OPINION ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
WHITE, Judge.
Appellant pled not guilty to an indictment for murder. V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 19.02. A jury convicted appellant of murder, and assessed his punishment at 20 years imprisonment. He appealed from, and the San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed, that conviction. Gonzales v. State, 679 S.W.2d 638 (Tex.App.—4th Dist.1984). We granted the State's petition to review the correctness of the Court of Appeals' holding that the appellant was entitled to a charge on voluntary manslaughter.
On appeal, appellant claimed that he presented sufficient evidence to raise the issue that he acted under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals agreed, and held that the appellant's testimony, alone, was sufficient to raise the issue and warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The State filed a petition for discretionary review and we granted that petition on two grounds: first, was the evidence sufficient to raise the issue that the appellant acted under the immediate influence of sudden passion; and second, did the Court of Appeals err by creating an automatic right to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter whenever self-defense is raised by the evidence. We agree with the State that the evidence was insufficient, and that no instruction on the law of voluntary manslaughter was necessary.
The testimony indicates that the appellant witnessed a confrontation in a nightclub between his friend and the victim. The appellant testified that he left the nightclub before the victim. Appellant went to his friend's car and waited. The victim came out of the club, and the appellant watched him walk to his car, open the trunk and get something out. At that time, without being certain that the victim retrieved a gun from his trunk, appellant picked up his friend's automatic pistol. Appellant left his friend's car and walked away. He said the victim came up behind
This evidence clearly raised the issue that the appellant acted in self-defense. In his opening and closing arguments to the jury, defense counsel explained that "this was a case of self-defense," and that the victim was the passionately angry party involved. The appellant testified that "I fired in self-defense." The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals concluded that the appellant's theory from the outset was one of self-defense. The majority opinion also stated that the appellant was not at all upset over the words of the victim (in the victim's confrontation with appellant's friend). The only defensive issue raised by the evidence was that the appellant acted in self-defense.
The evidence at trial did not indicate that the appellant acted under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. At the most, appellant indicated that he was scared of the victim. Within the context of all of his testimony, this fear of the victim did not amount to the terror which would qualify as "sudden passion." As the dissenting opinion of the Court of Appeals stated:
Gonzales, supra, at 640. The evidence, including appellant's testimony, does not reflect "anger, rage, resentment or terror", V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 19.04(c), of the appellant.
The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals erred when it incorrectly assumed that a defendant feels sudden passion (as defined in Sec. 19.04(c), supra), whenever a soon-to-be deceased victim provokes the defendant with a gun. In spite of the evidence to the contrary, the majority of the Court of Appeals held that:
Gonzales, supra, at 639. We will not imply material evidence into the record. It must be in the record for us to review when making a ruling. This Court, as well as the Courts of Appeals, have ruled in several cases, that when the evidence raises the issue of self-defense, a defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter unless there is evidence that the offense occurred under the influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. Luck v. State, 588 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Cr.App.1979); Green v. State, 658 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.App.—1st Dist.1983); Martinez v. State, 664 S.W.2d 822 (Tex.App.—3rd Dist. 1984); and Wolford v. State, 675 S.W.2d 530 (Tex.App.—14th Dist.1984).
This Court has ruled that a mere claim of fear, as the appellant made in the instant case, does not establish the existence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. For a claim of fear to rise to the level of sudden passion, the defendant's mind must be rendered incapable of cool reflection. Daniels v. State, 645 S.W.2d 459 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). There was no testimony to indicate that the appellant became enraged, resentful or terrified immediately prior to the shooting. Bradley v. State, 688 S.W.2d 847 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). The appellant did not indicate through his testimony that he was emotionally aroused at the time of the shooting, and gave no cause for being aroused. Stevens v. State, 671 S.W.2d 517 (Tex.Cr.App.1984). The appellant's testimony showed that throughout his confrontation with the deceased he stayed cool and maintained his composure. The appellant's mental state did not call for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Moore v. State, 694 S.W.2d 528 (Tex.Cr. App.1985). The appellant's claim that he was scared of the deceased was insufficient
In its second ground of review, the State accuses the Court of Appeals of creating an automatic right to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter whenever the issue of self-defense is raised. We disagree with the broad interpretation of the language used by the majority of the Court of Appeals. We overrule the majority's presumption that evidence of a defendant's sudden passion always exists when a victim shoots at a defendant with a gun.
