WESTWEGO CITIZENS FOR BETTER GOVERN. v. CITY OF WESTWEGO

KING, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-appellants Westwego Citizens for Better Government appeal from the judgment of the district court dismissing their class-action suit under section 2 et seq. of the Voting Rights Act. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand this case for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I.

Westwego is a small city located in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana with a population of 12,663 persons of whom 1,466 — or 11.6% — are black. Pursuant to Louisiana's Lawrason Act, Westwego is governed by a mayor and Board of Aldermen. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 33:321 et seq. (West 1988). The five aldermen are elected on an at-large basis and also serve as coordinators of five city departments. While there is no prohibition of "bullet" or "single-shot" voting, there is a majority vote requirement. It is apparently undisputed that no black candidate has ever run for the Board of Aldermen.

Plaintiffs1 filed suit on November 20, 1985 alleging that Westwego's system of electing aldermen on an at-large basis results in the denial or abridgement of black citizens' rights to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the "Act"), as amended. Plaintiffs sought to demonstrate, through analyses of recent state and local elections, that the voting patterns of Westwego's voters are so racially polarized that a black candidate could not be elected under the present electoral system. Plaintiffs also sought to demonstrate that Louisiana and Jefferson Parish in particular have a long history of racial discrimination which includes segregation and the imposition of significant barriers to black citizens' right to vote, that the residential areas of the City are still segregated by race, and that there continues to be a significant disparity in the socioeconomic status of black and white residents of the City. Plaintiffs also sought to show that the present city government is not responsive to the concerns of Westwego's black residents.

As a remedy for the allegedly unlawful dilution of minority votes, plaintiffs proposed two districting plans for Westwego — one which would retain the present five-member Board of Aldermen and one which would expand the number of aldermen to six. Both plans would create one district in which black residents would comprise a majority (52.9% under the five-aldermen plan and 59% under the six-aldermen plan).

The trial was initially postponed, pending the Supreme Court's decision in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986) — the Court's first case involving the 1982 amendments to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The Supreme Court issued its decision on June 30, 1986. At the conclusion of a two-day bench trial, the district judge dismissed the case, for reasons stated orally at the close of evidence. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal, asserting that the district court erred in dismissing the case.

II.

In order to review the district court's judgment, it is essential that we have before us findings of fact and conclusions of law which adequately reflect the bases of the district court's decision. Before we can consider appellants' other claims of error in the district court's decision, we must therefore decide whether we have in this case a sufficient foundation for appellate review.

A. Adequacy of District Court's Findings

The district court's factual findings regarding section 2 claims and the ultimate determination of whether vote dilution has occurred are ordinarily subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79, 106 S.Ct. at 2781; Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 498 & n. 4 (5th Cir.1987). However, Rule 52(a) also requires that such findings "provide a sufficiently definite predicate for proper appellate review." Curtis v. Commissioner, 623 F.2d 1047, 1051 (5th Cir.1980) (quoting Hydrospace-Challenger, Inc. v. Tracor/MAS, Inc., 520 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir.1975)). We have stressed repeatedly the special need for detailed findings of fact in vote dilution cases:

Velasquez v. City of Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir.1984) (quoting Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 879 (5th Cir.1979), vacated on other grounds, 704 F.2d 143 (5th Cir.1983)).

In Velasquez, we found it necessary to remand the case to the district court for further findings because, despite an otherwise long and detailed opinion, the court failed "to take note of substantial contrary evidence." Id. at 1021.2

In the instant case, the district court dismissed the case without providing written findings of fact or conclusions of law. While Rule 52(a) provides that "[i]t will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence," the findings must still be sufficiently specific to provide a basis for the judgment and for meaningful appellate review of the decision.

The district court's findings in this case are manifestly inadequate. The district court not only failed "to take note of substantial contrary evidence" as in Velasquez, it also failed to specify on which evidence it relied in support of its conclusions. The district court's findings are stated in a conclusory fashion, with virtually no reference to the evidence presented at trial. While the district court may in fact have evaluated the evidence critically, the court's assessment of the evidence cannot be discerned from the record before us: "[W]e are unable to determine from a silent record the thought processes of the court below." Velasquez, 725 F.2d at 1021.

Because we find that the district court failed to explain its reasoning with sufficient particularity, we must remand this case to the district court so that it may make the specific findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary to support a judgment.

B. Errors of Law

While we cannot render any decision on the merits of appellants' voting dilution claim, we will address the errors of law which the district court is alleged to have made in order to provide guidance for the proceedings on remand.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended,3 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 and provides as follows:

The question which the trial court must answer in a section 2 case "is whether `as a result of the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice.'" Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44, 106 S.Ct. at 2763 (quoting Senate Report).

