OPINION
GERRY, Chief Judge.
Plaintiffs are a group home for recovering drug addicts and alcoholics and its residents. They seek a preliminary injunction from this court preventing the Township of Cherry Hill from interfering with their rental and occupancy of a house located in a single family residential zone in Cherry Hill. The complaint and an application for a temporary restraining order were filed on March 20, 1992, after the Township refused to issue plaintiffs a Certificate of Occupancy ("C.O.") on the grounds that they failed to meet the definition of a "single family" under the Township's zoning ordinance. Without this C.O., plaintiffs were prohibited under the zoning ordinance from occupying the house. The complaint charges that Cherry Hill's action constitutes discrimination on the basis of handicap in violation of the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. On the day the suit was filed, this court issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the Township from interfering with the immediate occupancy of the house by plaintiffs. A preliminary injunction hearing was subsequently held on May 14, 1992. Based on the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction will be granted.
FINDINGS OF FACT
A. The Parties
1. Plaintiff, Oxford House, Inc., is a Maryland, not-for-profit, tax-exempt corporation which assists in the establishment of housing for recovering alcoholics and substance abusers. Oxford House, Inc. serves as the umbrella organization for a national network of approximately 400 individual Oxford Houses, approximately 20 of which are located in New Jersey.
2. Plaintiffs, John Does One through Seven, are current residents of a newly-established Oxford House located at 911 South Kings Highway in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. They are all recovering alcoholics and substance abusers in need of housing, and they each have completed a rehabilitation program for either alcoholism or drug abuse prior to moving into the house.
3. Defendant, Township of Cherry Hill, is a municipal corporation located in Camden County, New Jersey, organized under the laws of the State of New Jersey. Cherry Hill exercises zoning authority over the land within its borders.
4. Oxford Houses are not health care facilities, rehabilitation centers, or supervised halfway houses. They are simply residential dwellings rented by a group of individuals who are recovering from alcoholism and drug addiction. Three basic rules govern the functioning of all Oxford Houses: each house must 1) be democratically self-governed by its residents, 2) be financially self-supporting, and 3) immediately expel any resident who relapses into drug and/or alcohol use. No professional treatment, therapy, or paid staff is provided. Unlike a boarding house, where a proprietor is responsible to run and operate the premises, at Oxford House, the residents are responsible for their own food and care as well as for running the home. Because the house must be self-supporting, each of the residents needs a source of income to pay his or her fair share of the expenses.
6. Although Oxford House, Inc. provides assistance in setting up individual houses and provides technical support initially, once established, an individual Oxford House is no longer subject to direct, ongoing control by Oxford House, Inc. The residents of the house make all of the decisions regarding the management of the house, including decisions concerning new residents. This helps the residents to develop a sense of responsibility and self-esteem, which are important ingredients to a successful recovery.
7. Oxford House, Inc. attempts to locate houses in clean, drug-free, single family neighborhoods that will provide the occupants a sense of pride and self-worth. Oxford House, Inc. has found that the location of these houses in such neighborhoods plays a crucial role in an individual's recovery by promoting self-esteem, helping to create an incentive not to relapse, and avoiding the temptations that the presence of drug trafficking can create.
8. There is no limit on the amount of time an individual may reside in an Oxford House; as long as she does not resume the use of drugs or alcohol, meets the requisite financial obligations and does not engage in disruptive behavior, an individual could reside in an Oxford House indefinitely. At one of the original Oxford Houses, a resident stayed for 16 years. Most stay for shorter periods of time, however. In another Oxford House in Cherry Hill, which has been operating for two years, the average length of stay of the current residents has been six months to a year.
B. The Dispute
9. Early this year, Oxford House, Inc. made a decision to open up another house in Cherry Hill because the existing houses in Camden County were unable to meet the demand for suitable housing for recovering alcoholics and substance abusers in the area. Accordingly, in February of 1992, pursuant to Oxford House, Inc.'s contractual obligation with the State of New Jersey, it entered into a lease with a property management firm, Realco Management Inc., to rent the premises at 911 South Kings Highway for use as an Oxford House. In connection with this lease, a check in the amount of $2,875.00 was drawn from the New Jersey revolving loan fund and paid to Realco on March 5, 1992 to cover the first month's rent and security deposit. Oxford House, Inc. intended to have the house occupied beginning on March 15, 1992.
