A long line of this Court's precedents acknowledges that, generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages. See, e. g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980); Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson
In this case, respondent Howard Waco, a Los Angeles County public defender, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, against petitioner, Raymond Mireles, a judge of the California Superior Court, and two police officers, for damages arising from an incident in November 1989 at the Superior Court building in Van Nuys, Cal. Waco alleged that after he failed to appear for the initial call of Judge Mireles' morning calendar, the judge, "angered by the absence of attorneys from his courtroom," ordered the police officer defendants "to forcibly and with excessive force seize and bring plaintiff into his courtroom." App. to Pet. for Cert. B-3, ¶ 7(a). The officers allegedly "by means of unreasonable force and violence seize[d] plaintiff and remove[d] him backwards" from another courtroom where he was waiting to appear, cursed him, and called him "vulgar and offensive names," then "without necessity slammed" him through the doors and swinging gates into Judge Mireles' courtroom. Id., at B-4, ¶ 7(c). Judge Mireles, it was alleged, "knowingly and deliberately approved and ratified each of the afore described acts" of the police officers. Ibid. Waco demanded general and punitive damages. Id., at B-5 and B-6.
Taking the allegations of the complaint as true, as we do upon a motion to dismiss, we grant the petition for certiorari and summarily reverse.
Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Accordingly, judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S., at 554 ("[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly"). See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-819 (1982) (allegations of malice are insufficient to overcome qualified immunity).
Rather, our cases make clear that the immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances. First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i. e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Forrester v. White, 484 U. S., at 227-229; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S., at 360.
We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Judge Mireles' alleged actions were not taken in his judicial capacity. This Court in Stump made clear that "whether an act by a judge is a `judicial' one relate[s] to the nature of the act itself, i. e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i. e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity." 435 U. S., at 362. See also Forrester v. White, 484 U. S., at 227-229. A judge's direction to court officers to bring a person who is in the courthouse before him is a function normally performed by a judge. See generally Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 128, 177, 187 (West 1982 and Supp. 1991) (setting forth broad powers of state judges in the conduct of proceedings).
Of course, a judge's direction to police officers to carry out a judicial order with excessive force is not a "function normally performed by a judge." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S., at 362. But if only the particular act in question were to be scrutinized, then any mistake of a judge in excess of his authority would become a "nonjudicial" act, because an improper or erroneous act cannot be said to be normally performed by a judge. If judicial immunity means anything, it
Nor does the fact that Judge Mireles' order was carried out by police officers somehow transform his action from "judicial" to "executive" in character. As Forrester instructs, it is "the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it, that inform[s] our immunity analysis." 484 U. S., at 229. A judge's direction to an executive officer to bring counsel before the court is no more executive in character than a judge's issuance of a warrant for an executive officer to search a home. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492 (1991) ("[T]he issuance of a search warrant is unquestionably a judicial act").
Because the Court of Appeals concluded that Judge Mireles did not act in his judicial capacity, the court did not reach the second part of the immunity inquiry: whether Judge Mireles' actions were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. We have little trouble concluding that they were not. If Judge Mireles authorized and ratified the police officers' use of excessive force, he acted in excess of his authority. But such an action—taken in the very aid of the judge's jurisdiction over a matter before him—cannot be said to have been taken in the absence of jurisdiction.
The petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Judicial immunity attaches only to actions undertaken in a judicial capacity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-229 (1988). In determining whether an action is "judicial," we consider the nature of the act and whether it is a "function normally performed by a judge." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978).
Respondent Howard Waco alleges that petitioner Judge Raymond Mireles ordered police officers "to forcibly and with excessive force seize and bring" respondent into petitioner's courtroom. App. to Pet. for Cert. B-3, ¶ 7(a). As the Court acknowledges, ordering police officers to use excessive force is "not a `function normally performed by a judge.' " Ante, at 12 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S., at 362). The Court nevertheless finds that judicial immunity is applicable because of the action's "relation to a general function normally performed by a judge." Ante, at 13.
Accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, as we must in reviewing a motion to dismiss, petitioner issued two commands to the police officers. He ordered them to bring respondent into his courtroom, and he ordered them to commit a battery. The first order was an action taken in a judicial capacity; the second clearly was not. Ordering a battery has no relation to a function normally performed by a judge. If an interval of a minute or two had separated the two orders, it would be undeniable that no immunity would attach to the latter order. The fact that both are alleged to
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Kennedy joins, dissenting.
"A summary reversal . . . is a rare and exceptional disposition, `usually reserved by this Court for situations in which the law is well settled and stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error.' " R. Stern, E. Gressman, & S. Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice 281 (6th ed. 1986) (quoting Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 791 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). As Justice Stevens' dissent amply demonstrates, the decision here reversed is, at a minimum, not clearly in error.
I frankly am unsure whether the Court's disposition or Justice Stevens' favored disposition is correct; but I am sure that, if we are to decide this case, we should not do so without briefing and argument. In my view, we should not decide it at all; the factual situation it presents is so extraordinary that it does not warrant the expenditure of our time. I would have denied the petition for writ of certiorari.