LAY, Senior Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of International Trade brought by the Ad Hoc Committee of AZ-NM-TX-FL Producers of Gray Portland Cement.
The Ad Hoc Committee challenged Commerce's calculations of the dumping margins in the Court of International Trade. Ad Hoc Committee of AZ-NM-TX-FL Producers of Gray Portland Cement v. United States, 787 F.Supp. 208 (Ct.Int'l Trade 1992). The court
The sole issue on appeal is whether the foreign market value provision of the antidumping statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b, authorizes a deduction from foreign market value of pre-sale transportation costs within the exporting country for goods sold within that country. The parties agree that although the Act requires Commerce to deduct transportation costs from USP, there is no specific statutory authorization for Commerce to deduct home-market transportation expenses from its calculations of FMV. In the past, Commerce determined whether to deduct home-market transportation costs by looking to the "circumstances of sale" provision of 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4) (1988).
Commerce argues, and the Court of International Trade agreed, that it has the discretion to deduct home-market transportation costs from foreign market value because the statute is silent and doing so furthers its primary goal when calculating FMVs and USPs of comparing "apples with apples," i.e., comparing prices of merchandise in the United States with those in the foreign market at a similar point in the chain of commerce. Ad Hoc Comm., 787 F.Supp. at 212-13 (citing Smith-Corona, 713 F.2d at 1578). The deduction from FMV, when combined with the statutorily mandated deduction from USP, means that on both sides, ex-factory prices will be the basis for comparison. Id. Without the deduction from FMV, the comparison is apples to oranges: ex-factory price in the United States but the ex-warehouse price in the foreign market.
The Ad Hoc Committee disputes the initial premise that the statute is silent. In its view, the fact that the deduction is included in the provisions for USP but not for FMV means that Congress did not intend for home-market transportation costs to be deducted.
It is well established that where Congress has included specific language in one section of a statute but has omitted it from another, related section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress intended the omission. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 300, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) (citing United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir.1972)); see also United States v. Azeem, 946 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Espinoza-Leon, 873 F.2d 743, 746 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924, 109 S.Ct. 3257, 106 L.Ed.2d 602 (1989); Arizona Elec. Power Cooperative, Inc. v. United States, 816 F.2d 1366, 1375 (9th Cir.1987). Absent strong evidence to the contrary, "courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 1149, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992).
The applicability of this principle was made clear in Zenith Electronics Corp. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1573 (Fed.Cir.1993), where we held that Commerce erred when it adjusted both the USP and the FMV to account for Japanese commodity taxes that were collected on merchandise sold in Japan, but not collected on merchandise exported to the United States. We noted that 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(C) (1988) explicitly requires Commerce to increase USP by the amount of taxes that the exporting country would have assessed on the merchandise if it had been sold in the home market. Zenith, 988 F.2d at 1580. Commerce applied the circumstances of sale provision to adjust FMV in an effort to achieve tax neutrality in its comparisons, reasoning that adjusting USP to account for the forgiven commodity tax would cause an increase in the dumping margin not directly related to less-than-fair-value sales. Id. at 1578. We rejected this approach, concluding that "[t]he Act is not silent about the disparity created between FMV and USP when a foreign government forgives commodity taxes on exports. Section 1677a(d)(1)(C) expressly directs Commerce to adjust USP. In the face of an unambiguous statutory directive, Commerce may only effect tax adjustments under that section." Id. at 1582.
In the circumstances of this case, we believe that had Congress intended to deduct home-market transportation costs from FMV, it would have made that intent clear. FMV and USP are intimately related concepts, given full meaning only by their relationship to one another. The Antidumping Act revolves around the difference between the two. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.2(f)(1) (1993) (defining dumping margin with reference to USP and FMV). In slightly different forms,
In reaching its decision, the Court of International Trade upheld Commerce's interpretation of § 1677b in part because it was "loath to tell ITA it cannot be more fair than it has been in the past when the statute would seem to allow it some room to make the fairer choice." 787 F.Supp. at 213. Thus, the court urged that deducting pre-sale home transportation costs from FMV "engenders a more accurate and meaningful comparison," id., and better serves Commerce's "primary goal" of comparing "apples with apples," id. at 212 (citing Smith-Corona, 713 F.2d at 1578). Under Chevron
Even if the statute's "primary goal" may seem to be ill-served by not allowing the deduction from FMV, that conclusion does not justify reading into the statute agency discretion that clearly is not there. As the Supreme Court stated in Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987) (per curiam):
Id. at 525-26, 107 S.Ct. at 1393. Congress acts through bargaining and compromise; legislation frequently includes provisions that are not entirely consistent with the general statutory purpose. In Glaxo Operations UK Limited v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392 (Fed.Cir. 1990), we rejected a claim that the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks' interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 156 was more consistent with the general purpose of the Act of which it was a part than the plain statutory language. We concluded:
Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 397. We make a similar assumption here. Congress may have wanted the differential for any of a number or reasons, the most evident of which being to increase the likelihood and size of dumping margins found by Commerce. Whatever the reason, it is not this court's role to substitute its view of the statute's purpose for the plain language, or conspicuous lack thereof, in the statute.
Finally, we note that the results of giving effect to the language of the statute by denying the deduction of home-market transportation costs from FMV are not so "absurd" as to justify departure under such cases as Ambassador Division of Florsheim Shoe v. United States, 748 F.2d 1560 (Fed.Cir.1984) and Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892). In Ambassador, we held that applying the plain statutory language of two tariff provisions, passed together in pari materia, would result in one provision frustrating or partially repealing the other. Id. at 1565. No such conflict occurs here. Deduction of transportation costs from USP but not FMV creates a different comparison than would obtain if the costs were deducted from FMV as well, but neither provision frustrates the operation of the other. As indicated by the fact that Commerce applied the deduction to USP alone for more than a decade without disastrous consequences, the plain language does not lead to absurd results.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of International Trade with respect to Commerce's deduction of pre-sale home-market transportation costs from FMV is reversed. The case is remanded with direction that Commerce recalculate the dumping margins involved in this case without such deductions.
Costs awarded to plaintiff-appellant.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
then due allowance shall be made therefor. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4) (1988).
Id. § 203 (emphasis added). Foreign market value is defined in part with the identical language, but without any mention of shipping costs. Id. § 205. Thus, FMV is the ordinary home market price:
Id. Even given the vagaries of the legislative drafting process, it is impossible to imagine that Congress unintentionally included the same phrasing in the two passages only up to the point where the deduction for transportation costs from USP was discussed. The omission of the transportation cost deduction from FMV seems fully intended.
Since passage of the original Act, the antidumping laws have been amended and the continuity of the identical phrasing has been eliminated, but the substance of today's USP and FMV statutes remains unchanged. Indeed, despite two significant amendments to the antidumping laws in the past ten years — in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984), and in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) — Congress has not altered the Act's treatment of home market transportation costs. Congress has not done so, even though it was advised by Commerce in its 1985 "Study of Antidumping Adjustments Methodology and Recommendations for Statutory Change" that Commerce believed it lacked statutory authorization to deduct home-market transportation costs from FMV. That Congress knew of the agency's prior interpretation of the Act and, despite twice amending other Act provisions, did nothing to change the interpretation or the statutory language on which it was based is persuasive evidence that the agency's prior interpretation was the one intended by Congress. See Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1511, 1522 (Fed.Cir.1993); Chaparral Steel Co. v. United States, 901 F.2d 1097, 1105-06 (Fed.Cir.1990) (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 275, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1762, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974)). In such circumstances, we cannot attribute the difference between the statute's treatment of transportation costs under the USP and FMV provisions to Congressional inadvertence or inattention.