10. 911 South Kings Highway is a detached single family house located in a single family residential zone under the
11. Subsequent to entering into the lease with Oxford House, Realco applied to the Township for a Certificate of Occupancy pursuant to Township Ordinance 75-11, which requires a landlord to obtain a C.O. prior to any rental, including the rental of a single family home.
12. On March 11, 1992, Bernard Rosen, an inspector from Cherry Hill, inspected the premises pursuant to Realco's C.O. application. At the time of the inspection, he was informed that the prospective tenant was to be Oxford House. Mr. Rosen then informed Realco that he would have to report to the Township that Oxford House was the prospective tenant, and he told Realco that this "was a problem." Rosen subsequently did inform the Township's Director of Community Development, William Ragozine, that the house was to be occupied by Oxford House.
13. On the same day as Rosen's inspection, Francine Axelrad, attorney for Cherry Hill, wrote to Realco informing them that their application for a C.O. had been denied.
14. As a result of this letter, Realco Management sought to return the first month's rent and security deposit and sever its relationship with Oxford House. On March 20, 1992, however, this court entered a temporary restraining order, enjoining the Township from interfering with plaintiffs' occupancy of 911 South Kings Highway. Pursuant to that order, the Township reinspected the premises for maintenance code violations and, finding no such violations, issued a C.O. on March 30, 1992.
15. Since April 1, 1992, 911 South Kings Highway has been occupied by a group of recovering alcoholics and substance abusers. Since that time, there have been no
16. In addition to 911 South Kings Highway, Oxford House also operates group homes at 141 Pine Valley Road and 108 Hilltop Court in Cherry Hill. The Township has previously filed suit in state court to evict the residents of those two homes because of their failure to meet the definition of family under the zoning ordinance.
C. The Township's Zoning Ordinance
17. Under the Cherry Hill Zoning Ordinance, a "family" is defined as:
Cherry Hill interprets this ordinance so as to impose more stringent requirements on groups of unrelated individuals seeking to rent a single family home than on groups who are related by blood or marriage. While groups related by blood or marriage who apply for a C.O. are automatically considered to meet the definition of family under the zoning ordinance, a group of unrelated individuals is initially presumed not to constitute a family. In order to obtain a C.O., a group of unrelated individuals must prove that they meet a standard of "permanency and stability." This standard is never imposed on groups related by blood or marriage because they are automatically found to meet the definition of "family" regardless of their particular circumstances. This "permanency and stability" standard is not referred to or defined anywhere in the zoning ordinance, and the Township has no written criteria according to which the standard may be uniformly applied.
18. When a group of people related by blood or marriage applies for a C.O., assuming that other requirements under the property maintenance code are met, it will be automatically granted on the basis of a simple application form which asks for little more than the proposed tenants' names. When a group of unrelated individuals applies for a C.O., however, it will initially be denied on the ground that they do not meet the definition of a single family.
19. To the extent that the Township of Cherry Hill takes the position that Oxford House does not meet the definition of a single family under its zoning ordinance, Oxford House is precluded from obtaining a C.O. for any single family home in any of the five residential zones in the Township. The vast majority of the single family homes in Cherry Hill are located in these five residential zones.
20. Other than Oxford House, there are no halfway houses, group homes or any other homes in Cherry Hill which provide housing for recovering alcoholics and substance abusers. There is no provision in the Township's zoning ordinance for halfway houses or group homes.
D. The Nature of Alcoholism and Drug Addiction
21. Addiction to illegal drugs or alcohol places severe limitations on people's lives, disrupting personal relationships, and impairing one's ability to advance in school or employment. These limitations continue to have a significant impact on an alcoholic's or drug addict's life even after the process of recovery has begun.
