ADAMS, Justice.
Ronald House, as a class-action representative, appeals from a judgment dismissing his complaint challenging the constitutionality of an act authorizing certain costs to be levied against him by the District Court of Cullman County. We affirm.
On July 26, 1989, Mr. House was convicted in the Cullman County District Court of speeding. The district court assessed fines and court costs against him in the amount of $303.50. Included in that amount were costs authorized by Act No. 86-113, 1986 Ala. Acts 135, and charged "[i]n addition to all other costs and charges in criminal cases in any court of Cullman County." Those charges included (1) $6 for use by the juvenile probation division and (2) $5 for use by the county sheriff's office "in connection with administrative duties performed for the courts."
Mr. House, on behalf of himself and others similarly affected by Act No. 86-113, sued Cullman County; Robert Bates, Cullman County Circuit Court Clerk; the City of Cullman; the Clerk of Cullman Municipal Court; the City of Hanceville; the Clerk of the City of Hanceville; and Jeanelle Raney, Clerk of the Cullman County District Court. In this suit, House challenged the constitutionality of the legislation authorizing the charges on the ground that the act, which provided for the additional assessment of fees and charges of court applicable only to Cullman County, violated Ala. Const. 1901, art. IV, §§ 96 and 105. He also sought a refund of the challenged charges and injunctive relief.
SECTION 96
Ala. Const. 1901, § 96, provides that "[t]he legislature shall not enact any law not applicable to all the counties in the state, regulating costs and charges of courts, or fees, commissions or allowances of public officers." There is no serious dispute that the additional charges authorized by Act No. 86-113 fall squarely within the scope of § 96. Green v. Austin, 425 So.2d 411, 412 (Ala.1982) (fees designated for sheriff's department fund and for maintenance of the county jail are charges of court within purview of § 96); see also Birmingham Electric Co. v. Harry, 215 Ala. 458, 111 So. 41 (1926) (law library fee a charge of court within purview of § 96). Indeed, were it not for the fact that the people of Alabama, on December 27, 1957, ratified Amendment 137 to the Constitution, we would have no difficulty in holding that § 96 of the Constitution mandates a reversal of the judgment of the trial court. Amendment 137, however, provides:
(Emphasis added.)
The disposition of this case turns on the proper construction of the phrase "costs and charges of courts." The appellee construes the phrase as removing the constitutional impediment to the passage of Act No. 86-113. The appellant, however, insists that Amendment 137, and the contested phrase in particular, "is nothing more than another of the many constitutional amendments passed over the years to convert public officials from a fee basis of compensation to a salary basis." Brief of Appellant, at 10-11.
The appellant contends that his interpretation of Amendment 137 is necessitated by this Court's construction, in Green v. Austin, 425 So.2d 411, 412 (Ala.1982), of Amendment 344 to the Alabama Constitution, and our determination of the effect of that amendment on statutes similar to those under consideration in this case. We agree that Green supports the appellant's contention. However, the rationale in that case is inconsistent with the language in a number of opinions issued by this Court. Consequently, in reviewing the constitutionality of Act No. 86-113, we are compelled to re-examine a number of opinions issued by this Court and to undertake a thorough analysis of the legislative and constitution-making activity bearing on this important issue.
We begin by reaffirming a number of fundamental principles of constitutional and statutory construction. First, "[i]n reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, we `approach the question with every presumption and intendment in favor of its validity, and seek to sustain rather than strike down the enactment of a coordinate branch of the government.'" Moore v. Mobile Infirmary, 592 So.2d 156 (Ala.1991) (quoting Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 9, 18 So.2d 810, 815 (1944), cert. dismissed, 325 U.S. 450, 65 S.Ct. 1384, 89 L.Ed. 1725 (1945). A second and related principle holds: "Where the validity of a statute is assailed and there are two possible interpretations,
In construing a provision of the Constitution, it must be remembered that constitutions "deal with larger topics [than statutes] and are couched in broader phrase than legislative acts." Realty Investment Co. v. City of Mobile, 181 Ala. 184, 187, 61 So. 248, 249 (1913). For this reason, a "`Constitution is not to receive a technical construction, like a common-law instrument, or statute.'" Realty Investment Co., 181 Ala. at 187, 61 So. at 249 (quoting Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216, 235 (1859)) (emphasis added).
