Petitioner argues that the court improperly computed the Statute of Limitations from the date of the issuance of the original determination rather than from the date of the denial of her request to vacate the default. She also contends that even if the Statute of Limitations has expired, this court can review the agency's decision since it was unconstitutional, and violated the agency's own rules and regulations. Moreover, she asserts, the Hearing Officer's denial of her request to vacate the default was arbitrary and capricious. After review of the record, we find petitioner's claims to be without merit.
CPLR 217 provides that "a proceeding against a body or officer must be commenced within four months after the determination to be reviewed becomes final and binding upon the petitioner". Here, petitioner commenced her article 78 proceeding 17 months after the Housing Authority's final determination was mailed to her; it is well established that an application to reconsider an administrative determination does not extend the four-month Statute of Limitations. (Matter of Johnson v Christian, 114 A.D.2d 321, 322.)
We find no record support for the claim that the Housing Authority violated petitioner's constitutional rights. Petitioner was afforded a hearing and the opportunity to argue her application. (See, Escalera v New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, cert denied 400 U.S. 853.) The record also demonstrates that the Hearing Officer's determination not to vacate the default was rationally based. (See, Matter of Papadakis v Brezenoff, 103 A.D.2d 704, 705, affd 64 N.Y.2d 878.)
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