22. There is a shortage of adequate housing in New Jersey for recovering substance abusers and alcoholics.
The above constitutes the court's findings of fact in accordance with Fed. R.Civ.P. 52.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
23. The Third Circuit has held that a district court may issue a preliminary injunction where the following standards are met:
Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171, 181 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849, 108 S.Ct. 148, 98 L.Ed.2d 104 (1987). We will address each of these standards in turn below.
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
1. Effect of State Court Ruling
24. Before we examine the merits of plaintiffs' federal claim, we pause briefly to consider defendant's assertion that we should give "deference" to the findings of the state court in Township of Cherry Hill v. Oxford House, No. C-00181-90, slip op. (N.J.Sup.Ct.Ch.Div., April 27, 1992), a case involving the other two Oxford Houses in Cherry Hill,
25. Presumably defendant's argument is based on the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. It is hornbook law, however, that a party in a second lawsuit cannot be bound by a determination
26. Secondly, although the organization itself, Oxford House, Inc., is a party to both actions, it is not bound by the state court's holding either. First, we note that the issue of whether Oxford House is in violation of the local zoning ordinance is not relevant to the question of federal law before us in this case. See United States v. Audubon, 797 F.Supp. 353, 357-58 (D.N.J.1991). The only question we have been asked to decide is whether Cherry Hill's actions discriminated against plaintiffs on the basis of handicap in violation of the Fair Housing Act. A finding that a Fair Housing Act plaintiff has violated a local zoning ordinance does not preclude a finding of discrimination in violation of the Act. Rather, it is well-established that the Act prohibits discriminatory land use decisions by municipalities, even when such decisions are "ostensibly authorized by local ordinance." Ardmore, Inc. v. City of Akron, No. 90-CV-1083, slip op. at 9, 1990 WL 385236 (E.D.Ohio, Aug. 2, 1990); accord, Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F.Supp. 1329 (D.N.J.1991) (on motion for preliminary injunction: city's enforcement of zoning ordinance so as to prevent operation of local Oxford House in area zoned for single family residences violated Fair Housing Act); Association of Relatives and Friends of AIDS Patients v. Regulations and Permits Administration, 740 F.Supp. 95 (D.P.R.1990) (government agency's denial of land use permit to open AIDS hospice violated Fair Housing Act); Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F.Supp. 720 (S.D.Ill.1989) (on motion for preliminary injunction: city's refusal to issue special use permit under zoning law to developer wishing to remodel building into residence for persons with AIDS violated Fair Housing Act). See also 42 U.S.C. § 3615 ("any law of a State, a political subdivision, or other such jurisdiction that purports to require or permit any action that would be a discriminatory housing practice under this subchapter shall to that extent be invalid [under the Fair Housing Act]"). Therefore, since the issue of Oxford House's compliance with the zoning ordinance is not before us in this case, the state court's ruling on that issue is irrelevant.
27. Secondly, we find that the state court's holding with regard to the definition of "handicap" under the Fair Housing Act is also not binding on this court. Although this is a legal issue that is before us in this case, we confront the issue here in the context of a different set of facts. The state court's holding that the residents were not "handicapped" was based on very specific factual findings regarding the particular individuals then residing at the Pine Valley and Hilltop Court Oxford Houses. Here we must determine whether a different set of individuals—the residents of 911 South Kings Highway—are "handicapped." Since the instant case presents us with an entirely distinct set of facts, the state court's ruling with regard to handicap is not binding on this court.
