MICHAEL J. KELLY, J.
Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit after plaintiff Arlene Shuttleworth was terminated from her employment by defendant in alleged retaliation for filing a complaint under the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act, MCL 408.1001 et seq.; MSA 17.50(1) et seq. The circuit court granted summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) in favor of defendant after finding that plaintiff Arlene Shuttleworth had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the MIOSHA and had failed to file a timely claim under § 2 of the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.362; MSA 17.428(2). Plaintiffs appeal as of right, and we affirm.
A motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim solely on the basis of the pleadings. All factual allegations made in support of the claim
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in finding that the WPA is the exclusive remedy for an employee who has been wrongfully discharged from employment for reporting an employer's violation of the law. Plaintiffs assert that a commonlaw cause of action for retaliatory discharge predated the WPA and that, therefore, the remedies are cumulative. We disagree.
The WPA provides a remedy to an employee terminated for reporting to any public body a violation of any law or regulation of this state, a political subdivision, or the United States. MCL 15.362; MSA 17.428(2). It is the general rule in this state that when a statute creates a new right or imposes a new duty having no counterpart in the common law, the remedies provided in the statute for its violation are exclusive and not cumulative. Pompey v General Motors Corp, 385 Mich. 537, 552; 189 N.W.2d 243 (1971). This Court in Covell v Spengler, 141 Mich.App. 76; 366 N.W.2d 76 (1985), held that no common-law counterpart existed before passage of the WPA and that, therefore, the act is the exclusive remedy for an employee whose employment is terminated in retaliation for reporting an employer's violation of the law. Plaintiffs have not cited, nor do we find, any commonlaw counterpart to the WPA.
Although plaintiffs maintain that retaliatory discharge actions predated passage of the WPA, they failed to direct this Court to any decision recognizing a common-law right for the type of
Lastly, we note that a separate remedy under the MIOSHA was available to plaintiff Arlene Shuttleworth for being terminated in retaliation for filing a complaint or instituting a proceeding under that act. Tyrna v Adamo, Inc, 159 Mich.App. 592; 407 N.W.2d 47 (1987). However, before resorting to a civil action, she first must have pursued the administrative remedies contained in the MIOSHA. Schwartz v Michigan Sugar Co, 106 Mich.App. 471, 480; 308 N.W.2d 459 (1981). The trial court did not err in finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim.