Ordered that the order dated February 2, 1987 is affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that the appeal from the order dated October 26, 1987 is dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the respondents are awarded one bill of costs.
We agree with the Supreme Court that the documents submitted by the defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment constituted prima facie evidence that the plaintiff had not suffered any serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). The report of the physician who examined the plaintiff shortly after the accident stated that the plaintiff had suffered only a "moderate cervical strain" and that there was "no actual limitation of motion". The plaintiff failed to submit any competent evidence in opposition to the defendants' motion. Under these circumstances, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the defendants (see, Insurance Law § 5102 [d]; Palmer v Amaker, 141 A.D.2d 622; Gootz v Kelly, 140 A.D.2d 874; Benitez v Sexton, 139 A.D.2d 686; Caiazzo v Crespi, 124 A.D.2d 623).
The plaintiff subsequently moved for "reargument" of his opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Although the plaintiff's subsequent motion was denominated as one for leave to reargue, he now argues that it was actually one for renewal since it was based on additional evidence which included medical reports prepared in August 1987. These reports were prepared several months after summary judgment had been granted in favor of the defendants and