Ordered that the appeal and cross appeal from the order dated May 8, 1986, are dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as no appeal lies from an order denying reargument, and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated January 8, 1986, is reversed insofar as cross-appealed from, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the words "by reason of being held liable for the acts or omissions of Cablevision Systems or its employees" are deleted from clause "(3)" of the decretal paragraph thereof; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated January 8, 1986, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
There was no reason in this case for the Supreme Court, Nassau County, to address the validity of the indemnity clauses in the pole attachment agreements between the plaintiffs and Cablevision, since, even if these clauses were void as against public policy or by reason of statute, and Cablevision had no obligation to purchase insurance which would cover the plaintiffs as additional insureds for liability arising as a result of work done pursuant to the pole attachment agreements, the fact remains that Cablevision did procure such a policy from American Employers. There is no evidence in the record which indicates that American Employers issued this policy involuntarily, or without the full knowledge and understanding, as expressed in the certificates of insurance, that it would be obligated to indemnify the plaintiffs against liability arising out of any claim for personal injuries resulting from the "erection, maintenance, presence use or removal of Cablevision's attachments" to the plaintiffs' utility poles.
Thus, American Employers' duty to pay any judgment rendered against the plaintiffs in the underlying personal injury action is enforceable, regardless of whether or not the reason for which the plaintiffs are held liable is their own negligence or that of Cablevision (see, Sentry Ins. Co. v National Steel Corp., 147 Mich.App. 214, 382 N.W.2d 753, 756-757;