2. Definition of Handicap
28. Plaintiffs rest their claim for relief on the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq., which was amended in 1988 to prohibit discrimination in housing on the
42 U.S.C. § 3602(h).
29. It is clear that Congress contemplated alcoholism and drug addiction as being among the kinds of "impairments" covered under this definition. First of all, the final clause excluding current users clearly indicates an intent that at least some prior users be covered by the definition. Additionally, the legislative history of the 1988 amendments,
30. Thus, we are confident in saying as a matter of law that alcoholism and drug addiction (excluding current drug use) constitute "impairments" under the Act. What is less clear is whether the second step of the analysis—that is, whether the impairment substantially limits a major life activity—can be satisfied as a matter of law, and thus whether all alcoholics and drug addicts (excluding current users) can be said to be handicapped per se, as a matter of law. Under such an analysis, the only factual showing plaintiffs would need to make in order to prove handicap would be that they were alcoholics or drug addicts who were not currently using illegal drugs. Certainly, there are a number of cases interpreting the definition of handicap under the Rehabilitation Act which appear to take this approach. See, e.g., Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171, 182 (3d Cir.) ("case law establishes that alcoholics are handicapped within the meaning of § 504"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849, 108 S.Ct. 148, 98 L.Ed.2d 104 (1987); Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253, 258 (4th Cir.1989) ("Alcoholism is a handicapping condition within the meaning of the Act"); Crewe v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140, 141-42 (8th Cir.1987) ("there can be little doubt that alcoholism is a handicap for the purposes of the Act"); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F.Supp. 791, 796 (E.D.Pa.1978) ("persons with histories of drug use, including present participants in methadone maintenance programs, are `handicapped individuals' within the meaning of the statutory and regulatory language").
31. Here, we will take the more conservative approach, assuming that the second step of the analysis cannot be reached as a matter of law but must rest instead on some specific factual showing that a plaintiff's alcoholism or drug addiction "substantially limits [a] major life activity." Although the record presently before us does not contain such evidence with respect to each individual plaintiff, the expert testimony of Riley Regan with regard to the limitations faced by alcoholics and drug addicts in general, in conjunction with the testimony of one of the current residents of 911 South Kings Highway as to the limitations he suffers, is sufficient at this early stage in the proceedings to meet plaintiffs' present burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits.
32. This testimony shows that alcoholism and drug addiction place severe limitations on people's lives, including disrupting personal relationships and impairing one's ability to advance in education or employment, and that such limitations do not magically disappear at the moment that abstinence begins, but rather continue to effect a person's functioning at least through the early stages of recovery. It is because of these limitations that recovering drug addicts and alcoholics need to live in a supportive environment of the type that Oxford House provides. Many witnesses testified as to the crucial importance of this supportive and drug-free environment in ensuring that a recovering alcoholic or addict does not relapse.
33. These generalized findings are sufficient to demonstrate that plaintiffs are likely to succeed at trial in demonstrating that each individual plaintiff is limited with respect to major life activities, or that residents of Oxford Houses in general are by definition so limited. In addition, plaintiffs' evidence shows that all of the residents of 911 South Kings Highway are alcoholics or drug addicts who have completed a rehabilitation program prior to moving into the house, and that if they resume the use of alcohol or drugs they will be immediately expelled. We are therefore satisfied that the final prong of the definition of handicap—excluding current users of illegal drugs—is also satisfied. Thus, plaintiffs have met their burden at this stage in the proceedings of demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits with respect to proving that they are "handicapped" within the meaning of the Act.
3. Discrimination
34. Under § 804 of the Fair Housing Act it is unlawful
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). To prove a violation of § 804, plaintiffs must show either intentional discrimination or a discriminatory impact. See Doe v. City of Butler, 892 F.2d 315, 323 (3d Cir.1989); Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F.Supp. 1329, 1343 (D.N.J.1991); Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F.Supp. 720, 732 (S.D.Ill.
35. Under the disparate impact theory, the court's analysis is similar to that in Title VII cases. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 488 U.S. 15, 109 S.Ct. 276, 102 L.Ed.2d 180 (1988); Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908, 99 S.Ct. 1457, 1458, 55 L.Ed.2d 499 (1978). Thus, plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case by showing that the Township's action had a greater adverse impact on a protected group than on others, regardless of intent. See Huntington, 844 F.2d at 935. Once plaintiffs establish a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their action, and that no less discriminatory alternatives were available. See Huntington 844 F.2d at 939; Rizzo 564 F.2d at 149.
