DURHAM, J.
At issue is whether information in a university researcher's unfunded grant proposal involving use of animals in scientific research must be disclosed under the laws governing disclosure of public records. The trial court held that with excision of certain exempt information contained in the proposal, the proposal is subject to disclosure. We affirm in part and reverse in part. We affirm the trial court's decision that the proposal is not exempt from disclosure in its entirety and hold that the exempt material was properly excised. However, because a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether all relevant public records were properly divulged, we remand for further consideration.
In January 1991, Progressive Animal Welfare Society (PAWS) requested a copy of an unfunded grant proposal from the University of Washington (University) pursuant to the public records portion of the public disclosure act, RCW 42.17. The grant proposal, titled "Effects of Socialization on Forebrain Development", concerns research proposed by Dr. Gene Sackett in collaboration with Dr. Linda Cork from The Johns Hopkins University. The proposed project involves the study of brain development in asocially raised rhesus monkeys
Pursuant to University procedure, the grant proposal was reviewed at several levels, including submission to the University's grant and contract services for approval. Because the project involves the use of vertebrate animals, it was also reviewed by the University's animal care committee to ensure compliance with federal requirements. As part of the latter review, a "project review form" was prepared identifying the project title, the number and type of animals to be used, whether alternatives to animal use are available, the relevance of the project to human or animal health or biology, the reasoning for using animals, the appropriateness of use of the species and number of animals used, and the care and treatment they will receive. As the University noted at oral argument, the animal care committee meets pursuant to the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971, RCW 42.30, and the project review forms are designed to be generally disclosable, ensuring a degree of public oversight of animal care and treatment. Cf. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. UW, 114 Wn.2d 677, 680, 684, 790 P.2d 604 (1990) (describing status of project review forms).
Once the grant proposal was approved at the various University levels, it was submitted to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) for funding. There, unfunded grant proposals go through a confidential peer review process. A group of scientists with expertise in the area of the proposed research reviews the grant proposal. The scientists' comments are incorporated into a formal written evaluation known as a "pink sheet". Clerk's Papers (CP), at 62. This pink sheet recommends approval or disapproval and contains a funding rank, which is important because only about 20 percent of approved proposals are actually funded. The pink sheet is given to the applicant. Projects which are not funded are often revised and resubmitted, sometimes to a different funding agency.
If funding is granted, the award is made to the University on behalf of the investigator. The University obtains considerable
Once a proposal is funded by the NIH, the grant application is made available to the public; thus, the project title, grantee institution, identity of principal investigator and amount of the award are disclosed. Also, a summary of the proposal and a budget breakdown is sent to the National Technical Information Service, United States Department of Commerce, and is available to the public. However, "[c]onfidential financial material and material that would affect patent or other valuable rights are deleted" from funded grant proposals which are requested under the Federal Freedom of Information Act. CP, at 213.
The NIH does not disclose any information about unfunded grant proposals and the "pink sheets". CP, at 203-05. The United States Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service grant application form instructions state that new grant applications for which awards have not been made are generally not available for release to the public, nor are the "pink sheets". CP, at 213. The peer review process is highly confidential, and breach of the standards applicable to that review and its participants may result in scientific misconduct charges being filed. CP, at 60. Moreover, the scientific community as a whole, and other universities, private and public, do not disclose information contained in unfunded grant proposals.
PAWS conceded that it was not entitled to material which might reveal valuable formulae, designs, drawings and research data, trade secrets, or other confidential data. The trial court examined the unfunded grant proposal in camera, excised such material, and ruled the rest of the document was not protected from disclosure. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of PAWS, requiring production of the unfunded grant proposal except for the excised material. Upon a motion for clarification by PAWS, the trial court explained it had excised material from the document which, in the court's view, an educated reader could use to reveal research hypotheses or data, valuable formulae and the like.
The trial court awarded attorney fees to PAWS as the prevailing party, but declined to award a penalty under RCW 42.17.340(3). The trial court also denied PAWS' request for production of certain internal University memoranda and correspondence on the ground that they were not relevant to the subject matter of the suit.
The University appealed to the Court of Appeals. PAWS cross-appealed to this court, and the University's appeal was transferred to this court.
THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT
The public records portion of the public disclosure act, RCW 42.17.250-.348 (hereafter, the Public Records Act or the Act), requires all state and local agencies to disclose any public record upon request, unless the record falls within certain very specific exemptions. The public disclosure act
(Italics ours.) RCW 42.17.010(11).
The stated purpose of the Public Records Act is nothing less than the preservation of the most central tenets of representative government, namely, the sovereignty of the people and the accountability to the people of public officials and institutions. RCW 42.17.251. Without tools such as the Public Records Act, government of the people, by the people, for the people, risks becoming government of the people, by the bureaucrats, for the special interests. In the famous words of James Madison, "A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both." Letter to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, 9 The Writings of James Madison 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
The University relies upon several statutory exemptions, a constitutional argument concerning academic freedom, and a claim that certain federal statutes mandating nondisclosure preempt state statutes to the contrary. We begin by clarifying certain procedural matters.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
Turning first to the nature of appellate review under the Public Records Act, the statute specifies that "[j]udicial review of all agency actions taken or challenged under RCW 42.17.250 through 42.17.320 shall be de novo." RCW 42.17.340(3). In Spokane Police Guild v. Liquor Control Bd., 112 Wn.2d 30, 35-36, 769 P.2d 283 (1989), we noted that the appellate court stands in the same position as the trial court where the record consists only of affidavits, memoranda of law, and other documentary evidence. This principle was drawn from the general rule that
Smith v. Skagit Cy., 75 Wn.2d 715, 718, 453 P.2d 832 (1969), cited in Spokane Police Guild, at 36; see also Brouillet v. Cowles Pub'g Co., 114 Wn.2d 788, 791 P.2d 526 (1990); Dawson v. Daly, 120 Wn.2d 782, 788, 845 P.2d 995 (1993);
RCW 42.17.320. Section .320 encourages prompt internal agency review of actions taken by an agency's public records officer. It also provides that, regardless of internal review, initial decisions become final for purposes of judicial review after 2 business days. The section does not, however, alter the fact that courts are to review agency actions de novo. Moreover, if agencies were forced to argue exhaustively all possible bases under pain of waiving the argument on review, the goal of prompt agency response might well be subverted. We therefore decline to consider only those bases cited by the University in its letter denying disclosure.
SPECIFIC EXEMPTIONS
We now examine the exemptions claimed by the University under the Public Records Act. The University first argues that unfunded grant proposals are protected from disclosure pursuant to RCW 42.17.310(1)(b), since compelled disclosure would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and lacks legitimate public concern. However, this exemption states only that: "Personal information in files maintained for employees ... of any public agency to the extent that disclosure would violate their right to privacy" shall be exempt from public inspection and copying. RCW 42.17.310(1)(b). The right to privacy is, in turn, violated "only if disclosure of information about the person: (1) Would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (2) is not of legitimate concern to the public". RCW 42.17.255. Unfortunately, the University does not specify the "personal information" it believes to be exempt. It is true that the disclosure of a public employee's Social Security number would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and not of legitimate concern to the public. Also, residential addresses and telephone numbers of employees of public agencies are independently exempt from disclosure under RCW 42.17.310(1)(u). Finally, under certain conditions the names of animal researchers may be withheld. See RCW 4.24.580.
The University next contends that much of the unfunded grant proposal is covered by the "valuable formulae" or "research data" exemption to the Public Records Act. That exemption excludes from public inspection and copying:
We agree that much of the material at issue is covered by this exemption. However, the University's argument is vitiated by the fact that PAWS has waived any claim to material which comes under this exemption. While such material may be properly excised by the University, those portions which do not come within the exemption and which are not covered by any other exemption or other statute must be disclosed. See RCW 42.17.310(2); RCW 42.17.260(1).
RCW 42.17.310(1)(i). The purpose of this exemption "severely limits its scope". Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wn.2d 123, 133, 580 P.2d 246 (1978). Its purpose is to "protect the give and take of deliberations necessary to formulation of agency policy". (Citation omitted.) Hoppe, at 133. For that reason, the exemption "only protects documents which are part of `a deliberative or policy-making process'". Brouillet v. Cowles Pub'g Co., 114 Wn.2d 788, 799, 791 P.2d 526 (1990) (quoting Hoppe, at 133). We have specifically rejected the contention that this exemption applies to all documents in which opinions are expressed regardless of whether the opinions pertain to the formulation of policy. Hoppe, at 132-33. See also Brouillet, at 799-800 (overruling Hafermehl v. UW, 29 Wn.App. 366, 628 P.2d 846 (1981)). Moreover, unless disclosure would reveal and expose the deliberative process, as distinct from the facts upon which a decision is based, the exemption does not apply. Hoppe, at 133.