In searching for the proper construction of Amendment 137, we must first examine the language of the provision itself. It is undisputed that when drafting the phrase authorizing the passage of local laws "fix[ing], alter[ing], and regulat[ing] the costs and charges of courts in Cullman county," the framers of Amendment 137 were attempting to alter the effect of § 96 of the Constitution, which prohibits the legislature from "enact[ing] any law not applicable to all the counties in the state, regulating costs and charges of courts." The appellant contends that the phrase "costs and charges of courts" as used in § 96 prohibits the extra charges assessed pursuant to Act No. 86-113. Paradoxically, he insists that the identical phrase in Amendment No. 137 does not address these same charges. The question thus becomes whether the phrase "costs and charges of courts," as it appears in Amendment 137, carries the same import as the identical phrase does in § 96.
A phrase that is used repeatedly in statutory provisions relating to the same object or subject matter shall "be interpreted to have the same meaning" throughout. See 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes §§ 232-33, at 415-16 (1974). This rule applies with particular force in the construction of provisions of the Constitution, where "[e]ach section ... must necessarily be considered in pari materia with all other sections." Jefferson County v. Braswell, 407 So.2d 115, 119 (Ala.1981); Opinion of the Justices, 333 So.2d 125 (Ala.1976). Moreover, "where, in a constitution or statute, a word or phrase is repeated, and in one instance its meaning is definite and clear, and in the other it is susceptible of two meanings, it will be presumed to have been employed in the former sense." State ex rel. Meyer v. Greene, 154 Ala. 249, 46 So. 268 (1908); see also Lehman v. Robinson, 59 Ala. 235 (1877). This phrase appears not only in both § 96 and in Amendment 137, but also in at least 32 other constitutional amendments authorizing local legislation regulating "costs and charges of courts." In addition to these amendments, our present constitution contains at least 35 amendments, which, although they do not include the specific phrase at issue here, nevertheless authorize the regulation of additional court costs or fees, as well as "fees, commissions or allowances of public officers" through legislation applying only to individual counties. Consequently, we consider a comparison of the language of these various amendments relevant in an attempt to ascertain the intent of the framers of Amendment 137.
It is not only possible, but expedient, on the basis of terminology and subject matter, to group these various amendments into four general categories. The first category, Type I, contains the largest number
Type II encompasses the second largest number of amendments. Amendments of this variety contain no reference to "costs" and "charges of courts," and, instead, specifically refer only to the legislature's authority to change the compensation basis of specifically designated officials. See, e.g., Amendments 33, 43, 47, 48, 50, 138, 231, 241, 265, 297, 362, 372, 414, 479, 480, 481, 485, 487, and 496.
Amendments representative of those grouped in Type III address only costs and charges of courts, thus, omitting any reference to the compensation basis of officials. See, e.g., Amendments 105, 139, 233, 278, 412, 416, 424, and 434.
Analysis of Type I
Amendment 2, which, like Amendment 137, is typical of Type I amendments, was the first of the so-called "salary amendments" to be ratified. The pertinent language of Amendment 2, which is essentially identical to that of Amendment 137, provides:
In Birmingham Electric Co. v. Harry, 215 Ala. 458, 111 So. 41 (1926), this Court addressed, albeit in dicta, the effect of Amendment 2. The issue in Harry concerned the constitutionality of Act No. 564, 1919 Ala. Acts 825, which provided for a "fund for support of a law library for the circuit court in counties of two hundred thousand or more inhabitants." Harry, 215 Ala. at 459, 111 So. at 41 (quoting Act No. 564). In that case, we said:
Harry, 215 Ala. at 459, 111 So. at 41 (emphasis added). We thus stated that the
Much more recently, we expressed the same opinion, again in dicta, regarding another Type I amendment, Amendment 28.
Norton, 562 So.2d at 506 n. 2 (emphasis added). It is clear that this Court has often construed the language in Type I amendments authorizing the legislature to "fix, regulate and alter the costs, charges of court, fees, commissions, allowances or salaries to be charged or received" by various county officers broadly enough to remove the affected counties from the applicability of § 96.
