Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs payable to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
Where the evidence as to the cause of an accident is undisputed, the question as to whether any act or omission of the defendant was a proximate cause thereof is one for the court and not for the jury (Rivera v City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 856). Unquestionably, a proximate cause of the accident was the fact that Goldstein lost control of his motor vehicle, causing it to crash through the fence of the restaurant and strike Rivera. There will ordinarily be no duty imposed on a defendant to prevent a third party from causing harm to another unless the intervening act which caused the plaintiff's injuries was a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant's negligence (Boltax v Joy Day Camp, 67 N.Y.2d 617). The plaintiffs failed to set forth any evidentiary facts to demonstrate that this particular accident was not a unique occurrence. The fact that the outdoor dining and play area were near two major thoroughfares and the fact that the fence could not withstand the impact of a runaway automobile is insufficient to establish the respondents' liability for the unforeseeable event of a driver losing control of his vehicle (see, Grandy v Bavaro, 134 A.D.2d 957; Marcroft v Carvel Corp., 120 A.D.2d 651; cf., Arena v Ostrin, 134 A.D.2d 306). The restaurant was merely the location of the accident, not the cause (see, Benjamin v City of New York, 99 A.D.2d 995, affd 64 N.Y.2d 44).