36. With regard to this analysis, it is important to note that Congress defined "discrimination" as used in § 804 to include "a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). The legislative history indicates that Congress borrowed this language from case law interpreting § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, particularly Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979), and that it intended for those cases to supply the governing standard as to what accommodations are reasonable.
37. Here, plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of disparate impact by showing that the Township's interpretation of the definition of "family" in its zoning ordinance imposes more stringent requirements on groups of unrelated individuals wishing to live together in a rental property than on individuals related by blood or marriage. Because people who are handicapped by alcoholism or drug abuse are more likely to need a living arrangement such as the one Oxford House provides, in which groups of unrelated individuals reside together in residential neighborhoods for mutual support during the recovery process, Cherry Hill's application of this ordinance has a disparate impact on such handicapped people.
39. Further, we hold that defendant did not meet its burden of establishing that no less restrictive alternative was available or that no reasonable accommodation could be made.
40. In short, we are hard-pressed to find any evidence in this record as to how such an accommodation would impact negatively in any way upon the Township of
B. Irreparable Injury
41. We note at the outset that the 11th Circuit has taken the position that a showing of a substantial likelihood that a defendant has violated the Fair Housing Act is itself sufficient to create a presumption of irreparable harm, which shifts the burden to defendant to prove that any injury that may occur is not irreparable. See Gresham v. Windrush Partners, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1417, 1423-24 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 882, 105 S.Ct. 249, 83 L.Ed.2d 187 (1984); see also Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 803 (3d Cir.1989); Gov't of Virgin Islands Dep't of Conservation & Cultural Affairs v. Virgin Islands Paving, Inc., 714 F.2d 283, 286 (3d Cir.1983). Here, however, even if we place the initial burden on plaintiffs, we find that this second prong of the preliminary injunction standard has been met.
42. Plaintiffs have presented evidence demonstrating that the ability of recovering alcoholics and drug addicts to live in a supportive drug free environment in a quiet residential area is critical to their recovery. Plaintiffs' expert witness, Riley Regan, testified that an addict's or alcoholic's chances of recovery are enhanced fivefold by living in a drug and alcohol-free environment. Additionally, the record is replete with testimony from individual drug addicts and alcoholics as well as professionals in the field, who all agree that Oxford House provides a supportive environment that is critical to the continued recovery of its residents and that shutting down the house at 911 South Kings Highway would result in a high likelihood of relapse for its residents.
43. This Circuit has already held that an action that jeopardizes the recovery process for a group of alcoholics and threatens to push them into relapse causes just the kind of irreparable harm that justifies preliminary injunctive relief. In Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171, 179-80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849, 108 S.Ct. 148, 98 L.Ed.2d 104 (1987), the circuit court observed:
Here too we find that the uncontroverted evidence showing that a failure to issue an injunction will substantially increase the likelihood of relapse for the current residents of 911 South Kings Highway constitutes a sufficient showing of irreparable harm.
44. Defendant argues that it is premature to make a finding that plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm by the denial of a C.O. because the Township has not yet made a final determination that a C.O. will be denied. Thus, at this juncture, the Township argues, it is simply asking plaintiffs to apply to the Cherry Hill Zoning Board for an interpretation or a variance, and since plaintiffs will not suffer any irreparable harm by making such an application, they must be required to exhaust this administrative remedy before coming to this court for relief.
45. We are not persuaded by this argument. The record indicates that an appeal to the Zoning Board takes time
46. Therefore, regardless of the ultimate outcome of a proceeding before the Zoning Board, we find that the delay involved would cause plaintiffs to suffer irreparable harm. Therefore they are not required to exhaust such procedures before obtaining relief from this court. See Easter Seal, 798 F.Supp. at 235-36 (citing American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Resor, 442 F.2d 993, 995 (3d Cir.1971)).
