In this case of first impression we are asked to determine whether a store owner must provide armed, visible security guards to protect customers from the criminal acts of third parties.
I
On May 4, 1979, plaintiff Willie Williams was shopping in a Cunningham drug store located in a high crime area of the City of Detroit. A plainclothes security guard was employed by the store, but on the day in question he was sick. Store personnel called the main office to request a substitute, but one was not sent.
While plaintiff was shopping, an armed robbery occurred. During the resulting confusion and panic, plaintiff ran out of the store, directly behind the fleeing robber. As the two men were outside, the robber turned and shot plaintiff.
In May of 1980, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant Cunningham Drug Stores, alleging that defendant had breached its duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its patrons. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendant had failed to provide armed, visible security guards and had failed to intercede after having noticed that an armed robbery was in progress. Plaintiff's
Upon the close of plaintiffs' proofs at trial, defendant moved for a directed verdict pursuant to GCR 1963, 515.1 (now MCR 2.515), on the basis that defendant did not have a duty to protect plaintiff from the unforeseeable acts of a third party. The trial court granted defendant's motion as a matter of law and directed a verdict of no cause of action.
Plaintiff appealed by right in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed, holding that as a matter of law defendant's duty of reasonable care did not extend to providing the degree of protection plaintiffs claimed was due. Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 146 Mich.App. 23; 379 N.W.2d 458 (1985).
We granted plaintiffs' application for leave to appeal, 425 Mich. 871 (1986), and now affirm.
II
In determining standards of conduct in the area of negligence, the courts have made a distinction between misfeasance, or active misconduct causing personal injury, and nonfeasance, which is passive inaction or the failure to actively protect others from harm. The common law has been slow in recognizing liability for nonfeasance because the courts are reluctant to force persons to help one another and because such conduct does not create a new risk of harm to a potential plaintiff.
Social policy, however, has led the courts to recognize an exception to this general rule where a special relationship exists between a plaintiff and a defendant.
Owners and occupiers of land are in a special relationship with their invitees and comprise the largest group upon whom an affirmative duty to protect is imposed. The possessor of land has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition of the land.
The duty a possessor of land owes his invitees is not absolute, however. It does not extend to conditions from which an unreasonable risk cannot be anticipated or to dangers so obvious and apparent that an invitee may be expected to discover them himself.
III
The question before us in this case is whether a merchant's duty to exercise reasonable care includes providing armed, visible security guards to protect invitees from the criminal acts of third parties. Plaintiffs contend that it does and that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for a directed verdict rather than allowing the jury to determine whether defendant's conduct met the standard of reasonable care.
In deciding this question, we note that the court and jury perform different functions in a negligence case. Among other things, the court decides the questions of duty and the general standard of care, and the jury determines what constitutes reasonable care under the circumstances. However, in cases in which overriding public policy
We agree with the Court of Appeals that a merchant's duty of reasonable care does not include providing armed, visible security guards to deter criminal acts of third parties.
The duty advanced by plaintiffs is essentially a duty to provide police protection. That duty, however, is vested in the government by constitution and statute.
Furthermore, although defendant can control the condition of its premises by correcting physical defects that may result in injuries to its invitees, it cannot control the incidence of crime in the community. Today a crime may be committed anywhere and at any time. To require defendant to provide armed, visible security guards to protect invitees from criminal acts in a place of business open to the general public would require defendant to provide a safer environment on its premises than its invitees would encounter in the community at large. Defendant simply does not have that degree of control and is not an insurer of the safety of its invitees.
In addition, any duty we might impose on defendant to protect its invitees from the criminal acts of third parties would be inevitably vague, given the nature of the harm involved. Fairness requires that if a merchant could be held liable for the failure to provide security guards, he should be able
Even if a merchant were not required to prevent all crime, defining a reasonable standard of care short of that goal might well be impossible.
Finally, we note that imposing the duty advanced by plaintiffs is against the public interest. The inability of government and law enforcement officials to prevent criminal attacks does not justify transferring the responsibility to a business owner such as defendant. To shift the duty of police protection from the government to the private sector would amount to advocating that members
IV
We conclude as a matter of law that the duty of reasonable care a merchant owes his invitees does not extend to providing armed, visible security guards to protect customers from the criminal acts of third parties. The merchant is not an insurer of the safety of his invitees, and for reasons of public policy he does not have the responsibility for providing police protection on his premises. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
RILEY, C.J., and LEVIN, BRICKLEY, BOYLE, and GRIFFIN, JJ., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.
ARCHER, J., concurred in the result.
FootNotes
We note, however, that some courts have recognized a defendant's duty to protect business invitees in situations similar to the facts of this case. For example, the Supreme Court of Colorado, in a four-to-three decision, has cited 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 344, pp 223-224, and, in the interest of "fairness," affirmed the imposition of liability upon a merchant for failing to take measures to protect invitees from the criminal acts of unknown third persons. See Taco Bell, Inc v Lannon, 744 P.2d 43 (Colo, 1987).
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