COFFEY, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiff-appellant William Lowrance filed a § 1983 action alleging he was arrested and detained without probable cause in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. He appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Benton County, Tennessee, sheriff and two Kenosha, Wisconsin, police officers involved in the arrest. We affirm.
On Thursday, December 1, 1983, Merian Lowrance, the plaintiff-appellant's wife, filed for divorce in the Chancery Court of Benton County, Tennessee. On the same day, Mrs. Lowrance obtained ex parte orders from the Tennessee Chancery Court granting her temporary custody of the Lowrances' three-year-old daughter, Heather, and restraining the plaintiff-appellant William Lowrance from "coming about, interfering with, telephoning or having any contact with the plaintiff [Mrs. Lowrance], or interfering with the custody of the minor child ... [or] exercising unsupervised visitation with said minor child pending a hearing." On December 1, 1983, the appellant Lowrance picked up Heather from a babysitter in Benton County and took her to his parents' home in Kenosha, Wisconsin. During the afternoon or evening of December 1, 1983, Mrs. Lowrance telephoned the Benton County Sheriff, Bobby Shannon, and informed him that her husband had taken Heather and left the area. Sheriff Shannon advised Mrs. Lowrance to contact her attorney.
As of Sunday, December 4, 1983, the appellant and Heather had not returned to their home in Benton County, Tennessee. That morning, Merian Lowrance went to the Benton County Sheriff's Department and advised Sheriff Shannon that her attorney had suggested that she seek a warrant for her husband's arrest. Mrs. Lowrance advised Shannon that the appellant had taken their daughter, Heather, to Kenosha, Wisconsin, and she (Mrs. Lowrance) was fearful he would take the child to Canada. She also informed Shannon that she was having serious marital problems, a divorce was pending and that she had obtained ex parte custody and restraining orders.
Based on the information the appellant's wife provided, Sheriff Shannon typed an "Affidavit of Complaint" for Mrs. Lowrance's signature, stating as follows:
While Sheriff Shannon typed the Affidavit of Complaint, or shortly thereafter, Mac Prichard, the Clerk of the Benton County General Sessions Court, arrived at the Sheriff's Department.
In the early afternoon of December 4, 1983, the City of Kenosha, Wisconsin, Police Department received a teletype message from the Benton County, Tennessee, Sheriff's Department reciting that:
On December 4 the Kenosha, Wisconsin, Police Department command responded with a teletype message to the Benton County, Tennessee, Sheriff's Department stating the appellant's arrest warrant did not appear on the National Crime Information Center's (NCIC) computer and that the "warrant must be on NCIC files for us to pick up and hold [the appellant]." Later that afternoon, a warrant for the arrest of William Lowrance appeared on the NCIC computer. Based on the information in the NCIC computer, Kenosha Police Officers George Pflueger and Gary Sentieri arrested William Lowrance during the evening hours of December 4, 1983, and detained him in the Kenosha county jail. The appellant, after being confined overnight in jail, was released the following day on a $1,000 signature bond. Three days later, on December 8, 1983, the appellant appeared before a Kenosha County Court Commissioner, who reviewed the warrant of arrest, found it to be "defective" and quashed it. Benton County, Tennessee, subsequently dropped the charges against the appellant.
The appellant alleges in his complaint that Sheriff Shannon and Officers Pflueger and Sentieri were responsible for his arrest and detention without probable cause in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. Specifically, he claims Sheriff Shannon violated his rights in making application for the arrest warrant without initially establishing the appellant's knowledge of the ex parte custody and restraining orders issued to Mrs. Lowrance. He argues Sheriff Shannon was required to establish the appellant's knowledge of the orders because "it was not a crime under Tennessee law for a lawful parent to leave the State of Tennessee to go to another state with a minor child." Furthermore, the appellant alleges Officers Pflueger and Sentieri violated his rights in arresting him without independently ascertaining whether probable cause existed.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Shannon on qualified immunity grounds, stating: "[A]
The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Kenosha Police Officers Pflueger and Sentieri, ruling that they were not required to conduct an independent investigation into the question of probable cause but could reasonably rely upon the NCIC's computer and the information received via teletype from the Benton County Sheriff's Department.