It has been widely recognized that "multimember district and at-large voting schemes may operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial minorities in the voting population." Id. at 47, 106 S.Ct. at 2765. Such schemes are not, however, per se violations of section 2. Id. at 46, 106 S.Ct. at 2764. Rather, the determination whether an at-large election system such as Westwego's violates section 2 "`depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality' ... and on a `functional view of the political process.'" Id. at 45, 106 S.Ct. at 2763.

The Senate Report enumerates several factors that generally are relevant to the evaluation of section 2 claims:

Typical factors include:

S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 177, 206-07.

In Gingles, the Supreme Court clarified that "[w]hile many or all of the factors listed in the Senate Report may be relevant" to a vote dilution challenge to an at-large electoral system, "the use of multimember districts generally will not impede the ability of minority voters to elect representatives of their choice," unless "a bloc voting majority [would] usually be able to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically insular minority group." 478 U.S. at 48-49, 106 S.Ct. at 2765-2766; Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir.1988). Under Gingles, plaintiffs must establish first, that the group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district;4 second, that it is politically cohesive; and third, that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. 478 U.S. at 50-51, 106 S.Ct. at 2766-67; Campos, 840 F.2d at 1243. The second and third elements are usually established by statistical evidence of racially polarized voting by the voters in the relevant political unit. Id. The final determination, however, must be made by an evaluation of the "totality of the circumstances," including the factors listed in the Senate Report. See Citizens For a Better Gretna, 834 F.2d at 498-99 (noting that Senate Report substantially follows factors set forth in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir.1973) (en banc), so that analysis under Zimmer was not sufficiently different as to require remand in light of Gingles); Campos, 840 F.2d at 1249.

Appellants assert that the district court misapplied the governing law in several critical respects. Specifically, they argue (1) that the district court improperly held that a greater showing of discriminatory results is required in voting dilution cases involving the electoral systems of small city governments as opposed to larger political bodies; (2) that the court improperly refused to consider evidence of bloc voting derived from elections other than aldermanic elections; (3) that the court improperly considered factors which are irrelevant to the determination of a section 2 violation; and (4) that the court generally failed to apply properly the Act's "totality of the circumstances" test.

We address each of appellants' claims in turn.

1. Applicability of the Voting Rights Act to Local Elections.

Appellants object that the district court erroneously held that small municipal governments are subject to less stringent standards under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act than are larger political subdivisions. The following comments by the district court are the source of appellants' concern:

While it is not clear whether the district court in fact applied a different standard of proof for small city governments, the court does imply that the Gingles decision, which involved the reapportionment of state legislative districts, does not apply with equal force to at-large municipal elections.

There is absolutely no authority for this proposition. Congress clearly contemplated that city governments would be subject to Section 2 and created no exception for small political subdivisions.5 Indeed, we have decided numerous vote dilution claims under section 2, involving the at-large electoral systems of municipalities of varying sizes, without any suggestion that these political subdivisions are subject to a less stringent standard than larger political subdivisions. See, e.g., Campos, 840 F.2d 1240 (at-large system of electing city council members violated section 2); Citizens for a Better Gretna, 834 F.2d 496 (city's at-large system of electing aldermen violated section 2); Velasquez, 725 F.2d 1017 (remanding to district court for further findings regarding section 2 challenge to at-large method of electing city council members); Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364 (5th Cir.1984) (at-large system of electing city council members violated section 2). Any doubt regarding the applicability of the Gingles decision to this case is in any event eliminated by our recent applications of Gingles to aldermanic elections in Westwego's neighboring town of Gretna, Citizens for a Better Gretna, 834 F.2d at 498-504, and to city council elections in the City of Baytown, Texas. Campos, 840 F.2d at 1242-50.

To the extent, therefore, that the district court believed that a less stringent standard applies to the electoral systems of small municipalities, that view is erroneous. The district court should be guided on remand by our decisions in Citizens for a Better Gretna and Overton v. City of Austin, 871 F.2d 529 (5th Cir.1989).

2. Evidence Demonstrating Racial Bloc Voting.

Appellants argue further that the district court erroneously declined to consider evidence of racial bloc voting derived from elections other than the aldermanic elections.6 Evidence of racially polarized voting "is the linchpin of a section 2 vote dilution claim," Citizens For a Better Gretna, 834 F.2d at 499, and is relevant to establishing two of the three elements set forth in the Gingles decision — the political cohesiveness of the minority group and the ability of the white majority usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56, 106 S.Ct. at 2770; Campos, 840 F.2d at 1244.