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand this cause for the court to consider the appellant's other grounds of error.
CAMPBELL, J., concurs in the result.
ONION, P.J., not participating.
CLINTON, Judge, dissenting.
Again the Court is confronted with the question of when evidence in a murder prosecution sufficient to entitle an accused to an instruction on the issue of selfdefense will also raise the issue of whether he may also have acted "under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause." V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 19.04. Today the majority finds that despite the fact that the evidence raised the issue of selfdefense in this cause, voluntary manslaughter was not raised because "[t]he appellant's testimony showed that throughout his confrontation with the deceased he stayed cool and maintained his composure." At p. 357. Among the cases relied on by the majority in support of this finding is Daniels v. State, 645 S.W.2d 459 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). Because I feel that the Court's opinion in Daniels has been misconstrued, not just by the majority in this cause, but also by various courts of appeals, I write.
On direct examination appellant testified that, apparently sensing trouble brewing between his companion, Elias Maldonado, and the deceased, he left the club to wait in Maldonado's car:
The majority finds that, notwithstanding appellant's acknowledgment that he was "scared," his testimony somehow indicates he acted coolly in spite of his fear. I cannot agree.
It is of course now axiomatic that a charge on voluntary manslaughter is mandatory only when there is evidence that the defendant acted under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. Hobson v. State, 644 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). It is equally well established that where the evidence does raise the question whether the defendant acted under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause, if the charge is properly requested, it must be submitted to the jury. Medlock v. State, 591 S.W.2d 485 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). Unfortunately, neither of these converse propositions provides a framework for determining when the evidence may be said to have raised the issue.
Section 19.04, supra, defines voluntary manslaughter thus:
In construing this statute the Court takes guidance from cases decided under former manslaughter statutes. McCartney v. State, 542 S.W.2d 156, 160 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976).
In Maria v. State, 28 Tex. 698, 711 (1866) it was observed:
Fifty five years later, in Lewis v. State, 89 Tex.Cr.R. 345, 231 S.W. 113 (1921), this Court reasoned:
Id., at 115. Because "Section 19.04 is basically the 1856 definition of (voluntary) manslaughter, without, however, that first code's enumeration of what was and was not adequate cause[,]" V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 19.05, Practice Commentary, it is safe to assume that the above pronouncements apply to the current statute.
Thus it may be said that before a charge on voluntary manslaughter will be required there must be evidence tending to establish two distinct occurrences. First there must be evidence of some conduct of the deceased or another acting with him amounting to legally sufficient provocation under § 19.04(c), supra; that is, some conduct adequate to "produce a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection." It will be observed that there are really two determinations to be made about this first occurrence. There must first be found evidence of conduct by the deceased which was in fact to some extent provocative.
The second occurrence which must be raised is that the defendant was in fact provoked; that is, regardless of whether the cause was "adequate," which is a discrete inquiry better left to the jury to resolve, there must be evidence that the defendant killed under a state of mind, be it "anger, rage, resentment, or terror," which indeed rendered him incapable of cool reflection.
The majority in the instant case somehow divines from appellant's testimony that "throughout his confrontation with the deceased he stayed cool and maintained his composure." At p. 357. Presumably by this the majority means that there is no showing of "sudden passion;" no showing that appellant was in fact provoked. Elsewhere the majority declares that it will "not imply material evidence into the record." At p. 357. It strikes me that what the majority is willing to do is to ignore material evidence that is in the record, from which it may readily be inferred that appellant was in fact acting under the influence of sudden passion. But in this, the majority preempts what is patently a function of the jury.
