Plaintiff-appellant Charlotte Flanagan filed this diversity action against her parents, defendants-appellees Gary and Mercia Grant, in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on November 12,
Having considered the record, the parties' briefs, and oral argument, we essentially agree with the lower court's reasoning and result and see no need to go over the same ground in the same detail. See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 989 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir.1993). The magistrate judge correctly applied the Massachusetts discovery rule to the facts of this case, taking into account the controlling Massachusetts cases including the leading authority, Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 565 N.E.2d 780 (1991). Since issuance of the lower court's opinion, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts has handed down another relevant decision, Phinney v. Morgan, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 202, 654 N.E.2d 77, rev. denied, 421 Mass. 1104, 656 N.E.2d 1258 (1995). Phinney gives further support to the magistrate judge's view that the limitations period and discovery rule considered in Riley, a malpractice case, will apply here.
Focusing, as the lower court properly did, on when plaintiff knew or had sufficient notice of the cause of her harm,
Riley held that even though emotional and psychological barriers may prevent a plaintiff from taking action against an abusive defendant, a plaintiff's knowledge of a causal association between the abuse and the resulting psychological harm suffices to trigger the running of the statute of limitations. Riley, 565 N.E.2d at 787; see also Phinney, 654 N.E.2d at 81-82. We think the magistrate judge did not err in finding no triable issue here, and are constrained to agree with her conclusion in this sad case that "[i]n the case at bar, although plaintiff did not fully experience the extent of the damage inflicted by her father, she nevertheless realized that her father was the likely cause of her injuries prior to November 12, 1990." Flanagan, 897 F.Supp. at 643.
There is no merit in plaintiff's second argument that the district court inadequately performed its review duties because it simply noted its approval on the magistrate judge's report itself. Plaintiff cites no caselaw or particular fact supporting her claim and we discern none.