Again, although the basis of the district court's decision is not entirely clear, it does appear that the court relied heavily on the fact that there had never been a black candidate7 for the Westwego Board of Aldermen:

To the extent that these comments indicate that the district court believed that plaintiffs could not, as a matter of law, make out a vote dilution claim based on evidence of racially polarized voting drawn from elections other than the aldermanic elections themselves, this view is incorrect under both Gingles and Citizens for a Better Gretna.8 In the latter case, we explicitly declined to construe Gingles so narrowly that "the inability of ... blacks to participate as aldermanic candidates would also function to deprive them of relief under § 2."9 834 F.2d at 502-03. Instead, we found that Gingles "suggests flexibility in the face of sparse data." Id. at 502. In the Gretna case, data was available for only two aldermanic elections in which a black candidate had run. We noted that the Supreme Court addressed this situation in Gingles, stating that "where a minority group has begun to sponsor candidates just recently, the fact that statistics from only one or a few elections are available for examination does not foreclose a vote dilution claim." Id. (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 57 n. 25, 106 S.Ct. at 2770 n. 25). Accordingly, we held that the district court had properly considered additional evidence of racial bloc voting, derived from the voting patterns of Gretna precincts in "exogenous" elections10 — the 1984 presidential primary and state elections.

In the instant case, there are no statistics available for a Westwego aldermanic election involving a black candidate because there have been no black candidates. The Supreme Court, however, also contemplated that "[w]here a minority group has never been able to sponsor a candidate," plaintiffs could rely on other evidence to prove unequal access to the electoral process.11 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 57 n. 25, 106 S.Ct. at 2770 n. 25. While we noted in the Gretna case that "exogenous elections alone could not prove racially polarized voting in Gretna's aldermanic elections," 834 F.2d at 502, we also held that the data from nonaldermanic elections introduced in the Gretna case qualified "as a local appraisal because they reflect local voting patterns." Id. at 503. We read the second statement as a qualification of the first: Rather than implying that plaintiffs may never make out a vote dilution claim when there is no evidence from "indigenous" elections, the Gretna case properly focuses the inquiry on the probative value of the proferred evidence as an indicator of the voting behavior of the relevant polity.

Plaintiffs relied in this case not only on evidence drawn from the voting patterns of Westwego precincts in the 1984 presidential primary elections and in state-wide elections, but also on evidence from elections involving black candidates in parish-wide contests. Following our decision in Citizens for a Better Gretna, the district court should decide whether this evidence qualifies as a sufficiently "local appraisal" to establish some degree of racial bloc voting by Westwego's voters and should base its ultimate conclusion upon the strength of that evidence, considered in the context of the "totality of the circumstances" test. In other words, plaintiffs may not be denied relief simply because the absence of black candidates has created a sparsity of data on racially polarized voting in purely indigenous elections. Rather, plaintiffs' claims should stand or fall based upon the probative value of the evidence of racial bloc voting that they have adduced,12 along with the presence or absence of other factors demonstrating a lack of access to the political process.

3. Factors Irrelevant to the Vote Dilution Claim.

Appellants next contend that the district court relied improperly on several factors that are not relevant to the totality of the circumstances test mandated by section 2. Specifically, they point to comments by the district court referring to the absence of any discriminatory purpose behind Westwego's adoption of the at-large method of electing aldermen,13 several references to the longevity of Westwego's electoral system, and a discussion of the potential costs of changing to a single-member district system.14

Again, while it is not clear to what extent the district court in fact relied on these factors, we address the appropriateness of these considerations in order to avoid unnecessary confusion on remand.

First, while the district court did not treat the issue of discriminatory intent as dispositive, we caution that the explicit purpose of the 1982 amendment was to remove the requirement that in order to establish a violation of section 2, plaintiffs must show that the challenged electoral procedure or practice was installed or maintained for a discriminatory purpose. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35, 106 S.Ct. at 2759; Campos, 840 F.2d at 1242; Jones, 727 F.2d at 378. Congress clearly intended that a violation of section 2 "could be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35, 106 S.Ct. at 2759.

With respect to the district court's references to the longevity of the Westwego system, we simply caution again that the focal point of the district court's inquiry must be whether the electoral system — however long it has been in place — produces discriminatory results.

Finally, the district court observed in closing that because Westwego aldermen also are responsible for administering certain city departments, a change to a single-member district system could require a costly reorganization of the city's administrative structure. We note, with the Eleventh Circuit, that "[n]owhere in the language of Section 2 nor in the legislative history does Congress condition the applicability of Section 2 on the function performed by an elected official." Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 250-51 (11th Cir.1986); cf. Chisom, 839 F.2d at 1062. In Dillard, the court evaluated a proposed remedy to a prior finding that the County's method of electing two county commissioners and the chairperson of the commission on an at-large basis violated section 2. The proposed alternative would have provided for five commissioners elected from single-member districts and one chairperson elected on an at-large basis. In response to objections to the proposal, the County argued that the chairperson had unique administrative duties and that it would disrupt the allocation of legislative and administrative duties to eliminate the single chairperson position, elected on an at-large basis. The court concluded that the disruption in the allocation of duties that would result from a proposed change in the electoral system is not a sufficient ground for maintaining an otherwise flawed system. Dillard, 831 F.2d at 252.

