JOSEPH, Chief Judge.
The state appeals an order dismissing an indictment for preindictment delay. We reverse.
Both parties rely on Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Section 10 has not been interpreted to protect against preindictment delay. The phrase "justice shall be administered * * * without delay" is directed to unreasonable delay after a charge has been formally made. State v. Serrel, 265 Or. 216, 218, 507 P.2d 1405 (1973); State v. Vawter, 236 Or. 85, 90, 386 P.2d 915 (1963). The provision parallels the Sixth Amendment protection of the right to a speedy and public trial so that a defendant will not be subjected to unreasonable delay between the time of the charge and the time of trial. United States v. McDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982); United States
Defendant contends that the lapse of time between the initial investigation and the indictment prejudiced his ability to formulate a defense and to locate exculpatory witnesses. He makes those contentions, even though he was indicted within the period of limitations and even though he concedes that "the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges is [the] [S]tatute of [L]imitations." See State v. Serrel, supra, 265 Or. at 219, 507 P.2d 1405; State v. Scurlock, 286 Or. 277, 282 n. 4, 593 P.2d 1159 (1979). Nonetheless, he argues that his rights under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the delay. In Serrel, the court recognized a two-part test to determine the due process effect of preindictment delay. A defendant must show both substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial and that the delay was done intentionally to gain a tactical advantage. See State v. Serrel, supra, 265 Or. at 216, 507 P.2d 1405; State v. Hunter, 58 Or.App. 99, 104, 647 P.2d 943 (1982), rev. den. 294 Or. 391, 656 P.2d 945 (1983).
Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the delay, because witnesses' statements allegedly had changed, he was unable to locate exculpatory witnesses, witnesses' memories had dimmed and his ability to find impeachment evidence had diminished. There is nothing in the record to show which witnesses' testimony had changed, how it had changed or even what efforts defendant had made to locate witnesses. Consequently, there is no evidence in the record to establish "substantial prejudice." Furthermore, defendant has not shown that the state intentionally delayed the investigation or the bringing of charges. Counsel conceded in the trial court that he "frankly [could not] point to anything in particular to show it was * * * an intentional act on the part of the District Attorney's office to delay this matter * * *."
Next, defendant argues that dismissal of the indictment should stand, because, before the grand jury, the prosecutor asked defendant about his "sexual preference."
In State v. McDonald, 231 Or. 24, 361 P.2d 1001 (1961), cert. den. 370 U.S. 903, 82 S.Ct. 1247, 8 L.Ed.2d 399 (1962), the Supreme Court held that ORS 132.320 does not bar the admission of irrelevant or inadmissible evidence in a grand jury proceeding. Recently, the court dealt with the validity of McDonald in the light of the commentary to OEC 101(4)(b)
Reversed and remanded.