ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge:
A defendant convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute appeals his 90-month sentence. After determining the applicable offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines, the district court made an upward departure on the basis of its finding that a firearm was in the defendant's possession during his commission of the offense and the cocaine was of high purity. The adjustment for firearm possession was proper, but we remand for a hearing on whether the cocaine was of unusually high purity because the district court did not afford the defendant an opportunity to dispute the factual basis for this departure.
I.
Manuel Otero and an undercover agent engaged in negotiations for the sale of a quantity of cocaine. On April 8, 1988, the agent purchased approximately one ounce of cocaine from Otero in Laredo, Texas. Thereafter, the agent and Otero agreed that Otero would deliver approximately twenty ounces of cocaine to the agent for $20,000. The deal was to take place in Laredo, but the parties eventually decided to consummate the transaction in San Antonio. On April 15, after telephone conversations, Otero and the undercover agent met in room 154 at the La Quinta Motor Lodge in San Antonio. Otero delivered two packages of cocaine to the agent, one of 493.8 grams and one of 88.3 grams. Before any money was delivered, the agent gave an arrest signal.
After Otero was arrested the agents seized an additional package of 10.5 grams of cocaine from Otero's hotel room. The average purity of all the cocaine either delivered by or seized from Otero was 93%. The agents also searched Otero's van, where they found a Smith & Wesson .357 caliber handgun and five rounds of ammunition.
Otero pled guilty to distributing approximately twenty ounces of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Because the offense took place after November 1, 1987, the Sentencing Guidelines apply to his sentence.
II.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 provides the statutory standard for reviewing sentences. Section 213(a) of the Act provides, in relevant part:
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the findings of fact of the
Otero does not contend that the sentence was improperly computed but that the record does not support the factual conclusions requisite to the upward adjustment for firearm possession and that the judge used an impermissible factor in departing from the guidelines to make the adjustment for cocaine purity. While we review the application of the guidelines fully for errors of law, we accept the fact findings of the district court absent clear error.
The trial court must sentence a convicted defendant to a term within the range provided by the Sentencing Guidelines, unless it finds "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines." In determining whether the Commission adequately considered a factor, the court may look only to the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission.
Interpreting the statutory provision, the Sentencing Commission has explained the grounds for departure from the guidelines. Section 5K2.0 of the guidelines provides:
The guideline for the offense to which Otero pleaded, distribution of a controlled substance, contains a specific-offense characteristic for possession of a firearm "during commission of the offense."
Either use or possession of a firearm therefore suffices to support a sentence above the calculated guideline. The firearm need not, as Otero contends, have played a significantly more prominent role than it would in the ordinary case, whatever role firearms play in an "ordinary" case of cocaine distribution, for firearm use or possession per se is a permissible basis for upward adjustment. The commentary to Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(1) explains when an upward adjustment for weapon possession should be made:
While Otero asserts, and the probation officer conceded, that Otero could not be convicted under Texas law for the misdemeanor offense of unlawfully carrying a weapon because he was traveling outside the county of his residence, that is not determinative. Otero mistakenly relies on United States v. Prieto-Tejas;
The record does not reflect that Otero possessed a firearm when the cocaine was delivered. The addendum to the presentence report, however, concludes that Otero transported the cocaine from Houston to San Antonio and that he had the firearm in his possession during the trip. The telephone communications between the undercover agent and Otero support the conclusion that Otero, who lived in Houston, decided to deliver the cocaine in San Antonio and that he traveled from Houston to San Antonio to do so. Thus the court's factual conclusion that Otero constructively possessed a weapon during the commission of the offense is not clearly erroneous.
With regard to the upward adjustment for "the unusually high purity" of the cocaine,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a)(1) provides, "At the sentencing hearing, the court shall afford the counsel for the defendant and the attorney for the Government an opportunity to comment upon the probation officer's determination and on other matters relating to the appropriate sentence." This rule contemplates that the court may base its sentencing decisions on matters not raised in the presentence report. If, however, the court intends to rely on any such additional factor to make an upward adjustment of the sentence, defense counsel must be given an opportunity to address the court on the issue. Otherwise the purpose of Rule 32(c), to ensure the accuracy of sentencing information, would be defeated.
Because the purity of the cocaine as a basis for an upward departure from the Guidelines was first mentioned when the trial judge imposed the sentence, we find that the judge did not comply with the comment requirement of Rule 32(a)(1). Furthermore, because the parties did not have an opportunity to address the issue, there was no evidence on which the district court could determine whether cocaine that is 93% pure is of "unusually high purity." We therefore vacate the sentence and remand the case for resentencing.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
Comment
User Comments