The question presented here is clearer than that presented in Dillard. We need not address whether these considerations could play a role in the process of crafting an appropriate remedy once a violation of section 2 has been found. We note only that Congress did not contemplate that such considerations would play a role in determining whether there has been a violation of section 2. A contrary holding would allow government bodies to defeat voting rights claims simply by attaching administrative duties to elected offices. This would frustrate Congress' aim of eliminating barriers to the political participation of minorities on grounds wholly irrelevant to the determination required by section 2 — namely, whether the electoral system at issue in fact denies minorities equal opportunities to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice.

Therefore, the district court should not consider this factor in determining whether Westwego's at-large electoral system violates section 2.

4. The Totality of the Circumstances Test.

Finally, appellants maintain that the district court appears to have erred in its consideration of several elements that are a part of the totality of the circumstances test. Specifically, appellants note that (1) a history of discrimination, not simply present discrimination, is relevant to a finding of vote dilution, (2) that evidence of socioeconomic inequalities between black and white citizens is relevant to establishing a lack of access to the political system, (3) the court must consider electoral practices which may enhance the dilution of minority votes, and (4) the court must evaluate critically the justifications offered for the retention of an at-large system of electing aldermen.

With regard to appellants' first concern, the district court stated:

To the extent that these comments indicate that the district court judge disregarded historical evidence of discrimination, based upon his belief that there has been no racial discrimination in Westwego or in the State of Louisiana in the past 15 to 20 years, the district court may have misconceived the role of historical evidence of discrimination in a section 2 claim. The concern underpinning section 2 "is that a certain electoral law, practice or structure interacts with social or historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunity enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47, 106 S.Ct. at 2765 (emphasis added). The first factor listed in the Senate Report is "the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process." S.Rep. supra, at 28, 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, at 206 (emphasis added) Thus, Congress was concerned not only with present discrimination, but with the vestiges of discrimination which may interact with present political structures to perpetuate a historical lack of access to the political system. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 69, 106 S.Ct. at 2776. While the district court may decide on remand that the historical evidence of discrimination is not significant in the totality of the circumstances, the court must provide a sounder basis for its conclusion than its personal opinion that discrimination has been eradicated in the recent past.

The following comments by the court are the source of appellants' second concern:

Again, it appears that the district court may have misconceived the role of evidence of socioeconomic inequalities in the totality of the circumstances test. The point is not whether changing the at-large electoral system would eliminate such inequalities. Rather, Congress and the courts have recognized that "political participation by minorities tends to be depressed where minority group members suffer effects of prior discrimination such as inferior education, poor employment opportunities, and low incomes." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 69, 106 S.Ct. at 2776. Evidence of socioeconomic inequalities therefore "may be probative of unequal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives." Id. The court may not disregard Congress' policy judgment regarding the relevance of these factors based simply upon a belief that these factors are widespread or may not be remedied by the relief sought by plaintiffs. On remand then, the district court should consider this evidence in the light intended by Congress.

Third, appellants argue that the district court did not adequately consider other aspects of Westwego's electoral system which could enhance the alleged dilution of minority votes. Specifically, the district court stated that:

The fact that majority vote requirements may be commonplace does not alter the fact that Congress clearly did conclude that such provisions could serve to further dilute the voting strength of minorities. See id. at 56, 106 S.Ct. at 2770; see also Jones, 727 F.2d at 383 (finding that majority vote requirement further submerges political minorities). Again, we caution that the district court may not eliminate a factor from the totality of the circumstances test simply because the court does not agree with Congress' policy judgment.

Finally, appellants note that the district court did not evaluate the reasons provided by the City for maintaining its at-large electoral system. Congress did note that the tenuousness of the policy underlying such a system may be probative of a violation of section 2. S.Rep., supra, at 29, 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, at 207. To the extent then that plaintiffs argue that Westwego's reasons for maintaining its present system of electing aldermen are tenuous, the court should address those arguments on remand.15

III.

We emphasize in conclusion that we do not express any opinion about the merits of plaintiffs' claims. We may not do so until we have before us a decision of the district court which sets forth with sufficient particularity its factual findings and the reasoning upon which its ultimate conclusion is based. As the basis of the district court's judgment is unclear, we have addressed appellants' allegations of legal error simply to provide guidance to the district court on remand — we cannot determine from this record the extent to which any of the asserted errors may have affected the district court's judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is VACATED and the case REMANDED for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with this opinion.