Time after time this Court has found voluntary manslaughter to have been raised when defensive evidence showed some immediately provocative conduct on the part of the deceased and the defendant testified to the effect that he was "scared" or "afraid." See Steen v. State, supra; Monroe v. State, 501 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.Cr. App.1973); Mays v. State, 513 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Ray v. State, 515 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Medlock v. State, supra. Then, in Luck v. State, 588 S.W.2d 371, at 374-375 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), the Court observed:
Id., at 375. The opinion of the Court does not specify in what respect the evidence
Thus the Court seems to have established, somewhat anomalously in my view, that at least when the evidence raises selfdefense, before it may be said that it also raises voluntary manslaughter, there must be some additional showing, apart from the circumstances themselves, that appellant was in fact enraged, resentful or terrified. Presumably this evidence would not have to come from the defendant himself; another witness might give a "shorthand rendition" of what the defendant's state of mind seemed to be at the time. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 47 Tex.Cr.R. 515, 85 S.W. 5 (1905).
Nevertheless, since appellant testified in the instant cause that he was "scared" when he acted, it would seem he has satisfied the requirement of Luck. The majority finds, however, that his claim of fear was not shown to have risen to the level of sudden passion; that indeed his testimony somehow indicates otherwise. For this proposition it relies on Daniels v. State, supra. Thus the majority builds upon the Luck anomaly.
In Daniels, supra, the defendant acknowledged from the witness stand that when he shot the deceased, he was afraid the deceased was going to kill him. On recross examination, however, he demonstrated that such fear did not in fact render him incapable of cool reflection, when he testified:
645 S.W.2d at 460. The Court effectively held that because the defendant himself testified that whatever fear he experienced did not impair his capacity for cool reflection, "sudden passion" was not shown, and hence the issue of voluntary manslaughter was foreclosed. Clearly there was evidence raising provocative conduct on the part of the deceased, such that a jury determination as to the adequacy of the provocation would be called for; provided that from his testimony that he was afraid, taken with the provocative conduct itself, it could be inferred that Daniels was in fact provoked. By his further testimony, however, he eliminated whatever inference may otherwise have been possible that in fact he was provoked. Thus, though provocative conduct was shown, from which adequate cause could be inferred, actual "sudden passion" was taken out of the case, and therefore voluntary manslaughter was not raised.
The same cannot be said here. The majority maintains that by his testimony appellant demonstrates he acted coolly and with composure. Everything that bears on the question of appellant's state of mind at the time of the offense has been set out ante. A stranger with whom his friend only moments before had a verbal altercation shoots at him on the street outside a bar. In fear, he retaliates. As observed by Judge Dial below, it would indeed be difficult to imagine a specific event more
After Luck voluntary manslaughter cannot be raised merely by circumstances in evidence which could give rise to an inference of sudden passion—at least not if selfdefense is also in the case. After today it will not even be enough for a defendant to introduce evidence he was "scared" or afraid, under circumstances giving rise to such an inference. Apparently there must now be direct evidence that the defendant was in fact enraged, resentful or terrified before it will be said that voluntary manslaughter has been raised. Surely Daniels, supra, does not support such a requirement.
The State complains that the court of appeals has created an automatic right to a voluntary manslaughter instruction whenever the issue of self-defense is raised. Daniels, supra, belies this contention. Nevertheless, it is true, as was long ago observed, that "where the case becomes involved from the issues raised, and it is claimed the killing resulted from a fight, and the facts of its inception or progress become controverted issues raising the question of self-defense, it is a rare instance where the issue of manslaughter does not also become pertinent." Lewis v. State, supra, 231 S.W.2d at 116.
I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. Because the Court does not, I respectfully dissent.
TEAGUE and MILLER, JJ., join.
ONION, P.J., not participating.
FootNotes
(All emphasis supplied by the writer of this opinion.)
"When a killing takes place, and there are circumstances in evidence from which such adequate cause and passion might be inferred, the duty to submit the issue to the jury is plain. Whether said mental condition did so exist, and whether the causes in evidence were such as would be calculated to produce such passion in the mind of an ordinary person, are questions of fact for the jury, and are not to be decided by the court."
Id., 104 S.W.2d at 531.
Comment
User Comments