Initially, we determine whether Sheriff Shannon is entitled to qualified immunity from liability for damages for his role in the appellant's arrest. In a § 1983 action based upon a violation of the fourth amendment, it is not sufficient to establish that an arrest warrant was "defective" (as the Kenosha County Court Commission determined in this case) or that an arrest was made without probable cause. Donald v. Polk County, 836 F.2d 376, 384 (7th Cir.1988). Rather, the qualified immunity defense will shield the defendant from liability unless the record demonstrates that the defendant had no reasonable good faith belief in the legality of the seizure. Id. The Supreme Court explained the "reasonableness" or "good faith" standard in the qualified immunity context in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). In that case, a Rhode Island state trooper (Malley) presented felony complaints and affidavits to a Rhode Island state district court judge, who signed arrest warrants attached thereto. The charges against the arrestees were eventually dropped when the grand jury refused to return an indictment. The arrestees later brought suit under § 1983 alleging that Malley's application for arrest warrants, under the circumstances presented, violated their rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
The Supreme Court held that the standard of "objective reasonableness ... defines the qualified immunity accorded an officer whose request for a warrant allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest." Malley, 475 U.S. at 344, 106 S.Ct. at 1097. Thus,
Id. at 344-45, 106 S.Ct. at 1097-98. The Supreme Court emphasized in Malley and this court has reiterated that the test is an objective one, requiring that "the plaintiff ... demonstrate that a reasonable official, confronted with the specific facts at issue and the law in effect at the time, would have known that his conduct violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights." Schertz v. Waupaca County, 875 F.2d 578, 583 (7th Cir.1989), citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987), and Green v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 647, 651 (7th Cir.1987). See also Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180, 1201-1210 (7th Cir.1988) (en banc).
On the face of the affidavit it is clear that Mrs. Lowrance had "lawful charge" of Heather, in that she had been granted custody of the child and had obtained an order restraining the appellant from interfering with custody. In addition, the Affidavit alleges a "taking" in violation of the statute, stating the appellant did "take Heather ... from a babysitter in Benton County, Tennessee, ... to the state of Wisconsin." We note there is no record evidence that Mrs. Lowrance consented to Heather's accompanying the appellant on his journey north. Moreover, we are convinced that the Affidavit contains more than sufficient information to support a belief that the appellant took Heather "with intent to detain or conceal" in violation of § 39-2-303. In this regard, the Affidavit reflects the following: the appellant and Heather had been missing for three days at the time Sheriff Shannon requested the arrest warrant; the appellant took Heather to Kenosha, Wisconsin, (we take judicial notice of the fact that Kenosha, Wisconsin, is several hundred miles north of Tennessee and in the general direction of Canada, and is less than 300 miles from a Canadian port of entry); the appellant had previously threatened to take Heather to Canada; and the Affidavit's reference to the custody and restraining orders demonstrates that Heather was in the middle of a severely damaged marital relationship. Indeed, Mrs. Lowrance told Sheriff Shannon that she and the appellant were having serious marital problems and that a divorce was pending. We are convinced a law enforcement officer could reasonably conclude from the Affidavit of Complaint, and specifically from its reference to the custody and restraining orders issued to Mrs. Lowrance, Heather's three-day absence, the breakdown of the Lowrances' marriage, the appellant's stated desire to remove Heather to Canada and his having traveled several hundred miles in that direction, that there was probable cause for the appellant's arrest for violation of § 39-2-303.
The appellant urges the Affidavit of Complaint lacks sufficient indicia of probable cause for qualified immunity purposes because it failed to state affirmatively that the appellant took Heather knowing she had been placed in Mrs. Lowrance's legal custody. The need for such an averment is premised on the Tennessee Supreme Court's holding in Hicks v. State, 158 Tenn. 204, 12 S.W.2d 385 (1928), that a parent cannot "kidnap" his or her own child in violation of § 39-2-303 unless and until the parent becomes aware that legal custody has been awarded to another person.