Analysis of Type II
This Court has not, however, so broadly construed Type II amendments. For example, in Garmon v. Thornton, 255 Ala. 136, 50 So.2d 402 (1951), we invalidated Act No. 482, 1949 Ala. Acts 700, which provided for the assessment of a law library fee as a portion of court costs in Etowah and Cherokee Counties, Amendment 43 notwithstanding. Amendment 43 provides:
We rejected the contention that the amendment served to "place Etowah County without the operation and effect of § 96 of the Constitution." Garmon, 255 Ala. at 139, 50 So.2d at 405. In holding that the library fee violated § 96, we stated that the effect of Amendment 43 was "only to permit the legislature ... to fix, regulate and alter the fees ... of certain named county officials." Garmon, 255 Ala. at 139, 50 So.2d at 405. Consequently, we concluded that the amendment had "no application whatsoever
Contrasting the terminology of Amendment 43 with that of Amendment 2, we stated: "The language of [Amendment 2] is much broader than that of Amendment [43] affecting Etowah and Cherokee Counties in that [Amendment 2] relates to costs and charges of court which, as above indicated, are not included in the amendment affecting Etowah and Cherokee Counties." Garmon, 255 Ala. at 139, 50 So.2d at 405 (emphasis added). This Court thus attributed particular significance to the phrase "costs and charges of court" terminology that is present in all Type I amendments but conspicuously absent in Type II amendments.
Analysis of Type III
The difference that this Court noted in Garmon in the terminology used by the framers of the amendments logically applies with even greater force to those amendments which refer exclusively to costs and charges of court. Typical of the Type III amendment is Amendment 105, which simply provides that "[t]he legislature may from time to time, by general or local laws, fix, alter, and regulate the costs and charges of courts in Madison county, and the method of disbursement thereof." (Emphasis added.) To construe the phrase "costs and charges of court" in this type of amendment as serving only to "convert public officials from a fee basis of compensation to a salary basis," as the appellant, in effect, would have us do, would require us to rewrite the amendment.
This Court is not permitted to "legislate by construction." City of Birmingham v. Hendrix, 257 Ala. 300, 312, 58 So.2d 626, 638 (1952); see also State v. Tuscaloosa Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 230 Ala. 476, 161 So. 530 (1935). Neither are we permitted arbitrarily to disregard the marked differences in terminology illustrated by these distinct types of amendments. Indeed, where there is a "material alteration in the language used in the different clauses, it is to be inferred" that the alterations were not inadvertent. Lehman, Durr & Co. v. Robinson, 59 Ala. 219, 235 (1877); Cf. 2A Sutherland Stat. Const. § 51.02 (4th ed.) ("`where a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different intention existed'") (quoting Western States Newspapers, Inc. v. Gehringer, 203 Cal.App.2d 793, 22 Cal.Rptr. 144 (1962)). In this connection, we note with particular interest the peculiar structures of Amendments 326 and 360.
Analysis of Amendments 326 and 360
Amendment 326 provides:
(Emphasis added.) Amendment 360, which is similarly structured, provides:
(Emphasis added.)
Like Amendment 137 and other Type I amendments, Amendments 326 and 360 combine the phrase "costs and charges of court" with provisions for regulating the compensation basis of county officials. However, unlike the Type I amendments, in which the phrase "costs and charges of court" appears immediately adjacent to the reference to county officials' compensation basis, Amendments 326 and 360 sever those provisions and place them in separate paragraphs. The placement of these provisions within the texts of the amendments is a relevant consideration in ascertaining the intent of the framers with regard to the meaning of the phrase "costs and charges of court." 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 222, at 412 (1974).
In Amendments 326 and 360, the significance of the separation of the phrase "costs and charges of court" from the provision relating to compensation is amplified by the fact that the phrase is, in each instance, prefixed by the words "legislature may also"; thus, indicating something in addition to providing for a change the compensation basis, the authority for which appeared earlier in the text of the amendments. If, in these two amendments, the phrase "costs and charges of court" is merely synonymous with the antecedent provisions for changing the compensation basis of county officers, at least one entire paragraph in each amendment is wholly superfluous. The rule, however, is to the contrary, for constitutions must be construed to be in harmony, and, as much as possible, each provision must be given effect and a field of operation. Bouchelle v. State Highway Commission, 211 Ala. 474, 100 So. 884 (1924); State v. Court of County Comm'rs of Tuscaloosa County, 173 Ala. 724, 54 So. 763 (1910). The framers of Amendments 326 and 360, through their isolation of the phrase "costs and charges of court," have demonstrated more clearly the meaning to be ascribed to the identical phrase in Amendment 137. See State ex rel. Meyer v. Greene, 154 Ala. 249, 46 So. 268 (1908) (repetitious phrase will be interpreted according to its usage in the provision in which its meaning was clear); Lehman, Durr & Co. v. Robinson, 59 Ala. 219, 235-36 (1877).
