DUHÉ, Circuit Judge:
Appellant, Bennie Green, d/b/a Eagle Consulting Firm, appeals from the district court's grant of Appellees' motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Appellant sued several state and private actors under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), 1986 and the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. We affirm.
Bennie Green, d/b/a Eagle Consulting Firm, is an insurance adjuster licensed by the state of Texas. In August 1991, the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee (UPLC), acting under the authority granted to it by Texas Government Code § 81.102(a), sued Green to prevent him from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. After a hearing in August 1991, the state district court issued a temporary injunction against Green. On November 5, 1991, the state district court converted the temporary injunction to a permanent injunction. Because Green was not a party to the November 5 proceeding, the state district court vacated the permanent injunction and reinstated the temporary injunction.
In response, Green filed this action against the UPLC; Mark Ticer, legal counsel for the UPLC; James Blume, chairman of the
I. Standard of Review
We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo. We must accept all well-pleaded facts as true, and we review them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. We may not look beyond the pleadings. A dismissal will not be affirmed if the allegations support relief on any possible theory. McCartney v. First City Bank, 970 F.2d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1992).
II. Section 1981 Claims
In his complaint, Appellant alleges that he entered into contracts with his clients to negotiate settlements of their insurance claims with State Farm. Appellant argues that State Farm refused, solely because of his race,
To establish a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must allege facts in support of the following elements: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) an intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) the discrimination concerns one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute. See Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Secs. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir.1993). The "enumerated activity" implicated in this case is the right to "make and enforce contracts."
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989),
Appellant has failed to allege facts in his complaint that place him in the ambit of protection under § 1981 as defined by the Supreme Court in Patterson. Appellant has not complained that State Farm refused to contract with him or that State Farm somehow impeded his right to enforce a contract in either the courts or nonjudicial avenues. All he alleges is that State Farm refused to honor a third-party contract he had with his clients. Thus, Appellant has failed to allege
III. Antitrust Claims
Appellant asserts that the defendants violated § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
Appellant first alleges that Ticer conspired with the other defendants to cause Appellant's clients to breach their contracts with Appellant so that they might enter into contracts for representation with Ticer and other members of the State Bar of Texas. Appellant also alleges that defendants
Appellant's final antitrust allegation involves only the UPLC and Ticer. Appellant alleges that the UPLC and Ticer were part of a conspiracy to fix the price of representation in insurance negotiations and to preclude Appellant and other insurance adjusters from competing in interstate commerce. The only specific averment of a possible agreement between UPLC and Ticer involves the institution of the suit against Appellant for the unauthorized practice of law. The UPLC is a state agency, Krempp v. Dobbs, 775 F.2d 1319, 1321 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1985), that is authorized to pursue actions against those allegedly engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Texas Gov't Code Ann. § 81.102(a) (West 1988). Ticer was the agency's counsel in the action against Appellant. Accordingly, Ticer and the UPLC are immune from an antitrust suit under the state action doctrine. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943); Benton, Benton & Benton v. Louisiana Pub. Facilities Auth., 897 F.2d 198 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 975, 111 S.Ct. 1619, 113 L.Ed.2d 717 (1991).
IV. Monetary Damages Under Section 1983
Green asserts claims for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants. To state a cause of action under § 1983, Appellant must allege that some person, acting under state or territorial law, has deprived him of a federal right. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980); Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 764 F.2d 381, 387 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848, 109 S.Ct. 129, 102 L.Ed.2d 102 (1988).
A. UPLC, Blume and Ticer
The Eleventh Amendment generally divests federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain suits directed against states. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304, 110 S.Ct. 1868, 1871, 109 L.Ed.2d 264 (1990). That amendment may not be evaded by suing state employees in their official capacity because such an indirect pleading device remains in essence a claim upon the state treasury. Stem v. Ahearn, 908 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069, 111 S.Ct. 788, 112 L.Ed.2d 850 (1991). State officials sued in their official capacity are not deemed "persons" subject to suit within the meaning of § 1983. Id. at 4. Accordingly, Appellant's
Appellant alleges that Ticer caused a temporary restraining order to be issued under Texas Government Code § 81.102(a) in violation of his constitutional rights. Appellant also asserts that Ticer had the state district court issue a temporary injunction without giving him notice. Finally, Appellant alleges that Ticer used his position as legal counsel for the UPLC to attempt to interfere with Appellant's business.
In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), the Supreme Court held that prosecutors were absolutely immune from damages claims arising out of their activities. The Court reasoned that the need for absolute immunity arose from the "concern that harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor's energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by his public trust." Id. at 423, 96 S.Ct. at 991. The Supreme Court, applying a functional approach to the scope of immunity, extended absolute immunity to agency officials in the administrative adjudication process. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978).
C. The Remaining Defendants
The remaining defendants are not state actors. A private party may be held liable under § 1983 if he or she is a "willful participant in joint activity with the state or its agents." Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1606, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Appellant has failed to aver facts that suggest that an agreement existed among the state and private actors to deprive him of his constitutional rights.
V. Section 1985 Claims
A. All Defendants
Appellant alleges a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) against all defendants. To state a claim under § 1985(3), Appellant must allege that two or more persons conspired to directly, or indirectly, deprive him of the equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the laws. Again, Appellant has failed to allege facts that suggest an agreement among the parties. The only connection among the parties is their participation in the state court proceedings. These facts are insufficient to establish an agreement to commit a deprivation of Appellant's equal protection of the laws and equal privileges and immunities under the laws in violation of § 1985(3).
B. State Farm
Appellant's § 1985 claim against State Farm arises from a different set of facts from his other federal claims. On January 30, 1991, Appellant was operating a motor vehicle in Dallas County, Texas when a vehicle driven by a person insured by State Farm struck him and several other vehicles. Appellant presented a claim for his damages to State Farm and was denied coverage. Appellant alleges that State Farm refused to honor his claim solely on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Appellant's claim is asserted only against State Farm for denying his accident claim. Appellant has failed to plead an essential ingredient of a § 1985(3) claim — participation by two or more persons. Accordingly, we must dismiss Appellant's claim against State Farm under § 1985(3).
VI. Additional Claims
Appellant's remaining claims include a constitutional challenge to § 81.101 and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 against James Blume. Appellant argues that the district court failed to address these issues. Appellant's only reference to these arguments is in his summary of the argument section. A party who inadequately briefs an issue is considered to have abandoned the claim. Marple v. Kurzweg, 902 F.2d 397, 399 n. 2 (5th Cir.1990). Accordingly, we need not address these issues.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Appellant's claims under Rule 12(b)(6).