Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied May 23, 1994.
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:
Advocacy, Incorporated ("Advocacy, Inc."), the Association for Retarded Citizens of Dallas ("ARC"), and Matt W., through his guardian Judi Chamblee, sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and monetary damages under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 against the Dallas County Mental Health and Mental Retardation Center Board of Trustees, the Dallas County Commissioners Court, Commissioners Jim Jackson and John Wiley Price, the McShann Road Neighborhood Association, Inc., and the Dallas County Mental Health and Retardation Center.
Matt W., a minor with mental retardation and cerebral palsy, resided at Crossroads, a large residential facility serving children with developmental disabilities. In April 1991, the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation decided to close the facility and relocate the children to small group homes located throughout the community. The Board of Trustees of the Dallas County Mental Health and Mental Retardation Center ("the Board") took responsibility for developing three homes in the Dallas area. The Board purchased a site located at 5640 McShann Road in Dallas upon which to construct one of the small group homes ("the McShann home"), the home in which Matt W. was scheduled to live. However, the McShann Road Neighborhood Association (the "Association") objected to the construction of the home, and the Board eventually voted to abandon the construction of the group home on this site, choosing instead to sell the property to the Association.
The McShann home was originally scheduled to be completed by February 1992, and Matt W. was scheduled to move in shortly thereafter, simultaneous to the closing of Crossroads. However, following the cancellation of the construction of the McShann home, it was necessary for Matt W. to move into a temporary home until another small group home in which Matt W. was to reside permanently was completed. Matt W. finally moved into that permanent home.
Advocacy, Inc., ARC, and Matt W. filed suit against the defendants asserting that the move to the temporary home caused irreparable injury to Matt W. and five other children.
B. Lack of Standing
On appeal, Advocacy, Inc. contends that the district court erred in dismissing its claim for lack of standing.
1. Standing On Behalf of Itself as an Organization
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), the Supreme Court stated the minimum requirements that a plaintiff must establish in order to demonstrate constitutional standing on behalf of itself as an organization:
Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 (internal quotes, parentheses, and citations omitted).
Advocacy, Inc. claims that it has suffered the requisite injury because, as a federally funded organization, it has more than a general and abstract interest in this case. Advocacy, Inc.'s statutory mandate is to protect and advocate the rights of disabled individuals
The mere fact that an organization redirects some of its resources to litigation and legal counseling in response to actions or inactions of another party is insufficient to impart standing upon the organization. Advocacy, Inc.'s argument implies that any sincere plaintiff could bootstrap standing by expending its resources in response to actions of another. Furthermore, that Advocacy, Inc. is a federally funded program established in part to provide disabled individuals with legal representation does not enhance its assertion of organizational standing. If this were not so, then, for example, indigent defender organizations established pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act or any other self-styled advocacy group could assert standing to sue whenever it believed the rights of its targeted beneficiaries had been violated. This result is at odds with Lujan's definition of injury in fact as the "invasion of a legally-protected interest." Lujan, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2136. Advocacy, Inc. and similar groups have no legally-protected interest in not expending their resources on behalf of individuals for whom they are advocates, at least where the only resources "lost" are the legal costs of the particular advocacy lawsuit. See id.; Cleburne Living Ctr. v. City of Cleburne, Tex., 726 F.2d 191, 202-03 (5th Cir.1984) (relying on Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982)) aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); cf. Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27-29 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 980, 111 S.Ct. 508, 112 L.Ed.2d 521 (1990) (fair housing agency has standing if its time and money were deflected from counseling to legal efforts against discrimination); Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1525 (7th Cir.1990) (same).
2. Standing On Behalf of Disabled Individuals
Advocacy, Inc. also advances its alleged associational standing to sue on behalf of individuals with developmental disabilities. In order to have associational standing, Advocacy, Inc. must establish (1) that its members would have standing to sue in their own right, (2) that the interests Advocacy, Inc. seeks to protect are germane to its organizational purpose, and (3) that neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. See Self-Insurance Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Korioth, 993 F.2d 479, 484 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977)). Advocacy, Inc. fails to establish the first prong of this inquiry because Matt W. is not a "member" of Advocacy, Inc. The organization bears no relationship to traditional membership groups because most of its "clients"—handicapped and disabled people —are unable to participate in and guide the organization's efforts.
Matt W. and other disabled individuals affected by the appellees' actions have standing in a case such as this, and Advocacy, Inc. has the duty to provide them with legal assistance. Advocacy, Inc. may be permitted to participate in such a case as amicus curiae. However, Advocacy, Inc. does not possess standing in its own right to litigate these claims against these appellees.
For these reasons, this court AFFIRMS the judgment of the district court.