In view of the foregoing discussion and analysis of the use of the phrase "costs and charges of court" in the various types of amendments, we are compelled to reject the contention that the phrase merely authorizes the legislature through local legislation "to convert public officials from a fee basis of compensation to a salary basis." Such a narrow construction would
Analysis of Green v. Austin
We have not overlooked the fact that the conclusion we have reached is inconsistent with the holding and rationale of Green v. Austin, 425 So.2d 411 (Ala.1982). In Green, we rejected the defendant's contention that Amendment 344 exempted the provisions of Act No. 81-642, 1981 Ala. Acts 1059, and Act No. 81-643, 1981 Ala. Acts 1060, from the application of §§ 96 and 105 of the constitution.
Green, 425 So.2d at 414 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
This Court's construction of Amendment 344 is perhaps best understood in the context of the opinion offered to the litigants in Green by the Administrative Director of Courts regarding the constitutionality of Acts No. 81-642 and 81-643:
(Emphasis added.)
The holding in Green represented a departure from a number of this Court's pronouncements regarding the scope of Type I amendments of which Amendments 137 and 344 are representative. In oral argument, counsel for the appellant defended the result in Green by arguing that Amendment 328 had, in effect, "superseded" or repealed Amendment 137 and pre-1973 case law, such as that interpreting Amendment 2 and similar amendments. This argument, however, is contrary to established rules of constitutional and statutory construction.
In Vaughan v. Moore, 379 So.2d 1240, 1241 (Ala.1979), this Court explained the rule as follows:
(Emphasis added.) This rule proceeds from the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, Scottish Union & National Ins. Co. v. Baker, 17 Ala.App. 188, 189, 84 So. 480, 481, cert. denied, 203 Ala. 696, 84 So. 924 (1919), that is, "[g]eneral words do not derogate from special." Black's Law Dictionary 616 (5th ed. 1979).
Amendment 328 was ratified December 27, 1973. Of its purpose, the amendment states:
Amendment 328, § 6.01 (emphasis added). The application of the amendment, as evidenced, inter alia, by the phrase "unified judicial system," is clearly general and statewide. See Cowin Equip. Co. v. Robison Mining Co., 342 So.2d 910 (Ala.1977). Because Amendment 328 nowhere refers expressly to costs and charges of court, if it supersedes or repeals Amendment 137 or pre-1973 case law, it does so only by necessary implication. Vaughan v. Moore supra.
"[R]epeal by implication is not favored in the law. It is only when two laws are so repugnant to or in conflict with each other that it must be presumed that the Legislature intended that the latter should repeal the former." Davis v. Browder, 231 Ala. 332, 334-35, 165 So. 89, 91 (1935). The substantive text of Amendment 328, § 6.01,
Moreover, it is interesting to note that in the 18 years since the ratification of Amendment 328, the legislature has proposed and the people of Alabama have ratified no less than 35 amendments authorizing the regulation of "costs and charges of courts, or fees, commissions or allowances of public officers" through local legislation. See, e.g., Ala. Const. amends. 331, 332, 344, 345, 346, 347, 349, 353, 359, 360, 362, 367, 372, 380, 391, 403, 412, 414, 416, 418, 424, 433, 434, 476, 478, 479, 480, 481, 485, 487, 496, 504, 507, 522, and 524. No less than 20 of these amendments expressly authorize local legislation regulating costs and charges of courts. See Ala. Const. amends. 331, 332, 344, 345, 346, 347, 349, 353, 359, 360, 367, 380, 391, 403, 412, 416, 418, 424, 434, and 478. These numbers are especially striking when it is considered that only 33 such amendments were ratified during the 61 years from the ratification of Amendment 2 in 1912 to Amendment 328 in 1973.
