sex." Therefore, he asserts, a plaintiff need only offer proof of the elements set forth in the specific definition of sexual harassment.
Thus, we must determine whether the legislature intended that proof of the elements of Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 41, is enough to establish a claim of same-gender sexual harassment or whether a plaintiff must offer additional evidence that the behavior was "based on sex," specifically that it affected one gender differently than the other or that the harasser was homosexual.
In analyzing questions of statutory interpretation, our object is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1996). The legislature has indicated that the MHRA should be liberally construed for the accomplishment of its purposes. Minn.Stat. § 363.11 (1996). One of those purposes includes protecting Minnesota employees from sexual harassment. See Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(2) and Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subds. 14, 41 (making sexual harassment an unfair employment practice).
We are persuaded that Cummings is correct in his argument that the "because of sex" requirement of section 363.03, subd. 1(2) is rendered superfluous in sexual harassment claims by the specific statutory definitions of discrimination and sexual harassment.
Specifically, we reject the arguments by appellant that a plaintiff in a same-gender sexual harassment case must prove either that the harassment affects one gender differently than the other
Secondly, holding as we do that proof of the "because of sex" element is provided by evidence on the specific statutory elements of sexual harassment, Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 41, we must also reject appellants' argument that a plaintiff must affirmatively prove the same-gender harasser is homosexual to proceed on a same-gender sexual harassment claim. Appellants argue that harassment of a sexual nature could not be "because of sex" unless the harasser had an actual sexual interest in the victim, that is, unless the harasser was homosexual. However, that argument is simply not supported by the statutory language. The statute defines sexual harassment as including "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, sexually motivated physical contact or other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature" that substantially interferes with the victim's employment or creates a hostile work environment. Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 41. Appellants' argument that a plaintiff must also show that the conduct is always motivated by the sexual desires of the harasser would narrow the prohibition in a manner inconsistent with the statute. The statute simply does not require a plaintiff to always show the conduct was motivated by an actual interest in sexual activity with the plaintiff. Rather, sexual harassment can include any "verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature" that has the effect of substantially interfering with the plaintiff's employment or of creating a hostile work environment. Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 41. Evidence that the harasser was actually interested in sexual contact with the plaintiff may help to show that the conduct was "of a sexual nature," but in a case such as this, where the alleged actions were overtly sexual, such proof is not mandated by the language of the statute.
Our holding in this matter is supported by the legislative history of the MHRA. Initially, the MHRA did not specifically prohibit sexual harassment, only sex discrimination. See Minn.Stat. ch. 363 (1978). The specific definition of sexual harassment, and its placement within the prohibition of "discrimination based on sex," was added by the legislature at a later date. Act of March 23, 1982, ch. 619, §§ 2 and 3, 1982 Minn. Laws 1508, 1511. The legislature placed the prohibition of sexual harassment within the prohibition of "discrimination based on sex" in order to fit that new provision within the existing structure of the MHRA. We believe that the apparent requirement that a plaintiff prove both that the complained-of behavior was "because of sex" and also that it met the requirements of Minn.Stat. § 363.41, subd. 41, is a drafting anomaly resulting
In addition, our conclusion is consistent with the position taken by the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, in its probable cause finding in this case and its brief as Amicus Curiae, which is entitled to deference.
In summary then, we hold that under the MHRA, a plaintiff alleging sexual harassment by a person who is of the same gender must prove that the conduct complained of meets the elements set forth in the definition of sexual harassment, Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 41, but does not need to prove that the harassment affected one gender differently than the other, nor that the harasser was homosexual.
Finally, we must emphasize that our decision in this matter does not mean that every sexual comment in the workplace becomes actionable sexual harassment. The plaintiff must still prove the elements of sexual harassment set forth in section 363.01, subd. 41. That is, the conduct must be unwelcome, it must consist of "sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, sexually motivated physical contact or other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature," and it must be sufficiently pervasive so as to substantially interfere with the plaintiff's employment or to create a hostile, intimidating or offensive work environment. Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 41; see, e.g., Klink v. Ramsey County by Zacharias, 397 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. App.1986) (foul language and vulgar behavior in workplace did not rise to level of actionable sexual harassment under MHRA). In addition, to hold the employer liable, a plaintiff must show that "the employer knows or should know of the existence of the harassment and fails to take timely and appropriate action." Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 41. This is a high threshold, and our holding here today does not change that fact.
