Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs to the appellants appearing separately and filing separate briefs, payable by the plaintiffs, the motions and cross motions are granted, and, upon searching the record and granting summary judgment to the defendant John Alexander, the complaint, third-party complaint, and all cross claims are dismissed.
We agree with the conclusion of the Supreme Court that the plaintiffs' suit is not barred by the rule of Santangelo v State of New York (71 N.Y.2d 393), as the negligence complained of, the failure to maintain the premises in a safe condition which caused the injury, was not related to the situation which created the need for the injured plaintiff's services (see, Murphy v Creative Foods Corp., 170 A.D.2d 441; Janeczko v Duhl, 166 A.D.2d 257; Sharkey v Mitchell's Newspaper Delivery, 165 A.D.2d 664; Guadagno v Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 155 A.D.2d 981; Starkey v Trancamp Contr. Corp., 152 A.D.2d 358). However, where injuries are sustained as a result of an alleged failure to maintain property in a reasonably safe condition, liability is governed by the "standard of reasonable care under the circumstances whereby foreseeability shall be a measure of liability" (Basso v Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241). Under the circumstances presented by this case, we find, as a matter of law, that the appellants could not reasonably foresee that the plaintiff would climb over the wall of the condominium complex and jump down onto its grounds, thereby injuring himself (see, Guida v 154 W. 14th St. Co., 13 A.D.2d 695, affd 11 N.Y.2d 731; Beedenbender v Midtown Props., 4 A.D.2d 276). Accordingly, the appellants may not be held liable for the unforeseeable injuries suffered (see, Mulholland v Willis, 177 A.D.2d 482 [decided herewith]).
Furthermore, after searching the record (see, CPLR 3212 [b]) we find that the nonappealing defendant John Alexander is