Even more significant, however, is the fact that Amendments 328, 331, and 332 were proposed as Act No. 1051, 1973 Ala. Acts 1676; Act No. 556, 1973 Ala. Acts 811; and Act No. 557, 1973 Ala. Acts 812, respectively, in the same legislative session. Thus, the same legislature that proposed to create a "unified judicial system" through Amendment 328, simultaneously proposed to authorize the legislature to regulate by local act "the costs and charges of court" in Cleburne and Bibb Counties. These facts are inconsistent with the argument that Amendment 328, by necessary implication, repealed Amendment 137 and pre-1973 case law. See Davis v. Browder, 231 Ala. 332, 165 So. 89 (1936) (acts considered by the same legislature "are presumed not to conflict, and a field of operation will be given each if consistent with clear intent").
In short, the rationale of Green v. Austin cannot be defended by reference to Amendment 328. Green's construction of Amendment 344, which was unnecessarily narrow, is inconsistent with the two cardinal separation of powers principles as stated in Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 9, 18 So.2d 810, 815 (1944), cert. dismissed, 325 U.S. 450, 65 S.Ct. 1384, 89 L.Ed. 1725 (1945): (1) a "presumption and intendment in favor of [a statute's] validity" exists; and (2) the judiciary's duty is to "adopt the construction which would uphold" a statute rather than strike it down. Similarly, Green interpreted the phrase "costs and charges of courts" in a sophisticated and "technical" manner, one that is unsuited for the construction of constitutional provisions. See Realty Investment Co., 181 Ala. at 187, 61 So. at 249; Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216, 235 (1859). To the extent that Green construed the phrase "costs and charges of court" as referring only "to the fees, commissions, and allowances to be charged or received by" designated county officials, that opinion is expressly disapproved and we decline to follow it. We hold, therefore, that Act No. 86-113, by virtue of Amendment 137, does not offend § 96 of the Constitution.
SECTION 105
The appellant contends alternatively that even if Amendment 137 effectively removes Act No. 86-113 from the operation of § 96, the Act is, nevertheless, repugnant to Ala. Const. 1901, § 105. The applicable portion of § 105 provides that "[n]o special, private, or local law ... shall be enacted in
The appellees' defense against the § 105 challenge is the same as that which they employed against the appellant's § 96 challenge—that is, they contend that Amendment 137, which provides that "[t]he legislature may from time to time, by general or local laws, fix, alter, and regulate the costs and charges of courts in Cullman county," allows the legislature to enact a local law of this nature. The appellant, however, contends that Amendment 137 authorizes the legislature to regulate the costs and charges of court by general or local laws, but not by both. In other words, the legislature, the appellant insists, may employ only one of these methods. Therefore, the argument goes, because it chose to regulate costs and charges of court through § 12-19-20, a general act, the legislature abrogated its authority to regulate such costs through local legislation. We disagree.
This Court has often stated the following rule regarding the construction of disjunctive and conjunctive words:
In re Opinion of the Justices No. 93, 252 Ala. 194, 198, 41 So.2d 559, 563 (1949) (emphasis added); see also Rutland v. Emanuel, 202 Ala. 269, 80 So. 107 (1918); Porter v. State, 58 Ala. 66 (1877); Harris v. Parker, 41 Ala. 604, 615-16 (1868); Hilliard v. Binford's Heirs, 10 Ala. 977, 996 (1847).
The effect of this rule is enhanced by the requirement, noted above, that "technical constructions" of constitutional provisions are to be avoided. See Realty Investment Co., 181 Ala. at 187, 61 So. at 249 (quoting Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216, 235 (1859)). This Court, when confronted with a choice between two possible constructions of a constitutional provision, one that would forbid the legislature to act and one that would permit the legislature to act, is not free to choose the construction that would restrict the legislature's power. Cf. Beasley v. Bozeman, 294 Ala. 288, 315 So.2d 570 (1975); Hendrix v. Creel, 292 Ala. 541, 297 So.2d 364 (1974); McAdory, 246 Ala. at 10, 18 So.2d at 815. For these reasons, we do not construe Amendment 137 so narrowly as to restrict the legislature to but one method of execution of the amendment's objectives. Instead, we interpret the amendment as though it read: "The legislature may from time to time, by general and local laws, fix, alter, and regulate the costs and charges of courts in Cullman county...."
We hold that Act No. 86-113, by virtue of Amendment 137, offends neither § 96 nor § 105 of the Constitution. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
MADDOX, ALMON, HOUSTON,
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the result.