Sheriff Shannon testified during his deposition that he did not know when he applied for the appellant's arrest warrant whether the appellant had been served with either the custody or the restraining order. Indeed, as the appellant observes, the Affidavit itself demonstrates that at least the restraining order had yet "to be served" as of December 4, 1983. Thus, the record demonstrates that Sheriff Shannon presented Mrs. Lowrance's Affidavit without knowing for certain that the appellant took Heather in knowing violation of his wife's custodial rights. The question before us is whether a reasonable law enforcement officer in Sheriff Shannon's position would have believed, based on the Affidavit of Complaint (as well as Sheriff Shannon's independent knowledge of the Lowrances' severe marital difficulties) and the law in effect at the time (including Hicks), that a warrant should have issued — considering Malley's"objective reasonableness" standard provides "ample room for mistaken judgments," and "ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley, 475 U.S. at 341 and 343, 106 S.Ct. at 1096 and 1097.
Notwithstanding the Tennessee Supreme Court's holding in Hicks, we are convinced a law enforcement officer might very reasonably conclude under the circumstances presented that the appellant took Heather from Tennessee to Wisconsin in violation of § 39-2-303. Sheriff Shannon knew the appellant and Mrs. Lowrance had a history of and were presently undergoing serious marital problems, possibly culminating in a divorce, and that Mrs. Lowrance had legal custody of Heather. He also could reasonably assume the couple had argued over Heather, as Mrs. Lowrance told him (and the Affidavit of Complaint recites) that the appellant had previously threatened to take the child to Canada. In addition, the appellant transported the child several hundred miles from Benton County, Tennessee, in the direction of Canada on December 1, 1983, without Mrs. Lowrance's knowledge or consent. Furthermore, the appellant took Heather on the very day the custody and restraining orders issued, on his wife's petition, a coincidence which in our view could logically lead an officer reasonably to conclude that the appellant knew his wife was going to or had obtained the custody and restraining orders, even though service apparently had not been accomplished. The timing of the appellant's action, as well as the distance and direction he traveled with Heather, strongly suggest that the incident was not the typical exercise of a parental right to custody, the product of a minor domestic squabble or an innocent desire to visit Heather's grandparents. Rather, we have little doubt that Sheriff Shannon might very reasonably have concluded that the appellant's conduct resulted from an "intent to detain or conceal" Heather within the meaning of § 39-2-303, and thus was entitled to reasonably believe there was probable cause for his arrest. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Sheriff Shannon on qualified immunity grounds.
The district court also ruled that Kenosha, Wisconsin, Police Officers Sentieri
Officers Sentieri and Pflueger were informed, via teletype from the Benton County, Tennessee, Sheriff's Department, that a warrant had issued for the appellant's arrest; that the appellant had been charged with kidnapping his three-year-old daughter in violation of a Tennessee statute; that Mrs. Lowrance had been granted legal custody of the child; and that the appellant was "preparing to leave for Canada." Moreover, the Kenosha Police Department took the precaution of insisting that the appellant's arrest warrant be entered and recorded on the NCIC computer before it took any action. Officers Sentieri and Pflueger acted only after the existence of the warrant had been confirmed through the NCIC. Because we have previously determined that Sheriff Shannon acted reasonably in making application for the appellant's warrant of arrest, and Officers Sentieri and Pflueger had the same information Sheriff Shannon possessed (and, in addition, knew that a warrant had issued for the appellant's arrest, from which they could infer that a neutral, detached judicial officer had reviewed the information and found probable cause), it follows that Officers Sentieri and Pflueger acted reasonably in arresting the appellant. Therefore, Kenosha, Wisconsin, Police Officers Sentieri and Pflueger are entitled to qualified immunity as well. See also Donta v. Hooper, 774 F.2d 716, 721 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1019, 107 S.Ct. 3261, 97 L.Ed.2d 760 (1987) (Ohio police entitled to qualified immunity for arrest based upon a teletype from Kentucky state police); Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 1037, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971) ("[P]olice officers called upon to aid other officers in executing arrest warrants are entitled to assume that the officers requesting aid offered the magistrate the information requisite to support an independent judicial assessment of probable cause.") (dicta).
The district court's judgment is
Malley, 475 U.S. at 345, 106 S.Ct. at 1098. The Court went on the state in footnote 9:
Id. at 346 n. 9, 106 S.Ct. at 1098 n. 9.
Hicks, 12 S.W.2d at 386. Unlike this case, Hicks resulted from Mr. Hicks' challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his kidnapping conviction. The Hicks court did not reach the question of civil liability of the officers (if any) involved in Hicks' arrest.