In order to rely on this exemption, an agency must show that the records contain predecisional opinions or recommendations of subordinates expressed as part of a deliberative process; that disclosure would be injurious to the deliberative or consultative function of the process; that disclosure would inhibit the flow of recommendations, observations, and opinions; and finally, that the materials covered by the exemption reflect policy recommendations and opinions and not the raw factual data on which a decision is based. Columbia Pub'g Co. v. Vancouver, 36 Wn.App. 25, 31-32, 671 P.2d 280 (1983) (citing Hoppe, at 132-33). Subjective evaluations are not exempt under this provision if they are treated as raw factual data and are not subject to further
While the unfunded grant proposal itself does not reveal or expose the kind of deliberative or policy-making process contemplated by the exemption, the so-called "pink sheets" do. Because the pink sheets foster a quintessentially deliberative process, we hold they are exempt from disclosure under this provision, but only while they pertain to an unfunded grant proposal.
The University argues that research is a vital governmental function which would be substantially and irreparably damaged by even partial disclosure of unfunded grant proposals. The University's argument misconstrues the nature of RCW 42.17.330. As its language reveals, that section merely creates an injunctive remedy, and is not a separate substantive exemption.
RCW 42.17.330 is simply an injunction statute. It is a procedural provision which allows a superior court to enjoin the release of specific public records if they fall within specific exemptions found elsewhere in the Act. Spokane
In fact, the Public Records Act contains no general exemptions. It provides only:
In re Rosier, 105 Wn.2d 606, 621, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986) (Andersen, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
The Public Records Act begins with a mandate of full disclosure of public records; that mandate is then limited only by the precise, specific, and limited exemptions which the Act provides.
(Footnote omitted. Italics ours.) 112 Wn.2d at 36.
Indeed, the Legislature's response to our decision in In re Rosier, supra, establishes that the Public Records Act contains no general "vital governmental functions" exemption. In Rosier, this court interpreted general language in a procedural section of the Act concerning personal privacy to create a general personal privacy exemption. 105 Wn.2d at
(Italics ours.) Laws of 1987, ch. 403, § 1, p. 1546. Moreover, the actual changes the Legislature made reveal that section .330 is not one of the permissible statutory exemptions or prohibitions. In rejecting our holding in Rosier, the Legislature added the following underlined language to the Public Records Act.
Laws of 1987, ch. 403, § 3, p. 1547 (amending RCW 42.17.260). Three times the changes mention the sources of specific exemptions or prohibitions on which alone nondisclosure may be predicated. Each time the changes fail to mention RCW 42.17.330 as a source of such exemptions or prohibitions. We do not believe that the Legislature meant to include section .330 as an independent statutory source of exemptions, yet somehow neglected to specifically mention it along with sections .310 and .315 — its nearest statutory neighbors at the time.
Nor does it make sense to imagine the Legislature believed judges would be better custodians of open-ended exemptions because they lack the self-interest of agencies. The Legislature's response to our opinion in Rosier makes
The University's interpretation of section .330 is mistaken for another reason. If section .330 were a source of broad exemptions for personal privacy and vital governmental interests, it would render the carefully crafted exemptions of RCW 42.17.310 superfluous. A trial court or appellate court reviewing de novo could simply declare records covered by personal privacy or vital governmental interests without ever having to invoke or construe the exemptions of RCW 42.17.310. We will not interpret statutes in a manner that renders portions of the statute superfluous. Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish Cy., 119 Wn.2d 91, 829 P.2d 746 (1992) (statutes should not be interpreted in such a way as to render any portion meaningless, superfluous, or questionable), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1044 (1993). The University's interpretation of section .330 relegates the specific exemptions in RCW 42.17.310 to the status of optional guidelines.
Finally, the Legislature takes the trouble to repeat three times that exemptions under the Public Records Act should be construed narrowly. RCW 42.17.010(11); RCW 41.17.251; RCW 42.17.920. The Legislature leaves no room for doubt about its intent:
RCW 42.17.251.