APPENDIXCOUNTY AMENDMENT — TYPE Baldwin 229 I Act No. 90-187, 1990 Ala. Acts 213 ACT
Bibb 306 I 332 I Act No. 80-377, 1980 Ala. Acts 499 Chambers 103 I Act No. 89-504, 1989 Ala. Acts 1042 Chilton 346 I Act No. 80-557, 1980 Ala. Acts 866 Clarke 416 III 478 I Act No. 80-413, 1980 Ala. Acts 577 Clay 359 I Act No. 81-284, 1981 Ala. Acts 366; Act No. 81-285, 1981 Ala. Acts 367; Act No. 81-286, Ala. Acts 368; Act No. 80-188, 1980 Ala. Acts 265 Cleburne 331 I Act No. 90-642, 1990 347 I Ala. Acts 1197; Act No. 81-203, 1981 Ala. Acts 244; Act No. 81-204, 1981 Ala. Acts 245; Act No. 81-205, 1981 Ala. Acts 246; Act No. 81-206, 1981 Ala. Acts 247; Act No. 79-654, 1979 Ala. Acts 1133 Coffee 360 I/III Act No. 90-435, 1990 Ala. Acts 599; Act No. 79-531, 1979 Ala. Acts 952 Colbert 136 I Act No. 88-396, 1988 Ala. Acts 585 (amending Act No. 1144, 1969 Ala. Acts 2145 and Act No. 1255, 1969 Ala. Acts 2372) Coosa 345 I Act No. 90-641, 1990 Ala. Acts 1197; Act No. 81-298, 1981 Ala. Acts 379; Act No. 723, 1977 Ala. Acts 1268 Cullman 137 I Act No. 711, 1976 Ala. Acts 991, amended by Act No. 81-1037, 1981 Ala. Acts 237, and Act No. 85-886, 1985 Ala. Acts 144 Dallas 233 III Act No. 81-722, 1981 Ala. Acts 1234; Act No. 415, 1978 Ala. Acts 412,amended by Act No. 87-489, 1987 Ala. Acts 743 Dekalb 134 I Act No. 83-677, 1983 Ala. Acts 1067; Act No. 367, 1971 Ala. Acts 661 Elmore 278 III Act No. 89-260, 1989 Ala. Acts 374; Act No. 586, 1967 Ala. Acts 1358 Escambia 391 I Act No. 82-305, 1982 Ala. Acts 410,amended by Act No. 84-542, 1984 Ala. Acts 1167 Jefferson 2 I Act No. 84-607, 1984 Ala. Acts 1241; Act No. 462, 1939 Ala. Acts 277,amended by Act No. 193, 1965 Ala.
Acts 276, Act No. 265, 1971 Ala. Acts 4533, and Act No. 390, 1975 Ala. Acts 972 Lawrence 321 I Act No. 89-716, 1989 Ala. Acts 1430 Madison 105 III Act No. 85-596, 1985 Ala. Acts 924; Act No. 452, 1975 Ala. Acts 1073; Act No. 470, 1975 Ala. Acts 1094 Mobile 28 I Act No. 81-415, 1981 Ala. Acts 656; Act No. 80-333, 1980 Ala. Acts 453 Montgomery 139 III Act No. 97, 1965 Ala. Acts 140 Morgan 44 I Act No. 87-276, 1987 Ala. Acts 385; Act No. 87-285, 1987 Ala. Acts 396; Act No. 80-302, 1980 Ala. Acts 420 Talladega 85 III Act No. 79-592, 1979 Ala. Acts 1051, amended by Act No. 81-125, 1981 Ala. Acts 146,amended by Act No. 81-1044, 1981 Ala. Acts 249 Walker 127 I Act No. 89-763, 1989 Ala. Acts 1543; Act No. 79-679, 1979 Ala. Acts 1210; Act No. 1366, 1971 Ala. Acts 2312; Act No. 1487, 1971 Ala. Acts 2547 Washington 349 I Act No. 80-273, 1980 Ala. Acts 361 Wilcox 434 III Act No. 82-268, 1982 Ala. Acts 338; Act No. 642, 1978 Ala. Acts 905,amended by Act No. 89-394, 1989 Ala. Acts 773 Winston 424 III Act No. 82-172, 1982 Ala. Acts 202
FootNotes
Id. (Emphasis added.)
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