C. Harm to Defendant
47. As noted above in our discussion of the Fair Housing Act's reasonable accommodation requirement, we search the record in vain for any showing by the defendant as to how the granting of the requested injunction will harm the defendant. Any threat to the residential character of the neighborhood is minimal at most and is overwhelmingly outweighed by the potential for harm to the individual plaintiffs if the injunction is denied and they are forced to leave Oxford House.
D. Public Interest
48. Through its enactment of the Fair Housing Amendments of 1988 and the Federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Congress has expressed a strong public policy favoring an end to discrimination in housing on the basis of handicap and favoring the establishment of housing programs for recovering drug addicts and alcoholics. Indeed, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act's provision encouraging the establishment of revolving loan funds by states to make startup loans to help establish group homes for recovering drug addicts and alcoholics was based specifically on the model of Oxford House. See 134 Cong.Rec. E 3732 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (remarks of Rep. Madigan). Thus, Congress has directly endorsed Oxford House itself as an organization worthy of public support because of its role in helping to stem the national epidemic of alcohol and drug abuse. This public policy is further reflected in enactments of the New Jersey Legislature supporting programs that assist recovering alcoholics and substance abusers. See N.J.S.A. 26:2B-1 et seq.
49. Viewing these clear expressions of legislative support for the goal of reducing drug addiction and alcoholism against the backdrop of the current atmosphere of overwhelming public concern over the impact of drugs on our society, as reflected by the much publicized federally-declared "war on drugs," we would be hard-pressed to deny the significance of the public interest in supporting efforts like Oxford House to assist in and encourage the recovery of alcoholics and drug addicts. See Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 803 (3d Cir.1989) (legislative expressions of public policy through statutes may be relied on to define "public interest" for purposes of preliminary injunction analysis). Accordingly, we hold that the public interest factor weighs heavily in favor of the issuance of a preliminary injunction in this case.
The above constitutes the court's conclusions of law in accordance with Fed. R.Civ.P. 52.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, we find that all four preliminary injunction standards have been satisfied, and we therefore find sufficient grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, enjoining the Township of Cherry Hill from interfering with the occupancy of the single family house at 911 South Kings Highway by Oxford House, Inc. and John Does One through Seven.
FootNotes
The dispute as to the code violations existing on March 11th, therefore, relates only to the question of what was the original basis for the Township's denial of the C.O. We believe that the most persuasive evidence on this question is the letter of March 11th to Realco Management from the Township's attorney. As noted above, the only basis for the denial of the C.O. set forth in that letter was the failure to comply with the zoning ordinance's "single family" requirement. Had there been an additional reason for the denial, we believe that it would have been stated in the letter. Since no additional reason was stated, we are persuaded that the sole reason for the Township's original denial of the C.O., as well as its ongoing opposition to plaintiffs' occupancy of 911 South King's Highway, is the Township's view that plaintiffs do not constitute a "family" under the zoning ordinance.
Additionally, one of the current residents of the Oxford House at 911 South Kings Highway, A.R., testified that alcoholism has "taken over [his] life" and is "the reason [he] cannot hold a job [or] relationships."
Joan Treske, the Program Coordinator for a treatment program for substance abusers and mentally ill persons in Cherry Hill, who has worked with alcoholics and drug addicts for 12 years, testified that living in a supportive environment is particularly important for people who are in the early stages of recovery. With regard to one of her clients who is a current resident of 911 South Kings Highway, she said that living in Oxford House has made "the difference of night and day" for him.
Mary Long, an aftercare counselor at an inpatient treatment program for alcoholism and drug addiction located in Williamstown, New Jersey, testified that it has been so difficult to find suitable housing for recovering alcoholics who have completed the program, that she has been forced to place clients in Pennsylvania.
Riley Regan testified that if communities like Cherry Hill were able to shut down Oxford Houses, "it would be a major disaster for our field." Finally, one current resident of 911 South Kings Highway, when asked what would happen if he were forced to leave, testified: "At this time? It scares me. I don't know where I'd go or what I'd do, you know. I have no plans. I don't know what I'd do right now."
H.R.Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2173, 2183.
24 CFR § 100.201(a)(2).
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