Affirmed.
PAGE, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. While I agree with the court's conclusion that the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) prohibits sexual harassment between individuals of the same sex, I do not believe that in amending the MHRA to specifically prohibit sexual harassment the legislature intended to make actionable all "rude and crude" conduct that takes place in the workplace between people of the same sex. In dissenting, I do not mean to suggest that Koehnen's conduct was not offensive and disgusting or that employers should either permit or be required to tolerate such conduct in the workplace. The conduct alleged is both rude and crude and employers have a right to prohibit it. However, that is not the same as saying that the conduct is prohibited by the MHRA.
Minnesota Statutes § 363.03, subdivision 1, provides that:
(Emphasis added.) Minnesota Statutes section 363.01, subdivision 14, in defining the term "discriminate," states that "for purposes of discrimination based on sex, it includes sexual harassment." (Emphasis added.) Subdivision 41 of section 363.01 then
This statutory framework came about as a result of the legislature's codification of this court's holding in Continental Can Co., Inc. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn.1980).
The court's interpretation of the MHRA reads the "because of sex" requirement out of the statute and extends the MHRA to cover claims of workplace harassment inconsistent with the statute's underlying purposes as articulated in Continental Can. Significantly, the legislature, without modification, adopted this court's interpretation of the MHRA in Continental Can. Had the legislature intended to eliminate the "because of sex" requirement for establishing claims of sexual harassment under the MHRA, it could easily have done so but did not.
The court's opinion raises the concern that if "because of sex" is not read out of the statute, an absurd result would follow because two classes of employees would be left unprotected: "employees who work in a single-gender workplace and employees who work with an `equal opportunity harasser,' who harasses sexually both males and females." Ante at 423. First, and most important, employees who fall into these two categories are not left unprotected. In order to establish an actionable claim, they need only show that the alleged harassment occurred "because of sex." This is the same test that women making claims of sexual harassment against men have had to meet since the law of sexual harassment was developed. Moreover, the legislature could reasonably decide that employees who do not face barriers to equality because of their sex do not need protection under the statute. Such a decision is not absurd.
Finally, in reading the "because of sex" requirement out of the statute, the court claims "that the apparent requirement that a plaintiff prove both that the complained-of behavior was `because of sex' and also that it met the requirements of Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 41" was a mere "drafting anomaly." Ante at 423. While, I suppose, theoretically that is a possibility, it is certainly not the only possibility, nor even the most likely. Our rules of statutory construction provide that, "[w]hen the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursing the spirit." Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1996). Here, the statutory provisions in question are clear and free from all ambiguity. In order for conduct to constitute sexual harassment, it must first be "because of sex." It is not for this court to read into the MHRA that which the legislature did not provide, nor is it the court's role to read
I see the court's decision today as generating a flood of sexual harassment claims
Therefore, I dissent.
FootNotes
Similarly, several other states have construed their antidiscrimination laws to include a prohibition of same-gender sexual harassment. Melnychenko v. 84 Lumber Co., 424 Mass. 285, 290, 676 N.E.2d 45, 48 (1997) ("[s]exual harassment as defined in [the statute] is not limited to conduct of a supervisor aimed at a subordinate of the opposite sex, nor is it limited to same-sex conduct only where the harasser is a homosexual."); Mogilefsky v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1416, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 116, 119 (1993) (same-gender sexual harassment actionable under California statute); Barbour v. Department of Social Services, 198 Mich.App. 183, 186, 497 N.W.2d 216, 218 (1993) (male plaintiff stated claim for sexual harassment based on homosexual advances by male supervisor); Doe v. Department of Transportation, 85 Wn.App. 143, 148-49, 931 P.2d 196, 199-200 (1997) (assuming without stating that same-gender harassment actionable); Yukoweic v. International Business Machines Inc., 228 A.D.2d 775, 643 N.Y.S.2d 747, 748 (N.Y.App.Div.1996) (same-gender harassment actionable but plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to support claim).
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