In sum, the Public Records Act contains only limited and specific exemptions. Treating section .330 as an exemption,
"OTHER STATUTES EXCEPTION"
In general, the Public Records Act does not allow withholding of records in their entirety. Instead, agencies must parse individual records and must withhold only those portions which come under a specific exemption. Portions of records which do not come under a specific exemption must be disclosed. RCW 42.17.310(2).
(Italics ours.) RCW 19.108.010(4). The UTSA also provides that "[i]n appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to protect a trade secret may be compelled by court order", RCW 19.108.020(3), and provides broad means for courts to preserve the secrecy of trade secrets. RCW 19.108.050. Actual or even threatened misappropriation may be enjoined. RCW 19.108.020(1). Given the potential for unfunded biomedical grant proposals to eventuate in trade secrets as broadly defined by the statute, this "other statute" operates as an independent limit on disclosure of portions of the records at issue here that have even potential economic value. The Public Records Act is simply an improper means to acquire knowledge of a trade secret. The Legislature recently emphasized this in a slightly different context:
(Italics ours.) Laws of 1994, ch. 42, § 1, p. 130.
"Harassment" is, in turn, defined as:
RCW 4.24.580(2). Quite clearly, the Legislature intended to forestall the kinds of threats, harassment, and intimidation that have become all too familiar to those attempting to carry out legitimate biomedical research. We hold that researchers may seek to enjoin the release of certain portions of public records if the nondisclosure of those portions is necessary to prevent harassment as defined under the anti-harassment statute. Though the names of the researchers in the present case have already been divulged, the names of researchers or certain other information in future grant proposals need not be divulged under the Public
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 197, 107 L.Ed.2d 571, 110 S.Ct. 577 (1990). The Public Records Act does not impose any content-based restrictions on speech. We cannot but agree with the Supreme Court when it stated:
(Citations omitted.) 493 U.S. at 199.
Moreover, from the point of view of the First Amendment, the speech of employees of the University is not somehow superior to the speech of other agency employees. Even assuming there were plausible grounds for doing so, it would be difficult to grant special First Amendment protection to public university employees while denying it to other state employees. It is true that courts traditionally have been reluctant to interfere unnecessarily in the internal functioning
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wn.2d 299, 326, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993) (citing Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604-05, 115 L.Ed.2d 532, 111 S.Ct. 2476, 2481-82 (1991)). We have also repeatedly emphasized that
(Footnotes omitted.) Fisons, at 327.
Nor does FOIA so comprehensively or pervasively occupy the field of public disclosure as to raise a colorable claim of field preemption or conflict preemption.
(Footnotes omitted.) James T. O'Reilly, Federal Information Disclosure § 4.02, at 4-7 (2d ed. 1994); see also § 4.02, at 4-4 through 4-5 (listing state agencies in list of "typical exclusions" of entities from FOIA jurisdiction). As we have previously noted, while the Public Records Act closely parallels the Federal Freedom of Information Act, nevertheless the "state act is more severe than the federal act in many areas". Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wn.2d 123, 129, 580 P.2d 246 (1978). Moreover, because FOIA simply does not apply to state agencies, there can be no federal-state conflict of the kind that gives rise to conflict preemption.
The University also appeals to federal patent law. As we indicated above, trade secrets and valuable formulae or research data are protected from disclosure under the State Public Records Act. Moreover, PAWS has waived any access to proprietary or patent-related information. Because the trial court excised anything resembling patentable information or ideas, and because PAWS waived access to the applicability of patent law to the Public Records Act, the issue is not properly before us.
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
PAWS appeals the trial court's ruling regarding three documents in addition to the unfunded grant proposal.
During pretrial discovery, PAWS sought to obtain any documents exchanged between Dr. Sackett, who is the coauthor of the grant proposal, and various other university employees concerning the release to PAWS of the grant proposal at issue. The University eventually produced three documents it considered responsive to PAWS' requests for production, and the trial court reviewed these documents in camera. The University contended, and the trial court agreed, that the documents were not relevant to PAWS' public records request because the three documents were created several months after the initial request.
To the contrary, the documents cast a backward light on the University's response to the January 9, 1991, request. The documents include a letter from Dr. Sackett in which he clearly states that he will not respond to requests for information pursuant to the Public Records Act.
We acknowledge that some "animal rights" activists have acted improperly and, on occasion, illegally. However, the protective measures of the anti-harassment statute provide a powerful shield against harassment as well as a sword against harassers. RCW 4.24.580 (providing for injunctive relief from harassment); RCW 4.24.570 (providing for joint and several liability on the part of persons or organizations planning or assisting in acts against animals in research or educational facilities). The anti-harassment statute sends a
An agency's compliance with the Public Records Act is only as reliable as the weakest link in the chain. If any agency employee along the line fails to comply, the agency's response will be incomplete, if not illegal.
There appears to be an additional question of fact. For reasons that are not apparent from the record, portions of the grant proposal were not submitted to the trial court. An affidavit in the record refers to "the data in the Preliminary Studies and Materials and Methods portions of this [grant] application", CP, at 254, yet no such section appears in the 23-page sealed proposal before us. Indeed, a comparison of the table of contents of the grant with the sealed proposal reveals that only section 1 was submitted. See CP, at 482. The whole of section 2, titled "Research Plan", is missing from the record. Finally, though only 23 pages of the grant proposal are in the record, the grant proposal had at least 55 pages.
(Italics ours.) RCW 42.17.310(4). Silent withholding would allow an agency to retain a record or portion without providing the required link to a specific exemption, and without providing the required explanation of how the exemption applies to the specific record withheld. The Public Records Act does not allow silent withholding of entire documents or records, any more than it allows silent editing of documents or records. Failure to reveal that some records have been withheld in their entirety gives requesters the misleading impression that all documents relevant to the request have been disclosed. See Fisons, 122 Wn.2d at 350-55. Moreover, without a specific identification of each individual record withheld in its entirety, the reviewing court's ability to conduct the statutorily required de novo review is vitiated.
ATTORNEY FEES AND PENALTIES
The Public Records Act provides, in part:
RCW 42.17.340(4). Attorney fees incurred on appeal are included. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. UW, 114 Wn.2d 677, 690, 790 P.2d 604 (1990). Because we affirm the excisions made by the trial court, we remand to the trial court for a determination of the attorney fees due PAWS. The trial court may determine PAWS' attorney fees and allowable costs both at the trial court and on appeal. See 114 Wn.2d at 690-91; RAP 18.1(i).
As to penalties, the statute specifies that "it shall be within the discretion of the court" to award to a requester who prevails against an agency not less than $5 and not more than $100 for each day the requester was denied the right to inspect or copy the public record. RCW 42.17.340(4). Both parties invite this court to create a standard governing imposition of penalties in public records cases. Because this case is before us on summary judgment, and because we
CONCLUSION
While the records requested by PAWS are in large part protected from disclosure, the grant proposal at issue here does not come within an exemption that authorizes withholding it in its entirety. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's decision to disclose appropriate portions of the grant proposal. We remand to the trial court for a factual determination of whether any other relevant records were silently withheld, and for a determination of attorney fees.
GUY and MADSEN, JJ., concur.
ANDERSEN, C.J. (concurring in the majority)
No organization should be able to use the state public disclosure act
That said, I also concede that the law as the majority declares it is correct. It is the duty of this court to uphold the law as enacted by the people of this state unless it is unconstitutional. We have no right to substitute our judgment for the judgment of either the duly elected legislators of this state or that of the people when exercised through the initiative process.
Rosier, 105 Wn.2d at 621.
If the Legislature finds that the disclosure of parts of unfunded grant proposals will seriously hamper legitimate medical research, then the Legislature has every right to enact protective exemptions from disclosure. As I also noted some years ago in another setting, suffice it to say the Legislature is the appropriate forum in which to do battle on this issue. See Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wn.2d 662, 675, 732 P.2d 989 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988).
I therefore concur with the law as explained by the majority.
The majority overrules our 1993 unanimous holding in Dawson v. Daly, 120 Wn.2d 782, 845 P.2d 995 (1993). To avoid a direct clash and inconsistency with the holding of Dawson, the majority simply characterizes the Dawson holding as dicta. Majority, at 261 n. 7.
The majority's cavalier dismissal of Dawson reveals the fundamental confusion and error in the majority's analysis. RCW 42.17.330 does not create an exemption in addition to those set forth in other sections of the statute.
First, looking at the majority's characterization of the Dawson holding as "dicta", the language of the Dawson opinion disproves the majority's conclusion which is made without any pretense at analysis of the issues and holding in Dawson. That opinion states: "We hold that RCW 42.17.330 does create an independent basis upon which a court may find that disclosure is not required". (Some italics mine.) Dawson, at 794. In fact, Dawson went on to provide that if the trial court on remand found the requirements of RCW 42.17.330 to be met, it should enter an appropriate injunction. That hardly smacks of dicta.
Second, the majority's analysis collapses when RCW 42.17.330 is viewed, as it must be, not as an exemption, but as an independent basis for a court to enjoin the disclosure of specific documents or parts thereof. That is precisely what Dawson held and what the statute itself provides.
By searching RCW 42.17.330 for a separate exemption the majority misses the point entirely. Looking at the various statutory exemptions, one finds they relate to categories, e.g., RCW 42.17.315-.31902. On the other hand, by its language, section .330 relates only to "any specific public record". We unanimously recognized this difference which the majority now ignores. We said: "However, the protection provided by RCW 42.17.330 differs from that provided by the exemptions in RCW 42.17.310(1) [the exemption there urged]." Dawson, at 794.
When the distinction is drawn, as the statute mandates, between statutory exemptions and the court's authority under section.330, the majority's citation of legislative amendments of exemptions becomes irrelevant.
This critical distinction can be easily shown. RCW 42.17.310(1)(s) exempts from disclosure membership lists of camping resorts, condominiums, etc., when in the possession of the Department of Licensing. That is a true exemption which can be asserted by the agency. There is no balancing of interests and no requirement for nondisclosure except that the document be that described in the exemption.
In stark contrast, section .330 relates not to a category of documents, but to a specific document. The court cannot withhold disclosure unless it finds "such examination would clearly not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably damage any person, or would substantially and irreparably damage vital governmental functions". RCW 42.17.330.
It makes no sense at all to give the court the authority provided in section .330 if a document is provided an exemption by another section of the statute.
There are no disputed facts and our review is de novo. I would hold the obvious: biomedical research, including the use of animals under the rigid conditions present, is a vital governmental research function of the University. The Legislature has recognized that fact. RCW 9.08.080. The record shows that animal research is heavily regulated at the federal level to ensure humane treatment of animals and their use only in limited circumstances.
The record also satisfies the requirement that this vital governmental function would be substantially and irreparably damaged through disclosure of unfunded grant proposals. The record is replete with uncontradicted proof that disclosure will have a profound chilling effect on biomedical
Finally, disclosure is not in the public interest. The disclosure mandated by the majority will severely disadvantage the University in its funding efforts, and therefore its research efforts — a result clearly contrary to the public interest and human beings who have benefited greatly from such research.
The propriety of use of animals in research is not before the court. I recognize the deeply felt opposition of some persons to such research, but the Legislature and Congress have recognized that animal research is of great value to the people and must be protected. Plaintiff seeks information not for the sake of knowledge, but to impede and if possible destroy a method of vital research. I do not quarrel with the right of Plaintiff to use every resource to accomplish its purpose, but this court need not blindly assist by misreading the statute and overruling Dawson. If Dawson does not represent a proper interpretation of RCW 42.17.330, why did the Legislature not amend section .330 in its 1993 or 1994 sessions? Dawson clearly held contrary to what the majority now holds, but for two sessions the Legislature acquiesced. The lack of legislative repudiation is highly significant.
I would apply RCW 42.17.330, as unanimously interpreted in Dawson in February 1993, and reverse.
UTTER and DOLLIVER, JJ., concur with BRACHTENBACH, J.
Reconsideration denied February 1, 1995.
FootNotes
"Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying all public records, unless the record falls within the specific exemptions of subsection (6) of this section, RCW 42.17.310, 42.17.315, or other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records." (Italics ours.) RCW 42.17.260(1).
"Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying all public records, unless the record falls within the specific exemptions of subsection (6) of this section, RCW 42.17.310, 42.17.315, or other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records." (Italics ours.)
Laws of 1994, ch. 154, § 105, p. 742. The provision takes effect January 1, 1995. Laws of 1994, ch. 154, § 319, p. 769.
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